


25

Second Series

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru



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“So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the ‘third world’ as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote...the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.”

Indira Gandhi







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works of  
Jawaharlal  
Nehru**



LEAVING FOR COLOMBO CONFERENCE, NEW DELHI, 27 APRIL 1954



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**Second Series**

**Volume Twenty Five**

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## FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.


That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interests in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively

and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Indira Gandhi". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping line for the 'i' in 'Indira' and a distinct 'G' in 'Gandhi'.

New Delhi  
18 January 1972

Chairman  
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund



## EDITORIAL NOTE

The current volume of the *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* deals with the period from 1 February to 31 May 1954. A distinctive feature of this volume is the sense which the speeches, letters and memoranda incorporated herein convey of profound changes in the offing within Indian society. This sense flows from the realisation that with the initial tasks of national consolidation having been achieved, Jawaharlal Nehru, in association with the people of India, commenced moving towards the concrete goals of economic regeneration and social transformation which had been defined in the course of the struggle for liberation that characterised the second quarter of the 20th century.

Nothing epitomises the task of creating a resurgent India better than the continuous dialogue between Jawaharlal Nehru and the citizens of India, subsumed in the title "General Perspectives", which we locate in the opening section of the individual volumes of this Series. This section contains some of the seminal public speeches made by Jawaharlal Nehru in the period under review. Addressing a vast gathering in Kanpur, a flourishing industrial city in Uttar Pradesh, he spoke of the role which the ordinary citizens could play in removing the obstacles which stood in the way of making India a prosperous society. Yet, certain important considerations had to be kept in focus, as the nation struggled towards social and economic reconstruction. No longer did the governance of India rest upon an alien ruling class; no longer could the political leaders of the country, or its citizens, blame outsiders for the shortcomings of the collective national endeavour. For freedom brought with it tremendous responsibilities. As Jawaharlal Nehru observed: "Now, as you know, things have changed and it is the responsibility of all of us who live in this country to manage its affairs....Responsibility rests with the people of India because we have democracy in the country....But the moment we got it (that is, freedom) we have quickly become accustomed to it and forgotten what a valuable thing freedom is. Every right involves responsibilities and duties. There is always a price to be paid for freedom and we have to take to its burdens and responsibilities."

What were the rights and responsibilities to which Nehru referred in his speech at Kanpur? Subsequent speeches provide valuable clues to his understanding of these rights and responsibilities. Speaking shortly afterwards at Bhavnagar, for instance, the Prime Minister referred to the character of economic inequality and social discrimination within Hindu society, both of which would have to be resolved before it became a just and prosperous polity. Small wonder, then, that Mahatma Gandhi had devoted the last decade and a half of his life to the uplift of the untouchables, whom he renamed the Harijans, or the 'People of God.' "You may remember that Mahatma Gandhi had laid

great stress on the question of Harijans", Jawaharlal Nehru stated, "because down the centuries, great injustice had been done to them by Hindu Society....Freedom cannot be for a few selected classes at the top....The uplift of the Harijans, was an urgent need in the country....How could there be real freedom if one section of the people was depressed, or if everyone did not enjoy equal rights in society?"

Beyond the question of economic equality and social dignity, so Nehru believed, lay the need for a relationship of cooperative endeavour between the citizens of India, on the one hand, and the government, on the other. The various plans and initiatives for development, whether they dwelt upon the issue of industrialisation, or sought to unleash the productive potential of the peasant and artisan communities, were tied up with the question of a close rapport between the common folk and those responsible for governance. The austere ethic of self-denial, which Gandhiji had attempted to disseminate in the Congress, sought to conjure into existence precisely such a relationship between the ruling party and the citizens of the country.

In his dialogue with the people of India, Jawaharlal Nehru not only held out the broad principles, pursuing which the former could discharge their responsibilities towards civil society and the state but also simultaneously pointed to the manner in which the citizen could fashion a mutually beneficial relationship with the political classes. Jawaharlal Nehru was absolutely clear about the specific initiatives that were to be taken up to ensure economic progress within the Indian nation. Before the representatives of the industrial community, for instance, he defined his vision of planning and the complimentary role of private capital in the economic development of the country. The state in India, as he saw it, would have to assume an active role in organising key industries, particularly those responsible for the manufacture of producer goods; at the same time as it would have to initiate infrastructural development. The business of planning called for the elucidation of a judicious programme of action by the state, incorporating specific choices in areas of investment and production. Yet all this was not to be done in accordance with the theory and practice of doctrinaire socialism. Those located in private entrepreneurship would have as their legitimate theatre of activity a large arena of economic production. For the objective before the nation was to create new agricultural and industrial wealth that could, through equitable distribution, enrich the life of all the citizens of the Republic, rather than benefit only the privileged social classes.

Moreover, Nehru held out to the people a very comprehensive view of development and all that went into the making of social progress. The quality of education, for instance, was a critical input, both at the popular and at the elite level; and a well integrated concept of education, apart from providing literacy and vocational training to those endowed with the requisite capacity, had also to reach out to advanced studies in the pure sciences; in the technologies; and, last but not least, in the humanist disciplines. In talking of social progress, Nehru laid special emphasis on the emancipation of women located in different classes within society. As he stated in the Lok Sabha, Indian society had till the recent past been content with changes flowing out



of political and economic developments. Yet one could not isolate the 'social' from the 'political' or the 'economic'. It was, therefore, necessary to create a novel social status for women in Indian society after the political liberation of the country, in order to upgrade the quality of life of the people as a whole.

While the charisma of Jawaharlal Nehru and the catholicity of his vision tied the diverse social classes and religious communities of India in cohesive bonds of unity, the Prime Minister knew fully well that his personal qualities were no substitute for a vibrant political organisation as a conduit between him and the popular classes. During the struggle for freedom, the Congress had functioned as a superb mechanism for relating the leaders and the people to each other. The fact that independent India had chosen to shape herself as a democratic polity, resting upon adult franchise and popular participation in representative institutions, made the role of the Congress as the link between the leaders and the people even more crucial than it was before August 1947.

In his letters to the Pradesh Congress Committees, therefore, Jawaharlal Nehru repeatedly stressed the notion of the Congress as a vibrant organisation, alive to the aspirations of the people, at the same time as it communicated the vision of the apex leaders to the common folk. Writing to the Presidents of the Provincial Congress Committees in May 1954, Nehru observed how important it was for the Congress "to guide, to mould and to be guided by...public opinion, to discipline it and help it to work in the right channels....I have been convinced of the high importance of the Congress functioning today, carrying on its work of unifying and integrating India, laying stress on peaceful and cooperative methods, and carrying our people along the line of progress....It is easy for...(politicians) to lay down fine policies, but such policies should bear relation to the multitude of facts that...confront us. At the same time the need for rapid progress is evident. The greatest danger to India and to the Congress is a feeling of complacency that all is well."

Yet over and above the question of national unity, lay the unravelling of the path along which the people of India could attain material and cultural growth. So far as economic issues were concerned, the so-called "land question", was the most important of all. The rural classes, particularly the poor and the impoverished, had participated in the struggle for freedom in the belief that once British imperialism had been overthrown, the ownership of land would pass from the hands of parasitic zamindars and rent extracting jagirdars into the hands of the actual tillers of the soil. This momentous revolution within rural society had already been initiated. But it had to be brought to a successful conclusion, if India was to prosper in her innumerable villages, generating agricultural wealth, no less than was it to prosper in her cities, engaged in the generation of industrial wealth.

The issues of social cohesion and shared liberal values between the diverse constituents of a plural society, were issues to which Jawaharlal Nehru turned repeatedly in his letters to the leaders of the Congress. The Muslim community of India, he observed, constituted one large segment of society—whose aspirations were a matter of deep concern to the ruling party. It was important that Muslim sentiments be respected; that their culture be handled with sensitivity; and last but not least, that they received a fair share of the nation's

wealth. Even the Sikh and Christian communities, which constituted a modest percentage of the total population, needed to be handled with the same sense of fairplay as the Muslims. For social and economic injustice, wherever it was located, damaged the fabric of society and weakened the Republic. Indeed, so Nehru believed, the maintenance of social peace and orderly progress was a necessary pre-condition for the strength of those liberal institutions which were enshrined in the Constitution of India. For so plural a society as that of India, the parliamentary system of governance seemed the practically and morally valid choice. Yet it was called upon to meet the requirements of a very difficult situation: namely, to hold together diverse social elements and provide rapid progress for the country. For "ultimately (so Nehru argued) only the system which yielded large dividends in the shape of the well-being and advancement of the people will...survive...."

If what has been observed above has conveyed the impression that the opening months of 1954 posed no major problems in foreign policy before India, then nothing could be further from the truth. The issue of Kashmir, for instance, was a crucial test of statecraft in the period under review. The rulers of Pakistan, while chasing the illusion that their recent pact with the United States had increased their military strength, attempted to raise the possibility of a plebiscite in Kashmir with their Indian counterparts. For Jawaharlal Nehru the very thought of a country (like Pakistan), which had only recently liberated herself from imperial bondage, accepting military aid from a superpower was anathema, since such a relationship would inevitably undermined the will-power of a people for leading a truly autonomous existence.

Indeed, as Jawaharlal Nehru pointed out to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the receipt of military aid had "changed the whole context of the Kashmir issue, and the long talk we have had (earlier) about this matter...(has) little relation to the new facts which flow from military aid." This was all the more so because the people of Kashmir had, through the democratic agency of a Constituent Assembly, worked out afresh in 1954 their relationship with the Republic of India. The deliberations of a popularly elected Constituent Assembly had put a democratic seal on the accession of Kashmir to India in October 1947 by her ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh.

The principles which upheld the foreign policy of India in the middle 1950s, under the aegis of Jawaharlal Nehru, are best illustrated by the manner in which relations between India and China were handled at this juncture. As is well-known, a definition of the status of Tibet and the place occupied by such a definition in Sino-Indian relations was a central problem in the first decade of Indian independence. Jawaharlal Nehru was of the view that relations between sovereign nations could only rest on a policy of fairplay and a genuine regard for mutual interests. Under his direction, therefore, a treaty was signed with China in April 1954 that endorsed the suzerainty of the latter over Tibet, at the same time as it afforded explicit protection to the commercial and cultural interests of India within Tibet. While such a resolution of the Tibetan issue was a major achievement in itself, the preamble to the Treaty signed on the occasion defined categorically, for the first time, the 'Five Principles of Peace', or *Panch Śhila*, highlighting the bases on which Jawaharlal Nehru sought to



shape relations between sovereign nations in the world community, in a climate of peace and trust rather than a climate of hostility and suspicion. The annunciation of *Panch Shila* was thus a bold and imaginative attempt by Jawaharlal Nehru to apply the concept of non-violence to world affairs, as a cardinal principle in forming relations between sovereign nations in the international community.

While seeking to apply to the domain of international affairs the moral principles which Mahatma Gandhi had formulated in the course of the struggle for liberation in India, Jawaharlal Nehru was fully conscious of the axioms of realpolitik, backed by economic and military power, which in the main motivated sovereign nations in the international arena. Yet the unlovely reality of nuclear weapons as an agency of modern warfare, led him to believe in the strategic validity of the principles which he was seeking to locate in world affairs. That such principles could be violated by the insatiable ambition of individuals, severally, and nations, collectively, in the short run, is reflected in the Indian experience over the past four or five decades, on more than one occasion. Yet, equally often, men and women in control of the destiny of nations, turned to high moral principles and non-violent initiatives, as the only durable and legitimate means to a just and durable world order in the nuclear age.

It is our very pleasant duty, in placing this volume before its readers, to thank various individuals and institutions for their support and help in bringing it out. Shrimati Sonia Gandhi graciously permitted us to consult the papers in her possession referred to as the JN Collection. The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library has, as always, assisted in the publication of this volume by granting access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru. The Cabinet Secretariat, the Secretariats of the President and the Prime Minister, the Ministries of External Affairs and Home Affairs, All India Radio and the Press Information Bureau have allowed us to use relevant material in their possession. We wish to acknowledge in particular, the permission given to us by All India Radio to use the tapes of the speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru. Some classified material has necessarily been withheld.

Last but not least, it gives us pleasure in acknowledging the help and support we received from our colleagues in the creation of this volume. Indeed, we are deeply indebted to Shri T.K. Karanjai, Ms Geeta Kudaisya, Shri Bibhu Mohapatra and Ms Etee Bahadur, all of whom rendered scholarly assistance in the collection of archival material and its subsequent organization. We are no less deeply indebted to Ms Malini Rajani, Ms Saroja Anantha Krishnan, Ms Kulwant Kaur and Ms Aleyamma Babu for undertaking the necessary typing work and assisting in the preparation of the index. Without their labour and commitment, this volume, with its rich historical data, could not have been placed before the scholarly community and lay citizens interested in the life and work of Jawaharlal Nehru.





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## ABBREVIATIONS

AFPFL	Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, Burma
AICC	All India Congress Committee
AIR	All India Radio
AITUC	All India Trade Union Congress
ANZUS	Australian, New Zealand and United States Defence Pact
APCC	Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee
ATIRA	Ahmedabad Textile Industry's Research Association
CFI	Custodial Force, India
CLP	Congress Legislature Party
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPWD	Central Public Works Department
CS	Commonwealth Secretary
CSIR	Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
CWC	Congress Working Committee
DC	Deputy Commissioner
DCC	District Congress Committee
DVC	Damodar Valley Corporation
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
FICCI	Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
FRS	Fellow of the Royal Society
FS	Foreign Secretary
IAF	Indian Air Force
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICCR	Indian Council for Cultural Relations
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IFS	Indian Foreign Service
IIPA	Indian Institute of Public Administration
INTUC	Indian National Trade Union Congress
IPS	Indian Police Service
ISI	Indian Statistical Institute
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC	National Cadet Corps
NDMC	New Delhi Municipal Council
NEFA	North East Frontier Agency

NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
NNC	Naga National Council
NNRC	Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
NPL	National Physical Laboratory
NR & SR	Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
ODM	Ministry of Overseas Development
OSD	Officer on Special Duty
PCC	Pradesh Congress Committee
PEN	International Association of Poets, Playwrights, Editors, Essayists and Novelists
Pepsu	Patiala and East Punjab States Union
PIB	Press Information Bureau
PMS	Prime Minister's Secretariat
POW	Prisoner of War
PSP	Praja Socialist Party
PTI	Press Trust of India
P & T	Posts and Telegraph
PWD	Public Works Department
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
Scap	Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan
SG	Secretary General
SSC	Secondary School Certificate
UCRW	United Council for Relief and Welfare
UDF	United Democratic Front
UFL	United Front of Leftists
UGC	University Grants Commission
UK	United Kingdom
UN/UNO	United Nations Organisation
UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UP	Uttar Pradesh
UPCC	Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee
UPSC	Union Public Service Commission
US/USA	United States of America
USIS	United States Information Service
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## GENERAL PERSPECTIVES





## 1. Medical Facilities in Remote Areas<sup>1</sup>

Your Highness,<sup>2</sup> Chief Minister<sup>3</sup> and friends,

The Chief Minister referred to my present tour<sup>4</sup> a strenuous one. It is indeed strenuous and there was a possibility, if it had continued too long, that I might be a patient of your hospital! But so far as this function is concerned, it is very restful, not tiring.

I remember well that I came here two and a half years ago for the opening ceremony of the medical college<sup>5</sup> and as I look round and see these imposing buildings, I am greatly impressed by the general atmosphere that appears to surround this place. Naturally, I have had no time to find out what happens inside the buildings, which is very important no doubt! But I am quite sure that what is happening inside is at least as impressive as the look of the buildings from the outside.

You may not be aware that from the point of view of people in North India, this is a particularly auspicious day to start any undertaking. It is the first day of spring. I am afraid you do not have much of a spring here, it is all summer! But round about the beginning of February, we celebrate *Vasant Panchami* as it is called in all the villages in the North. You will find most women and many men putting on what they consider the colour of spring; a kind of golden yellow. There are some flowers of that colour which come out at this time of the year and because it is considered a very auspicious day, a large number of weddings and marriages take place on this day. Indeed many, many years ago, my marriage took place on *Vasant Panchami*.<sup>6</sup> So you are starting on an auspicious day. I am quite sure, that with all the care and labour that have gone into the buildings, and their working of this collection of institutions will make a very notable contribution to the public health of your State.

The question now is not so much of curing people but of looking after the public health of a whole area. We are so terribly short of qualified doctors that one does not quite see how long it will take to have an adequate supply of

1. Speech at the inauguration of a 450-bed hospital at Ulloor, Thiruvananthapuram, 8 February 1954. AIR tapes, NMML.
2. Sri Padmanabha Dasa Bala Rama Varma, the Maharaja of Travancore and Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin State since 1 July 1949.
3. A.J. John.
4. Nehru was on an election tour of Travancore-Cochin from 4 to 9 February 1954.
5. On 27 November 1951. For Nehru's speech see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 17, pp. 303-306.
6. On 8 February 1916.

them. The problem arises whether we should allow persons who are not fully qualified to work or have no doctors at all. It is a difficult question, because one should avoid the lowering of standards. On the other hand what are we to do in a large number of areas where there is nobody to look after people's health? This question may not be a very serious one for Travancore-Cochin State. It is a heavily populated state but one that has a fairly good level of education. In point of distance also, you are not perhaps far from medical help. In some other parts of India, the distances are very great. There are no good roads, specially in our hill areas. One must not lower qualifications. I am absolutely clear about that. But it is desirable to have, not half-qualified doctors, but some type of persons, maybe highly qualified nurses, who can be sent and who would be a kind of extension of the doctor, so that they can deal with simple cases and refer to the doctor whenever necessity arises and keep in touch with the doctor in charge of a large area. Some such system will have to be devised, because in our adherence to the principle of not lowering standards, we cannot wait for a generation or two before we give some medical support to large areas of the country. We may devise, as is being done in some parts of the country, mobile dispensaries or moving vans going about from village to village regularly, and keeping in touch with a large area.

Big hospitals are obviously necessary from many points of view; for research etc., and yet, I am inclined to think that one should pay a little more attention to spreading out of small medical units, connected with a big hospital somewhere at the centre. Our cities are at least provided to some extent, with medical facilities, but as you go into the interior, medical facilities fade away till they are nil. If you put up another big hospital somewhere, it would serve a certain area but not a very large one. But if you build this network of small units all over, connected with a big hospital by means of mobile vans etc., then perhaps one could serve a much larger area in that way. In a country like Australia, which has a vast territory, I believe, they have developed a system of a doctor going by aeroplane, he is immediately contacted by telephone and he has got a small aeroplane at his disposal. The distances are great, and he flies there to the patient, treats him and comes back. One has to devise facilities that are suited to the peculiar conditions in a particular area. We are too apt to go by some rule of thumb and do the same thing everywhere, which is absurd. One has to see exactly what the conditions are, choose a centre where there are competent men available and then have some kind of extensions to them in the form of trained nurses etc.

I am putting forward some ideas before you for your consideration, because, it is necessary that we should give some kind of simple medical relief to everybody, and not say, "Sorry, we do not have enough doctors today, but we hope to provide you with medical relief in the next thirty years." Well, most of us will be dead and gone by that time. Therefore, one must think on those lines.



In North India, again, one of our problems is that, young doctors do not like to go to rather remote places in the hills or even in the plains. They feel that in such places they do not have a cinema house and there are no amusements and other cultural amenities. The Government of India is going to make a rule—I am not sure whether it has already been made—that no young doctor will be engaged in Government service till he has served a year in a village or in some outlying hill place. I think it is a very good rule. I would go a little further and suggest that perhaps before you actually give a degree to anybody, you should ask him to serve for a period in some such place. Quite apart from the need for some competent or semi-competent medical help in those areas, look at it from the point of view of the young doctor. As everybody knows, the treatment of bodily disease lays tremendous emphasis on the mind; the body and the mind are connected together. Any serious disease is a disease of the entire system, mind, body and everything. You have to know the patient fully and treat him for it, and the less the medicine the better. How are you to know the patient? You have to know his environment. Doctors who may have had a good training in expert institutions, need not necessarily know all about the people they ought to know. From that point of view of the doctors, it is a good thing for them to be made to fend for themselves in a village or some such place at a very early age. It will do them an enormous amount of good. They will understand how the vast number of our rural people live. This training will stand them in good stead in their future career; and it will also be good from the point of view of large number of people, who have been neglected for so long.

Having been talking for the last few days about political matters a great deal, this switching over to a completely different subject is a form of relief to my mind. I wish this hospital a very useful career in human service. Do I say that I inaugurate it, or open it? I do so. Thank you.

## 2. Hurdles in Building a New India<sup>1</sup>

*Bahnon aur Bhaiyon,*

I am here in Kanpur somewhat by chance today. Actually I was going to Banda. I am here not as the Prime Minister but as a member of the Uttar Pradesh Congress. This is my more permanent identity, for the other things come and

1. Speech at a public meeting, Kanpur, 26 March 1954. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

go. We are holding a big conference in Banda in which all the Congress workers of the province will take part.<sup>2</sup> So on the one hand I had the desire to meet all my old colleagues and on the other to consult them about this State and the country. We are facing grave problems in the country and if, in spite of them, anyone feels complacent, it shows a lack of understanding. So I am going to Banda and stopped off in Kanpur on the way. As I was staying here for a few hours, it was not possible for me to go away without meeting you and enquiring about your welfare. Therefore I have presented myself before you. Kanpur is the biggest city in Uttar Pradesh. But that does not mean it is the most famous or the most beautiful city because it is neither. It is merely big. Let nobody be under any misconception that there is anything exceptional about being big. But it can provide opportunities for progress if they are availed of.

I have been to see the new houses that are being built for our labourers here. I liked them and wished that they could have been completed fast. Yet whenever I think of Kanpur, my mind always associates it with slums. When I saw them on two or three occasions I was upset and perturbed for a long time. I could not understand how the rich and the poor alike could tolerate the existence of these slums in the heart of the city. I had said at that time that years are spent by the Government and the PWD engineers, etc., in drawing up plans and designs and having them passed before any work gets done. It is true that there is need for careful planning. But when there is a disease, it has to be eradicated at once. We cannot afford to waste time in drawing up plans. This was my reaction to the slums at that time. Perhaps it was not quite proper for me to have said it, but I went to the extent of saying that it would be better to burn them as quickly as possible and then think about further course of action. I want you, especially the rich people here, the big mill-owners etc. to realize that there can be no greater harm to the city than the existence of these slums. So when I saw that new, strong and clean houses are being built, I was very happy. I do not know how long it will take to wipe out these slums. But if by chance they come up again and I happen to see them, it is possible that I may not be able to control myself and say something rude. But this is not a laughing matter.

All sorts of things need to be done in the country. For instance, if an enemy attacks the country, we have to defend ourselves. It is not open to argument and we cannot count the expense or the time involved. We must abandon everything else in order to defend the country. That becomes the first priority. Similarly there are certain things which have to be done for the simple reason that not doing them will be harmful to the nation and its honour. I am

2. Nehru was en route to Banda to attend the thirty-sixth political conference of UPCC to be held from 26 to 28 March 1954.



surprised that often people fail to realize this. Perhaps they are not able to comprehend it fully. Perhaps their hearts do not ache when they see that in a huge, growing city like Kanpur, where there are innumerable rich people and factories and shops, there are septic ulcers like these slums which are not being treated. They continue to be tolerated. I cannot understand this. Well, this is how I felt when I visited your new housing scheme. I want to congratulate the Government and citizens of Uttar Pradesh. But my sympathies are with the people who have to wait in a queue for occupying the houses.

I am here by chance and there are always plenty of things to talk about. I want all of you to understand the changing picture of the country and the world for the time is past when you and I were mere onlookers in the game and merely criticized the Government, for we had no power or responsibility. Our responsibility consisted of challenging the British and fighting for our freedom. Now, as you know, things have changed and it is the responsibility of all of us who live in this country to manage its affairs. It is not merely that in place of British rule there is an Indian Government in Delhi or Lucknow, whose responsibility it is to govern the country. The responsibility rests with the people of India because we have democracy, people's rule, in the country. That does not mean that you are responsible for my mistakes. But, by and large, the responsibility for governing the nation is ours. Freedom has conferred the right, a very precious one, to govern ourselves, and millions of people have sacrificed themselves in the past and dreamt of this day. But the moment we got it, we have quickly become accustomed to it and forgotten what a valuable thing freedom is. Every right involves responsibilities and duties. There can be no rights without duties in this world. There is always a price to be paid for freedom and we have to take on its burdens and responsibilities. For one thing, freedom has to be protected and defended. Defence does not mean having standing armies, though they too are essential. But nations have to be defended not only on their boundaries but in every one of our villages and cities and roads and market-places and fields. A nation is as strong as its general condition is. Its security does not depend on soldiers alone these days. Soldiers and armies are very essential, I agree. But it is extremely important to make the country strong and prosperous and united by getting rid of our weaknesses. So all this becomes the responsibility of the people of the country. I agree that the greater responsibility is mine and of my colleagues in Government which you have elected and put your faith in. There is no doubt about that. At the same time, your responsibility is not confined to criticizing the Government, though you have the right to do so. You have to shoulder the responsibility of building a new India. There is no doubt that we have become very backward. We may talk big and be full of conceit, but the fact is that we are among the backward nations of the world. We shall have to work very hard to catch up with the other nations. It takes time and the problem before us is to do it as quickly as



possible, because there is danger in too much delay. Apart from the fact that it hurts to think that we are backward, it is really dangerous in today's world.

So you must consider all this and then participate in the task of building a new India, in your own street and village and town. The task is a big one and no single individual can take on the burden by himself. Each one of us must do our own share if the country is to progress. There are often debates between the various parties, which is a good thing. We want that the public should be educated in this way so that even if we make mistakes, we can rectify them. This is how nations and individuals learn, by personal experience. It cannot be done by merely reading books. You can learn from history, but ultimately nations learn only from their own experience. We, and by that I mean the people of my generation, have learnt a great deal in the last thirty or forty years. It was a very special period, the years of India's freedom struggle. There were many tests, some of which we passed and in some we failed.

So the people of my generation have been bred on the story of India in the last thirty or forty years. The generation which has been born in independent India and has accepted freedom without much thought. Well, it is theirs and they are welcome to it. But they seem to think that it was easily come by, without realizing the tremendous effort and sacrifices that it involved or the difficulties that lie in preserving that freedom. They do not think deeply about the problems and feel that they are discharging their duties by shouting slogans. It is not enough. I was telling you just now that my life has been spent in the Congress. Forty-two years is a long time. I used to take an interest in it even earlier, but then I was studying abroad. I became a member as soon as I returned. But I cannot think of the Congress as merely an organization for shouting slogans or passing resolutions. When I go to Banda, more resolutions are bound to be passed.<sup>3</sup> But I have no special interest in them because it is mere paper work. We must try to understand the real work that has gone into the making of the Congress. It did not consist of shouting slogans. It is true that we have done that too in our time but there was the force of solid effort and sacrifice and a thousand other things behind it. Congress was a symbol of India. So if the Congress was able to represent India, it was not by passing resolutions, but by its service and sacrifice. Its strength lay in that and to the extent that the Congress or any other organization works like that, it will be strong. Otherwise it will get weakened and become useless. There is no place today either for useless organizations or useless individuals.

3. The eight resolutions approved by the UPCC and adopted at the political conference, were on, US-Pakistan military aid Pact; foreign pockets like Pondicherry and Goa; unemployment; Five Year Plan; call for unity; Congress Constitution; rights of Harijans; and construction of Rihand Dam.

The world is passing through a period of tremendous upheavals. Nobody can predict where they will lead us. It is the age of the atom bomb. Recently there was a nuclear test on an island in the United States<sup>4</sup> and the effects were felt thousands of miles away. Today man has acquired the power to destroy the entire world. Just think of that when you shout slogans and feel that you will achieve something by it or by cleverness and cunning. For the first time in the history of the world, man has acquired the power to destroy the world. This is a terrible power and the future will show whether man will use it wisely or not. Used wisely this power can alleviate all the common difficulties and problems of the world. It is strange that, on the one hand, the world has progressed so far and acquired the power to alleviate all human misery and, at the same time, man's foolishness has also increased to such an extent that he is now busy trying to destroy the world. This is the problem which is agitating the world today. All our small personal problems are absolutely unimportant in the face of this. That does not mean that we can forget about the smaller problems and do nothing to solve them. So what are we to do? It is obvious that at a time like this, it is necessary to prepare ourselves mentally and physically to understand these things and not get carried away or weaken the country by indulging in petty quarrels at a crucial stage in our history. First of all, it is absolutely essential to have unity in the country which is not normally to be found in India. Our history is full of many great things but we have always lacked unity. Somehow we seem to have a tremendous capacity to live in separate compartments. I do not know the various factors which were responsible for this. But it is my opinion that the caste system was responsible for putting up these barriers. The caste system may have had its uses when it was first thought of in the ancient times, but later on it weakened the country and repeatedly led to its downfall. We have suppressed the so-called untouchables down the ages. So it is not surprising that we had to go through tremendous vicissitudes.

Whatever we may do, we must pay special attention to the unity of the country. What does unity mean? There are different provinces in the country and it is strange that some of them behave as if they are separate countries and are hostile to the other provinces. They quarrel about pieces of territory leading to an uproar. After all, the various provinces are only for the administrative convenience. Even if you go from Uttar Pradesh into Bihar, it does not mean that you are in a different country. Then where is the question of hostility or dispute? I am not saying that there is any dispute between UP and Bihar just now. But why should there be so much heat about whether a piece of territory goes here or there? Whatever arrangement is made, it will be in the best interests

4. On 1 March 1954 in Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean.



of the people and it should be arrived at after calm thought. But usually a great deal of heat is generated almost as if it is somebody's personal property. This kind of provincialism is extremely wrong and dangerous. As you know, a Commission has been set up to go into this matter of states reorganization<sup>5</sup> and after considering everything we shall take a decision as we think proper.

The second and even more dangerous thing that creates barriers in politics is communalism. It is an extremely dangerous thing which has done great harm in the past and will do so again if it is not put an end to. I shall not say more than that but repeat that so long as we do not bring it under control, however great we think we are, we shall continue to be weak. Therefore any organization or policy which smacks of communalism is wrong and dangerous. Anything which creates barriers between us is wrong. Everyone is welcome to follow his own religion so long as he does not interfere with the others. But it is wrong to bring religion into our political life.

I was telling you about communalism. But it is strange that there are certain ideologies current in the world today which show almost as much rigidity as a religion. Communism is one of them. As you know, the world is divided into two armed camps and there is constant tension. On the one hand is the United States and on the other is the Soviet Union, with their own allies among the nations of the world. Both sides are engaged in bitter debate, which bears all the marks of rigidity of a religious dispute. Politics in the modern world is taking on a different line with a great deal of mutual abuse thrown in.

Well, communalism must not be allowed to creep in. If it were out in the open, we could combat it. But I see that it is taking all sorts of strange forms, and hides behind a curtain to deceive the innocent people who are easily lured into its snare. My complaint is that often it is the newspapers in this State I shall not name them, which are responsible for spreading communalism. They proclaim their nationalism very loudly but are in fact saturated with communalism and do great harm to India. So you must beware of this. Different kinds of people inhabit this country. There is great diversity among the people living in the North, near the borders, or in Kashmir or Ladakh or Assam, near Tibet and Burma, and the people in the South, in Malabar, etc. The climate is wholly different. In some area, there is snow and it is bitterly cold and in the other, it is always hot. There is difference in dress, food, living habits, etc., and all of it together goes into the making of this country. The grandeur of this

5. The States Reorganization Commission was constituted under the Home Ministry on 29 December 1953 with S. Fazl Ali as Chairman, H.N. Kunzru and K.M. Panikkar as members and P.C. Chaudhuri as secretary, to investigate the problem of states reorganization, the historical background, the existing situation and the bearing of all important and relevant factors thereon.



country lies in its diversity but it will become dangerous if it is not securely bound by unity. So we must preserve both the diversity and the unity of the country. If anyone were to try to pass a law that everybody, whether he lives in Lucknow or Kanpur or elsewhere, should dress and live alike, it will not be a sign of wisdom because each place is distinctive. Further away, you have completely different places like Ladakh, Assam, the Lushai mountains, Aizawl, Manipur, Tripura etc., which are all beautiful gems in the body politic of India. But just because they are different, we do not have the right to say that we are part of India or that they are not. This is what we seem to feel, especially because those areas are backward. What right do any of us have to impose our will forcibly on anyone else?

Take, for instance, the question of language and Hindi. We decided to adopt Hindi as our national language under the Constitution. Apart from the fact that there was no alternative, it was necessary and had to be done. Why was it necessary? It is obvious that we could not use English as an official language. That does not mean that we are hostile to English. English is a good language and it is essential to learn English and other foreign languages. Otherwise we shall slip back, for we shall not have access to the knowledge and scientific research being carried on in the world. But English cannot be our official language, for how can millions of people work in a foreign language? So we had to choose an Indian language. Apart from Hindi, there are ten or twelve major languages in India like Urdu, Marathi, Gujarati, Tamil, Telugu, etc., which are all very old languages with rich literatures of their own. Please remember that each one of them is a national language though for official purposes it can only be Hindi. The others are also national languages spoken in their own spheres and ought to make progress. Now we have decided and rightly so, that in each state, its language should be used fully. But for inter-state work the national and official language can only be Hindi. It does not however mean that there is any quarrel between Hindi and Bengali, Telugu or Marathi or any other languages. Each language must flourish in its own place and make progress. The moment you try to force Hindi down the throats of non-Hindi-speaking people, instead of advancing the cause of Hindi, you will only succeed in alienating them. People are learning Hindi all over India today because that is what the times require. We must try to encourage that. But even if there is the slightest hint of coercion, the effect will be just the opposite. We must understand this because we happen to live in a Hindi-speaking area and it is easy for us to demand that Hindi should be the national language. It is our mother tongue. But have you ever paused to think what the effect of coercion would be on people whose language is Tamil or Telugu? Therefore I feel that the greatest obstacle to the spread of Hindi is being created by the Hindi lovers themselves, or at least some of them, which is very strange. In their enthusiasm and love for the language, they want that it should be imposed all over India

which scares the others. They feel that Hindi is going to be forced upon them or that their own languages will be suppressed and so they oppose Hindi. This is wrong.

I wish to say one thing more which concerns your State specially and that is about Urdu. As I have often said, Urdu is a different form of Hindi. Its script and literature are different but the spoken language is similar, it matters little. Urdu belongs to this province, for it was born here in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. It is the product of foreign influence on Hindi and it developed a literature of its own. Earlier there used to be a fierce debate between Hindi and Urdu. Well, it may have been relevant then but now it is all over. Hindi has been adopted as our national language and there is no competition with Urdu. That is perfectly right. But that does not mean that we should treat something which has been born and bred in this State and has a literature which forms an important part of our heritage as alien or suppress it and prevent it from growing. I am amazed that such things should be happening in our State. I want that all the different facets of our literature must grow simultaneously. Literature cannot be hidden behind closed doors just as culture cannot be suppressed. The moment you try to bind it down, you diminish it. The hallmark of greatness is an open mind. Mahatma Gandhi used to say that he wanted to keep the windows of the nation's mind open to let the breeze blow in from all over the world. But at the same time, he did not want that the country should be carried away by any wind that blew. He wanted that it should remain firm in its moorings and take advantage of fresh ideas and cultures. I see that narrow-mindedness is on the increase. It is one thing to work for one's own advancement and quite another to pull someone else down. It is narrow-mindedness to think that propagation of Urdu will be harmful to Hindi. Such a thought is indeed strange. I feel perturbed by it. It is possible that many of you may not agree with me. But I wish to tell you what I feel for I do not want to deceive you. I feel very sad when I see such narrow-mindedness for I had dreamt of freedom not merely as the removal of British rule from India. That was only a part of it. It has been my dream to build India into a great country in the world, with a high intellectual and spiritual calibre, with a great culture, a nation which would have an impact on the whole world. I do not want our country to be a second or third-rate nation. I want India to be in the first-rank—not in the sense of maintaining a large army, but in the way that Mahatma Gandhi had made India famous in the world, in a spiritual and a cultural sense. So I am amazed when I see such narrow-mindedness. Where are all those loud professions that we used to make?

There is one thing more which I want to make quite clear to you. We take great pride in claiming that everyone in this country enjoys equal rights and that there is no communalism in India. It is true that we want people of all religions to have equal rights and to be able to practise their own faith. But I am not prepared to accept that in our daily lives this kind of equality prevails



and I am sorry to find that we are gradually slipping down from our ideals. Our professions are very loud but we invariably slip up in putting them into practice. The greatest responsibility in this lies with the majority community. The minority community may make some trouble out of fear or some other reason. But the responsibility really rests with the people who hold the power and are larger numerically, to see that no distrust or the feeling that they are not getting adequate opportunities for employment is created in the minority community. We must be ever vigilant to see that there is no injustice. Sometimes I find cases where justice is not done, perhaps not deliberately, but certainly this kind of atmosphere is increasing. Latent communalism is far more dangerous than something which is out in the open.

I have come to my Province not as the Prime Minister but as your old colleague in the Congress. So I do not want any barriers between us. It is a great honour to be the Prime Minister of a large country like India but an even greater honour is the love and confidence which the people have showered upon me. When millions of people feel like this, there can be no greater honour. Well, with all this honour have come great responsibilities too and I have tried to discharge them to the best of my ability and strength and will continue to do so until my strength fails. But it is obvious that the times are changing, people come and go and others will soon have to carry on the burden of the nation. Others will have to keep the flag flying. So the constant worry in my mind is how the younger generation will fulfil its responsibilities. I want you to understand these things clearly for if I do not mention them, I am not being honest with you.

Now let me just tell you about a couple of things more. One is the matter of American military aid to Pakistan<sup>6</sup> in which all of you must have been interested and aware of the line that we have taken. We think that it is wrong and dangerous for Asia and its newly independent nations. I felt sad that Pakistan is unable to understand such a simple thing. What it considers strength just now is paving the way for its future weakness. We can also get a few aeroplanes and arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union or the United States if we think that it will add to our strength in any way. It may be of some little use, but do you imagine that a country can advance by depending on others for its protection and defence? That would be a dangerous thing to do and will weaken the country. Well, Pakistan may do what they like for I cannot advise them. But we have to consider the repercussions for ourselves and what we must do.

6. Pakistan had formally requested the US Government on 21 February 1954 for military assistance within the scope of US mutual security legislation, which was accepted by the US Government on 25 February. The character and amount of the military aid was to depend largely on the recommendations of US military supply experts, who were expected to visit Pakistan soon.



We have to think about the consequences for the rest of Asia too. The question is what we ought to do. It is obvious that it will be wrong to get into a panic because Pakistan is increasing its air force or army. That is absurd. But we must certainly be vigilant and prepared for any eventuality. That really involves maintaining unity in the country and progressing economically. We must increase production and set up industries to produce whatever we may need militarily and otherwise within the country. This is how nations become strong, not by getting into a panic or by flattering other countries to give arms and to that extent lose our freedom.

So, once again we come round to the fundamental issue of building the edifice of new India rapidly and of forging unity in the country by removing the barriers among us. I cannot go into the details just now though I would have liked to have put before you a broad picture of the new India that we are planning to build. Where are all the plans being drawn up by the Planning Commission, etc., taking us? It is obvious that we have to work towards the removal of poverty, lessening unemployment as far as possible and reducing the disparity between the haves and the have-nots. At present there are a handful of wealthy people and the majority are extremely poor, which is wrong. The disparity cannot be reduced by merely shouting slogans or taking out protest marches. I have great faith in socialism but I find it strange that our colleagues in the Socialist Party think that they can transform the social system or make a poor country rich by such methods. The country can become rich only by hard work and increasing production. The problem cannot be solved by transferring some wealth from one pocket to another. It is true that the wealth should not remain in a few pockets and gradually we must bring about equality. But ultimately the question before us is to increase production from land and industries and by various other methods. We cannot get money from the United States or somewhere else.

So, this is what the Five Year Plan is all about. We must consider how far it will take us towards our goal and then increase our pace accordingly. You must think about these things because we need your advice and suggestions to draw up the Second Five Year Plan also.

You must have heard about the pockets of foreign rule still in existence in the country, Pondicherry in the South, under the French and Goa near Bombay, under the Portuguese. These are the result of the history of the last few centuries. They are the last remnants of colonial rule in India. The British did not bother very much about these small pockets of French and Portuguese rule. You will find that the total population of the places under colonial rule is not more than three lakhs, about one-third of the population of Kanpur. There is one city with a population of about two lakhs and some smaller ones with about fifty thousand each. Now when the British empire in India has come to an end, it is absurd to think of small pockets of French and Portuguese rule continuing in India. I

cannot understand how anyone can argue in its favour. Apart from the fact that it is absurd, it is also to some extent dangerous for us. It is dangerous to have pockets of foreign rule right in the heart of the country for they make us vulnerable and at some time or the other, our enemies may try to take advantage of them. At the moment, they are constant sources of irritation. They are flourishing centres of smuggling of gold, silver, cocaine, opium, etc., and it is very difficult to apprehend the culprits. Anyhow these are minor matters. The basic thing is that it is wrong to allow these little islands of foreign rule to flourish. We have said this quite clearly right from the beginning and also that we wish to solve this problem by peaceful methods for, after all, it is not only these little pockets which are involved. Big nations are involved and of them, we have friendly relations at least with France. France has an ambassador in Delhi and we have one in Paris. France is an ancient country and we wish to maintain friendly relations with it. So we wish to settle this matter amicably, though five or six years have gone by without any progress. There has been a new development recently. The local government in Pondicherry, which does not enjoy many powers, has yet managed to pass a Resolution in their Cabinet saying that all the colonies should be integrated with India immediately. So what we have been saying all along has been confirmed by the Cabinet which consists not of Frenchmen but of local people. I do not remember exactly but the Mayors of the fourteen municipalities and the councillors have passed a Resolution that they should merge with India immediately.<sup>7</sup> As you can imagine, after such a move, there is no scope for doubting the people's verdict. This happened three or four days ago. I regret to say that the French Government has started committing great atrocities. It is an old habit of the French officials to use strong arm tactics to punish the people whom they do not like. They have started threatening the members of the Cabinet to coerce them to withdraw their Resolution. The Mayor had run away to the Indian side and was staying with some friends. Day before yesterday the French police crossed the border and had taken him as well as his two Indian friends.<sup>8</sup> Today I heard that several of the Cabinet members have run away to India in panic.<sup>9</sup> It is becoming a joke that the French should indulge in such unlawful activities.

Well, we shall put a stop to them. We have made arrangements to stop

7. On 18 March 1954. For details see *post*, p.513, fn. 2.

8. On 24 March 1954, Nandagopal, the Mayor of Mūdaliarpuram and two others were arrested by Pondicherry police from Kattupalayam. See *post*, p. 516.

9. Edouard Goubert, a minister of the French India Government and K. Muthu Pillai, Mayor of Pondicherry, left Pondicherry proper on 25 March evening and were believed to have gone to the French Indian communes of Pondicherry to launch a mass movement for merger.



their police at the borders but the problem is that the French pocket is not one contiguous area. I do not wish to go into details. We shall do whatever is proper and try our best to solve the matter peacefully. But it should be clearly understood that it is impossible to let the French pockets continue to exist. That is absolutely wrong.

The same thing applies to Goa. The Goa issue is even more complex because at least as far as the French ministers and officials are concerned, we are able to talk to them, even if there are disagreements. It is extremely difficult even to talk to the statesmen in Portugal. I will tell you the reason for that. They present such fantastic arguments that we have no answer to them. Their argument is that four or five hundred years ago, the Pope in Rome had given Goa to them as a gift. This is a fantastic argument. What can I say in reply? Four hundred years ago, Europeans were largely ignorant about the rest of the world. They were just beginning to discover the world then with the voyages of Columbus to America and Vasco da Gama to the East. In those days, Spain and Portugal were two very rich countries of Europe with the new wealth pouring in from America. So there was a rivalry between Portugal and Spain to conquer the New World. The Pope, as you know, is their great religious leader. So when the case was taken to him, he divided the world into two halves between the two countries. Unfortunately, India fell to the lot of the Portuguese. They did not get half the world but they certainly established themselves firmly on the soil of Goa. Now what can I say if their argument is that Goa is the Pope's gift to them? You can imagine that it is absurd to argue like this in this day and age. It simply cannot be accepted. But in the dangerous world of today, when war is constantly knocking at the door, we wish to face these things calmly and often tolerate quite intolerable things. We shall certainly not accept anything that is against our dignity. Therefore, we would like to solve this matter peacefully even if it takes a little longer.

### 3. People's Cooperation in Progress<sup>1</sup>

The country has won the first round of the battle of food supplies during past few years. Satisfactory progress has been made in other directions but various

1. Speech at a public meeting at Ghabadiya Maidan, Bhavnagar, 10 April 1954. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi. Also from *The Hindu*, 12 April 1954, *The Statesman* and *National Herald*, 11 April 1954.



problems have to be solved. This huge task is impossible to complete without proper understanding and cooperation from the people.

So far as the linguistic reorganisation of the country is concerned, it is true that there should be readjustment with a view to making public administration better and cultural progress rapid. This question should be considered coolly. But what I do not understand is the feeling sometimes created that linguists want some units to secede from Bharat. This is not what is actually wanted by them. While unity of the country should not be weakened, it is also wrong to say there should be only one culture to be maintained in India.

Though there are various castes, sects and religions, politically they are equal. It is an ordinary thing but we should keep this always before us that minorities in India should have a feeling of security in this country. Otherwise the country would become weak.

All sorts of problems arise. There is rivalry between the various provinces and languages and a demand for linguistic states etc. As you know, we have set up a commission to go into this matter. We can form any kind of states that we think proper. But please remember that ultimately these states are not separate countries. The country is India and the states are mere administrative arrangements to facilitate the task of Government. But the country remains one whether there are one or two or more states, for all of them are parts of India. We can progress only if the whole country progresses. If India remains backward, a part of her cannot progress. Independence has come to the whole country, not to any one state and it was achieved through the effort of the entire country. The Congress is a national organization which belongs to everyone and we got freedom through it. We must go ahead with the tasks of economic progress and development in the whole country. I do not say that it is wrong to ask for something for one's own state. But I cannot understand why the debate should be so vociferous as if it concerns a foreign country. If you go abroad you cannot say you are citizens of Bhavnagar or Saurashtra for nobody will understand. Most people in the world would not have even heard of Bhavnagar or Saurashtra. You will be treated with respect because you are from India, the citizens of the Republic of India, for the whole world has heard of India and if you bear that stamp, you will be treated with respect. Therefore all of you have a place in the world today in the capacity of Indians and not as the citizens of Saurashtra or Gujarat, Maharashtra, Bengal, Punjab, Andhra, Madhya Pradesh or Rajasthan. Please remember this. It is not a bad thing to serve one's province, its special culture and literature and traditions, etc. You must preserve the heritage of Saurashtra. It is not necessary that there should be complete uniformity in the country. The beauty of India lies in her diversity. You may not have seen her different forms. I wander all over the country from the Himalayas in the north to the south and to the borders of Tibet and Burma and see the myriad forms of India. The more I see, the more amazed I feel, not

by her vast expanse but by the tremendous diversity that exists. If any of us thinks that the state we come from is India, it is not right. Uttar Pradesh and Saurashtra are all parts of India, not the whole. The people who live in Assam or Manipur or Tripura are as much Indians as you are, inspite of all the differences between us. So we must remember the diversity of India and we do not want to change that in any way.

About ten days ago, I was in Rajasthan and visited Jaipur, Udaipur and Jaisalmer, which is a desert, and met the people. There is something special about the people of Rajasthan just as there is some special quality in the people of Saurashtra and both gladden the heart. I told the people in Jaipur that I did not want them to give up their special way of life, of dressing, etc. I want that everything that is special in Rajasthan or Saurashtra or any other state should be retained for they add to the richness of our cultural heritage. It is wrong to feel that there should be complete uniformity. We must preserve and nurture the diversities and at the same time maintain the unity of India because otherwise we will become weak and the country gets divided into fragments. Then there is a danger of our freedom slipping away.

Please remember that the most important thing is India's unity and all of us are fragments of the whole. We must consolidate that unity while maintaining our diversity of language, culture, ways of life, traditions, etc. But if you think that the diversity is more essential than India's unity, you will become weak. There are various provinces in India. Then there are a number of different religions which have come down the centuries. Hinduism is an ancient religion, with innumerable off shoots of its own. Then there are millions of Muslims in India. Please remember that even today there are more Muslims in India than in either of the two parts—East and West Pakistan, even though Pakistan is a predominantly Muslim country. It is wrong to think that after the Partition there are no Muslims left in India. There are millions of them in the country and they are as much part of India as you and I and all of us are, and have been so for thousands of years.

There are Christians in India and if you go to the South, you will find that Christianity has prevailed in India for the last two thousand years, even before it reached the shores of Europe. Christianity came to India 1900 years ago—and the Christians in Madras and Travancore-Cochin, etc., have surprisingly no connection with any other country. It is purely indigenous. Later on, more Christians came in during the British rule but, Christianity came to India nearly two thousand years ago and has peacefully settled down into being an Indian religion. Similarly, there are Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, Parsis, Zoroastrians etc., who have lived in India for centuries. Some are of course indigenous like Buddhism, Jainism and the Sikh religion. The Parsis came to the country about thirteen or fourteen hundred years ago and been assimilated in the country. We have adopted all these religions as our own and now there is no distinction



between them and the indigenous religions. Each individual is welcome to follow his own religion but there is complete political equality for all. There must be equal rights for all Indians—we must remember this constantly, especially the Hindus, who are in a majority that if communities like the Muslims and Christians, etc., do not have equal opportunities for progress, the country will become weak. It will be rank injustice and will weaken the country. This is something that we ought to remember. It is our duty to create the confidence in them that this is their home and that there will be no discrimination.

There is another aspect of this problem. You may remember that Mahatma Gandhi had laid great stress on the question of Harijans because down the centuries, great injustice had been done to them by the Hindu Society which had suppressed them and prevented them from making progress. This injustice did great harm to us. Freedom cannot be for a few selected classes at the top. So when we were fighting for freedom, the question of our Harijan brethren became very important. The uplift of the Harijans was an urgent need in the country, particularly for the Hindu society, and to remove the disparities that had existed for centuries. How could there be real freedom if one section of the people was depressed, or if everyone did not enjoy equal rights in society? So we come round to the same thing once again—equality of rights and opportunities for everyone, especially for the depressed classes and the minority communities. I am telling you of ordinary things which you already know. But even ordinary things are important and essential, a fact which people often forget. We feel that now that we have got freedom, we have nothing more to do.

We have elections to the Assemblies and Parliament, to Congress committees etc. We must always remember that people belonging to all religions and castes, Harijans and others, must be given full opportunities to participate in the tasks of the country too. We have lived too long in a society riddled by casteism which kept us in compartments and destroyed our unity. We think more of our own caste than of the country which weakens the country.

As I said just now, the big problem before us today is the economic uplift of 36 crores of men and women in India. All of us know that we do not wish to go to war with anyone. We want to live in peace and amity. But we have to wage a peaceful war against poverty and unemployment in the country and it can be done only when all of us are united in this task. The war against poverty requires increase in production. How can we turn a poor country into a rich one? We must increase production in the country. At the moment we are trying to reduce the disparity between the haves and the have-nots by taking from one and distributing to the others. That may bring some temporary relief but the problem is that there is very little wealth in the country. The countries of Europe and the United States have grown rich because the people are hard-working and produce a great deal from land and factories, etc. Science has



increased their capacity for production enormously. We must also increase production from land and factories, cottage industries and in every other area. Only then can we become prosperous. Then the question of distribution of that wealth arises for it is not proper that it should remain in the hands of a few rich people while the rest remain poor. So there are two problems before us—one is to increase production by every possible method and second is the proper distribution of that wealth. After a great deal of thought, we have drawn up the Five Year Plan, which does not solve all our problems by any means, but at least it is a beginning. It lays the foundation of that great task. But if we complete the Plan—and already two and a half, three years are over—then we would have laid strong foundations for development. After that we can go ahead more rapidly. We can increase our speed even now and there is no obstacle in our way. But we have to do everything on a national scale, so that progress and development are properly spread out.

As you know, the most important question before the country was of land, abolition of the zamindari, jagirdari, talukdari systems which existed because the majority of our people live on land and unless they are uplifted, we cannot progress. So we took up the land question and made great headway in every province though the problem has not yet been solved. We have made great progress in the matter and these old jagirdari, zamindari and talukdari systems have been abolished almost all over the country. Here in Saurashtra, the matter was decided by common consent and mutual agreement. It is a big achievement and the same thing was accomplished in other countries after violent revolutions and enormous bloodshed while we have found a peaceful solution. We fought for and won freedom too peacefully and now wish to solve the great social problems facing us peacefully and by mutual cooperation. For one thing, peaceful methods are better than violent ones and secondly, violence does not really solve the problem but only creates new difficulties. Time is wasted and the great danger in a large country like ours is that it may break our unity and weaken us.

You must understand the implications of the land question. One is of course the abolition of zamindari and jagirdari. Second is the necessity to increase agricultural production. Why is it that people in the United States and of England and elsewhere produce much more from one acre than we do? After all, we are not less intelligent or hard-working. Then why? We must think carefully. The average rate of production of wheat in our country is about 9-10 maunds per acre, whereas elsewhere it is between 20 to 30 maunds per acre. Just imagine, if we were to produce even 15 or 20 maunds instead of 10 maunds per acre the wealth in the country will increase rapidly. After all, wealth is not silver or gold, which are only tools of trade. Real wealth comes from what is produced from land and factories, etc. If we raise the production even a little, not only our treasury be filled, but the people will become more prosperous too. So this

is extremely essential and not very difficult to do, though it means hard work.

As you know, for the last 3-4 years or rather, ever since independence, we have had to face a great problem because there was food shortage in the country. There was not enough wheat or rice. Now we could not possibly allow the people to starve to death. Do you remember that 12 years ago, in 1942, during the Second World War, there was a famine in Bengal and within a few months 35 lakh people died of starvation in a small part of Bengal? I am talking of the days of the British rule. 35 lakhs is a very large number. Nowadays if there is a report in the newspapers that unfortunately one individual died of starvation somewhere, there is an uproar over it and that is proper too. I am not objecting to that. But look at the big difference between then and now. Now even one death, whether it is due to starvation or disease or old age, it draws attention. 35 lakhs died in 1942. Some voices were raised in protest, no doubt. Now even a hundred or two hundred starvation deaths would shake up the country and the Government will come in for strong criticism. So you can see the change that has come about. In the last 4-5 years we have had to import foodgrains. I think we imported nearly 40 lakh tonnes—remember that a ton is 28 maunds—of wheat and rice and had to pay for it in precious foreign exchange. But there was no other way for we could not allow the people to starve to death. What is the food situation today? We have had to take recourse to rationing as otherwise the rich will consume everything and the poor will starve and the urban centres will suck in all the food. So we had rationing. Now as you know the situation is much better all over the country. I do not say that the food problem has been solved completely, but it has been brought under control and there is no cause for panic. Moreover our production has also increased.

In the last year or two, we have acquired some influence in world politics—not a great deal, but it is there. As a matter of fact, we have neither great armies which can compete with the great powers, though our army and air force, etc., are manned by extremely capable, excellent young men. But there is no comparison between our armed forces and that of the great powers like the United States and the Soviet Union. If we have fifty or hundred aeroplanes, they probably have ten thousand. So it is not a question of numbers. Then you may have heard of the new weapon—the atom bomb, which it is obvious we do not have. It makes all the other weapons obsolete. We do not have great wealth with which we can hope to influence other countries. So our influence is because we follow a path which seems right to others and bears some relation to reality. Well, there has been a new development in the world and there is a new tilt towards the Soviet Union and China which makes many people happy and others are perturbed and puzzled because they cannot quite fathom what is behind it. Now no one can say what the underlying motive may be, but if it is true and shows us the right path, we ought to like it. Anything that takes the world away from war and tension and towards peace is a good thing. There are



a thousand threats and dangers in the world and nobody can claim that this move will solve all the disputes in the world. But any lessening of the tension which exists in the minds of the people is welcome because it provides an opportunity to stabilize ourselves in the world.

Therefore this new turn has been welcomed by India and many other countries. There is no need to go into the details and anyhow no details are available yet. But there is no doubt about it that the atmosphere in the world has changed for the better. Nobody can say definitely how much difference there will be, but it is to be hoped that it will improve further. The affairs of China, Korea and the Soviet Union have a special significance because as you know there are two superpowers in the world today—the United States and the Soviet Union—and the other countries of the world cannot touch them as far as power goes. After the Second World War, these two powers have advanced so far ahead of the others in military might and other fields that there is no comparison between them and the others have become third rate powers, even if they are very capable in other ways. Therefore, the responsibility for any threat that may arise in the world rests mostly with these two powers as also for putting an end to them.

Let us now look at the consequences to our own country. There is plenty of food now. I am not referring only to the new land that has come under cultivation though that too is being done. But the production from the land already under cultivation has increased from ten to 11-12 maunds per acre. It makes a big difference when production increases in the whole country. Take rice for instance. It has been calculated that in the last year much more than what we had anticipated has been produced. It is true that there have been good rains and we cannot always depend on it. But even so the arrangements made by the Government for good seeds and fertilizers and better irrigation facilities have contributed to the increase of production. But we must also remember that if the production is increasing, so is the population. This is a big problem. The health arrangements are also becoming better, though I am not fully satisfied with them. But the result is that the people are becoming more immune to diseases which is a good thing. There is no doubt about it that it had to be done. Do you know what the average life expectancy in India used to be? Now, averages are confusing and you should not be deceived. Including the children and adults, it was supposed to be about 25 or 26 years. Now it is obvious that there are people sitting here who are much older than 25 years. But this was the average life expectancy in the whole country. In England I think it used to be about 56-57 years and now it is about 60 years to our 25-26 year, which is gradually increasing and is already about 30 years. My friend tells me it is 32 years. Anyhow, all this shows that the health of the country is improving, which includes better food, though I do not know if everyone is getting enough or not. But the general condition of the people is improving



which is a good thing but it leads to the increase in population which means more mouths to feed. So, it will be a good idea if there was planning of families also.

In spite of all this, I want to tell you that we have won a great battle in our country and by "we" I mean all of us. We have won the battle in the field of food production. The people had undergone great hardships in the last 3-4 years and we had to spend enormous sums in foreign exchange on importing food. Now the battle is won. I do not say that the war is over but at least we have had a great victory. Things are under our control, food production is increasing though we may have to import a little bit. For one thing, we already have a contract with the countries from which we get foodgrains, which we cannot go back upon. Secondly, we wish to build up stocks in the country for an emergency so that we do not have to run to other countries in a panic or have to pay more. So we have decided to import 1½ million (15 lakh) tons. Please remember that one ton means 28 maunds. We will keep 15 lakh tonnes in reserve in the country—10 lakh of wheat and 5 of rice. The godowns will be spread out all over the country for an emergency. In the meantime we will keep increasing the food production. This year especially we have had a bumper rice crop.<sup>2</sup>

You may have heard of the Japanese method of cultivation which has been tried in other countries too and production has increased tremendously. I have tried to explain the food situation to you and how it is fundamental to our economy. People tell me that there should be more industries and I agree with them. But unless we solve the food problem, other questions cannot be tackled. So a great problem has been brought under control. The task is not over yet and as a matter of fact it will not be over so long as we do not put an end to unemployment. Millions of people are unemployed in the country. There is no sense in it because the more people work, the more the country will benefit. Wealth can be produced only by the hard work of the people.

These are the big problems before us and it is all very well to draw up schemes and projects, but nothing can work unless we have your cooperation and understanding. Now as you know, we have two schemes called the Community Project and the National Extension Service. I want to draw your attention to them, especially the latter because it concerns the rural areas and we are rapidly expanding it. We hope that within 7-8 years there will not be a single village where it has not spread. This is a gigantic task because it is difficult to change the entire organization of 5-6 lakh villages. I do not remember

2. The figure for rice production in the country in 1953, stood at 22, 495 thousand tons.

exactly just now but I think we are taking up 50,000 villages or more every year. We send a trained village worker to each village and a group of ten villages has the services of a good doctor, teacher or an engineer. Then will come groups of ten villages to form a larger one of 100 villages. I will not go into it just now but you can see what a revolutionary idea it is, we may shout revolutionary slogans and some people think that revolution means violence. That is foolishness. Revolution means changing the social system. So what I have told you about just now is a great revolution for if we succeed in it, it will change the face of rural India and there will be great progress. The villages will enjoy better facilities for health, education, etc. We are not doing all this superficially but it is being done by the people themselves. I am merely reminding you so that you may understand it. You must have heard of our big river valley projects by which we are building canals and dams. In the Punjab, the Bhakra Nangal Dam is being built on the River Sutlej which flows from the Himalayas. The waters will be supplied to the Punjab and to Rajasthan, to the desert of Bikaner and in a few days you will see cultivation and greenery where there was only sand earlier. Such projects are being started all over the country. Then we have put up big industries. You may have heard of the fertilizer factory in Sindri which supplies the whole country with fertilizers. Rail engines are being made in Chittaranjan. In short, we are trying to produce everything in our own country instead of importing them. We are making aeroplanes, railway carriages, ships and all sorts of things and laying the firm foundations of a strong economy. After all, a foundation does not consist of bricks and stones. The foundations of a country are its people. If they are strong, the nation will be strong and if there is unity and the will to work among them, they can achieve anything. People are the cornerstone of progress. They should work hard and effectively cooperate in building and strengthening the nation.

Now look at the situation in the world today. Great powers whom we respect are constantly abusing and threatening one another, and preparing for war. A new weapon called the hydrogen bomb has been invented which is supposed to be far more deadly than even the atom bomb. This is a new genie that has been released and it is so terrible that if one of them was to be dropped on Saurashtra there will not be a single city left intact there. I do not say that they will all be razed to the ground, but its effect will be felt all over. You can imagine what a terrible weapon has been invented and if the big powers who have it were to use it in a moment of anger or fear, the whole world will be turned topsy-turvy. There will be no question of victory or defeat.

We in India have said quite clearly that we will have nothing to do with these quarrels. In the event of war, we could at least save ourselves from being drawn in if we are very strong—not in the sense of military equipment, but economic development and the strength born of it.



#### 4. The Need for Cooperation<sup>1</sup>

Your Excellency the Governor,<sup>2</sup> Chief Minister,<sup>3</sup> Madanji,<sup>4</sup>

The first thing to make sure is whether my voice reaches you or not. Those of you who can hear me please raise your hands... It looks as though people on the sides cannot hear me very well. Those who are behind me cannot hear me at all. Shri Madanji was speaking just now and though I was very close to him, I could not at all hear what he was saying. Organizers of functions often forget the audience at the back. They think only of the people in front.

I have come to Bombay specially to participate in connection with the golden jubilee celebration of the cooperative movement. Most of you seated here must have been engaged in this cause for years and in a sense are experts in the field. I have no special experience. What can I tell you? I consider the entire concept behind the cooperative movement to be extremely important at all times and particularly so in the present times.

Wherever we look, we find a sad lack of cooperation—whether it is between labour and capital, in international relations, or even among the various conflicting forces within a country. The world has become an extremely complex place. The greater the complexity, the greater the need for cooperation. I am speaking of the broader aspect of cooperation, not so much of your cooperative movement, although the idea is similar.

So long as people lived in their own little villages, a self-sufficient economy existed. But with the growing complexity of life, isolation has become impossible. There can only be one of two things; cooperation or conflict. It becomes essential to find a way to reduce tensions and conflicts. Otherwise it would be impossible to achieve anything.

Take the question of labour and capital. Ever since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, in England a couple of centuries ago, the impact of science and technology has grown and the fabric of human life has become more complex. The conflict between labour and capital has intensified.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Brabourne Stadium, Mumbai, on the occasion of the Golden Jubilee of the Cooperative Movement, 11 April 1954. AIR Tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. G.S. Bajpai.
3. Morarji Desai.
4. Janardan Atmaram Madan (b. 1885); ICS, Adviser to the Governor of Bombay, November 1939-April 1942; Chairman Public Service Commission, Bombay, April 1942-August 1947, and Saurashtra Public Service Commission, April 1948-January 1950; Chairman, Saurashtra Agrarian Reforms Commission, June-December 1950; Chairman, Bombay Provincial Cooperative Institute at this time.



In the beginning tremendous atrocities were perpetrated on the workers. Then gradually, they started organizing themselves for self-protection. It took decades and great hardships had to be endured before the trade unions became a strong, organized force. But trade unionism and capital continued to be in conflict.

Looking at this history it is obvious that forming of trade unions was a form of self protection. Within a hundred years, they became very powerful and started entering the arena of politics. It was in keeping with the demand of the times. On the other hand, it is very wrong for two such great forces of society to be in opposition, each constantly trying to harm the other and in the process harming the common people and the entire society. Particularly in our day and age, it is anomalous for one section of society to try to do down the other. So we have to find a way out of this impasse. At the moment the imperative need is economic progress, eradication of poverty and unemployment, and the raising the standard of living of the masses. It affects millions upon millions in India. But we are beset with innumerable problems and difficulties. If we fritter away our energies in mutual conflict, the problems will become even more intractable. So we have to find a way by which all our energies can be concentrated in order to facilitate the progress and betterment of the people.

There can be many yardsticks to judge progress. One is the size of national wealth. National wealth can be increased by stepping up production from land and large industries and small village crafts. The more we produce, the greater will be the wealth of the nation. We cannot get wealth from outside. The second test of progress is to ensure the equitable distribution of the wealth produced, so that it does not remain in the hands of a few. But wealth has to be produced first. Otherwise we shall have nothing but poverty to distribute, which is no solution.

There can be progress only if all our energies are concentrated on the task and not wasted in pulling one another down. The less conflict there is between various forces in society, the more progress there will be. But how can that be ensured? If the people are not convinced that the social and economic organization is a just one, there are bound to be conflicts. It is essential that we must first of all create this confidence in the people.

It would be unfair to say that the cooperative movement is the answer to all these problems. But I have no doubt about it that it can solve a number of them. You can either confine cooperation to a narrow context, or you can extend it to the whole country. You can go even further and apply it to the whole world. The concept of cooperation can be very usefully applied to international relations.

As you know, the atmosphere in the world is terribly vitiated by preparations of war and the roll of war drums. In a sense it can be said that for the first

time in the history of mankind, we have acquired the strength to eradicate the many evils in the world. We have acquired it through science. But it can also be used for self destruction. The question is which of the two forces will prove stronger, the force of destruction or of progress. It is strange that at a time when we have the capacity to rid mankind of the evils of poverty, another force is rearing its head which can destroy everything.

If the internal situation of the country is becoming extremely complex the international situation is fraught with even greater difficulties. There is great mutual suspicion and fear among nations. The result has been a terrible arms race with lethal weapons like atomic and hydrogen bombs being piled up which can destroy the world. Nobody knows the impact all this will have on the world. But at least one advantage has been that people have realized the necessity of thinking about these things, for no country can remain unaffected.

The world is faced with the fundamental issue of survival. On the one hand, there is the lethal power of nuclear weapons and on the other lies the path shown by Mahatma Gandhi, the path of non violence. The two things are poles apart. The big question mark today is which path the world will take. Our work lies within the country. It is not proper for us to advise others because most countries do not accept advice and get annoyed if it is offered. So the question for us is which path India would choose. I have referred to these major issues because in my mind, the cooperative movement has a major role to play in this context. It is necessary for us to see everything in the larger national context. I consider the cooperative movement to be extremely important because it gives a proper direction to the social and economic organization. We can no longer hope to remain in isolated compartments. Cooperation is absolutely essential.

You are living in this great city of Bombay. It is a great city where people of different professions, and from all over India and abroad live and work together, engage in trade and do a thousand things. Unless there is a spirit of cooperation, the life of the city will come to a standstill. Ultimately what really counts in the life of a city or a nation is the extent to which people cooperate with one another. Otherwise everything will come to a halt.

Therefore we must extend the area of cooperation and as far as possible make India an example for others. You may be aware that one of the ideals embodied in the constitution of the Indian National Congress is that of a co-operative commonwealth in India. People often ask me what that means. I have no simple answer. It is not easy to explain it very simply. The idea is simple but to demonstrate it in practice is not so easy. Nor perhaps is it necessary to put it down on paper in detail because such ideas have to evolve on their own momentum. We have to keep the ideal before us and then gradually move in the direction with time and experience. This is our objective when we speak of a cooperative commonwealth.



You can go a step further to the idea of 'One World' and a federal world union which are being widely talked about. What it all ultimately means is that there are two courses open to the world. Either we can go down the path of destruction and ruin, which in the atomic age can be vast, or adopt the goal of cooperation while maintaining our freedom and bring about the concept of 'One World'. I do not know how this will come about. But there is no doubt about it that that is the only way for survival today.

I should like to draw your attention to one more thing. I talked to you about the Industrial Revolution which started in Britain and spread to Europe and the United States with far reaching consequences. Some of it has percolated down to India too. Now we are trying to bring about technological change at a faster pace in our country. But we do not want it to be uncontrolled.

The Industrial Revolution was the product of scientific and technological change and of the machine age. As it spread, production went up. Machines have increased the capacity of man to work a thousandfold. At the same time it has made the fabric of life more and more complex. The world of heavy machinery is extremely complicated, unlike that of the farmer, which is simple, straightforward, with no complexities. As a result, a number of new problems were thrown up, not only the problems which are discussed in the newspapers but the fundamental question of the place of man in the world of technology. How is the heart and mind of man to fit in in this new age?

We travel by train and aeroplane. People work in factories. Life is changing. But how far would mankind have to change in this rapidly changing world? The change has to be in the right direction. The major issues which agitate mankind cannot be solved by decisions at the top. You can reach London or Moscow or Washington from Bombay in a matter of hours. People do it all the time. That is nothing. But it is more difficult to fit in physically in a new place, especially from a cold climate to hot or the other way round. What is the state of mind of human beings in a continuously changing atmosphere and technological change?

Forgive me for going on at length about all this. Perhaps I have not made myself very clear. But I have given you a hint. The debates held in the government or Parliament, assemblies and the press are no doubt important. But the fundamental question which the world faces today is seldom discussed in any of these forums. Sometimes articles are written. The fundamental issue before the world today is where this rapid technological change which has produced nuclear weapons is likely to lead mankind and with what consequences to the thinking and emotions of human beings and society.

Well, I have placed before you some ideas to think about. They are important issues which need careful thought because though India is by no means responsible for the whole world, it is one-fifth of the world. Therefore our actions have an impact on millions of people and to some extent bound to



affect the world too. This is the context in which we must think of the co-operative movement.

We are implementing the Five Year Plans in India as well as the Community Projects and the National Extension Service. I attach great importance to the latter because I consider them to be a revolutionary step for the rural areas. If they are implemented properly, the lives of millions of people living in the rural areas will under go a total change. Even in these areas it is important to inculcate habits of cooperation right from the beginning. Changing old systems is one thing. They must be changed. But we are building something new. It must be done on the firm foundations of cooperation. It is being done to some extent. But I would prefer that more attention should be paid to it. If our foundations are wrong, there will be difficulties later in changing the structure. Why not build correctly right from the beginning? Therefore from all aspects the co-operative movement is extremely important, for India and the world, and in a sense not only for our development but also perhaps to save the world from catastrophe.

You are celebrating the golden jubilee of the co-operative movement. This is an auspicious occasion. We must give up a new filip to the idea of co-operation in all its aspects. After all, though the co-operative movement in India is fifty years old, its sphere of work has been limited. It started with credit societies and has gone on to other things. But we must expand the scope of this work so that the impact is greater. I feel that ultimately our entire social structure should be based on the co-operative idea.

I should like to congratulate the people who are involved in the co-operative movement for taking on this burden. Fifty years have gone by, and in the next fifty years, the work must be given a new start and carried on with greater vigour. The time at our disposal is limited. So I hope the public as well as the Government at the centre and the states will put this principle into practice in the widest possible sphere. *Jai Hind.*

## 5. India in the World of Hydrogen Bomb<sup>1</sup>

*Bahnon aur Bhaiyon,*

As you must have noticed, I am going up in stature day by day! I used to

1. Speech at a public meeting at Chowpatty, Mumbai, 11 April 1954. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

speak to you standing. Now I sit on a *modha* and address you.\*I agreed to this arrangement because it makes it more informal. Shri S.K. Patil<sup>2</sup> just called Bombay a political barometer. India is a vast country with huge cities and provinces. It is difficult to pinpoint any one state or city as the centre for the whole country. In a sense, Delhi is the centre since it is the capital. But it would be carrying things too far to claim that Delhi is the heart and mind of India. Or, for that matter, any other city, whether Bombay, Calcutta, Madras. But perhaps it would be true to say that during the last thirty or thirty-five years of our freedom struggle, Bombay, more than the other big cities, has played a major role. Momentous decisions have been taken on this very Chowpatty *maidan* and some of the other *maidans* in Bombay. Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress often used this city to present their new programmes to the people of India. So it is to some extent right to say that the city of Bombay has always played a special role in our politics, apart from its other aspects like trade and what not. Therefore, whenever I come to Bombay, I feel a desire to meet and talk to its people. I cannot talk to you individually at this public meeting. But I am able to gauge your minds and thoughts, which gives me strength.

When I decided to come to Bombay to take part in the golden jubilee celebration of the cooperative movement in India, I had no idea of addressing a public meeting. I came only for half a day. But when the idea was mooted, I thought that as there had been a great many ups and downs in the world and in India since I came to Bombay in January<sup>3</sup> it would be a good idea to talk things over with the people.

I referred to the world situation, I do not have to tell you, for all of you are aware that a terrible new thing, a jinn or a monster or whatever you may call it, has arisen in the world. Many of you may have read the *Arabian Nights*. The story goes that once when a fisherman was out to catch fish, he caught a small jar in his net. When he opened the lid of the jar, a stream of smoke came out which soon took the form of a jinn. It had been kept under control when it was shut up in the jar. But the moment it came out, it was completely out of control and tried to eat the fisherman. This is more or less the condition in which mankind finds itself in today. The sources of energy which had lain sealed have now been released by man in his wisdom or foolishness. Once the lid has been removed, these forces are becoming uncontrollable. Even the world's greatest scientists are unable to gauge the amount of damage that can be done if those forces are unleashed to the full. This is the story of the hydrogen

2. President, Maharashtra PCC.

3. On 1 January 1954, he addressed a youth rally and inaugurated the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 68-76 and 198-201.



bomb. We had become used to the idea of the atom bomb in the last five or six years. Now this turns out to be even more deadly. It has become a crucial question for every nation in the world today. India does not have the bomb for we have neither the capacity nor the desire to produce one. But it is something which is bound to affect the future of every country, no matter how aloof it remains. So it concerns not only every single nation but every single human being in the world for it is not something distant. If this great source of destruction is not brought under control, no one knows where it will lead the world.

There are two aspects to atomic energy. On the one hand it is a great source of power which can do enormous good to the world. But it can also be used to make bombs. It is like electricity which can kill a man but can also be utilized for a number of good things. Both are forms of energy. Atomic energy can be transmitted more easily than conventional electricity. If it is utilized for the good of mankind, instead of for making bombs, there can be great progress in the world. So, in short, there are two aspects to atomic energy, one benevolent and the other destructive. The atom or hydrogen bomb can only destroy. It can do no good to anyone. You cannot utilize it as a source of energy. It is so pernicious that once it is unleashed it cannot be recalled till its work of destruction is complete.

The most crucial question that mankind faces today is whether this enormous source of energy which has been unleashed can be kept in check or not. Every nation has a stake in the matter though, as far as I have heard, only the United States and the Soviet Union have developed the technology to make nuclear weapons. Perhaps Britain can do so too or is likely to acquire the capability very soon. There may be a couple of others who can produce these bombs. But it is the two superpowers who have the undoubted capability. They are of course concerned about it. But other nations are also concerned because destruction will rain upon everyone equally. In fact, the question goes beyond governments and nations and concerns every single human being, for it is a matter of survival itself. You must understand this well. It is beyond our capacity to force the superpowers to agree to disarmament. It is up to them to take a decision. We can only try to point out which way the world is headed and what the consequences will be if we do not wake up.

There are many large issues which confront the world today. In India, we are beset by gigantic political and economic problems. But all of them pale into insignificance before the terrible fate which threatens to overtake the world. There are often heated debates in the country among the various parties about the ideology and the economic policy that India should follow. But these things will have no meaning if the basic structure itself is threatened. So this is something which requires immediate attention.

Now there are many angles to this problem. The nuclear bomb is a product



of modern science. Now science is something which adds to our strength by discovering new sources of power hidden in nature. Science lays bare what is hidden in the earth, though it may not create a new earth. Electricity is nothing new. But its discovery has led to tremendous progress in the world. Science does not concern itself with the consequences. It is a process of discovery and can unearth good as well as bad things. It is up to us to put the discoveries to good use. There is no question about it that the hydrogen bomb is an evil thing and must be kept in check. That is a matter of common sense. Then why is there so much reluctance to do so? That is because every great power is afraid of the other. I do not wish to boast but in spite of our weaknesses and faults, I dare to say that we are not overtaken by fear. The fear which engulfs the world has not affected us.

Look at the world today. Everyone knows that the two superpowers in the world—the United States of America and the Soviet Union—are bitter enemies of each other. Both live in fear and keep preparing for war. Both claim that they are preparing to protect themselves. Now who is likely to be the aggressor and who the victim no one can judge. But it is fear which makes them do this. It is no doubt a conflict of ideologies. But if the ideologies are followed peacefully, leaving the other nations to choose the course they want, there would be no problem. The difficulty is that peace is at a premium. To what shall I compare this conflict of ideologies? There have often been conflict of ideas in history, particularly of religion. You may have read about the crusades in Europe, in Palestine, etc. There were several great crusades down the centuries. The crusade was a kind of religious war.

So, in a sense, you can say that there is today a great crusade between the United States and the Soviet Union, a conflict of ideologies. Let us leave aside the moral question of who is right and who is wrong. Each side looks at this question in a crusading spirit. On the one hand, the communists fight for the victory of communism while the Americans are fighting against it. I will not say that no religious wars were ever fought in India. There have been some instances. But there have been hardly any religious wars or crusades on a large-scale during the long history of India. Indian culture, civilization and thought have no room for conflicts. Everyone is free to follow the path he likes. So India has always attracted people of different religious persuasions.

The two superpowers cannot understand why we do not join one side or the other. Each side thinks their ideology is the only right one and the other is wrong and also extremely harmful. First of all, during the thousands of years of India's history, though religion has played a major role, wars have very seldom been fought over different ideas. Our entire way of thinking has been different. We believe in standing firm by our beliefs and ideas and at the same time to keep the doors and windows of our minds open to the flow of new ideas from outside. We then accept what we like. Our method has always been

one of synthesis. We have never abandoned our position but we have always accepted new ideas and thought and let them influence us.

Perhaps you may remember Mahatma Gandhi's saying that he wanted the winds of fresh ideas to blow into the country from all sides but that he did not want to be uprooted by them. He was prepared to accept new ideas and benefit by them. On the one hand, it is very bad to close one's mind to new ideas because then there can be no progress. We did that in the past and while the world advanced in a thousand different ways, in science and technology, we thought we were superior and had nothing to learn. So we became backward. It was wrong of us to have closed our minds.

On the other hand, it is equally wrong to get blown away by the winds of change for then we shall lose our moorings and be neither here nor there. Those who want to draw us into a conflict of ideologies, the communists as well as the anti-communists, are trying to do just that. The communists in India have no real roots in the country for they look to another country for intellectual inspiration. This cannot work anywhere, far less in a country like India whose roots go down very very deep. It is not so easy to dig them out and plant an entirely new tree in its stead.

The other side, the anti-communists, want to put in the roots of ideology which belongs to another country, which is also wrong. So what can we do except to steer clear of both sides and adhere to our own path? We want to keep a completely open mind as far as new ideas go and we will take what we like, irrespective of whether they come from the Soviet Union, America, England or somewhere else. We do not want to close our minds to new ideas. But we want to retain the right to choose what we want and to hold on to our ancient roots. Put another way, you can say that India has an independent foreign and domestic policy. We take our own decisions without succumbing to any outside pressure. This is a simple, straightforward matter about which there is no room for argument. Others must understand this.

I referred to the communists in India. Many of them are full of enthusiasm and a spirit of sacrifice and I have several friends among them. But I simply cannot understand why they try to uproot themselves from their own country and look to some other country. I am not saying that they give up their citizenship. I am referring to their mental approach. Let me give you a small example which is not very important except that it betokens a mental attitude. I am talking about another Asian country, Indonesia. There the Communist Party has in its working committee of the presidium two honorary members, one of them a Russian leader, the other a Chinese. Now we must certainly honour the great leaders of China and Russia. But if someone were to say that we should have them in the Congress Working Committee or some other Indian organization as honorary members, it would seem very strange to me. You can see how the communist mind works. In a sense, mentally they adopt another



country as their motherland and do not feel a bond with their own. This is where they get confused and say things which differ fundamentally from our way of thinking. They become a kind of a mirror image of others.

I would say that the communist thinking differs very fundamentally from the Gandhian way of thought. First, the communist side believes in the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb, whereas Gandhiji believed in non violence. I do not claim that we are adhering strictly to that path. But Mahatma Gandhi showed us the path of non violence. You can see how completely opposed to each other these two ways of thinking are. India, and I would say other countries too must choose one or the other. Fundamentally, it is true that it is not at all easy for a nation or government to adhere to one rigid path. It is easier for an individual. But it is far more difficult for a nation or government or any other large organization to be uncompromising because circumstances change, difficulties crop up and a thousand obstacles come in the way. But there has to be an ideal, a principle, before the nation, and an attempt has to be made to adhere to it as far as possible.

The path of non violence is a very good one. This is my view and the view of great men all over the world. But if a man is a coward and behaves like one in the name of non violence, he cannot be called non violent. Those who are not strong enough should not try to follow the path of non-violence as an excuse for their cowardice. Mahatma Gandhi himself has said that he did not want any cowards and that if there is a sword in the heart, it is better to take it out and use it than to keep it hidden there. Otherwise it would be cheating to pretend to believe in non-violence if your heart says something else.

Therefore, I feel that we may adopt the principle of non violence. But everything depends on our strength to adhere to it, the strength of not one or two individuals but of millions of human beings. Secondly, we must make sure that we do not behave like cowards in the name of non violence. So we must keep the principle of non violence as our goal and our eyes must be fixed upon that. We may stumble and fall but our eyes must be fixed upon that bright star. That will give us greater strength and whether our pace is slow or fast, it will be a steady path.

There are two trouble spots, one Korea and the second, Indo-China. The fighting has stopped in Korea. But the problem has not been solved. As you know, there is no fighting but no peace either. There has been a war in Indo-China for the last five or six years. It would be a very good thing if both these problems were to be solved or at least, some steps were taken in that direction. I do not say that we did anything extraordinary. But at least India has helped a little in stopping the fighting in Korea. That is because India has kept herself aloof from the Cold War. So both sides heard her voice and trusted her. I am very hesitant to let India get involved in international disputes. But it is not proper to keep aloof when a little help from us could solve a problem. After



all, India is a great nation and as such, there are great responsibilities which the country has to shoulder, particularly in the present times.

A few days ago, I had said in the context of Indo-China that it would be a good thing if the Conference in Geneva<sup>4</sup>, were to think about a ceasefire there also. After all, when peace talks are held, there will have to be a ceasefire. Why not implement that first, to save unnecessary bloodshed? The idea was liked by the great powers though we have not heard anything more yet. Well, I know it is complicated and difficult to declare a ceasefire in Indo-China. I am also aware that many others are thinking about it. But other problems have cropped up, particularly the detonation of the hydrogen bomb. The great powers threaten one another with dire consequences in case of an attack. Now if peace talks are going to be held in a few weeks, there should be an attempt to change the atmosphere and create a climate of peace. This is not the occasion to threaten and bully one another. But the great powers continue to shake their fists at one another and use threats. Now it is not proper for me to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or to advise them. But this is something which concerns all of us deeply. How can we keep quiet? So I want to point out very humbly that this is not the time to threaten one another when there are great forces which, if unleashed, could destroy the world.

If we want to keep these forces in check, it is not enough just to say that nuclear weapons should be banned. I would be glad if they made such a declaration. But the truth is that it will not take us very far if there is bitterness among nations. If that is not removed, then the nuclear weapons will be taken out and used at some time or the other. So it is these problems which should be solved first and that cannot be done by threatening one another. International politics have become very strange. Even when the great powers meet in conference they continue to threaten instead of trying to find a solution. It is a dangerous trend. The situation in Indo-China and elsewhere is pretty serious. I hope that the Geneva Conference will take place in an atmosphere of calm and the great powers will not bring the Cold War to the conference table.

I have taken up a great deal of your time in talking about international affairs. Whatever we may say, ultimately our voice will be heard only to the extent that it is backed by strength. We do not have the hydrogen bomb or a powerful army, navy or air force. Our strength lies in unity and cooperation and in improving our economic condition. The question of economic progress involves millions of people and the stronger we grow economically, the greater

4. The Geneva Conference on Far Eastern problems opened on 26 April with the objective to discuss (i) the establishment by peaceful means of a united and independent Korea, and (ii) the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China.

the respect for India will be. India's voice will make a great impact. India's economic situation is improving gradually. But there is no magic formula for all this. It requires hard work and effort. The time has now come when we must put aside our petty differences and squabbles and march towards progress.

You must have heard about the Five Year Plans, Community Development Projects and the National Extension Service. They add to the strength of the people. A great deal depends on the people's capacity for hard work, unity and cooperation. If the people set their minds to it, we can achieve double of what we have targeted in the Five Year Plans. So we always come round to the people's ability. Everyone can help in a number of ways.

The people of Bombay may not know very much about the Community Development Projects and the National Extension Service because they are meant for the rural areas and aim at improving the standard of living in the villages. After all, nearly seventy to eighty per cent of the people live in villages in India and the country's progress depends on the progress in the rural areas. It is a good thing for large cities like Bombay to progress. But it does not make a great difference to the progress of the nation. The National Extension schemes are revolutionary in character. If they take off, we feel that within the next seven or eight years all the five or six lakh villages in the country will be covered. Please remember that it is not a joke to take up 50,000 villages every year. In fact, we are planning to take up more.

I should like to tell you one more thing in this connection. It may not be possible for everyone of you to work in the rural areas. But soon you will hear about a loan that the Government is floating. We do it almost every year, both from the Centre and the state governments. The money that is collected is used for various development schemes. Now we are thinking of increasing the scope of the loans. We want that apart from the rich people who contribute, every single man and woman in the country must become a partner in the national effort by contributing small amounts. Their capital will remain intact and earn interest. We want to collect a large amount of money by these public loans to invest specifically in development projects, both at the Centre and in the states. In this way, our progress will gather momentum and new avenues of employment will open up. I want you to understand that it will demonstrate to the world that we do not wish to be beholden to anyone but to progress on our own steam. Therefore, it would be a fitting reply to the complex situation in the world to show our strength and capacity for hard work. We are a poor country but we must show to the world that we are capable of great things and know how to stand on our own feet. It will demonstrate our self reliance and self respect.

I want to draw your attention to one more thing. You may have heard about the Commission for the reorganization of states on a linguistic basis which has been set up. We have to view every problem from an all India perspective. Andhra Pradesh was constituted as a separate State which was the



easiest in a sense. But it had an effect on the old Madras province, Mysore and some other states all around. That is bound to happen because after all we do not conjure up these states out of a hat. There are provinces all around which are affected in the process. Therefore, this question has to be considered from this broader perspective. So we have set up a Commission to go into this matter. It will make its recommendations in due course. We have given them a free hand to meet anyone they like, consult people and arrive at some conclusion. There will be no obstacle to their functioning. We have told them that changing the map of India internally will be a historic step and so whatever we decide must be done peacefully and after careful thought. Shouting slogans or launching agitations will not help. Everyone of you has the right to go and talk to the Commission and its recommendations will be put before the public. We shall not take a decision in a hurry. There will be plenty of time and opportunity to think over the recommendations of the States Reorganization Commission. We must demonstrate our ability to resolve our problems by peaceful methods and by mutual agreement instead of resorting to violence.

I want you to understand this clearly because I find that passions run high over the issue of states' reorganization. We might weaken the country if we allow tensions to mount which is not proper. After all, the various provinces in India are all part of India. The lines which have been drawn between them are to facilitate administration. A state is not a separate country but a part of India. We are held in respect in the world because we are citizens of India, the Republic of India and not because we come from Uttar Pradesh, Bombay or some other province. Therefore, I cannot understand why there should be so much heat over this issue. I want you to think about these things with calm minds, without making a great deal of noise about it. The Congress Working Committee has also made the same recommendations to the Congress Party members particularly but to others in the country too. It has given a free hand to everyone, including Congress members to express their views frankly. This is not something over which the Party has to present a united front. But it should be done peacefully and after careful thought. It has also been made clear to the members of the Congress that there should be no propaganda or agitation about it, one way or another, or siding with any of the other parties over this issue. That does not mean that we consider other parties to be evil. There are good as well as bad organizations. But we cannot draw a line and permit the members of the Congress to work with some and not others. It would not be proper to single out any organization. Therefore every individual has the right to express his views frankly, to meet and discuss the issue. Individuals or groups of them can express their views. The only difficulty which will arise is if members of the Congress sign a representation and so on with members of other parties. The problem may not arise here. But it could do so in Bihar. We have to think about the whole country and not parts of it.



So, I want you to be aware of the dangerous and ruthless world of hydrogen bombs and threats of war that we live in and consider our internal problems, no matter how big they are from this angle. The most urgent priority for us at the moment is to maintain unity and cooperate to make India strong and prosperous. Otherwise we shall find ourselves unable even to defend our freedom, let alone make any progress. We cannot go very far if we are bogged down by petty internal squabbles and are lacking in unity. I hope you will think about these things. *Jai Hind.*

## 6. Tasks Before India<sup>1</sup>

Friends and Comrades,

I have come to you here at Chidambaram after many years. In the address of the Municipal Council,<sup>2</sup> I am reminded of my last visit eighteen years ago.<sup>3</sup> Just a little while earlier, when I visited the temple of Chidambaram, a priest also reminded me of that visit 18 years ago, when I came here with my friend and colleague, Satyamurti.<sup>4</sup> The priest added, "you came here then as a fighter and now you come here, well, as a victor." Well, that is not quite correct. I came here then as a fighter certainly, as a soldier in the struggle for India's freedom, but if I come to you here today I come again as a fighter and as nothing else.

You and I have many struggles ahead and if any man thinks that we have won the final victory, he is mistaken. It is true that a great achievement has been attained. We attained Swaraj. It is you and I and all the people of India who have achieved this. To that extent, you are the victors. I myself do not like to be a victor and vanquished which swells up our head. We do not want to be defeated. We want to achieve what we want, and not to go about with the idea that we are victors and others are defeated.

We achieved Swaraj more or less through the methods which

which Mahatmaji

1. Speech at a public meeting, Annamalai Nagar, Chidambaram, 17 April 1954. AIR tapes, NMMI

had taught us. And because we followed those methods, we achieved Swaraj without anybody's defeat, in friendship and cooperation. And so, we ended one stage of our journey and immediately embarked upon perhaps even more difficult stages. Now we have this great journey to undertake, all of us, the 360 million people of India. And I go about India, not to visit temples, I shall be quite frank with you, but to visit the temples which are in the minds and hearts of millions of the Indian people. Those are the temples that attract me, and I travel then as a soldier if you like, as a pilgrim if you like, all over India, meeting fellow soldiers and fellow pilgrims and trying to find a way to reach the next goal in our journey. Let us not think of victories but rather realise that this is a great opportunity for us. As Dr Radhakrishnan told you, this great opportunity has come to us and we are on trial and we as a people of India are going to be tested.<sup>5</sup> So you and I have to think how we should meet this trial and, how we should succeed this time profiting by the lessons of the past? For the first time, as you just heard this whole great land of India is held together politically, and is working together towards a certain ideal. That ideal, you have heard just now, is what is called the welfare state, call it what you like. But the ideal is that in this country all the 360 million people of India should prosper, should have the opportunity of development and that the curse of poverty and unemployment and the lack of the necessities of life should go. That is the ideal. It is a very big thing and it will take a great deal of hard work for us to achieve that and perhaps a good deal of time, because we have to make 360 million people realise that. It is not a question of some of us reaching the next stage of the journey, but of all of us fellow travellers marching together.

If what I have said is true, you must realise the immense importance of all of us holding together, all of us having that unity of purpose, all of us having that sense that our fate depends on our keeping together and not living in separate compartment. You will remember that one of these disruptive movements in the North led to a part of the old India being cut off from us, to Pakistan being formed. Well, that is over. And I am not complaining about it, but I want you to realise how misguided people try to disrupt and break up the unity of India, what harm they can do. Pakistan has been formed and we want it to prosper. It was formed with our concurrence. We do not wish ill to it, but we certainly are not going to tolerate any further disruptive movement in India

5. Radhakrishnan said that the young men trained in universities were living in a transition of great potential. If they were to rise to the challenge of building a new India, an India much greater than the India of the past would come into being. This India would not only be a great technological power, but it would also reflect a profound humanism.



wherever it might be and whatever form it might take, whether it takes a religious form or any other. Therefore, you must beware of these disruptive movements. They sometime come in the guise of religion or caste or province, in the guise of north and south and east and west. All these disrupt. They create divisions. You, men and women, who belong to Chidambaram or round about, belong to the Madras State. If you go anywhere abroad, do you think you will create a great impression on the world by saying that you come from Chidambaram? Most people would not even know Chidambaram. But you will create an impression if you tell them, "I come from India, I am a citizen of the Republic of India." The position you have in the world, you and I and all of us, comes to us because of India, not of this state or that state or this town or that village. Remember that always. Those who want to weaken this idea of India, this conception of India, do harm to themselves, to their own group, to their state.

You and I and all of us in India are inheritors of great traditions. Dr Radhakrishnan told you of the ancient principles that guided our forefathers and that should guide us today.<sup>6</sup> We are inheritors of this. You in Madras State the people of Andhra State, the people of Uttar Pradesh and, Punjab are all joint inheritors of this culture and background of India as a whole. If you are proud of the temple of Chidambaram here, that is not your own particular isolated inheritance. That too, is the inheritance of India as a whole. And so also, if you go to the north, the Himalayas, and see those cold icy regions, that is also part of your inheritance, not only of those who live round about there. So, those people who wish to cut up India, to disrupt India, to think of only one part of India, they discard this great inheritance of this whole country, which is yours and mine and which belongs to every single individual in India.

When Swaraj came to us, it came because of the united efforts of the Indian people, all over India, belonging to all the provinces of India and to all the religions of India. It did not come to us because one province got it or the followers of one faith or religion got it, but because we built up a movement in this country under the auspices of a great organisation, which included all the parts, areas, provinces and states of India, and included the people of all religions, all faiths, all castes and outcastes. We made common front and put up a common ideal for all the people. We built up that great movement which ultimately succeeded.

Now, if you have to maintain that Swaraj and to go further ahead, you must again think on the same lines, of all the people of India, of all the states

6. Radhakrishnan said that so far as religion was concerned, the State did not identify itself with any particular one, but gave equal treatment to all. That was the true spirit of our ancients. This concept of a secular state was, therefore, a logical consequence of our own religious inheritance.



of India, of all the religions and castes and creeds of India, pulling together and going to a common goal which will apply to all the people. Therefore, it is important that you should not allow yourselves to be led away by cries and slogans which disrupt, which separate you from others in India. Unfortunately, the history of this great country, while it is full of great deeds and great persons, it is also full of repeated mistakes, repeated divisions, repeated fights amongst ourselves and, therefore, repeatedly we have fallen. And now that we have got a great opportunity of working together, we cannot afford to fail. The first lesson that we must ever keep in mind is that your future, whether you live here in Madras State or whether you live in the Himalayas in the North, future is tied up and if ill befalls you, the North will suffer and if the North falls or fails in any way, you will fail also. That is the essential lesson that you have to learn, and I want to repeat it, because there are some misguided persons who talk about the North dominating the South, as there are some misguided persons in the North who say the South interferes too much in North. There is no North or South except in the map of India. There is the body of India, the whole body of India with its various parts and limbs, and if any part of that suffers the whole body becomes unhealthy. Therefore you must actively fight, every slogan, every idea, every argument that separates and disrupts India. India is a country providing a great variety, a great diversity and for my part I am happy at this tremendous diversity and variety which makes for the richness of our culture. But it also provides a unity and we must not be led away by the diversity into forgetting that unity.

We have in India, as I said, many varieties. We have many languages. You speak one of the oldest languages in India, a very beautiful language, the Tamil language. That is certainly your particular language, but it is also something more. It is a national language of India, just as all the great languages of India are national languages of India. We have said that Hindi should be the all India national language, because we must have some of our own languages for the whole of India. We cannot use a foreign language for ever. But that does not mean that the other great languages of India are not national, they are as much national as any other. And I hope that in the future, just as I expect many of you to learn Hindi, many people in the North will learn Tamil. And in this way we shall understand each other more and cooperate with each other more. I have laid stress on unity in this country of many religions and castes. We have always to remember that, particularly those among us who are Hindus, that because we the Hindus are much larger than people following any other faith in this country a greater responsibility rests upon them as it always does on those who are in a dominant position. A responsibility rests upon you and me and all of us to see that those who are in lesser numbers, what might be called the minorities in India, are not only fairly treated, not only have equal rights in everything, but have the sensation of being fairly treated. That is

important. If a minority feels that it is unfairly treated, it is no good your coming and telling me it is not so or my telling them and arguing with them. I want to remove that feeling from their mind. Only then can there be the real sensation of equality in this country. I want you to remember this always, whether a group is weak, in point of numbers or whether because of our social structure we have made it weak, it is our first duty and responsibility to remove that sense of weakness and frailty from them, to help them to raise themselves and to give them the sensation of equality. That is why Mahatma Gandhi laid the greatest stress on Hindu-Muslim unity and on the uplift of the Harijans. Behind all this is the same idea of equality, equal opportunity, and the burden of doing this falls on you and me, because we are the dominant majority. It is no good our saying that the minority has misbehaved. That is no answer. We must make it feel at home in this country so that it cannot misbehave. There are in our country millions of Muslims, millions of Christians, and people of other faiths. It is up to us to see that all of them have this feeling of perfect security, perfect opportunity in this country and have no sense of real grievance.

I have talked about the minorities. Let me talk about the great majority. The great majority of the people in India are poor and have very little opportunity of progress. The great problem of India is how to raise this tremendous majority of our people, who have no economic stability and few opportunities of progress. After we attained Swaraj, the great problem for us was how to raise these hundred of millions of our people. It was an economic problem as well as a social problem; and it is in order to solve that problem that we make our Five Year Plans. And it is in the measure that we solve this problem, that we shall succeed. If we do not solve it, then we fail and we deserve to fail. This is the great problem, that you and I have got to understand and solve. We have got to put an end to the curse of poverty in this country. I am no worshipper of the poor. I want to put an end to poverty, not consider it a virtue. And I want to put an end to unemployment in this country, so that every person has productive work, providing for himself and adding to the wealth of the country. We are a poor country, although we have great resources. If only we work them properly, and as rapidly as possible, we can put an end to the low standards which prevail in this country. We cannot put an end to poverty by some magic formula, by reciting *mantras* or by shouting slogans. We shall be able to do so by hard, united, continuous work. There is no other way. Therefore the question is whether all of us are prepared for this hard, continuous and united effort. It does not matter what policy we adopt. It does matter, of course, but for the purpose of argument I would say it does not matter what policy we adopt, because behind every policy there lies hard work. There is no policy, that will lead you to your goal without hard work and austerity.



We have drawn up what is called a Five Year programme, and you may consider it good or not good enough. We have got the Community Development Projects, the National Extension Service, which are gradually spreading out all over our rural areas. Ultimately the development of India depends upon what happens in our five hundred thousand villages. We have to work along many fronts and put in hard work. There are far too many slogans being shouted. I have no objection to slogans. Sometimes they warm the heart, cheer the mind, but if anybody thinks that a slogan is going to take the place of work he is grievously mistaken. The persons who indulge most in this business of shouting slogans are the communists. Half, if not more than half, their work is shouting slogans. I have no objection to accepting anything which I think is good for my country, whether it comes from communism or any other 'ism'. I am not afraid of communism, like some people are, but I am not going to tolerate anything which, first of all, is associated closely with violence; secondly, which forgets this country and thinks in terms of some other country. I am convinced that violence, if applied to India, will be not only bad in itself, but it is a tremendously disruptive force, and I do not want the disruption of India. Further, I am convinced that we shall solve our problems, certainly by taking advice and learning from other countries, but fundamentally by learning from our own country, and from our own people, and we cannot impose upon them something from outside which may have no relation to fact here. That is the way our friends, the communists, function. It is often very harmful. Our young men, perhaps liking some bright slogans, repeat them, or imagine they have solved the problem of India by learning some of these slogans or catch phrases. The phrases may be good, but you will not solve any problem unless you understand the basic conditions in India, unless even in your thinking you do away with the approach of violence. This kind of mistake is made not only by the communists who look to some other country there are others who look to other countries and want to import their ways here.

In our country, we must never be blown away from our moorings. Mahatma Gandhi said that he would like the winds from all quarters of the world to blow in into his house but he refused to be uprooted and blown away. And I think that is a saying we might well remember. Remember it both to avoid getting into our narrow airless houses and shutting the doors and windows, as we did for several hundred years, living in some kind of complacent mood, imagining that we knew everything, and we became thoroughly backward, and other nations went ahead of us. We must allow the winds to come from everywhere, to freshen us, to teach us. But if we allow them to blow us away, then we would have no roots in our country and for an ancient race like us to be uprooted does not mean progress, it will mean utter decay.

I have talked to you a little about India and our problems, but our problems are tied up with the great problems of the world. And all of you have heard, no



doubt, about the coming of that awful thing—the hydrogen bomb. It is no laughing matter, and again the world hovers between war and peace. I do not mean to say there will be a war soon, but the fact is that everything gradually leads this world of ours towards what might well be the most horrible and destructive of wars.

I am not going to discuss foreign affairs here, but I want you to realise the kind of world we live in, the kind of frightened world. People who consider themselves strong nations are living in fear. And when people are afraid, they can do anything. We are not a strong nation—the world measures strength, either in military or in financial terms. But, I do believe that we are not a frightened nation. We were not frightened when we stood up unarmed against the might of the British Empire and I see no reason why we should be frightened even though the world might be full of hydrogen bombs and atom bombs. Nevertheless, we must understand this world and prepare ourselves to meet any emergency, any development, anything that might happen. How are we to prepare ourselves? Surely, again by unity, united efforts, by making ourselves strong, by putting an end to divisions amongst ourselves and everything that weakens us, and not being afraid whatever happens, and by standing up for our principle whatever happens. I want to mention this to you so that you may remember this world drama that is unfolding itself before us. We cannot control it, we can hardly affect it much. Perhaps sometimes we may say something which makes a little difference, but, generally speaking, we do not presume to control world events. But we do wish to control our destiny and we do not want to be swept away by world events or by the play or conflicts of great powers or small. Therefore we have to strengthen ourselves and to work hard in order to strengthen India. And the strengthening of India means, well, politically you know what it means, but economically, working hard also to better ourselves because strength ultimately comes from economic strength.

Then there are problems, in a sense internal to us and in a sense international, the problems of Goa and Pondicherry. Two or three days ago, I made a statement in Parliament in which I made it perfectly clear that there could be no solution of these problems except one, and that is, that these foreign possessions in India must become complete parts of the Indian Union.<sup>7</sup> It amazes me that anyone in the wide world should imagine that having attained Swaraj over this great country and having put an end to British rule, we are going to tolerate little bits of foreign rule here and there in this country. It is an impossible thing even to conceive of. We follow the path of peace and are firmly convinced that the methods of peace yield the best results. During these last five or six years we have made a friendly approach to the countries which hold these

7. Nehru made this statement in the House of the People on 15 April 1954. See *post*, pp. 520-522.

foreign territories in India. We shall continue to approach them in a friendly way because we believe in the method of peaceful negotiation. But it is obvious to any person that unfortunately some people still live in the 17th century, specially those who govern Goa. They talk about treaties made in the early 17th century.<sup>8</sup> Let them remember that the Republic of India has come into existence in the twentieth century and the Republic of India recognises no treaty and nothing that affects its rights unless it itself is a party to it.

Now, look at Pondicherry. Here not far from here, for the last few weeks, there has been a popular upheaval, which may have surprised you, as it no doubt surprised many people elsewhere, because it was said by the authorities there that the people of those settlements do not want a merger with India. There was talk of a referendum. We had no objection to a referendum, but it became patent that it was quite impossible to have a referendum there which could be called a fair referendum. Even foreign observers who came there stated that the conditions there were not good enough for a fair referendum.<sup>9</sup> So, we said there could be no referendum and we suggested that, as it was inevitable, these foreign settlements must merge with India, and the sooner this was done the better. If there were constitutional difficulties, let us consider them later. Let the fact of union, the physical fact occur *de facto*; the *de jure* power can be considered later, at leisure. Unfortunately, that has not been accepted thus far. Now, as I said, the people of those settlements, all the elected representatives of the different communes or the assembly there, practically everyone of them, representing 90 per cent or so of the population, themselves declared openly in favour of merger and without a referendum. That in itself was significant enough and was in fact as good a referendum as you could have. Since then, there has been tremendous repression against these persons employing methods which I consider very deplorable. But the movement spreads. I want you to understand and appreciate that this has been a completely spontaneous movement. It is not difficult for India to interfere in these small enclaves. If we wish to do so, why should we resort to round about methods? But we decided long ago to settle this matter in a friendly manner with France. We still want a friendly settlement. France is a great country with long traditions of freedom which unfortunately do not extend to its colonies. The French people are a great people and we want a friendly settlement with them. This spontaneous movement has grown in spite of all this repression. It is obvious that the sympathies of all of us are with the people of Pondicherry. We agree with the

8. The reference is to the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1642. See *post*, pp. 512-513.

9. In 1952, at France's insistence, a team of four observers was sent by the International Court of Justice to report on political freedom in French India. They commented that political climate was inimical to the free exercise of political expression.



demand they make for merger with India. That is our demand also. It is about time that the French authorities who are responsible for the Government of Pondicherry realised how absurd and fantastic it is for this kind of thing to continue there, or for Pondicherry to remain outside the Indian Union; and come to a friendly settlement. I doubt very much if other countries, circumstanced as we are, would have been so patient and friendly in spite of all that has occurred.

## 7. Building a New India<sup>1</sup>

Mr Chancellor,<sup>2</sup> Mr Vice-Chancellor,<sup>3</sup> young men and young women, I am happy to have this opportunity of a little talk with you during my very brief visit to Chidambaram and to this University. Some eighteen long years ago, I had come to Chidambaram on another business. So far as I remember, I did not visit the University then, which was much younger in years. Your University has since grown and attained some fame in this great land of India as one of our principal universities striking out new paths from time to time. So it is a privilege for me to visit this University.

What shall I talk to you about? A multitude of subjects cross my mind. I address a variety of audience in all parts of India. I address masses of human beings, chiefly peasants, because our country consist mostly of the peasantry. I also speak to industrial workers, urban people, industrialists, engineers, civil servants, and so many others; and also, of course, students. Naturally, when I address a gathering I have to fashion myself somewhat to the audience I address. But, as a matter of fact, what I say to them is perhaps not very different. The basic thing that I want to put across is much the same although I may be addressing a gathering of students or of peasants. Yet I have to say it in completely different language.

Each individual has some function in life. I am not merely talking about the job you may do, the post you may occupy, the profession you may take to. But behind that there would be some objective in view, something that you are working for, individually or as a member of a larger group. What is my function? In the main, it is the same as yours—to build up this India, to make a new

1. Speech at the Annamalai University, Annamalainagar, Chidambaram, 17 April 1954. AIR tapes, NMML.
2. Sri Prakasa.
3. C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar.



India, to make it strong and prosperous, to help it to retain its inner roots but also put forth new branches and shoots and flowers, so that it might solve many of the problems that afflict our 350 or 360 million human beings in this country, and yet remain true to itself. That is a very big thing. There is some virtue in undertaking something really big, because, if you ally yourself to some very big task, something of the bigness of that task gets transferred to you and you grow big with the task you are undertaking. If your objective in life is something small, well, you may achieve it, but you also remain small.

Many of us who function on the political stage in India today have spent nearly the whole of our lives in the struggle for India's freedom. That was a very big task. We were, and we are, normal human beings in India; there is nothing very special about us. Some may be a little cleverer, a little more intelligent than others. Some may have a few virtues, others may have lesser virtues. But we represented the average man or woman. But because in our earlier days we attached ourselves to a mighty cause, and to some extent forgot our petty worries and cares, something of the shadow of that cause fell on us, and we became a little bigger in consequence, bigger in stature. And the people of India honoured us with their affection and their respect and faith. In doing that they were really honouring the cause more than any individual. What I am driving at is this that we as a nation and we as individuals will advance in so far as we think in big terms, in so far as we ally ourselves to big causes.

Now what is that big cause. A big cause may be political, but there are hundreds and thousands of occupations and kinds of work that a nation has to do in order to go ahead, just as in this University you learn a number of subjects and you specialise in some of them in your later years. We want many kinds of people. Do not imagine that it is the politicians who run the country. It is grossly mistaken idea. They gain more notoriety than others, but the country ultimately is run by vast numbers of people doing their job, and by a certain limited number doing special jobs for which they are specially fitted. We talk about the Five Year Plan. A great part of the Five Year Plan means building. It may be a big river valley project, it may be your lignite quarry, which I just visited, it may be the development of our agriculture or the building up of great factories, ship building concerns, automobile factories, aeroplane factories, the great fertiliser factory at Sindri, the locomotive factory at Chittaranjan, and the magnificent national laboratories that we have put up all over India. They are all parts of this great national undertaking of building up India. In none of them is the politician required, except may be, as an administrator at the top for laying down broad policies. Who is required? You require engineers, you require the educationists, you require medical men of high quality, you require specialists, you require scientists, because this world of ours is a world of science. In fact, almost everything that you see around you has come out of development of science and technology. Technology itself is a child of science.

So if India is to be built up, we have to have persons of high degree in all these numerous types of activities that go to build the nation. India would never be built up if we are all just politicians and nothing more. It will collapse. Unless we have our own high grade, first class engineers, high grade scientists and high grade doctors and educationists, even high grade carpenters, we cannot build India. I want you young people to remember that, because many of our young men seem to think that what is called a public career, a politician's career, is the most important thing. It is not. Take another class of workers, the administrator class. Of course, a country requires good administrators. In the old British days the administrator in India was at the top. From Governor downwards—and the Governors of those days had much more power than in a democratic set up—the administrator, who normally belonged to the old Indian Civil Service, was at the top and all other branches of services or other activities came below him. An administrator is important in any structure of government, and administration becomes more and more intricate and complicated when it has to deal with social problems. The old administrator, by and large, did not have to deal with developmental and social problems except to a small extent. He had to deal with the primary functions of government. What are the primary functions of government? Peace, law and order. They are essential. If there is no peace and law and order, if there is trouble and conflict, a community cannot function. So the civil servant of the old days was supposed to maintain peace. Secondly, he collected taxes to run the government. Those, in effect, were his two chief functions and if he did them well, he was a successful administrator. But in the new regimes that are developing, the administrator, though he must continue to be very important, loses that pre-eminent place that he previously had. Other people come up who are equally important, sometimes more important. An engineer is perhaps far more important than any administrator. You can replace an administrator, but you cannot easily replace an absolutely first class engineer or first class scientist. So one's perspective changes about the importance of various activities and those who do them. The old administrator in India had a relatively limited function. Today our main purpose is developmental, to build up the country in a hundred ways, whether it is building up of factories or the agricultural sector, the educational system or the health services and so on. In such a scheme of things, anything that pertains to development becomes of primary importance. The administrator too has far more functions today than he used to have previously when he was, as I said, mainly responsible for law and order and collecting the taxes. Now it is his job to see that the area under his control develops. He has to help it develop, whether through the Community Development Project or the new National Extension Service. So the very conception of administration changes, because social activities form a far greater part of national activities than they used to do. In the modern age, there are more and more public activities, activities in



which the state is interested either through controlling them directly or through assisting them indirectly. At the same time, the state must also encourage private people, private organizations, doing their work well. So all these change our conception of the state.

No doubt amongst yourselves you discuss all kinds of economic and political theories and 'isms' like socialism, communism, Gandhism, capitalism. You should discuss them and try to understand what they are. Your minds should be able to sift, analyse any theory and test any theory by applying it to the present-day circumstances. Now, most people, if I may say so, don't even try to think much. They take their thoughts readymade from others. If a great man of today or the past addresses us through his books or writings, we must read his thoughts with respect, whether they deal with religions or anything else. We must approach them with receptiveness. But if we merely have blank minds, which mirror other people's thoughts and do not ourselves test them, then we shall only become second rate human beings. The whole purpose of your education is to develop your minds and your creative faculty apart from your bodies. Obviously, all of you are not likely to develop into geniuses and creative artists. A number of you may not be geniuses, but you can become high class human beings all the same. If your educational system and your environment do not make you develop creatively, then they have failed.

An odd thing about the world is how people tend to accept *en bloc* some idea which come to them. It is very easy to accept some stock arguments and shout some of the stock slogans, and to think that you have solved the problems. You may also think that you are very progressive and advanced because you can repeat those things, while, in reality, there is nothing coming from you at all, but you are only repeating what you have read or heard somewhere. It is not good enough. For my part, I should like you to treat with respect the thoughts of great men wherever they may be, but not to swallow them wholesale, however great a man may be. Be receptive to them, examine them. At the same time, I should like you to go with a rebel's mind to every kind of theory, so that you might not be swept away by it without giving adequate thought.

Apart from that general attitude, we have got to deal with two specific dangers. In a country like India which, like all old countries with enormous past histories, is governed by innumerable conventions and grooves of thought, one automatically falls in those grooves and accepts them. That does not necessarily mean that the grooves are always wrong. But falling into a groove of thought, whether it is religious or any other, means a static quality which is not good for a community. We are living in dynamic times in the world, in a period of great transition, and the static way of thinking and acting does not equip us to deal with a dynamic situation. We have to react to a changing situation by thinking about it and adapting ourselves to it. That is the first danger.

The other danger is a reaction to it, that is to jump out of the groove without thinking where you are going to, and imagining you are better off because you are out of the groove and you can repeat some slogans.

These fresh lines of thought come to us from other countries. They have a historical background. They are the result of a certain historical growth in those countries. Now, we have not had that historical or physical growth. We have a different background. But if we unthinkingly adopt that thinking it may not have any application to our conditions, objective or other. You cannot reproduce in our country or at this stage, what had happened in another country and at another stage. It does not matter what it is, whether you repeat the communist slogan or whether you repeat some old orthodox slogan from England or America. Neither is good enough to be repeated. It has to be examined in terms of what we are, what our background is. We can accept it or not accept it in so far as it fits in according to our own thinking.

Well, we in India are not a primitive race with no background of thought. We have probably more accumulation of thought in India in the last few thousand years than any other country. It is a bad habit to try to boost your own country at the expense of others. Other countries also have their great qualities. But we can say we have as great an accumulation of thought in any other country if not greater. So we are not writing on a blank piece of paper or a clean slate. Anything that we do has to take into consideration the whole conscious and sub conscious thought processes which have governed our race from immemorial times. At the same time, we must remember that those processes apparently became static and we lost that dynamic character which every growing community should possess. For some hundreds of years, we have been relatively static in this country. The world went ahead, the western world particularly. What I am saying about India would apply to the greater part of Asia. It became static. Science came to the West and in the course of a hundred and hundred and fifty years made a tremendous difference to life there. It did not come to us in that way. it crept in very slowly, just the outward manifestations of science, not the basic facts of science.

It surprises me how easily the students in our universities are swept away by some slogan. They feel they have found a safe harbour by repeating that slogan. It solves all problems for them, whether it is some communal slogan or communist or socialist slogan or any other, it is immaterial. Socialism may be good. I think it is good, that is to say, the basic approach of socialism is the right approach in my view. In fact one may say that a great part of the world recognises that in varying degrees. But if you merely repeat some slogan, we do not go very far. Let me take an instance. The average socialist believes in the nationalisation of industries. I think that, basically, that belief is correct, and I think that persons who talk in terms of the old, what is called the *laissez-faire* economy of the nineteenth century, have lost all touch with the modern world.



Not even in a country like the United States where private industry and individual enterprise are the most highly developed, do you find *laissez-faire* of the kind that prevailed in the nineteenth century or in the earlier twentieth century. The whole thing has changed. In the countries of Europe, it has changed much more.

More and more they are going in for public ownership.

In India we have a great deal of public ownership, compared to any country, barring the socialist countries. But saying vaguely 'nationalise everything' has no meaning to me. I am prepared to consider a specific industry, and discuss whether the nationalization of that industry in the present moment is desirable or not. There are a number of limiting factors, our preparedness for it, adequacies of personnel and many other things. If we are not ready for it, then our attempt to do it may in fact retard our growth. It may fail, although the idea may be a good one.

Again, why should I nationalise any industry which is already rather out of date? It is a changing world. Why should I pay good public money as compensation for an out-of-date plant? I see no reason. I want to use the money that the state possesses to build up new industries, if necessary publicly owned. Why should I waste existing resources in nationalising some existing industry and have nothing left for new industry? It seems to me quite a wrong approach. Obviously, our resources in India are limited, and we have to decide how to use them to the best advantage, so that our wealth-producing capacity might grow. Instead of my using our money in acquiring something that is already existing, why should we not put up a new thing, which the state owns, and the old thing carries on too?

This is just one example of how we are apt to run away with slogans. Of course, the people who go in most for slogans are the communal people who always look back and are incapable of understanding the modern world, who seem to think that we can draw ourselves into a shell and live the same kind of life as was lived here a thousand or five thousand years ago. The other kind of slogan makers are the communists. They repeat their slogans and many people listen to them and accept them, regardless of their suitability to our conditions. I am not going to discuss communism and all that here. What I want you to appreciate is that, if we are going to make progress, we have got to progress on our own soil and with our own roots. Secondly, with our own thinking, not by accepting somebody else's thought and applying it here. The question is whether it fits in with our conditions or not. It is quite absurd for anyone to tell me it will automatically fit in. It cannot.

Take Russia, the Soviet Union. They have a vast territory, six or seven times India. India is big enough, but the Soviet Union from the point of view of expanse is, much bigger. In this vast territory, they have a population which is less than half that of India, about a third, I think. So their problem takes a different shape, that is, they have one third population and six or seven times

the area of India. We are a crowded country. If we think of agriculture, we have a crowded population with little land to spare. They have vast territory to spare and fewer men. So their approach to the problem, quite apart from communism or anything, is governed by the objective factors that they deal with. Perhaps we may be able to learn something from the Soviet Union, just as we may be able to learn something from America or England, but we have to learn it keeping in mind the conditions in India. The South is fairly heavily populated. You go to the Gangetic plain in North India. It is even more heavily populated. You go to Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat. They are not very heavily populated. They are desert areas more or less. The whole land problem becomes different for us, because of the heavy population and the lack of land, compared to the land problem either in America or in Russia, where they have to deal with a smaller population and have vaster areas. You cannot, therefore, blindly apply either the American method or the Soviet method to our country.

If it is not good enough to accept blindly what others say, it is also not good enough to reject blindly what others say, and we are apt to do one of the two, accept or reject wholesale. Some of you may be fascinated by what has been done by the Soviet Union; therefore, you accept blindly whatever you may hear about things there. I have no doubt that there are many things in the Soviet Union from which we can learn very greatly and we should learn. They have made great progress in many ways. Where we can, we should learn. But even in learning we have to remember that conditions are completely different in India. I have no doubt that we can learn tremendously from Western Europe and America, the progress they have made in those most highly developed countries, industrially speaking. But, again, our conditions are different.

The problem before us is that we are an underdeveloped country. And an underdeveloped country has not got much left over. We do not produce enough to have a surplus for fresh investment in development. What we produce in the country is barely enough to keep our low standards going. How are we to get a surplus for such investment? The United States of America has had a clear field for a hundred and fifty or two hundred years to develop a vast area. They have developed it. They have become a very rich and powerful country. Western Europe also because of various things, has had this long period of industrial development, in spite of their high standards of consumption, they get a surplus for fresh investment and development. It is difficult for us to find such a surplus, yet we must; otherwise we do not develop. Obviously we cannot rely on foreign countries to provide us surplus. They may help us here and there. Well and good if they help us; but that is only just a trifle. Ultimately we have to find that surplus ourselves. It is a difficult matter, considering that our masses as a whole live on the margin of subsistence. How are we to do it? To eat less and spend less even from what we are doing now! In a country like the Soviet Union they produce some surplus. They started from relatively low standards,



compared to Western Europe. How do they create the surplus? Well, largely by political and other methods which are almost impossible for a democratic country to adopt. An authoritarian regime can, by virtue of authority, produce a surplus. It can make the people undergo austerity to a degree which, normally speaking, a democratic country can never succeed in, because any government trying to do that will be thrown out and another government will come in a democratic country. In an authoritarian country the government goes on. It is not upset, except of course, when there is a major upset, which is a different matter. So all these considerations apply when we look at our major problem, which is the building up of India.

Again, suppose you say, applying the socialist view of thinking, that we must equalise everything. There are a number of rich people. Why are they not taxed more heavily? Rich people should be taxed heavily, I agree. But in the final analysis, it would not make much difference to the whole of India, even if you took everything that the rich possessed today and spread it out over the rest what I mean to say is that all that they possess is so little compared to the whole of India, that, spread out, it makes no difference except perhaps some sentimental difference to you. It may appeal to your sentiments that we have done so. But, practically speaking, it would not affect the situation at all, it may, of course, affect it in a different way, that is, if you proceeded in that way you may stop the productive apparatus from functioning in many places. It is a possibility, if you did that without taking care of the consequences, it is a big job. And I do not want you to be small minded about it. Small minded people do not build, or do anything big.

Sometimes some people in the South talk about Northern imperialism in South India. I might tell you, that some people in Delhi talk about people from the South taking possession of Delhi! Among our senior government officials, there is a far greater proportion of people from the South than the people from the North. Well, they have come there because of their ability. This kind of complaint is just silly. You have to consider India, as North, South, East, West, one whole body, and if any part of it, any limb of it suffers, the whole body is diseased, it cannot progress. A little boil on your toe might make your whole body unhealthy. We have to think of India as a whole. We cannot simply think of one part progressing and the other not. We must get out of these narrow-minded conceptions, and each one of us must think of ourselves not merely as residents of Chidambaram or Madras State or Tamil Nadu or whatever it is, but as citizens of the Republic of India. That is what gives us strength. After all, you and I and all of us as I was saying at the PEN's conference yesterday<sup>4</sup> inherit not our little patch of earth or town or village where we come from, we

4. Nehru was referring to his speech at the third All India Writers' Conference, organised by the PEN on 16 April. Not printed.

inherit a few thousand years of India, each one of us, whether we live in the North or the South. Chidambaram is as much my inheritance as yours. The Himalayas are as much your inheritance as mine. The whole of India is our joint inheritance. And if any of you wish to cut yourself off from this magnificent inheritance not only in extent but in thousands of years and of culture and all that, where numerous rivers have flowed into India and will absorb them and make them our own, if you think of your little patch, here or there, well, you cut yourself adrift from this mighty whole. Whatever was possible in the past is not possible today. People today talk of 'One World'. Quite rightly, because it is becoming increasingly difficult today for any country to lead an isolated existence. Do you realise what modern science has done? To give a ready example, there is this new development of the hydrogen bomb, which may obliterate whole countries. But leave that out. If you think of one development of science which has changed our lives completely, that is communications. Until about a hundred and fifty years ago, how did people communicate with each other? What was the fastest means of communication? I should say the fastest was a fast horse. That was more or less the fastest means of communication before this industrial age came in. And that was the fastest means even two thousand years earlier, or whether you lived in Buddha's time or in Ashoka's time or in Akbar's time. You see, they were relatively static periods of existence, so far as communications were concerned. Then suddenly new things began to come in as the telegraph, the railway train, the telephone, the automobile, the aeroplane and ultimately from the point of view of communication, radar or radio, which are instantaneous. This is just one instance of how the modern world has changed through science and invention. Society changes, new occupations come up. People who were far apart are brought next to each other. Therefore, persons who think in narrow lines in terms of territory or caste or group or community are just completely out of date today. They are not much good, mentally speaking. I mentioned caste, it may be that when the system of caste originated and in the form it originated, it suited those ties. But it is patent that afterwards it did not suit us at all and was one of the major reasons for our country becoming static. And it is patent that, today, it is totally out of place, unsuited, and totally opposed to the basic conceptions of our Constitution. It drags us back.

We have got very big tasks ahead. More particularly you, young men and young women of India, wherever you might be, are in for tremendous adventures, tremendous dangers and tremendous rewards too, as individuals, as nations. And this major job of building up India is a tremendously exciting job, in which all of us can find a place, not in the sense of joining Government service, but in a hundred and a thousand ways. I want you to look upon the future from this point of view.

*Jai Hind!*



## 8. Problems Facing India<sup>1</sup>

*Bahnon aur Bhaiyon,*

Vinobaji has just ordered me to say a few words about the national interest to you. Now it is right that I should obey him, but I am in a bit of a dilemma because I have not come here in my usual capacity—that is, I am here neither as the Prime Minister nor as the Congress President. Now if you can forget those two positions, you can take it that I am here as Jawaharlal. So it is a little difficult for me to speak on an occasion like this. But I shall try to draw your attention to some matters though it will not be about the endless political debates that go on amongst us, for after all, we must get away from them sometime or other and think with a cool mind about what we are and where we are going.

Vinobaji has talked about Bhoodan. He has been talking about it for the last two or three years and has vowed that he will complete that task. I am sure that his vow will be kept. But I am often reminded of the situation in the world today. On the one hand, threatening voices are being raised in the world and new weapons are being forged which can destroy the planet. The powers which possess these lethal weapons, in their conceit, order the others around to carry out their behest. The world is ringing with these strident voices and the even more strident clang of arms being tested. No one knows what will happen if there is an actual war. Then the other picture comes to my mind of a world in which Mahatma Gandhi preached the lessons of peace and non violence to the millions in this country. It is a different matter as to how far the people learnt those lessons. They tried and had some success, but look at the difference between the two voices—Mahatma Gandhi's and the other more commonly heard voice in politics. I am also reminded of how people repeatedly talk about revolution. I have no doubt that we have to bring about a revolution in the economic and social set up in the country. If we can do it with everyone's consent, it will be well, but if we cannot, then we shall have to do it by force. But force is not in keeping with the spirit of the times, which is the most important reason for change. There are a great many other reasons too. It is a different matter that we may be able to drag on for a few years more. But historically speaking that era is a thing of the past. When I talk about the social and economic set up, it includes many things. It would be wise to go about the task of changing it in a peaceful way by common consent. The difficulty is that very few people realize the need for change. They try to hold on to the things which benefit them to the last possible moment. In such

1. Speech at a prayer meeting, Sarvodayapuri, Gaya, 18 April 1954. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

circumstances a violent revolution is often inevitable. Moreover we live in revolutionary times, which began about forty years ago, from the time of the First World War. There have been great revolutions in the world, and the maps of Europe and Asia have changed out of recognition. The revolution in our country was brought about to a large extent by Mahatma Gandhi. It was unique in character. The like of it is not to be found anywhere else in the world. We won our political freedom by peaceful means and behaved even towards those who were our enemies in a friendly way. I do not think it is proper to boast about these things. But we must recognize the fact that we have a unique way of doing things. For instance the call that the Mahatma gave to the country was unique—though in a sense it had been done in the past too, but it was a unique thing to have applied those principles in politics. We were weak and afraid and could not follow his path all the way. But even the few steps that we took in that direction brought about a great revolution in this country.

Now, we find that among the innumerable problems before us, the most important is the land problem because in our country seventy to eighty per cent of the people live and work on land. I do not say that by solving the land issue all the problems of the country will get solved. But I am prepared to say that unless the question of land is solved, none of the other problems can be solved. The fact is that if we wish to progress, we have to take steps in every direction; for a nation has to grow on all fronts. So the problem of land as well as numerous other problems have to be solved. The problem of unemployment may get eased slightly when the land question is settled. But that will not provide the complete solution. Other avenues of employment have to be found that will be productive as well and add to the country's wealth. But the question of land is crucial in a country like India, whether you look at it from the economic point of view or from the point of view of justice.

Even on this issue, the unique call of Bhoodan was given by Acharya Vinoba Bhave three years ago. It sounded good but I do not know how many of us would have realized that it was a revolutionary idea. Gradually we began to realize how powerful that call was. People in India and abroad have realized that revolutionary things are being done in the land issue which are absolutely unique in the world. All this has an effect and we begin to pride ourselves on being unique, though we are by and large rather useless. The fact that Mahatma Gandhi was great does not mean that we are also great, though we may have acquired an aura of greatness in his shadow. We have yet another shortcoming, that we praise something loudly and then forget about it.

The straightforward problem before us is to change our social system, it has to be done wisely, or it is bound to involve some sacrifices. If we put it off too long the change will be violent and cause great damage. So the only answer to this problem is to bring about the change ourselves, not only for our personal benefit but also for the good of the country. When something is achieved by



the combined effort of the country, in unity, it adds tremendously to the strength of the nation.

So Vinoba Bhave has put the idea of Bhoodan before you. It will have its own repercussions but I have full faith that the individual who participates in it does not lose anything but gains strength from it. He may give up a little bit of his property, but his strength increases in other ways and so does the strength of the nation and society. That does not mean that I am forcing you to follow the path shown by Vinoba Bhave. What I am trying to say is that it would be wrong if the Central Government or the State Governments think that they can put the entire burden of the land issue on Vinobaji's shoulders, and content themselves with making occasional speeches about it. Ultimately the responsibility for solving the land question lies with the Centre, though the Centre does not own any land. The responsibility of the state governments in this matter is no less. They must also help in the Bhoodan movement as much as they can. It is the responsibility of the government to bring in proper land legislation. Our responsibility in the matter does not diminish because of the Bhoodan movement. That movement is separate, though I want that we should help it to the best of our ability. But I am doubtful as to how far we can help officially because I feel that these movements must grow on their own momentum and official interference, instead of strengthening them will probably weaken them. People will think of it as an official movement and expect the government to do it and the internal strength of the movement will be lost. Therefore, I do not wish official interference in this matter. Any help that is possible can be given and the officers can participate in their capacity as ordinary citizens. On its part the government has to solve this question and it should certainly take into account the impact of the Bhoodan movement on it because apart from acquiring land, it creates an atmosphere which will make the task of solving this problem easier.

Apart from Bhoodan, there is one other matter which Vinobaji has been pointing out elsewhere and this has perturbed me greatly. It is the disunity among us and the barriers which keep us apart—casteism, provincialism, communalism, etc. Perhaps they have their roots in our caste system which has prevailed among the Hindus down the ages. Perhaps it was relevant to those times but I am fully convinced that during the last centuries it has led to the downfall of our society and bred innumerable evils which have weakened us and prevented us from being united. How did we get our freedom? There was no casteism, communalism or provincialism then and the movement was a national one in which everyone, irrespective of their caste and religion and province participated in it. Our strength lay in our unity, but now we are forgetting it and again allowing communalism to rear its head. During elections, casteism plays an important role. These things show the weakness in our society and Bihar leads the way, or is the most backward, whichever way you may put

it, in such matters. Casteism is so rampant in this province that the effects are felt even in Delhi. So you must try to understand why this happens. I singled out Bihar but it is true of the whole country and we must curb it. Otherwise we shall fall again as we have repeatedly done in the past. There have been great men in this country and yet we have fallen again and again because we had got into the habit of living in separate compartments and never learnt the lesson of unity. We must put an end to these disparities and disunity.

Let me tell you one thing in this connection. There are a number of religions in our country. The majority of the people are Hindus and there are innumerable castes among them. Then there are Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, Parsis, etc., and they are by no means negligible in number, though they may be fewer than the Hindus. Even after Partition, there are nearly four crore Muslims in the country. There are innumerable Christians as well, particularly in the South. Then of course Sikhs and Buddhists, who follow indigenous faiths. Christianity had come to the shores of India long before it went to Europe—nearly eighteen or nineteen hundred years ago and the Christians in the South are quite independent of Europe. In short, the religions which originally came from outside have adopted this country for the last hundreds of years or more and become completely Indianized. Religious tolerance and freedom have been one of the glorious hallmarks of our culture.

During the freedom struggle we stressed again and again that freedom was for everyone, irrespective of religion, caste and community, and that particularly our down trodden Harijan brethren should be given full rights. Later it was laid down clearly in the Constitution, but as you know, no constitution or law can be effective unless they are implemented by the people themselves and I find that that is not being done properly. Let me give you small examples. When we have elections, our minorities are getting less and less representation, whether they are Muslims or Christians or anyone else. This is something for you to think about for it cannot remain hidden for long. There have been one or two examples of this in Bihar<sup>2</sup> which have perturbed me greatly as to where our narrow-minded ways are leading us. You must remember that the responsibility for seeing that justice is done to the minority groups rests with the majority. In fact I shall go a step further and say that the minorities must have confidence and faith that justice will be done to them and that this will be as much their home as anybody else's. This is something that the whole country ought to bear in mind. People come to me and say that the Muslims or Christians or people belonging to some other religion do not love India whole-heartedly. This may be true of a handful of individuals. But again the question that arises is what did we do to destroy their love. After all, it is our responsibility to

2. The reference is to the declining number of Muslim representatives in Bihar PCC. See *post*, pp. 169-170.



create confidence in them, make a place for them in the country and provide opportunities for them to progress. It is not a good thing for them to get the feeling that they are not held in respect in India or that they do not have the same opportunities for progress as the majority community. I feel this very deeply and want that we should try to create confidence in them. It is not being done at all levels and when I put it to them, they present all sorts of legal and other arguments. I am concerned with laws to a large extent but I am even more concerned with the people of India. We have integrated the country politically after Independence. But what we need is integration of hearts and minds for the country to become really strong, for without it, we shall remain weak and backward. What is achieved by holding elections and sending members to Parliament or to the assemblies? They become a mere farce unless they add to our unity and strength. Look at the situation in the world and the history of the last couple of decades and the revolutions that have taken place, empires broken up and kingdoms uprooted. In times like these, do you think you can make the country strong merely by drawing up a constitution or that we can relax now and not bother about what our neighbour's might be up to? This is the age of the hydrogen bomb and other deadly weapons. We do not have a hydrogen bomb and nor are we likely to, for we do not want it. How are we to survive if we insist on living in separate compartments or fostering disunity? Or by opposing all change and clinging on to an outmoded system of society with all its evils? That is the surest way to disaster because the world will not bother about us unless we are strong from within and are united and have the will to work, the disparities are reduced and people of all religions enjoy equal rights and opportunities. I do not want an assurance from you that all these things are being done. It is not enough for me to say that the minority communities are confident of getting just treatment. I want the answer not in words but in deeds and the impact of our actions on their emotions. Otherwise India will be divided into fragments of caste and class as happens during elections. We must build a new India and any policy that we may follow has to be backed by hard work. It cannot be achieved by magic or by chanting a *mantra*. Whether you take the United States or the Soviet Union, China, Japan or Germany, each with a different ideology, they have one thing in common and that is hard work and the willingness to make sacrifice.

Look at the situation in the world today. I do not know what it will be like in a few month's time, I cannot say. What is the date today, 18th? Within the next six or seven days there is going to be a big power meeting in Geneva to discuss the Korean situation and to try to come to an agreement. But the air is full of threats and preparations for war which seems to be a strange way of trying to come to an agreement. Well, whatever they may do, the question is what we must do. We do not want to get involved in other people's business. We have to put our own house in order first. I do not have any desire to

interfere in other people's affairs. But being such a large country, we are drawn willy-nilly into developments in the neighbouring countries and have to express an opinion. We cannot help it. We cannot control their actions. We can only try to explain things in a friendly way. But we have to bear the full responsibility of what we do in our own country. If we are bogged down in our petty quarrels and casteism and communalism, etc., what will happen to our nationalism? We talk a great deal about nationalism but all these separatist tendencies work against the principle of nationalism. If we do not understand true nationalism how can we play a role as a great nation?

I have come from the South today. I left Chidambaram this morning. The feeling that is widely prevalent is that the North Indians try to rule over the South, pressurize them and force Hindi down their throats, etc. It is wrong but at the same time we must try to do our work in such a way that we do not give rise to these feelings. All these big problems which arise in the country show that though we are a big nation on the map, there are innumerable weaknesses among us. There is no fundamental unity among us, no true integration. So long as we do not bring it about we will remain backward. We must consider these problems carefully and remember that the big problems which confront the nation today are economic, land, unemployment, etc. If we can understand Vinobaji's call and try to solve them in a friendly spirit, by mutual agreement, we shall be more successful and stronger as a nation. We can make tremendous progress and play a role in world affairs—and influence other countries. We can perhaps try to reduce the fear and tensions which prevail in the world today. *Jai Hind*.



## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION





## I. ECONOMY

### (i) Planning

#### 1. Houses for the Millions<sup>1</sup>

Mr Chairman,<sup>2</sup> Your excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, My colleague, our Minister for Works,<sup>3</sup> has already conveyed to you the welcome of the Government of India for this Conference and those distinguished guests who have come here. I am here to add to that welcome and to tell you how much we appreciate your having decided to hold this conference here.

This subject in which you are interested is of intense interest to us. We want to plan. We want first of all to provide houses for a vast number of human beings who have not got houses or who live in mud huts which are sometimes washed away by heavy rains. It is a terrific problem in size but, I have no doubt it can be solved if approached rightly or from their point of view. Essentially, we attach importance to houses for millions of people, more specially for rural people as well as industrial labour and not so much for more grandiose structures. Indeed that is why, we have an exhibition of low cost housing, so as to encourage that type of house.

Now, we are becoming in India more and more planning-minded and it is interesting and very encouraging for me to find that this talk of planning has permeated even our villages, of course, in a rather vague way. We are soon beginning, for instance, our work in building up what we call our Second Five Year Plan<sup>4</sup> and building it up from the villages upwards, asking the village groups, the village panchayats, as we call them, to contribute their views about planning in their area, so that, gradually, it should come up from there and

1. Speech at the inauguration of the South East Asia Regional Conference of International Federation for Housing and Town Planning, New Delhi, 1 February 1954. AIR tapes, NMML. The Conference was attended by 130 experts from ten South East Asian countries.
2. George S. Pepler, Honorary President of the International Federation.
3. Swaran Singh.
4. The main objectives of the Second Five Year Plan, covering the period from April 1956 to March 1961, were: (i) an increase of 25 per cent in the national income; (ii) rapid industrialisation with particular emphasis on the development of basic and heavy industries; (iii) a large expansion of employment opportunities; and (iv) a reduction of inequalities in income and wealth and a more even distribution of economic power.

ultimately go up to the state governments and from the state governments to our Central Planning Commission.

Now, a big part of this planning, any important element of it, is housing and town planning. So, not only are we planning-conscious more and more, but if I may use the strong word, we have got a passion for learning, for acquiring knowledge as to how to do things, quickly and properly. It is, I may use again, a rather abstruse word in our Sanskrit, a *Jijnasa* for solving our problems through various ways, through planning, through understanding them, through understanding what is happening in the rest of the world. We realise that we have to learn and we must learn a great deal from other parts of the world where they study these problems, where in many respects they have gone far ahead of us, so we have to learn a great deal from them.

At the same time, we also realise, and are convinced that any real good that is done in a country has to bear an intimate relation to that country and it cannot be imported from outside, whether it is in the realm of ideas or of action. Take for instance, this housing and town planning. Obviously it must relate not only to the climate of India—and the climate of India is very different in north India and in south India, in the mountains and the plains,—it has to fit in with all those things. It has also to fit in with all kinds of customary ways of living that have grown up. It is no good putting up an excellent house which does not fit in with the ways of life of the people. Therefore, it has to represent, well, the individuality of the nation or the group, the climatic conditions and all kinds of such things. And I hope it represents all this in an attractive, graceful and beautiful a manner as possible.

It is a painful thing for me, often enough, to see the type of structures that are put up. Now, we do not want grandiose structures, but I do not know why people imagine that beauty is connected with money; normally it is the reverse. Where there is too much money, there is utter lack of beauty. A person goes off in the wrong direction in thinking of things as if an expensive thing is necessarily a beautiful thing. A simple cottage might well be more attractive than some heavy cement structure put up. But we want both. We want cheapness as well as grace so that people should grow up in graceful surroundings.

I do not know, if any of young gentlemen, who have come from abroad are going to travel about India. I hope so. Perhaps you may go to the city of Jaipur.<sup>5</sup> Jaipur is interesting. It is a new city as things go in India, only about 300 years old, or about 250 years, I forget exactly. It is interesting because it was a deliberately planned city. The man who planned it was the then ruler of

5. The foundation of Jaipur, named after its founder Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh, was laid in November 1728. This city is unique in its straight line construction, symmetry, picturesque setting of cross-broad roads and pink-rose buildings.



Jaipur,<sup>6</sup> of that State, and he shifted his capital to Jaipur and planned that city. You will see some of his works even in Delhi. He was an astronomer and in various places, including Delhi, he built, all kinds of constructions, for observing astronomical formulae. Here in Delhi, if you go, it is called Jantar Mantar. It is interesting and is not much used now because we use more accurate instruments. But in those days, it is quite interesting how relatively accurate observations could be made in this way.

Now, I remember, once many years ago, going to the museum in Jaipur, and I was very much surprised and interested to find that Jai Singh, before he started planning for Jaipur, sent some people to Europe to bring him plans of European cities. And I think that those plans are still preserved in the Jaipur museum, plans nearly 250 years to 350 old plans of European cities as they were then of course. And they extended all over right up to Istanbul I think. It is interesting even to find these old plans of even these old cities, but what I am driving at is his desire to profit by what was being done in Europe, as long ago as 200, 300 years ago.

So, I am very happy that you have come here and I hope that I am speaking of India, for the moment, of course, but in a sense, these problems which we face are common problems in this whole region, South East Asia, differing here and there because of the climatic reasons, customs etc., of course, as they differ in north and south India. And I have no doubt that we can help each other greatly in this region by profiting by each other's experience and in other ways.

So, I welcome you all again here and wish your work success.

6. Jai Singh II of Amber (1699-1743); popularly known as Sawai Jai Singh; astronomer, architect, legislator, statesman, historian, scientist, a scholar of Persian and Sanskrit; constructed astronomical observatories at Delhi, Jaipur, Ujjain, Banaras and Mathura.

## 2. New Approach to Planning<sup>1</sup>

I had occasion to meet Prof Charles Bettelheim<sup>2</sup> and had two long talks with

1. Note to the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, 18 February 1954. File No.17(309)/54-PMS.
2. (b.1913); French economist; Head of the UN Mission for technical assistance to India, 1955-56; author of: *Long-Term Planning Problems; Studies in the Theory of Planning; Class Struggles in the USSR, 1917-23*.

him. I understand that he had two meetings with the Planning Commission and also met the Finance Minister<sup>3</sup> and discussed some aspects of planning with him.

2. Prof Bettelheim is considered to be a great expert on planning. He is the editor of a journal of planning, and has written a number of books on the subject, which, I am told, are considered as standard works. He is a Professor at the Sorbonne in Paris.

3. He came to India in December last at the invitation of the Indian Statistical Institute as visiting professor. He gave a number of lectures and participated in seminar discussions in Calcutta, Bombay and New Delhi. Some of these seminar discussions have been incorporated in some notes on various aspects of planning.<sup>4</sup> I have read these notes, and I find them both interesting and thought-provoking. I think that the Planning Commission should specially consider them. In view of their importance, however, I am also sending them to all members of Cabinet for their consideration.

4. Prof Bettelheim's approach to planning is somewhat different from our present approach. To some extent, the approach we made two or three years ago was inevitable as it was limited by a lack of adequate data as well as certain commitments already made. This position is somewhat different now. We have gathered experience and data and, therefore, we are in a better position to consider the whole field of planning and decide about our method of approach. Prof Bettelheim lays stress on "Physical Planning."<sup>5</sup>

5. Whatever our final approach might be, certain preliminary studies appear to be essential. These are indicated at page 7 of the note on "Methods of Planning".<sup>6</sup> I understand that some of these studies have already been undertaken by the Statistical Institute and we have important data to help us. These studies should be extended and carried through.

6. Recently, at a meeting of the Indian Science Congress held at Hyderabad, the importance of a field survey of mineral resources was stressed, more

3. C.D. Deshmukh was the Union Finance Minister.

4. These three notes dealt with different methods of planning, nature and character of different types of planning and planning of investments.

5. "Physical planning" implied that the plan was based on an objective estimate of the demands at different levels of national income, of the investments needed to produce the goods to satisfy these demands, and of inter-industrial relations resulting from such investments.

6. The note stated that for maximising national income and employment, objective preparatory statistical studies in the fields of industry, mineral resources, agriculture and institutional changes were essential.



particularly by Dr Alan M. Bateman,<sup>7</sup> Head of the Department of Geology, Yale University, USA. In his address to the Science Congress, he showed how intimately the growth of the great industrial nations was connected with their surveys and exploitation of mineral resources. He demonstrated the great developments in USA in this field in recent years.<sup>8</sup> Dr Bateman was of opinion that thorough geological surveys in India were very necessary and were likely to lead to rapid development.<sup>9</sup>

7. Our work of the geological survey in India has been good but has been rather slow and not enough attention has been paid to its rapid increase. I think this deserves immediate attention, or else our future progress will be checked, apart from coming in the way of proper planning. Recently, we have asked for a full and intensive survey of mineral resources in Madhya Pradesh. This really should be extended to the whole of India, or a large part of it. In conducting this survey, Dr Bateman has pointed out that University staffs and young geologists can be utilised. With a little more equipment we might be able to go ahead at a faster pace even with existing technical personnel. I am enclosing a note on 'Conversation with Dr Bateman'.<sup>10</sup>

8. I suggest that the Planning Commission might pay special attention to these notes of the talks with Prof Bettelheim and Dr Bateman. All Members of the Cabinet are naturally interested in this important matter of planning, and we might, at a somewhat later stage, discuss these notes and the suggestions made in them at meetings of the Cabinet.<sup>11</sup>

7. Alan Mara Bateman (1889-1971); geologist, faculty, Yale University, 1913-59 and Chairman of the department, 1945-59; Head, special US Mission to Mexico, 1941-42; Director, metals & minerals, Foreign Economic Administration, Washington, 1942-45; Expert Consultant, SCAP, Tokyo, 1949; Adviser, ECA, ODM, Paley Committee; Author of *Economic Mineral Deposits* (1950); *Formation of Mineral Deposits* (1951), Editor of the *Journal of Economic Geology*.
8. Bateman said that the US Government after discussions with the scientists decided to encourage organised search for radioactive ores by lifting the ban on such search. A pamphlet was prepared by scientists and geologists on search for radioactive ores and given wide publicity. These led to the discovery of a large variety of ore deposits.
9. Emphasizing the need to encourage and provide the younger people with enough facilities for active field surveys and for stimulating the interests of lay people, Bateman suggested involvement of senior students, university staff, young geologists and use of latest technical methods.
10. This was a note by P.C. Mahalanobis on his conversation with Dr Bateman elaborating the points mentioned above.
11. Nehru sent these notes to V.T. Krishnamachari, Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission, Chief Ministers and Governors of States.

### 3. Self-Reliance for Progress<sup>1</sup>


Mr Chairman,<sup>2</sup> Gentlemen,

...You have mentioned that the Five Year Plan and the steps taken by the Government have laid the foundations for economic progress. I have no doubt that the people will realize this even more clearly in the days to come even if they do not do so now. It is difficult to perceive things which are under the surface. A foundation does not make the same impact as an edifice. So I think, taking into account the entire picture, what we have done so far is nothing to make us feel ashamed or frustrated. We have done good work. But I am in agreement with you that I am not satisfied with what we have done. I feel that we should make every possible effort to accelerate the pace of progress. We need your advice and guidance and help about this. There must be a constant search for a way—that is what occupies my mind all the time—for something which will grip the imagination of the nation. This is extremely important because ultimately, the journey that we have embarked upon is a journey of 36 crores of human beings. There is no other yardstick that I am prepared to apply. You have presented arguments in favour of private enterprise. I accept those arguments.<sup>3</sup> But I shall gauge them by the yardstick of how they affect 36 crore human beings. Anything that does not benefit them cannot work. That is the fundamental yardstick. You must remember that.

We have adopted planning and I feel that a great deal of our progress has been due to that. The important thing is that millions of people in the country have become familiar with this word and are aware, in varying degrees, of what we are doing. If every person was allowed to do what he likes, good work may get done here and there. But it is pretty obvious that it cannot have much of an impact. Leave aside the national problems. Take any big industry. If each individual has his own plan, it cannot work, we shall not go very far. Therefore a plan is drawn up to link the various aspects of it together. It is obvious that the same principle has to be applied when it concerns the national problems. Therefore people must understand the importance of planning.

1. Speech at the annual conference of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, 6 March 1954. *Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting, FICCI, 6-7 March 1954*. Nehru first spoke in Hindi and then in English. Extracts.
2. R.G. Saraiya, President of FICCI.
3. Saraiya had contended that large scale industry in the private sector created both direct and indirect employment, increased productivity of labour, improved the quality of the product, reduced the cost, increased consumer demand and maximised aggregate national income resulting in a much higher wage for the labour.





RECEIVING NATIONAL PLAN LOAN BONDS, NEW DELHI, 26 APRIL 1954



AT THE HOUSING AND TOWN PLANNING CONFERENCE, NEW DELHI, 1 FEBRUARY 1954



It is obvious that in order to plan, we must have sufficient statistics regarding the conditions in the country, its resources, etc. The more data we have, the more efficiently can we plan. Otherwise it will all be vague. Real planning is possible only when we have adequate information of every kind about the economic and social conditions. There has been a paucity of data in our country, but we had to make the beginning in spite of it. We have been gathering data as we go along. We drew the First Five Year Plan, and took up what we thought were the prime priorities in agriculture, industrialization, etc.

As I said, we have made a great deal of progress. But the First Plan had been drawn up without complete data and statistics regarding conditions in the country. Let me give you an example. Take the food situation. We found that the reports regarding the amount of foodgrains being produced were not correct. So we were misled when the Plan was drawn up and Planning Commission had to change the food target again and again when we found that circumstances had changed. So the Planning Commission faces great difficulties. But now we are getting more data and a true picture is beginning to emerge. Now that we have a better statistical base. We must now utilize this opportunity to draw up a more accurate plan.

What does planning mean? It means having a clear idea about what quantities of essential commodities and services are needed in the country and suggest how to produce and supply them. We need food for everyone, clothes, houses, education, health care, defence of the nation. All these things are essential. But we cannot do everything at once. It takes time. So we have to draw up a list of priorities always bearing in mind the need to alleviate the suffering of the people. With that plan before us, we have to go about systematically fulfilling those needs. We do not have unlimited resources and therefore we have to use what we have for essential things as far as possible—for production of food, cloth, defence requirements, health facilities, etc. Planning means doing things in a framework of the entire country and its needs, not just putting up a gigantic project because it seems impressive.

Now, there is a difference. You have laid stress on private enterprise and there is great scope for that in a mixed economy. Any individual in charge of a private enterprise pays more attention to profits and dividends. It is obvious that he will be more bothered about what will sell and yield more. But there is a difference between taking into account the genuine needs of the entire country and personal profit and marketability of a few goods. You may say that the needs of the people can be judged by what sells. But that is not quite correct. A starving man needs food but does not have the money to buy food. It would not be right to say that the country does not need food. When people have the purchasing power, then whatever they buy, if they buy something or not can be taken as an index. So there is a difference in looking at these problems and planning. There are 36 crore people in India. Their needs differ in so many

respects. Then we have also to take into account our limited resources and the best way of utilizing them.

I am putting some basic propositions before you for your consideration. Within those limits we must look at other issues. As you pointed out, private enterprises may yield more profit. I agree that private enterprises have done well in certain areas. I had told you last year<sup>4</sup> that private enterprises must not be shackled. They must be given the opportunity to develop and flourish. It is a different matter as to how they should be run and where they should be run, I concede that if you strangle their neck, they cannot function. But you must remember that when we are planning for the whole country, we have to keep in view both the public and the private sector. We can give a free hand to the private sector, but only within the Plan. If it is allowed to go beyond that, our planning will go awry. Therefore in strategic areas, some checks have to be exercised. Private enterprise cannot be given free rein. I agree that the frustrating obstacles must be removed and the private sector must be given full opportunities to grow. But controls are essential to keep within the ambit of planning, I want you to consider this.

First of all, we have to be even more careful in the Second Plan about the needs of the country. I agree with you when you say that there must not be too much emphasis on the regions. But we cannot allow any part of the country to lag behind even if it means more effort. The real meaning of economic development is the prosperity of 36 crore people not merely on paper but as a fact.

The other issue that you have raised is about village industries versus heavy industries. But in my mind there is no problem in principle. There may be difficulties in its application. There is no doubt about it that there can be no progress or increase in production of wealth unless new and improved techniques are adopted. I would prefer it if they are adopted on a small scale though heavy industries are also essential. It is obvious that locomotives or ship building industries cannot be cottage industries. Those will have to be in the heavy industries sector.

So we will have to develop heavy industries and adopt new techniques. There is no question about that. I also agree that that is the only way to reduce unemployment. But until we reach a stage where the heavy industries go into production, millions of people will have to undergo untold hardships and misery. It is an outdated concept that people have to perforce undergo hardships for the sake of future benefit. Even if you subscribe to it, in these days of democracy and adult suffrage, it cannot work. Therefore you have to constantly bear in

4. For Nehru's speech at FICCI annual conference, New Delhi on 7 March 1953, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 104-112.



mind the human factor and how it is affected by any step that we take. As I said, I do not want to create any obstacles in the path of something which makes for strength. I want to encourage such things. But if I am confronted with the problem of sudden loss of livelihood to millions of people, I cannot tolerate that. For instance, take the handloom industry, I cannot tolerate that 50 lakh people should be out of work and starving, no matter what principles you may quote. Some arrangement has to be made. It becomes a priority for the government because it is its duty.

So what is to be done? We cannot be tied down to old techniques for ever. We have to adopt improved techniques. But we do not have unlimited resources for development. We have to invest in the growth of higher techniques which generate employment. What are we to do if high techniques create unemployment in their wake? The problem has many aspects. There are many areas in which higher techniques lead to employment. We will invest in them so that everything is gradually turned into higher techniques. But we will not take any step by which millions of people may die of starvation. Ignoring the human factor is something no government can afford. I have no doubt in my mind about what you call higher technique or lower. Forgive me for saying this, but most of your textile mills are useless, outdated and dilapidated, using machines which may be termed higher technique in comparison to handloom but which are in fact useless. New techniques are being discovered. Within ten years, atomic energy has made all other techniques outdated. Even now you can use atomic energy except that it will mean greater expenditure for the next ten years. There is no doubt about it. We cannot progress without improved techniques. But the most important thing is the human factor.

I have talked about some basic facts before you. We must keep them in mind in drawing up the Second Plan. We need your help. We must keep in mind the needs of the country. I agree that we must look into the matter of the rate of investment. You can help a great deal with your experience. We must have confidence in ourselves and the nation.

I feel that India has great potential much more than what we think. We are somewhat pessimistic in assessing our strength. In the changed circumstances, we cannot use the old yardsticks to judge things. We need new yardsticks. It is not easy to attain the goals we have set before ourselves but I am sure we can do it. We must become self-sufficient and not depend on other countries as far as possible. I do not mean that we should quarrel with anyone. We want friendship with everyone. But we must not go around with a begging bowl. We must take stock of our latent potential and exploit it to the full. We must not think of money by the old yardstick but look beyond. We have to think of much larger amounts so that we are not dependent on others. That obviously means that we must all tighten our belts a little.

You have mentioned that the investor who puts in capital must get a fair

return on his investment. That is all right. But there are others who also hope for a fair return—the common people. It is becoming more and more clear as the nation moves that it is a question of partnership. So if we look at the broader picture, even if the return is slightly less, people know that there is justice. Everybody will be ready to tighten the belt. We can create an atmosphere in which the collective potential of the nation can be exploited to the maximum so that the people can benefit fully.<sup>5</sup>

...I thank you for what you said in regard to the present international or national situation that faces us. I am not speaking about India to begin with. Even looking at a much larger picture internationally, all kinds of very difficult problems face us, and in a sense it has become a struggle for survival for every country. Whether it is economic survival or some other type of survival, it is anyhow a struggle for survival. Looking at our own country, the more we go forward and add to our strength, the more the burdens we have to carry. That is a right which is inevitable. Every right has attached to it responsibilities and no right exists without obligations and responsibilities. The right of freedom itself brings obligations and responsibilities we have to carry. So, while we have made substantial progress in many directions, political and economical, with that progress has come additional responsibility and we have to shoulder that burden. For all of us, there is this struggle for survival. I repeat that because many of us are apt to be complacent about it. If there is one thing that is totally out of place in India, or for the matter of that in most other countries, it is complacency. Therefore, we have always to be on our toes, I might say, mentally and physically, and not to get lost in any groove of thought, which may not be really applicable today. The world has changed and has been changing ever since it began, no doubt, but I suppose it is true to say that the pace of change has quickened tremendously in the last generation or two. More especially, since the First World War, the pace has become hotter and hotter—the pace of technological change which affects society and its working, the pace of political change, and all that. One gets used to these things, but one does not realise the tremendous revolutionary age in which we live—change in everything. It is good to keep that in mind so that we become alert, because it is a struggle for survival, we are bound to understand it and to strengthen ourselves to face that struggle. Fortunately for us, we have potentially all the resources to do it—human and other. Nevertheless, it is no easy matter. You may have something potentially there but it is not an easy matter to use it fully to the advantage of the people. So, it is a difficult question and again it is difficult from the point of view of time. We cannot wait for a long period and go on in a leisurely way. We have to achieve certain objectives within a certain

5. Hindi speech ends here.



time. Otherwise, we will lag behind and various perils might overwhelm us. That is the background which must be remembered. Naturally something follows from them—the question of our functioning together, the unity of the country, so on and so forth, which is obvious. It is against this background that I say there is a sense of urgency about these things. We have to achieve results quickly—good, substantial results and not showy things. No country can be isolated today. Let that be quite clearly understood that certainly we, in the Government of India, do not think in terms of isolation. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly clear, if it was not clear before, that real progress depends upon the efforts that the country makes itself, by self-reliance. It is better that the progress is somewhat slower, provided it is progress and provided you are going in the right direction and that you are relying on yourselves, because if the spirit of self-reliance is not there, then, of course, there is no progress. The type of progress that we want in this country is not some temporary, statistical progress to show that we have made good in this area or that. Finally, it is the progress of human beings in India in every way that counts. That progress does not come if we go about on the crutches supplied to us by others all the time. It is true that sometimes one gets help. Anyhow, we must realise that we have to depend fundamentally upon ourselves in every way. We shall continue our policy of friendly cooperation with all countries that accept it, but reliance must essentially be placed on ourselves and that must be remembered.

Leaving out political and other problems, we are dealing with the economic growth of the country, which is so important and goes to strengthen us as a nation and to bring well-being to our people which is so necessary. It is a tremendous business to raise such a vast population from the relatively low level of the present. It is a big job and to imagine that we can do it by some magic formula is absurd. Nevertheless, it has been done, it can be done and it will be done, but always the yardstick for us should be how we are going to take these 360 million people forward. I might say that we are on a journey. The first was Independence. The next is the economic advance—and a substantial advance at that—of our people, and there is no end to that journey for any community or any group. There is no final goal and you always go on and on. On that journey it is not much good if an individual or a group reaches the end of the journey; it is the whole community of 360 million people more or less that have to reach the end of the journey. Therefore, the question is always to be viewed from that point of view. I said that our resources—potential—are great and I have no doubt that in the normal course of events, we will utilise them and benefit by them in bettering our people, but the problem is how to utilise them in the quickest possible way and the best way, not a superficial way. Sound economy—that is the problem. If we delay, other perils surround us, both external and internal—internally, the economic peril. We have a democratic Constitution or a democratic way of working. You saw two years

ago how we had big elections, fair elections, and you saw also recently the elections that were held. It does not matter if the elections went against us. I accept it because we have faith in the democratic way of working and because we want to raise our people in that way. We think whether it is in the region of politics or economics or any other thing, that way ultimately pays dividends and raises the human level. We shall continue in that way and we shall succeed—I do not know what the future will be—and because we have faith in that, we shall continue in that way. But, there is this time element. It is a very important factor. And while normally we could reach that goal gradually as other countries which had a long time of development for reaching it, present conditions in the world and in our country did not give us that long space of time; it has to be done much more rapidly—but solidly, not superficially. We cannot delude ourselves and the rest of the world by mere superficial show. Therefore, this is a question of planning. We have a Plan—we started planning three or four years ago. I think that this planning business has done us a lot of good. Firstly, we have made the country planning-conscious which is something. This kind of each person thinking individually and separately of doing odd jobs is good enough in its own way in planning. When the resources are limited one has to direct those resources to gain the best advantage. Our planning thus far was based on such data as we possessed which was very inadequate.

Just as I mentioned now, take food; our data was very bad. We are getting good data now. On the food front we have done very well, better than our planners thought, and we have come to a firm grip with the food problem and if I may say so with confidence, even if misfortunes come in we will have that firm grip—misfortunes of unusually bad harvest—we will have it. It is not merely a question of good harvest we have had but something more than that. The fact of the matter is that we have certainly got more land under cultivation but basically we have increased the yield per acre; that is the real thing. We have increased the yield per acre very much of rice; quite adequately of wheat. That is the real improvement. This very big problem which haunted us during the last two years and prevented us from going ahead in many ways—the food problem—may be said to be going well towards solution. That is a great burden off. Of course, we have to be awake, and careful and all that.

In one of your resolutions, you say something about having a reserve stock of food. I entirely agree. We are going to have it; we are going to have good stock this year and always in future so that even if some calamity befalls us next year we shall have a stock and face it. In fact as you know the difficulty arises—the other side of the difficulty—prices tend to fall too low. We have considered that because that affects large numbers of producers. However, the food problem is, if I may say so, in a happy state so far as we are concerned and that takes away one major difficulty.

I entirely agree with what you have said about our concentrating on the



growth of industries. Agriculture has, and will have, first consideration in our minds; but industry must be thought of in much more active terms. You talk about private enterprise and all that. I said last year that the private sector should be allowed to function satisfactorily; that is to say, it is no good having a private sector and tying it up hand and foot so that it cannot function; it is better not to have it. If we have a private sector, it should be allowed a certain obvious freedom of functioning. Nevertheless, the private sector has obviously to be a part of the National Plan just as the public sector and therefore, it must conform to the broad aspects of the Plan. Therefore, any talk of some kind of private enterprise doing what it chooses is completely out of place.

If we plan, as we must, what do we plan for? We plan for greater wealth and all that. Finally and essentially, we plan for the greater well-being of the Indian people and by that I mean the 360 millions—not a handful here and there. Therefore, the object of planning should be based on major needs of the country, of the people—whatever it may be—food, clothing, housing, education, health and the hundred and one things that people require. That is keeping a certain objective in view we have to reach this, whether it is five years later, ten years later or fifteen years later; we cannot jump to it going through it and planning accordingly, finding out our resources today. We know what our resources are today more than we did three or four years ago; nevertheless, we do not yet know all; we have not yet really obtained knowledge of the mineral resources of India today. Of course, we have got vast quantity of iron ore, coal, this and that; we have some knowledge; we have got it but I say, I have no doubt in my mind, that there are many hidden, unknown resources in India which we have not yet tapped. One of the things we must do is we must go ahead with much more rapid speed in regard to these various mineral and other surveys.

Talking about surveys, we want data, we want statistics for our planning and for everything. We have to go ahead with the sample surveys which under modern conditions give us very good data. It is these surveys that have given us much more data about food. Now, recently, after a long waiting, we are going to get to know something about the national income which will be very helpful because this is one thing which will give some idea as to what our future needs may be as our standards rise as incomes rise and we have to take steps. Take sugar; far more sugar is consumed today than it was previously. We produce more and even then there is a lack of it. More people take sugar; more people can afford sugar now, whatever the reasons may be. Planning has to be on that basis in future.

Then there is talk about cottage industry and big industry techniques. I can assure you that no one in Government is against big industry. We want big industry to develop. We want the latest and the highest techniques to develop. We want in fact far higher techniques to develop than most of you here are

generally used to. You are used to very ancient techniques and ancient machinery, and if I may say so with all respect, you are completely out of date in such matters. You are talking about higher techniques without knowing even what the latest techniques are. I want the latest techniques, and I am going to use atomic energy and upset all your techniques, one of these years. So, we are not against higher techniques. We want them—I would prefer them wherever possible—to be utilised in a decentralised form. I know you cannot do it, and sometimes one has to think of the other thing, but wherever possible, I should like it, just as you have electric power, in a decentralised form. It may be that when atomic energy is available for civil use, we may be able to use it that way. Essentially, the higher technique must come in. The only consideration against this coming in rapidly everywhere—and it is a very big consideration—is that it should not upset human beings in large numbers. It is a very important consideration that it should not create large scale unemployment. Higher techniques will create more employment, I accept it, but there may be a gap here for many years, and we cannot afford years and years of gap when people are starving and are unemployed in large numbers. Therefore that consideration is always to be borne in mind, and it should not really come in the way of our planning. We have got so many industries today that we should concentrate on the higher techniques in the types of industries which add to our employment, and not displace those who are employed. That is the way to approach this problem. We may have the lower techniques in the other industries, where large numbers of people are employed; as the higher techniques develop in the other types of industries, they can afford employment to others, and we can gradually improve the lower techniques too. So, there is no theoretical conflict in my mind. I accept the higher techniques everywhere, subject always to the human problem. The human factor can never be ignored. While we lay stress on cottage industries, village industries and the like, because we want to improve their techniques of marketing, etc., others want to use them so that large numbers of people can be employed in them, so long as they cannot be employed in higher techniques. That is the main approach. Of course, it has to be looked into much more, in greater detail.

Then your President mentioned something about a fair return to the investor.<sup>6</sup> That is true, of course. But as I said just now in Hindi, there are other people who want fair returns too. It is not merely the investor who wants a fair return, but your technicians want a fair return, your workers want a fair return, and the consumers also want a fair return; in fact, everybody wants a fair return, so that in looking at this business of a fair return, one has to see the whole picture,

6. Citing examples of cement, steel and electric supply industries, Saraiya urged upon the Government to readjust their concept of "fair return" and the basis for computing it in order to secure the savings of average investors in the industry.



and one has to remember that there are a number of social forces at work today, which cannot be and should not be ignored. They do look in the right direction, but they may go wrong occasionally, they may misbehave occasionally, but they are obvious developments of the age, we must understand them.

We have to work hard in future. Somewhere else I said once that this generation of ours is condemned to hard labour. That hard labour need not be unpleasant labour. If that hard labour is for an objective that is worthwhile, it is pleasant labour, but we have undoubtedly to work hard in whatever job or profession we may be. When the country is working hard, and one has got a difficult journey ahead, there is a certain incongruity in some people not doing so, but just lazying and indulging in ostentatious display. If I might use a colloquialism, it is bad form, and it is nothing else; it verges on vulgarity that when millions of people are struggling for the barest necessities of living, others should flaunt their wealth. I would say it is bad form, and certainly this business of flaunting is excessively bad form. I am afraid, Delhi at the present moment is not a good example to the rest of India, and people in Delhi consist of all kinds of official and non-official elements—I refer to both—when I see the type of feasting that goes on here, the cocktail parties and the rest, you will forgive me for using the word, I am disgusted.

Thank you.

#### 4. To Chief Ministers<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9th April 1954

My dear Chief Minister,

You will remember the resolution passed at the Kalyani Session of the Congress on "A Call to the Nation".<sup>2</sup> That resolution was not just a party resolution, but drew the attention of the country as a whole to the grave situation that had developed, both internationally and internally, and pointed out the necessity and urgency of our meeting it in an effective and united way. That call to the nation was generally welcomed, and there was a realisation that we should make a great effort.

2. Recent developments in the international field have brought home to our people even more the paramount importance of directing the country's

1. JN Collection.

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, p. 98.

energies and resources to the building up of the strength of the nation. The hydrogen bomb has become the symbol of the extreme gravity of the situation in the world.<sup>3</sup> We intend to keep out of war, even if this might unfortunately descend upon this world. But we cannot escape the consequences of world conflict and only our own internal strength can save us then.

3. In the Kalyani resolution, special reference was made to the raising of a development loan which would appeal to small investors. We feel that the present is an opportune moment for making a broad-based appeal to the country for the support of such a Government loan which will be specially meant for development. In view of the national emergency, I feel that the loan ought to be a national loan, intended to meet the requirements both of the Central and of the state governments. In this matter there should be full cooperation between the Central Government and the state governments and there is no question of any competition between them.

4. In consultation with the Reserve Bank of India, we have decided to issue a National Plan Loan on the 12th April, the lists for which will open for subscription on the 19th. The Finance Minister will intimate separately the amounts which would be available from the proceeds of the loan to the various states, which would otherwise have gone to the market this year.

5. Meanwhile, I write to request that you, your colleagues in your cabinet and government of your State should give the widest publicity to the loan and assist in securing the maximum amount of subscriptions for it.<sup>4</sup> We have to approach not merely the big investors, but even more so the people of small means. I have no doubt that, properly approached, there is a vast field in this direction for us to explore. Recent experience shows that where a person of small means is approached, he reacts enthusiastically. The measure of the success of the loan will be a measure of our self-reliance and of our determination to meet all contingencies.

6. Apart from getting subscriptions to the loan from a very large number of persons, there is another advantage in thus linking these numerous subscribers to the national plan and the development of the country. In this way, they become partners in this mighty undertaking and are likely then to take even more interest in it than they do now.

3. On 1 and 26 March 1954, the United States carried out tests of a new series of thermo-nuclear weapons in Marshall Islands in the South Pacific. As a result, radiation sickness was reported among the Japanese fishermen.

4. Out of the total subscription of Rs 61 crores till 15 May, the Reserve Bank had put in Rs 18 crores, the Central Government Rs 5 crores, the Bombay Government Rs 5 crores, the Imperial and other Banks Rs 17 crores, Insurance Companies Rs 2 crores and the general public the balance of Rs 14 crores.



7. I need not suggest to you the various methods of approaching the public. You will, no doubt, give thought to this and devise your own procedure. Among these methods should be the use of the AIR at suitable intervals. Public organisations should be approached to assist in this appeal. The point is that there should be a widespread and continuous appeal so as to make the entire population conscious of this effort.

8. You will no doubt address your district magistrates and other officials and ask them to give the fullest publicity to this appeal for the loan.

9. I am enclosing separately an appeal to the nation, on my behalf, for this National Plan Loan. This may be given suitable publicity and sent to such organisations, officials and non-officials as you think necessary.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. National Plan Loan<sup>1</sup>

The Government of India have today announced an issue of the National Plan Loan, for which subscriptions will be received all over the country from the 19th April and until further notice.

Both the Central and state governments issue loans from time to time. The present issue of the National Plan Loan, however, is something different and very special. It is a national loan and it covers both the Central Government and states. It is a loan especially meant for development purposes and for the fulfilment of the National Plan.

This loan is addressed to everyone in India. It is an invitation to all of us to join in this mighty adventure of building up new India. It is a way of showing that we shall stand on our own feet and not allow ourselves to be uprooted by the strong winds that might blow in upon us from any quarter. The strength of a nation ultimately depends on its economic and industrial development bringing not only greater production, but greater employment. All

1. Appeal to the nation for subscribing to the National Plan Loan, New Delhi, 12 April 1954. Prime Minister's Secretariat (PIB), 1954. Also from the *National Herald*, 13 April 1954.

else flow from this. We are firmly resolved to build up our nation and make India united, strong and prosperous, with friendship to all and malice to none.

The institutional investors, like banks and insurance companies and others, must, of course, give their massive support to this loan. But this is essentially a popular loan going down to the humblest amongst us, who should be as much a sharer in this great adventure as anyone else.

The world is full of talk and preparation for war and the latest symbol of this world of ours has become the hydrogen bomb. Do we succumb to this tremendously powerful symbol of evil and destruction? Or do we decide to stand on our own feet and be true to our own principles and cultural inheritance? That is the question which each one of us has to put to himself, and find an answer.

The answer is clear, but that answer has no meaning unless it is translated into terms of action, of building up India with all the resources that we possess, of money, of human intelligence and labour, and of the will for a great, united and cooperative effort.

We have much to do. But here, in this National Plan Loan, there is an opportunity for all of us to do something. I trust, therefore, that our people, whoever and wherever they might be, in state or district or tehsil or village, official or non-official, and to whatever group or creed or party they might belong, will associate themselves in this loan and thus give their answers to the challenge of the time.

## 6. Integration of India and Planning<sup>1</sup>

I am sorry that I am unable to be present at the Conference of Development Commissioners of the Community Projects Administration.<sup>2</sup> I am greatly interested in the development of these Community Projects and the National Extension Service and attach the greatest importance to them. For this reason, apart from others, I would have liked to come in intimate contact with the Development Commissioners, who have to shoulder a great responsibility in this matter.

1. Message to the Conference of Development Commissioners of the Community Projects Administration, New Delhi, 20 May 1954. JN Collection. Also published in *The Hindu*, 28 May 1954.
2. The four day conference began at Ootacamund on 27 May 1954 under the chairmanship of V.T. Krishnamachari, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission.



The last two years or so have, I think, justified this great experiment and both those who are in some sense connected with this vast undertaking and the general public have begun to realise the significance of this work. It is not merely working for some improvement in some selected places. The conception is much vaster. It means really covering the whole of this great country and building up a new India from the roots upwards. There can be no greater or more fascinating adventure than this. Those of us, who are partners in this work, must therefore have some sense of pride in it and a feeling of exhilaration that they are participating in a historic task.

The bigger the task, the greater the responsibility. This work has grown and continues to grow. It has already covered a substantial part of India and in the years to come we hope that it will reach every village in this country. Mere extent, of course, means little. It is the quality of work that counts and the spirit with which it is undertaken. Essentially, what we are endeavouring to do is to bring about a peaceful and yet far reaching revolution in this vast land of India. If we succeed, and succeed we will, then we shall have done in our generation something worthwhile and something that will deserve permanent record.

We have many dangers and perils to face and the greatest of these is complacency. If any of us feels complacent, he is out of step and has fallen out. We work in our respective areas, a village or a block or a project area or a state, but wherever we might work, we have to think of it as a part of the larger whole. We have to develop, therefore, an integrated view of our work, integrated in many ways.

Indeed, the entire world today demands an integrated view and if we do not succeed in achieving this, conflict and disaster may well descend upon us. But, for the moment, let us forget the world and its problems and think of India and her problems. These are big enough.

We want an integrated India not only politically but emotionally. The essence of planning is to bring about this integration through numerous approaches. Integration means cooperation at every level and an understanding that progress lies in the common effort. Planning means a close coordination of the work of the Central Government with that of the states. At the Centre there has to be that coordination between the manifold activities of the Union Government. Each ministry does not stand by itself; it is a part of the Government of India. So also in each state and so also as between the states and Centre. This idea of planning, coordination and integration should spread in village and town and State.

Community projects envisage a coordination of a number of activities. They cannot be separated or viewed as isolated activities. The object is to build the human being and the group and to make him and the group advance in many ways. Therefore, the activities in the community centres must be closely coordinated and worked to this end.

Officials and non-officials have both their parts to play in this work. Both are essential, officials should bring the experience of training and disciplined service. The non-officials should represent and bring that popular urge and enthusiasm which give life to a movement. Both have to think and act in a dynamic way and develop initiative. The official has to develop the qualities of the popular leader; the people's representatives have to develop the discipline and training of the official. So they approximate to each other and both should be guided by the ideal of disciplined service in a common cause.

We want good men at the top to guide this great movement. But we want even more good men at the village level. We have to train up scores of thousands of village leaders who have a measure of initiative and pride in their work.

I hope this Conference of Development Commissioners will not be afraid to consider our failings. It is only by looking at them frankly that we can get rid of them. I hope also that their meeting will bring about a new feeling of solidarity and enthusiasm among them which they will communicate to their coworkers all over India. *Jai Hind*.

## (ii) Industry and Labour

### 1. To Ravi Shankar Shukla<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
15th February 1954

My dear Shuklaji,<sup>2</sup>

We were much impressed by what you told us yesterday about the location of the steel plant and the necessity for developing Madhya Pradesh. But, after giving the most careful consideration to this matter, we felt that we had to choose Rourkela now.<sup>3</sup> Any other course would have involved delay. In the balance also, Rourkela was more suitable.<sup>4</sup> But I have little doubt that Madhya

1. JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh.

3. The Cabinet decided on 15 February 1954 to set up the proposed Rs 71 crore steel plant at Rourkela in Orissa on the recommendations of the German firm of Krupps and Demag.

4. The overriding consideration for location of the steel plant was the economics of production and distribution. The presence of a cement factory including a foundry at Hirakud, water supply from Brahmani river, and availability of iron ore from Singhbhum district went in favour of Rourkela site.



Pradesh has to be developed and that too, soon. We are, therefore, taking urgent steps to have a full enquiry made into the mineral resources, more particularly those of coal and iron ore in Madhya Pradesh. I hope this will lead to further developments.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. Foreign Experts for Small-Scale Industries<sup>1</sup>

...Jawaharlal Nehru: Apart from getting advantage from experts who are acquainted with cottage industries and small scale industries in other countries, the principal purpose was how to improve the technological aspect of these industries, i.e., we felt that enough attention had not been given to improve that technical approach.<sup>2</sup> We have the normal technical people dealing with bigger industries in other countries or even here and their attention has not been drawn so much to improving small industries and making them technically high grade. That is the main purpose but in addition to other things, they have advised us and I must say I had an opportunity of meeting them and I profited very much by the talk I had with them and the ideas they put forward.

H.C. Mathur wanted to know whether the Government of India was aware of competent Indians having experience of cottage industries in India and abroad and whether they would be more useful.

JN: The Government of India has not excluded any Indian or others experts. We take advice and expert knowledge from wherever we can get it. We have been trying to get it from Indian experts—sometimes good—and we have profited by it but this particular team was sent for a particular purpose and I

1. Reply to questions in Parliament, 23 February 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, *Official Report*, 1954, Vol. VI, col. 702. Extracts.
2. The Government of India had invited an international team of experts to look into the developmental possibilities of the small-scale industry sector and recommend on the question of setting up an institute of technology to facilitate its functioning.

think it has already been, to some extent justified. There is no question of exclusion and I would like to make it clear that the Government of India always welcome good foreign experts to advise us and we do not reject any offer. We do not take that narrow limited view that a foreigner should not be utilised or should not be consulted because he is a foreigner.

H.C. Mathur pointed out that services of Indian experts, who had a better opportunity of studying the same conditions outside, having knowledge of Indian conditions, psychology and Indian techniques, could have been utilised.

JN: They are constantly being made use of.

H.C. Mathur referred to Nehru's comment that the experts had already justified their work, while the Minister, D.P. Karmarkar had said that they had not submitted even an interim report so far.


JN: I submitted that I had met them and the first approach they brought, made us think that it is on profitable lines, just as many Indian experts whom we have consulted have also made us think like that in this problem.

### 3. Promotion of Handloom Industry<sup>1</sup>

For the last thirty-five years or so, a large number of us have been wearers of hand-spun and hand-woven cloth. That became a symbol of many things to us. While khadi made some progress, the handloom industry continued to be one of our biggest industries in India. Even today that is so, and the state and the people must pay particular attention to this great industry which gives employment to vast numbers of people and produces articles of beauty and artistry.

1. This message, drafted on 26 February 1954, was sent to H.V.R. Iengar, Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry and released to the press on 6 March 1954 on the eve of All India Handloom Week held from 7 to 13 March. The *National Herald*, 7 March 1954. Also available in File No. 9/148/54-PMS.





AT THE CENTRAL SALT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, BHAVNAGAR, 10 APRIL 1954

MARATHON RACE —  
KANYA KUMARI TO PEPSU





I welcome, therefore, every effort to promote the production and sale of handloom products. These efforts are necessary and desirable, but they must be backed up by a constant attempt to improve the techniques employed by the handloom industry. I think this is possible and, indeed, it is inevitable if we are to stabilise this industry fully and make it progress.

#### 4. To T.T. Krishnamachari<sup>1</sup>

Camp: Mandsaur  
7th March 1954

My dear T.T.,<sup>2</sup>

This is a belated reply to your letter of the 10th February about the proposal of B.M. Birla to start a steel plant with American help.<sup>3</sup>

Since you wrote to me the situation vis-a-vis American help has somewhat changed. However, I do not think that need come in our way at present at least. On the whole I agree with what the Finance Minister has written.<sup>4</sup>

You will remember that Dr. B.C. Roy is also anxious to start some kind of a steel plant at Durgapur. He does not suggest any Government help at this stage. Possibly this proposal and B.M. Birla's proposal are more or less the same.

I think we should certainly encourage further steel plants. But, naturally, if any burden falls on Government, we should consider it more carefully. There is demand for a steel plant in Madhya Pradesh which is somewhere in the picture.

Anyhow there should be no particular objection on our part to the consideration of any proposal without any commitments.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister of Commerce and Industry.
3. Espousing Birla's proposals, Krishnamachari had written that since the Government could not set up a steel plant on its own, in view of financial commitments to the German collaborators and progressive investment in other sectors, it should allow establishment of another steel plant by private enterprise.
4. C.D. Deshmukh had no objection to private parties setting up a steel plant, but was against any financial assistance that might be requested later from the Government.

## 5. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12th March 1954

My dear Rajaji,<sup>2</sup>

Please refer to your letter of February 2nd about your lignite quarry.<sup>3</sup> I have had this matter examined here and I enclose a note made by our Cabinet Secretary, Sukthankar,<sup>4</sup> which will give the present position. I am not sending you the other notes on the subject. But if you so wish, I can have them sent also.

It seems to me that there has to be a full investigation of this matter and a proper plan to work it before we actually start working. Certainly there need be no wastage of time in between. One preliminary enquiry appears to be essential and that is by the Geological Survey. We shall have that done immediately or as soon as possible....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(4)47-PMS. Copies of this letter were sent to the Cabinet Secretary, S.S. Bhatnagar and K.C. Reddy. Extracts.
2. Chief Minister of Madras.
3. Rajagopalachari wanted an expert in administration and organisation to examine and advise on regular mining and full exploitation plans of the lignite quarry at Neyveli.
4. Y.N. Sukthankar had suggested that technical experts from Germany and Australia should be invited where conditions of lignite quarrying were similar.

## 6. To T.T. Krishnamachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12th March 1954

My dear T.T.,

I am profiting by being in bed.<sup>2</sup> I am looking through some of my papers. Among these is a letter from you dated 16th February suggesting that the bonus

1. File No. 26(82)/49-PMS.
2. Nehru was indisposed after returning from Madhya Bharat on 10 March.



should be converted partly into higher basic wage.<sup>3</sup> I remember seeing a copy of a letter that Deshmukh wrote to you on this subject.<sup>4</sup> In this he did not approve of your suggestion.

*Prima facie*, I like your suggestion, though of course it is a little difficult to give a firm opinion without a full examination of the data. I do not know if Deshmukh had all the available data examined. Anyhow, if data could be collected, it would be interesting. There is of course a limit beyond which wages cannot rise without upsetting the industry completely. And yet, I think that the argument of the employers is not impressive and is short-sighted. They never think of the wage-earner as being possibly a consumer of their product.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Krishnamachari had written that the most prolific source of labour disputes was demand for bonus, which contributed to the creation of an extremely unsatisfactory and unstable atmosphere in industry. He suggested merger of bonus with the basic wages.
4. C.D. Deshmukh, the Union Minister of Finance, wrote to Krishnamachari on 4 March that a bonus should be residual after all costs, depreciation, and legitimate dividends had been met. It ought to be related to production and should be given as an incentive for more and better work and generally promote harmonious industrial relations. Krishnamachari's suggestion, he feared, might start a new controversy and drive the marginal and sub-marginal units out of business. He doubted the efficacy of the proposal in reducing industrial disputes.

## 7. To Lal Bahadur Shastri<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21st March 1954

My dear Lal Bahadur,<sup>2</sup>

I am sending you a copy of a letter<sup>3</sup> I received some days ago.

It does seem odd that this young man should be refused even an interview by any official of the Railway Board. I think you should enquire into this and

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Railways and Transport.
3. M.C. Ray, a Calcutta based businessman, had proposed to set up a factory to manufacture railway wagons, locomotives etc., which were still being imported. He complained about lack of interest on the part of the Railway Board in his proposal.

give a chance to this man to explain what he can do. It is possible that he cannot do much, but we must encourage young talent and not discourage it in this way.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 8. To V.V. Giri<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3rd April 1954

My dear Giri,<sup>2</sup>

.... As for reference of disputes to tribunals, I am largely in agreement with you and I think there is unnecessary reluctance sometimes to refer cases in this way.<sup>3</sup> There is, however, a difficulty. A tribunal tends to consider the limited problem before it and not the wider consequences that might arise. Government obviously cannot ignore these wider consequences. Much depends upon the choice of the tribunal.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 26(27)-PS/48, PMS. Extracts.

2. Union Minister for Labour.

3. On 2 April, V.V. Giri had written that the complaint of long delay in taking decisions regarding reference of industrial disputes to tribunals was not without justification. For example, he pointed out, the industrial dispute in the coal industry was referred to the tribunal after protracted negotiations with various ministries for over four years and after strike notices had been threatened twice.



## 9. To V.V. Giri<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
6th April 1954

My dear Giri,

... I really am amazed at the way we continue to function. Here is a question of the widest importance raising human issues, economic issues and concerning not only the welfare of the workers and the industry, but the whole development plan of economy of the country, and these people sit down in a tribunal and function pompously and deliver judgements without even trying to understand these issues.<sup>2</sup>

If this is the way your tribunals work, surely we shall have to find some other way, or some other persons, to deal with them.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 26(27)-PS/48, PMS. Extracts.
2. Nehru was commenting on the functioning of the Colliery Disputes Tribunal.

## 10. To T.T. Krishnamachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20th May 1954

My dear T.T.,

Damodara Menon<sup>2</sup> came to see me today. He is, as you know, one of the PSP people in the Lok Sabha or, to be more correct, he has practically left the PSP because he does not wholly agree with them. He has always struck me as a rather fine man.

He came to see me about various matters. In the course of his talk, he spoke to me about the coffee industry, he himself being probably one of the small producers or, at any rate, he was interested in the producers. He was rather anxious that the nominations made by the Central Government to the

1. File No. 44(70)/54-PMS.
2. K.A. Damodara Menon was one of the 19 PSP members from Malabar, who resigned from the party owing to differences with the leadership over the 'Aikya Kerala' issue, in February 1954.

Coffee Board should include representatives of these producers. I do not know what your views are in this matter, but the proposal seems to me, on the face of it, a good one and I pass it on to you.

Rafi Ahmed<sup>3</sup> spoke to me also about coffee. He had recently been to Malanad area and some of the other coffee growing areas in the South and has seen many people there. I suggest that you might have a talk with him and discuss this question. He told me that there was a large surplus of coffee with the growers which they could neither dispose of here, nor export. The figures he gave me were as follows; last years' production was 24,000 tons. There was also some carry over from the previous year. Consumption in India last year was 18,000 tons at the price fixed for the consumers. Thus there was a surplus of about 7,000 tons. This was not allowed to be exported in order to maintain Indian prices.

This year's production estimates are 25,000 tons and the consumption estimates stand at 18,00 or so. Thus the total surplus at the end of this year might well be about 14,000 tons.

Apparently, export is being allowed for 2,000 tons this year and the profit is to be used for reducing internal prices. This large surplus is straining the capacity of the producers greatly. They have to borrow money from the banks for the purpose.

Outside prices, apparently, are much higher than those in India and there is also a heavy export duty. It would be advisable, therefore, and profitable to both the producers and the Government if a much larger export was permitted this year. The coffee growers can take some profit out of this and Government will make a substantial amount out of the export duty. The prices in India need not go up because something can be kept over to control these prices.

The arguments appear to be logical. If there is a surplus, as apparently there is, it seems right to allow it to be exported, leaving some margin for adjustment here.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai was the Union Minister for Food and Agriculture.



## II. LANGUAGE QUESTION

### 1. To Abul Kalam Azad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12th March 1954

My dear Maulana,<sup>2</sup>

The President's Office has sent me some papers in connection with the deputation<sup>3</sup> which waited upon him recently on behalf of the All-India Anjuman-i-Tarraqqi-i-Urdu.<sup>4</sup> With these papers is also a long note sent by the UP Government on this subject.<sup>5</sup> I understand that this note has been sent to your Ministry directly, so you might have seen it already. However, I am sending it also to you for facility of reference, as it is a part of the papers sent to me by the President.

I should be grateful if you would kindly consider this matter, because we have to advise the President in regard to them.

There is one thing which I do not understand. This collection of signatures on behalf of Urdu has been going on for many months past, or possibly a year or two. I spoke about this matter to the Chief Minister of UP. At his instance, I asked some of the sponsors of this memorial to go and see him and discuss the matter, but apparently they never thought it worthwhile to do so. This is rather surprising, because the proper course would have been for them to approach the local government or the Chief Minister, discuss the matter with him, and then come up to the President.

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Education and Natural Resources and Scientific Research.
3. A deputation led by Zakir Husain, President of the Anjuman, presented a petition signed by over 20 lakh adult citizens. They demanded recognition of Urdu as one of the regional languages of U.P. and its use for specific purposes namely, i) as a medium of instructions of primary education for children whose mother tongue it was; ii) in applications to law courts and government offices, and iii) in publication of important laws, rules and notifications.
4. The Anjuman-i-Tarraqqi-i-Urdu (Hind) was established in 1903 and was split into two organisations after the Partition in 1947. The reorganised Anjuman in India sought to adopt all possible measures for promoting Urdu and popularizing its simpler form, the Hindustani.
5. With the enactment of UP Official Language Act, 1951, declaring Hindi in Devanagari script as the official language of the State, the demand for a similar recognition to Urdu became vehement. The Anjuman set up a Regional Language Committee in 1951 to collect signatures and to petition the President to issue a directive under Article 347 of the Constitution, asking the State Government to redress the linguistic grievances of a substantial population of the State.

It is, of course, a serious matter to suggest that the President should issue any directive, as suggested. That might well create some kind of a constitutional crisis, and, in addition, it would make the controversy even more acute and bitter, and thus actually injure the prospects of Urdu. It seems to me that the right way to tackle this question is in a friendly, cooperative way.

Anyhow, I should like your advice in regard to this matter.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To Morarji Desai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12th March 1954

My dear Morarji,

Your letter of the 8th March, about the language controversy.<sup>2</sup>

This question bristles with difficulties, both practical and psychological.<sup>3</sup> Logically, it is perfectly clear that Hindi must displace English and the regional languages should have full place at the same time. How and in what manner to do this is not quite so easy to determine. I have particularly in view the serious situation that has arisen in the south of India, where there is little doubt that the feeling against the North is becoming stronger. The objection to Hindi is one of the main reasons for this feeling. I am afraid that our Hindi enthusiasts have really encouraged this feeling in the South.

This matter was discussed at some length at the Governors' Conference recently held in Delhi, and Sri Prakasa<sup>4</sup> was quite alarmist about it. Obviously,

1. File No. 52(5)/50-PMS.

2. Desai, Chief Minister of Bombay, wrote that a Bombay Government order regarding enforcement of "the policy of adopting the mother-tongue as the medium of instruction in secondary schools and consequent restrictions on admissions to English medium schools", was declared *ultra vires* by the High Court on the ground that it contravenes Article 29 (2) (protection of interests of minorities) and Article 337 (educational grants for Anglo-Indian community) of the Constitution. The State had gone in appeal to the Supreme Court.

3. Desai suggested that the objectives of the Constitution must be secured by amending certain provisions for substitution of English by Hindi within 15-year period.

4. Governor of Madras.



in this matter, more than even in others, one has to carry people and cannot coerce them too much. The general view in the Governors' Conference was that in so far as the South was concerned, we should go cautiously about Hindi, or else the reactions would be grave.

In other parts of India, this same difficulty does not arise to this extent at any rate. But, to some extent, it may be there.

I do not see why we should insist upon English as a medium of examination. It has obviously to go as the principal medium. But I suppose it can and should continue as an alternative medium.<sup>5</sup> In fact, English can be claimed to be the mother tongue of a certain small percentage of our population, notably the Anglo-Indians. There is no reason why we should deny this fact.

Therefore, during the transition stage, I think that examinations should progressively be not only in English, but in Hindi and the regional languages.

The difficulty is that the regional language will not take the place of an all India language. Only Hindi can do so, and by laying stress on Hindi, we come up again with the difficulty of the South, which will feel that it is being put at a grave disadvantage.

This is one of those questions which, apart from being inherent in the difficulties of the transition period, brings in all kinds of emotional factors which cannot be ignored.

Anyhow, we have to face these questions and decide them.

As a matter of fact, so far as the state employment is concerned, I feel more and more that it should be divorced from university examination.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Desai had written that ninety per cent of Bombay students appearing for SSC examination "answer papers in Indian languages" and out of 1403 secondary schools, 1285 did not use English as the medium of instruction. He felt that the insistence upon public service examination papers being answered in English would result in such recruitment being confined to a "privileged class of students" and "a stage has been reached" when candidates should be given the option of answering papers in Hindi or regional languages.

### 3. To Ravi Shankar Shukla<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20th March 1954

My dear Shuklaji,

Thank you for your letter of the 10th March with which you have sent me a copy of your address at the Rashtra Bhasha Sammelan on the 7th March.<sup>2</sup>

There can be no two opinions about encouraging in every way the use and development of Hindi. The question to be considered is how best this can be done. There are two aspects to this question or perhaps three.

One is how to develop the language from the point of view of dictionaries, technical and scientific terminologies and other such like basic works. Another aspect of this would be to encourage translations into Hindi and from Hindi of classical works in other languages, whether Indian or foreign. A language is thus enriched from these other sources, new ideas come in and help in developing it internally. Good writing cannot be brought about by an order nor can a genius be produced by a decree, but the material to help people to develop and thus become good writers can be provided and other forms of encouragement given to writers. All this should be done.

The second aspect, important though temporary, is the replacement of English by Hindi as an all India language. This has to be done. Again the question is how best to do it without upsetting too much standards in higher education which are so important, and without creating an adverse reaction in many parts of the country which are non-Hindi-knowing.

This really leads us on to the third aspect which is about an anti-Hindi feeling developing in those parts of India where other great regional languages flourish. This is a very important matter and the judges of this cannot really be the people in the Hindi-speaking areas but in those other areas. If those other people develop this feeling, it does not much matter how much the Hindi-speaking people feel the other way or tell them that their fears are mistaken. A serious situation has indeed arisen in the South, more especially in the Tamil area where there is increasing resistance to Hindi because it is supposed to be an emblem of northern domination. I do not think this is adequately realised

1. File No. 52(5)50-PMS. Copies of this letter were sent to M.A.K. Azad, Union Minister for Education and Krishna Kripalani, Secretary, Sahitya Akademi.
2. While inaugurating the Rashtra Bhasha Conference on 7 March 1954 in Varanasi, Shukla referred to the difficulties in compiling technical terms in Hindi and suggested setting up a commission to make recommendations for progressive use of Hindi for official purposes of the Union.



in the north. The other day an eminent Hindi poet who is an MP, Dinkar,<sup>3</sup> paid a visit to the south and told me that he was greatly disturbed by what he found there. He said that activities of some of our ardent devotees of Hindi were actually doing harm in the south and frightening people there. In fact, he said that Hindi was doomed in the south unless we made a much more tactful and friendly approach. At the Governors' Conference held recently here, this question was discussed at some length because as you know, the President is very keen to encourage Hindi. The result of that discussion was that we should proceed cautiously and warily in the south and not allow any impression to grow that Hindi was at all trying to push out or subordinate the regional languages.

It is all very well for people in the Hindi-knowing areas to give expression to their opinion in strong language. But the test is not their opinion but the opinion of the non-Hindi-knowing areas. There are, as a matter of fact, all kinds of forces, apart from our Constitution, which inevitably are encouraging the spread of Hindi. To that end we add our own activities. All that is right and proper. But if we overdo this and create the slightest feeling of compulsion from the north on the south, the reaction injures the very cause we seek to encourage. So far as scientific and technical terminologies are concerned, it is obvious that we cannot have different technical terms in different languages in India, except perhaps for some common words. We should try to evolve a single terminology as far as possible, and that is bound to be a Hindi one.

You say in your address that the Sahitya Akademi does not pay particular attention to Hindi as an all India language and is meant to spread out its activities over all the Indian languages. That is partly correct, but only partly so. Any such Akademi dealing with all India must necessarily take into consideration all our literatures and principal languages. But, inevitably it will pay much more attention to Hindi, and in fact, Hindi will become a kind of focal centre. This must of course be done in a way so as not to produce that very reaction which I have referred to above. Indeed, Hindi is going to progress much more through its interaction with other languages in India as well as some foreign languages notably English, than in isolation. In some ways, more especially in regard to modern literature, some of our Indian languages, for instance, Bengali, are more developed and Hindi can well profit by that.

There are already a number of well-established literary organisations in

3. Ram Dhari Sinha Dinkar (1908-1974); famous Hindi writer; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-64; received Padma Bhushan, 1959 and Sahitya Akademi Award in 1959 for *Sanskriti Ke Chaar Adhyay*.

Hindi, the chief of which is the Nagari Pracharini Sabha.<sup>4</sup> To establish another literary academy for Hindi would be merely to overlap with these organisations and perhaps come in conflict with them. Of course, it is always open to literary men to do so if they so choose, but there would be no point in Government starting a special academy for Hindi. Government, of course, must have special Hindi departments to encourage Hindi, which is a different thing.

An important aspect of Hindi to which I have sometimes referred in my letters to you is the content of the language. There is today a vast Hindi-reading public, mostly not too well educated but knowing enough to read and write Hindi. These people are not catered for by our newspapers and even by most of our books in Hindi. It is quite absurd, I think, that our newspapers in Hindi should have such small circulations. They do not compare, generally speaking, with the Bengali or Marathi or Gujarati or Tamil language newspapers.<sup>5</sup> Why is this so? People have come to me who know a little Hindi and try to read Hindi newspapers. They know no other language. They complain that they do not understand much that is written because the language is difficult. I am quite sure that, if someone had the enterprise to issue a good Hindi newspaper in very simple language, understood by the average villager or the average little-educated person, he would develop an enormous circulation. The Bengali newspapers are understood by the least educated Bengali. Somehow our newspaper writers in Hindi have developed an ornate and intricate style which is certainly not easily understandable and is not even literary in the best sense of the word. Ornateness is not literary.

You refer to the universities of Madhya Pradesh not having been given representation in the Sahitya Akademi. I did not know about this, and I am enquiring.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Nagari Pracharini Sabha was founded in 1893 as a debating society in a college hostel in Banaras by some students to extend the use of the Hindi language and Nagari script; to improve Hindi and its literature; and to get Hindi recognised as a medium of instruction.
5. The circulation figures for daily newspapers on 1 January 1953 were: Hindi, 3.79 lakhs, Bengali, 2.40 lakhs, Marathi, 1.91 lakhs, Gujarati, 1.87 lakhs, Tamil, 1.68 lakhs. Yet, in view of the large Hindi-speaking population, the circulation of Hindi newspapers was one of the lowest.



#### 4. To Morarji Desai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22nd March 1954

My dear Morarji,

Thank you for your letter of the 19th March about replacement of English etc.

2. I am sending your letter to the Education Ministry. I should, however, like to make clear how I think about this matter. On principle, there can be no two opinions on the subject of Hindi replacing English as an All-India language, and the other regional languages growing in use and importance. I consider all our principal regional languages as national languages, and Hindi, as an All-India national language.

3. The question is how best to bring this change about. The language issue is always a very ticklish issue and rouses people's passions. Language is a very delicate instrument which cannot easily be forced. We cannot produce good writers or good books in a language by decree. All we can do is to create conditions which are favourable to good writing.

4. At the Governor's Conference, there was a long discussion on the reactions in South India on the language question. Sri Prakasa was quite alarmed with these reactions and pointed out that the position vis-a-vis Hindi was worse than it had been previously. This related to the Tamil area especially. Every attempt by Government to push Hindi was having a contrary effect.

5. We need not go into the logic of it but we cannot ignore the facts. We have to achieve certain objectives and if any action that we take actually comes in the way of such achievement, then it is not a wise action.

6. We have just seen the election results in East Bengal.<sup>2</sup> The complete collapse of the Muslim League was no doubt due to many causes, but one of the principal ones was the attempt to suppress Bengali in favour of Urdu.<sup>3</sup>

7. I am much concerned at the state of the mind of large numbers of Muslims in north India especially. They are deeply troubled about their future. Openings for them in government services, civil and military, are getting fewer

1. File No. 52(5)/50-PMS.

2. In a House of 309, the United Front won 223 seats while the ruling Muslim League got only 9 seats.

3. The major issues in this election were political autonomy and recognition of Bengali as the state language. The efforts of the Muslim League to impose Urdu as Pakistan's national language, hardly known in East Bengal, led to widespread resentment.

and fewer. Their business also has suffered. Our evacuee property laws are a continuous threat to them,<sup>4</sup> even though they may or may not be applied. Over and above all this, our general policy in regard to Urdu has created a very deep impression on them. This applies especially to U.P. and Madhya Pradesh. There is no question of a conflict between Urdu and Hindi and they are all learning Hindi, but partly governmental action and partly non-official agitation against Urdu has made it difficult for them. The other day, a representation signed by two million people, both Hindus and Muslims, was presented by a deputation headed by Dr Zakir Husain, to the President.<sup>5</sup> This was in regard to Urdu. The members of the deputation included several Hindus. The President was asked to issue a directive in terms of the Constitution for facilities to be given to Urdu, as a language recognized by the Constitution. Whatever the merits of this representation might be, the mere fact that large numbers of people feel that way is a very important consideration. These people have a sensation that they are being uprooted from the linguistic and cultural background and they present this and feel unhappy. It is no small matter for us to adopt a course which makes millions of people feel that way. Instead of helping and developing the unity and integrating spirit of India it works the other way.

8. In the Tamil areas in the South, the position is not at all good and even Congressmen there have a great deal of sympathy with the agitation for Tamil and against Hindi. As a matter of fact, there are many powerful forces working all over India in favour of Hindi. There is no doubt in my mind that Hindi will prevail all over India. The question is what is the best method to encourage this and not to rouse up antagonism.

9. The language issue has been a powerful one in many countries. In Ireland it played a very important part although Gaelic is hardly a spoken language by many.<sup>6</sup> In Switzerland,<sup>7</sup> complete equality is given to three languages. In

4. The Evacuee Property Law put severe restrictions on the sale/purchase of properties owned by Muslims. In a Cabinet meeting of 17 December 1953, Nehru had said that "there was little justification for continuing restrictions of this nature in regard to Muslims, when foreign nationals residing in India were free to dispose of their property in any manner they liked." He proposed liberalisation of the Law to which the Cabinet concurred.
5. See *ante*, pp. 91-92.
6. The Gaelic language is a member of the Goidelic branch of the Celtic tongue. In Ireland's efforts for a separate national identity, language played a major catalytic role. It was the avowed policy of the Republic to revive the use of Gaelic as a vernacular language, as against English, through compulsory teaching in schools since 1922, though its speakers were virtually confined to the western part of the peninsula.
7. In Switzerland German, French and Italian are the three official languages.



Yugoslavia there are, I believe, four or five official languages and two scripts officially recognised.<sup>8</sup> This has been done in a totalitarian country where the Government is absolutely supreme. Nevertheless, they are proceeding cautiously in regard to language.

10. There is also the question of standards. It is a fact that our standards have been going down and we have not got enough proper text books in various languages in India. Apart from the text books in higher education, many other books are required which are totally absent in our languages. We have to get them written or translated as soon as possible.

11. All these factors lead me to the conclusion that we have to proceed cautiously in regard to the language issue. This includes both the language and the script. I have been suggesting to Assam that they might adopt the Nagari script instead of the Assami, which is nearly alike to Bengali, but the Assam Government and the people objected to this proposal. If the suggestion was made in Bengal, there would be a furore.

12. We have to pass through the transitional period and during this period there is bound to be a great advantage in favour of the Hindi-speaking areas, from the point of view of service etc. Even if others learn Hindi, as they undoubtedly will, they are not supposed to know it as well as others whose home language is Hindi. All this leads people to think that there is a deliberate attempt to give second place to the non-Hindi speaking areas and more especially to the southern areas.

13. I feel, therefore, that we should encourage Hindi by developing it more and more rather than by official government action except where this becomes easy and feasible by consent. As for examinations,<sup>9</sup> I do not think we have arrived at a stage when we can replace English completely. What we can do is to allow option of papers to be answered not only in English but Hindi or the regional languages. All this is rather confusing and difficult but every transitional phase involves difficulties.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. In Yugoslavia three languages, Slovene, Macedonian and Serbo-Croat, were used in Cyrillic and Latin scripts.
9. Morarji Desai had suggested that the Union Education Ministry might announce its decision to "displace English as the principal medium in all examinations for public services or employment... and allow an option to answer papers in Hindi or regional languages."

## 5. Development of Hindi<sup>1</sup>

Shri Agnibhoj,<sup>2</sup> like Col Zaidi<sup>3</sup> just now, and Mr Dasappa<sup>4</sup> referred to controversies and conflicts. There is of course some controversy and conflict. The remarkable thing is that there is so little of it. I want you to think of that. It is really remarkable, over a question which raises not only heated argument but passion, how much common ground there is between everyone in India. Let us remember that, not merely the fact that we accepted in our Constitution and accepted it, after much argument, more or less unanimously—but apart from the Constitution, it is a fact I think that there is an exceedingly large measure of agreement in India about the major things. I know that there are some controversies and disputes and something (somewhat in the south), some feeling of revolt—if you like to put a big word—but I do not think that is really serious. It is always possible. So the first thing to remember is what a large and common ground there is of agreement.

In a question of this kind, there is bound to be different approaches. But I would beg everyone to remember that while there should be argument, there should be discussion, there should be no controversy of the aggressive and bitter type. I have not a shadow of doubt that if we approach this question in that rather hostile way to each other, the result is not advancing the cause we seek to advance, but raising hostility. It is not a question of deciding this by a majority of votes—many things are decided by a majority of votes of course—it is a question of creating a certain atmosphere in the country which is favourable to the growth of what we want to grow. Now, that is important all over India. It is more important—let us face it—in regard to the south for various reasons into which one need not go. I am quite sure that because of various factors, circumstances, etc., the south generally has widely accepted the decision in the Constitution and, what is more, not merely accepted it, but is acting up to it, may be, you may think somewhere the pace is slow, but still acting up to it fundamentally. And it is no good for people in the north to shout too much and say that you are not doing enough and all that. If any criticism is to be made, it should be made by people in the south of the south

1. Speech at the Congress Parliamentary Party Meeting, New Delhi, 7 May 1954. JN Collection. Also published in *Congress Bulletin*, 1954, pp. 164-174 and the *National Herald*, 17 May 1954.
2. Rameshwar Agnibhoj was member, Council of States.
3. Col B.H. Zaidi was member, House of the People.
4. H.C. Dasappa was member, Council of States.



and not by people in the north of the south. So, what I would beg all of you—and if I could address a wider audience, I would beg them too—to remember this tremendous achievement of ours in getting this vast degree of support and agreement over a question which bristles with difficulties. That is the main thing. And if there is argument, well it is natural; why should not there be over a question like this? The main thing is that we should always lay stress on this common agreement and not on the element of controversy or dispute, or rather treat that element of controversy or dispute as an argument between friends who may differ, but who, no doubt, will come to an agreement step by step.

Everywhere where this question of language has arisen, there has been difficulty. Languages cannot be put over by compulsion on considerable numbers of people. It can be done only by agreement, only by consent.

Today it so happened that I had a long talk with two eminent persons from Yugoslavia, a Minister of the Government there or rather an ex-Minister and another.<sup>5</sup> And he himself started asking me about this language question in India. Well, I told him something about it. Then I asked him about his country. As you perhaps know, there are three major languages in Yugoslavia, three major languages in two scripts. All the three languages are official, national languages in both the scripts. Every law, every official thing is printed in two scripts and three languages. Naturally, one of the languages Serbian is the dominant language in the sense that more people speak it and use it and it may in the course of time dominate the others, by just lapse of time. But he told me that we have taken very great care not for it even to appear that Serbian is the chief language and the others are not as important. About the medium of instruction and all that, he said it is completely the language of the area, whether it is Macedonian, or any other. I asked: "Do you not make Serbian or all these languages compulsory?" He said: "No, we don't even make it compulsory as a second language, because we want to create an impression of full freedom to develop their own language. Of course, as a matter of fact, Serbian does gain." I said: "Do you have examinations for your people who go into the services in all the languages or in one?" Well, he said: "No, no compulsion; they pass the examinations in their own languages."

Of course, it is true—I do not know, of course, but I believe there is not a tremendous difference between the three languages. That is true. It is not as if they are quite different languages, probably they are languages like Gujarati and Hindi or Marathi and Hindi or some other languages, nevertheless they are different languages. "So that", he said, "having had a lot of experience of conflict

5. Milentije Popovic, an ex-Minister and Mr Asokorac came to see Nehru with Gojko Nikolis, Yugoslav Ambassador in India.

over other matters, we wanted to create a feeling of complete freedom in this matter." And, mind you, Yugoslavia is a communist dictatorship, not allied to the Soviet Union, but nevertheless a communist dictatorship, that is to say it is an authoritarian government which can fairly easily impose its will, but wisely they have left matters to develop and they encourage all their three languages fully, not even making one of them compulsory. Educated people know all the three or know at least two.

So, I merely mention this to you, how cautiously wise countries proceed about these matters. Therefore, we must, in whatever we may do, do our utmost to encourage the regional languages and the all India language, Hindi, certainly, but always keeping in view that we encourage it constructively to create no impression of opposition to any other. That is all. If not, you immediately create difficulties for yourself and then fight for its life and you spend your energy in opposing each other. That is one point I should like you to remember.

Now, long long ago, when many of us were spending a good part of our time in prison, I had to think of my daughter's education. She was my only child. I could not look after her properly because I was not available as a rule, but I thought that she should have some kind of a grounding in Indian languages, not high class, may be, and I sent her to a Gujarati school in Poona, I thought she would get a background of Gujarati and Marathi by being there. She was a little girl then, but she did that. Not that she knows too much of Gujarati or Marathi, but she can understand them and generally she can easily pick them up. I sent her to Santiniketan where she got to know Bengali fairly well, naturally. Then circumstances—her mother's illness and what not—made her go to Europe. I sent her to a French school, not to an English one. She picked up French a good deal, she picked up casually a little German and a little Spanish too. My point was I wanted her to know some languages of India, not as a compulsory subject, but just to pick them up so that she may feel at home in various parts of India. I had no chance of sending her to south India, but anyhow, if I had the chance, I might have done that too.

Now, therefore, again I repeat that the principal thing to remember is the vast amount of agreement on this issue and for a country like India, the size of it, the bigness of it, the numbers of it and the variety of it in language, this is a feat unparalleled, I say, in history. Therefore, let us look at the problem in its proper perspective of agreement, not of disagreement, and then consider the other questions.

One fact which was stressed right at the beginning was that whatever step we may take, we must not create even an impression—or the fact, of course—that we are handicapping any people in the south. It is important because really it is that question that troubles people, that they might be handicapped in service, in business, in politics, in Parliament wherever it is, by some language which they cannot adequately master or adequately know, being made the passport to



further success or further advancement. That is the real fear at the back of the minds of people. You must remove that fear and you will see that there is some reference to that in the Working Committee resolution.

Another thing which is highly gratifying to me and to my colleagues is that the resolutions—the Working Committee passed two resolutions recently, a month or six weeks ago—have had a larger measure of approval and support than any resolution of the Working Committee that I can remember of.<sup>6</sup> Now, that again shows the wide measure of agreement in the country, I come back to that.

We have to be careful. Let us, as I said, constructively think of pushing Hindi and the regional languages. Again, when you think of this, Hindi has to be thought of in two ways, as a regional language on exactly the same footing as other regional languages and, separately, as an all India official or other language. The two are somewhat different, although they overlap of course, naturally because as a regional language you want to impose that richness on the all India language, you make it too difficult for the others. As I said, there is no hard and fast line between the two. In south India who has learnt Hindi as an all India language can easily develop more knowledge of it, you have opened the door to him. The first thing is to make him feel at ease in the official and other work that he does, whether in Parliament or in the Congress or anywhere else. He knows that much language, he is not out of it. The second is—which is open to him, there is no compulsion—to know Hindi as a fine language.

But many people think of trying to make the all India language a kind of amalgam of various languages. To some extent, that is desirable but there is a grave danger that if you make it an amalgam, it may become very well the bazaar language but not a literary language at all. It may lose all its vitality which a language has, because you take a word from here, a word from there and mix them up together. Of course, a living language is always a bit of an amalgam, but it is an amalgam of its own making, it has absorbed words, not so much as—Dr Raghuvira<sup>7</sup> will forgive me, but he is the big expert here and therefore I refer to him—Dr Raghuvira sitting down and making a list of words or other experts making them, which may be excellent logically speaking, but which are not natural growths of the language, or taking words from various languages whether it is Marathi, Gujarati, Persian or anything and pushing them in.

There are hundreds and hundreds of words of Persian in Hindi. As a matter of fact, many of you must know there are no two languages in the world nearer

6. These two resolutions were on the question of language and medium of instruction in schools and colleges, and examinations for All India Services, which were adopted by the CWC on 5 April 1954. See *post*, p. 261, fn. 3 and 4.

7. Raghuvira was a member of the Council of States.

to each other than Sanskrit and Persian. Vedic Sanskrit and old Persian i.e., Pahlavi, are almost identical. It is a remarkable fact to remember that there are vast numbers, thousands of words, with slight differences of course, which are common in Persian and Sanskrit because they come from the same root. So this idea of amalgam being created artificially is rather a dangerous idea from the linguistic or cultural point of view. I like an amalgam, I want them to come, but I want them to come rather by a process of growth and creativeness than to be imposed on each other in an artificial way.

Therefore, let Hindi be developed as a regional language, made as rich as possible, and a simpler form of Hindi, and a part of it be specially developed for all India purposes for people to learn easily. Let it contain whatever you may like: five thousand words, let us say, which is quite enough normally speaking, or six thousands or ten thousand words let them know and then the door is open. I do not call that basic Hindi in that sense, but a first big step of knowing Hindi. Well, let everybody or most people know that fairly easily and let the regional languages develop.

I repeat again that the whole approach should be a positive, constructive approach, not a destructive and hostile approach, to anything which raises hostility on the other side and the major question—for as I said, looking as all the controversies that exist—the real thing is the question of the south, i.e., south India, should not feel that it is going to be handicapped because of Hindi being made the all India language. I see no reason why they should feel so if we proceed in the proper way. It is not a question of your logically laying down something, it is a question of their believing that they are not handicapped, remember that, you must get them to believe that they are not handicapped.

Then one test of course of the languages—I think Dr Raghuvira used the word—is: does it help in the advance in knowledge? That is important. Dr Raghuvira yesterday said much out of his deep knowledge of this subject which must help all of you to consider it in various aspects. Of course, there is one aspect which always comes to me when an expert in anything, and more specially a linguistic expert, is talking. It is just like a botanist who will tell you all the names—Latin or Sanskrit—of the flowers, without perhaps understanding the flower itself. You know the simple lines:

A primrose by the rivers' brim  
A yellow primrose was to him  
And it was nothing more

There is that danger in experts like Dr Raghuvira.

Having said that, what Dr Raghuvira said was very much to the point in the consideration of this problem. It is not that you can ignore what he said. It is to the point. It is, if I may say so, equally wrong for us in a wholesale way to talk about adopting international phraseology, as it would be of rejecting it. They are both wrong. We have to consider this question to some extent naturally



from the scientific and logical point of view which Dr Raghuvira advanced but also to a large extent from other practical considerations.

Now, whatever we may adopt, there is a certain advantage of course a minimum—for the next ten years or so in dealing with scientific and technical terms, to adopt what is called the international terminology, always subject to this that we do not adopt it wholesale—pick and choose what is suited—but the other important point is that within the confines of India whatever scientific and technical terms you adopt should, as far as possible, be common—leave out French and German and Latin—but in India at least we should try to develop a common phraseology for the languages of India. Because if they differ even here, then it is a great nuisance and a great burden.

Now, if you keep all these factors before you, then it is really not a question of laying down any hard and fast rule, but reasonably, logically people thinking about it and trying to evolve something which, for my part, I would not, even that way, consider as a rigid thing—of course, much of it, eighty, ninety per cent would be common, but it may be that 10 per cent requires change later. An attitude of rigidity in these matters is wrong.

Mr Gadgil<sup>8</sup> said something that his test was what is easily acceptable to the people. That is a very good test, but, of course, that test applied to technical terms does not help. Naturally somebody has to decide that. Now, we talk about advancing the cause of Hindi in various ways and we should. The fact of the matter is that languages are advanced by many national activities. Among the most powerful factors advancing the cause of Hindi today are the films and the radio. Naturally, more and more people see them not only in India, but even outside India—our films go to East Africa and elsewhere—Hindi gradually gets known by them.

I would therefore beg that in future whatever arguments you may have about this matter, to keep these points in view. The first is always remember and lay stress on the tremendous agreement on an unparalleled scale in this matter and less on the differences. Secondly, let us consider, that does not mean that we should not discuss the differences, but remembering the big agreement, then we calmly consider in a reasonable way the various view points—whether it is the content of Hindi or whether it is the content of the all India language—and always give a place and due importance to all the regional languages of India.

It is not a question of Hindi being, let us say, better than Bengali or Tamil. Not at all; the sole question is that from a practical point of view Hindi was the only possible all India language. Tamil might be a better language, a richer

8. N.V. Gadgil was a member of the House of the People.

language. This is not a matter for us to argue. I do not know all these languages and I cannot say, but I do know that Tamil is a great language, that Bengali is a great language, so also other languages in India. So that there is no question of Hindi being better, but in the circumstances it is the only suitable all India language.

As for the growth of the language, all our regional languages will grow naturally, and it is not ultimately by the lexicographer that a language is made. After all language gives clothing to a concept, to an idea. if we have those concepts and ideas, if our writers and poets, essayists and novelists and historians and biographers have those ideas in them, well they will flow out in their language. You cannot create ideas by putting a word there—it is an empty word. And, therefore, as I said yesterday, words are powerful things not because you have suddenly created a word but because they represent the power of all kinds of ideas in them. Amazing power the word has. If it is a good word, it survives.

So, I have ventured to put some considerations before you in regard to this language question.

## 6. To Govind Das<sup>1</sup>

Camp: The Retreat,  
Mashobra, Simla  
26th May 1954

My dear Govind Dasji,<sup>2</sup>

...I have received your letter of 24th May.<sup>3</sup> As you know, there are a number of organisations at present, both official and non official, which are especially interested in the progress of Hindi. We should see that these organizations work efficiently and produce results. It is not clear to me what a statutory commission can do in this matter. Commissions are appointed for controversial issues. In fact, the appointment of the commission might well lead to petty controversies assuming big proportions. The commission would roam about all over India and take evidence, and in this evidence all kinds of contradictory things might

1. File No. 52(5)/50-PMS. Extracts.
2. Member, House of the People and President of the Hindi Association of Parliament.
3. Govind Das had suggested that a statutory Hindi commission should be created on the lines of States Boundary Commission or Delimitation Commission. It should be empowered to devise means for the evolution, propagation and implementation of Hindi as the state language of the country with sufficient funds at its disposal.



be said. The result will be an impression that this matter is one of controversy. That would be unfortunate.

Whatever you say should be done without a commission, but in other ways.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### III. EDUCATION

#### 1. To Bhimsen Sachar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
19th February 1954

My dear Sachar,<sup>2</sup>

A number of Punjab publishers have sent me a letter on the subject of what is called "nationalisation" of educational text books. They have also sent me a number of text books so printed recently.

This is none of our concern and I have no desire to interfere in this matter. But since it has been referred to me, I am writing to you my own reactions.

It should be our duty to produce good and cheap text books for students, more especially for the primary and secondary classes. To exploit the students for private advantage is bad. Also the quality of the books has to be improved and great care taken in regard to the contents. For this reason I have been opposed to the private publication of text books, especially for the lower classes. I think that there should be no element of private profit in this. And this is eminently a subject for government to organise itself. When I say government, I do not mean that this should be done completely departmentally as the education department of a government need not be fully suitable for this work. I would appoint a high class committee of educationists to get such books prepared and then should publish them in a government press at the cheapest possible price. There would be no royalty on these books and no competition between various private presses to print them. Of course, the persons preparing will be paid for their work.

To use the word "nationalisation" in this connection has no particular meaning.

1. JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Punjab.

I find that the new books that have been published in the Punjab, under the scheme of nationalisation are badly got up and are full of mistakes. Also that they are not at all cheap. A complaint is thus made that in the name of "nationalisation", books are given to special private printing presses who might be favoured. Thus there is not much difference between the previous system and the new system except that patronage is exercised in a different way.

It is just this element of patronage which was sought to be avoided by the state taking over from private firms. In this matter, as in others, one should always avoid any appearance of favouritism and patronage. And, of course, the object is first class text books and as cheap as possible. A time may come when we might give text books in the lower classes free.

I am sending my reactions in this matter as it has been referred to me. I do not want the Punjab Government to be accused of favouritism in this matter.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
19th February 1954

My dear Deshmukh,

Your letter of February 8<sup>2</sup> about the University Grants Commission reached me when I was on tour in Travancore-Cochin State. On my return I went to Pepsu, hence the delay in dealing with this matter. I do not know if any further steps have been taken in regard to it.

2. You will remember that we laid it down clearly that the University Grants Commission would practically have the final decision in regard to grants to Universities.<sup>3</sup> They were not to function under any Ministry but would deal

1. File No. 40(52)/56-57 PMS.
2. Referring to a resolution passed by the UGC on 12 January 1954 for grants to be paid to various universities to enable them to increase the salaries of lecturers and professors, Deshmukh wrote that the Finance Ministry's budget had no provision for such grants. He also questioned the right of UGC to take such a decision.
3. The University Grants Commission was constituted on 15 November 1953 with S.S. Bhatnagar as Chairman and A. Lakshmanswamy Mudaliar, N.J. Wadia, Narendra Deva, K.G. Saiyidain and K.R.K. Menon as members, to advise the Central Government on coordination of facilities, maintenance of standards, examine the financial needs of the universities and allocation of funds for grants-in-aid.



directly with the Ministers concerned. The whole object of appointing this Commission was to give them this freedom of action, within the limits of the allocations made. The Commission, as constituted, consists of some of the most eminent educationists in India. These people made it clear to us that there was no point in their functioning unless they were given authority to act. We assured them that they would have this authority. Even though in theory they were an advisory body.

3. I have made it clear to the Education Ministry that the Ministry, as such, should not interfere at all in the work of the University Grants Commission, which would deal directly with the Minister.

4. Therefore, we call their decision a recommendation or a decision, in effect, it has to be treated as a decision, unless there is some grave irregularity. Probably some members of the Commission would not care to continue in it if they were not assured of this position.

5. The actual proposal, on the face of it, appears to be very fair. In fact, it might be considered to be a very modest proposal. There is no doubt that our university professors and lecturers are paid at a very low rate. Compared to people in other services, they are very badly off. It is generally recognised that this is not good for education and that one of the urgent reforms necessary in our university system is to increase their salaries. There has been a great deal of talk about our universities and their failings. We have been criticised for not giving effect to the recommendations of the Universities Commission. I have no doubt that little can be done in the universities in the shape of reform, unless we begin with professors and teachers, who are responsible for the running of the universities. To allow them to remain discontented and frustrated is to injure the cause of education.

6. We are having enough trouble in Calcutta at present about primary teachers' salaries.<sup>4</sup> The demands of those teachers are legitimate and one must sympathise with them, even though there may be some difficulty in giving full effect to them. The result of delay in dealing with that matter has been to create a very bad situation and, in fact, ninety per cent of their demands have been conceded. Instead of having done this gracefully, it has been done under pressure and with a lot of bad blood and a trail of bitterness which will come in the way of primary education in Bengal.

7. The other day I addressed a Primary Teachers' Conference at Nagpur.<sup>5</sup> They were all very discontented and were on the verge of taking strong action.

4. Teachers of non-government secondary schools in West Bengal, went on strike from 10 to 21 February 1954, demanding full implementation of the recommendations of the State Board of Secondary Education regarding scales of pay and dearness allowance.

5. On 5 January 1954, See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 183-186.

I expressed my complete sympathy with them and tried to explain the position. They were good enough to accept my advice.

8. So far as university professors and lecturers are concerned, both logic and justice as well as practical considerations lead to the conclusion that something must be done very soon. I think, therefore, that, on the merits, the decision of the University Grants Commission was justified and a good one. Even if I was not quite clear about it, I would abide by the decision of eminent experts, who themselves deal with universities. That indeed is the whole purpose of the University Grants Commission.

9. I do not think any policy decision on this question by Government was or is necessary. Official commission have considered this matter and there has been general agreement on this issue. Apart from this, it is for this very purpose that Government has appointed the University Grants Commission who are experts in this field. There would be little point in having that Commission if our Ministries over rode their decisions or recommendations.

10. The fact that there is no special provision for this particular item in the current year's budget is understandable, because there was no University Grants Commission then and this matter was not considered separately. The whole point is whether this means an addition to the block grants that you are placing at their disposal. The details of expenditure of that block grants should rest with the Commission who are the best judges. As a matter of fact, I see from some papers which the Education Ministry has forwarded to me that this proposal does not involve any fresh allotment. Some of the universities are actually paying what is suggested. Actually, therefore, not much money is involved and what might be involved is going to come out of the monies already made available.

11. It is suggested that this would lead to demands from professors and teachers of colleges and aided institutions. That may possibly be the result. But, even by itself, that is hardly a reason for refusing to agree to something that should be done. As a matter of fact, there is some reason to justify a different rate of payment to professors and lecturers in the university from that made to teachers in colleges. Anyhow, that has been left for separate consideration.

12. There is considerable differentiation today in our rates of payment, and professors and teachers compare very badly with other services. No one proposes that other high salaries should be reduced to fit in this.

13. I am rather concerned that at the very first meeting of the University Grants Commission, the difficulty we had tried to provide against has cropped up. We had stated fairly clearly that the Commission would have freedom to decide except in a matter of gross financial irregularity. If that is not so, then the whole structure of the Commission has to be reconsidered.

14. It seems to me, therefore, that from every point of view we should



give this full freedom to the Commission, subject only to the total finances that we make available to them, which has to be decided having regard to our general financial condition and like considerations. But as to the manner of spending that grant, the decision must rest with the Commission.

15. I have spoken to the Education Minister about it and he agreed with me. I have consulted Dr Radhakrishnan also, who is our biggest authority on education and was Chairman of the University Commission. He also was strongly of this opinion.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21st April 1954

My dear Bidhan,<sup>2</sup>

I have been functioning as some kind of a post office between you and Amrit Kaur.<sup>3</sup> I have forwarded some of your letters to her and some of her letters to you. These related to some argument as to who should be responsible for post-graduate medical studies.<sup>4</sup>

I did not apply my mind to this very much at the time. Naturally, your opinion on this subject would be of the greatest value because of your great experience.

I have been thinking about this however. I am not much concerned with the purely legal aspect, because that is not important. The real question is how we should maintain high standards in medical education. Obviously, these standards are going to be set by the post graduate studies. They will be the key to the under graduate standards. It seems important therefore for us to take every care to see that post graduate medical education is kept on a high level. We have had unfortunate experiences about many of our universities which

1. File No. 28(83)/54-PMS.

2. Chief Minister of West Bengal.

3. Union Minister of Health.

4. The correspondence dealt with the proposed legislation for the establishment of a statutory body for postgraduate medical studies. Amrit Kaur had written to Nehru on 12 April 1954 that B.C. Roy did not discuss the legal aspect of the legislation and that he was trying to prejudice Nehru's mind against his colleague.

function more as political arenas than educational institutions, or there is just personal rivalry between people. We had just this trouble in Visva-Bharati; it has been also in Allahabad and Lucknow. Democracy is a good thing, but there might be too large a dose of it when we reach higher studies.

The question is whether the Indian Medical Council, as it is at present, is capable of adequately discharging the duty of supervising post graduate studies. Many members of this Council are presumably not connected at all with post-graduate studies. Universities vie with each other in setting up courses for which they are not fully prepared. Standards suffer.

It seems to me that some small competent body would be far better for this work of supervision of post graduate studies. This small body could have, apart from representatives of the Indian Medical Council, top men in the profession. Such a body would be less effective by political or like pressures. We are just on the eve, I think, of advances in medical research in India. Indeed, I am told that there has been an upsurge of this kind here already. The research that is being done in India has largely been done under the auspices of the Council of Medical Research. We should like to encourage this.

In 1947, I am told, there were seventeen medical colleges in India. There are thirty-three now and there are likely to be fifty soon. New colleges are set up without proper equipment and standards go down. There is continuous pressure on the Indian Medical Council which decides, naturally by a majority. There is canvassing and again all this results in a deterioration in standards.

Recently, the Indian Medical Council passed a resolution to have a double shift system. This was done by a very small majority of one or two. I understand that most universities have not accepted this. This itself indicates that various pressures will be at work in a large organisation like the Indian Medical Council. Perhaps, we cannot help it, and we have to face this, as elsewhere. But we might at least keep post graduate studies above these pressures. Otherwise, the whole future of higher medical education may be affected.

We are on the eve of advances in medical research in India. I am very anxious that we should not make this suffer in any way, or give them a wrong trend which it will be very difficult to change later. As it is, our whole system of education has become a terrible headache for us and we cannot easily change it, much as we try. If we tie up this new development of post graduate medical studies, that too will suffer from the general confusion.

I thought I ought to let you know how my mind has been working about these matters. I am so thoroughly tired of present day education in India—high school, college and all that—that I do not wish it to be duplicated any more anywhere.

Yours,  
Jawahar



#### 4. Improvement of Educational System<sup>1</sup>

...2. In the brief note<sup>2</sup> of the Education Secretary above, reference is chiefly made to the percentage of expenditure by the state governments and the Central Government on education.<sup>3</sup> This does not seem to me a very profitable line of approach. Expenditure on education as well as on other subjects has to be balanced not merely by percentages, but taking into consideration many other factors. It is known that for various reasons, some beyond our control, the actual allotments made for education could not be fully utilised.

3. The real question therefore is not the percentage but what is essential for improving the educational system and how far this can be raised from our present resources.<sup>4</sup> Those resources are limited and it is always a question of doing something at the cost of something else. Planning involves putting some kind of an ideal or objective before one which affects all the sectors of the national economy, which are coordinated to this end. Therefore, an overall view has always to be taken, and no one subject can be isolated from another. As is mentioned in the note, much of the frustration caused today is due to lack of employment to those who pass through our schools or colleges.<sup>5</sup> That means that either the type of education we give does not fit in with the type of employment that is available or that, in any event, more employment has to be created. It is a well known fact that in some branches of employment there is an acute lack of suitable persons. Thus, we want thousands of overseers and

1. Note, 30 May 1954. JN Collection. Also available in File No. PC (VI)E/15/54. Planning Commission. Extracts.
2. The note, dated 26 May 1954, by Humayun Kabir, dealt with the proposals of the Education Ministry for improving university standards and for checking indiscipline among students.
3. Kabir had written that the proposed expenditure of Rs. 167.7 crores on education formed 15 per cent of the total Central and state budgets.
4. The note attributed the fall in standards and growing indiscipline to the loss of leadership by teachers at all levels. Unfavourable teacher-student ratio, growing economic difficulties and a general loss of idealism were, the note pointed out, responsible for the fall in the quality of teachers.
5. The note said that the main reason for unrest and discontent among students was frustration due to their inability to use their education in earning a livelihood. The pressure on the colleges and universities which led to overcrowding and consequent indiscipline, was due to the insistence on the possession of a degree as a passport to government or private service.

we cannot find them. Nor does our normal education produce them in adequate numbers. Many other instances can be given of this type. This means fitting in the educational system to the type of work required, apart from a general grounding which should be common to all.

4. As for extending opportunities of employment, this means extension of various forms of development in the country—industrial, transport, social services, agricultural, etc. Any planning which ignores this and only lays stress on training people who cannot find employment will come up against a dead wall. Therefore, these questions have to be considered together.

5. There are apparently some improvements which can be effected without any considerable additional outlay in expenditure. There are others which require some additional outlay, though not very much. There are others yet again which make a very serious inroad on the national finances.<sup>6</sup>

6. The first two should not be difficult.<sup>7</sup> The third undoubtedly would create difficulties because it would mean giving up some of the development schemes which are considered essential not only from the wealth producing point of view, but also from the point of view of giving employment.

7. I have mentioned some aspects of this matter which might be borne in mind. I am not presuming to discuss the draft note for the Cabinet in any detail.

6. The suggested improvements were: raising of salaries of teachers, pupil-teacher ratio; opening up national professorships, scholarships for teachers and students; conducting headmasters' seminar; interest free loans to universities to construct hostels and teachers' quarters; health benefits to teachers etc.
7. The first two suggestions were for upgrading the salary scales of teachers at the elementary, secondary and university levels, and recruitment of additional teachers for raising the ratio of teachers to pupils.

## IV. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

### 1. Review of CSIR Work<sup>1</sup>

I am sending you a copy of the report of the Second Reviewing Committee of

1. Note to Chief Ministers and Ministers of Central Government, New Delhi, 5 April 1954. File No. 17(220)/50-PMS.



the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research.<sup>2</sup> According to our rules, there is a general review of the activities of the Council and, more particularly, of the national laboratories and research institutes, which are run under its supervision and general control. The Second Reviewing Committee had, for its Chairman, a distinguished scientist, Sir Alfred Egerton, FRS.<sup>3</sup> The Report<sup>4</sup> gives an account of the various national laboratories and institutes, praises the work done there, and at the same time points out certain deficiencies and make suggestions for improvement and future work. This Report will be of interest to you, as it gives a broad survey of our scientific activities and the direction in which they are going. It makes valuable suggestions, to which we shall give careful consideration.

Normally, such a report should be considered by the ministry or department concerned and put up before the Cabinet or Parliament with Government's comments. In the present case, however, I think that it is desirable to circulate this report at an early stage and place some copies on the table of Parliament, even while we are giving consideration to its recommendations. I am, therefore, sending it to all Ministers of the Central Government and Chief Ministers of States. I shall place copies on the table of the House soon.<sup>5</sup> The report will of course be circulated to all our national laboratories and research institutes.

Later, I shall put before Cabinet a note on the steps that we propose to take in regard to the recommendations made in this report.

2. The Committee, comprising Alfred Egerton as chairman, Gaston Dupouy, S.N. Bose, Shri Ram, M.D. Chaturvedi, B.R. Batra and A.L. Mudaliar as members, was appointed by the Prime Minister to report on the Council's activities during the past five years. The committee submitted its report on 3 April 1954.
3. Alfred Charles Glyn Egerton (1886-1959); Professor of Chemical Technology, Imperial College of Science, 1946-52; Secretary of the Royal Society, 1938-48; Chairman, Scientific Advisory Council to Minister of Fuel and Power, 1948-53; Director, the Salters' Institute of Industrial Chemistry, 1949-59; Fellow, University College and Imperial College, London; Emeritus Professor of Chemical Technology, University of London, 1952-59.
4. The report pointed out absence of better coordination among various wings of the research organisations, which did not encourage Industries to take appropriate advantage of such research. It recommended appointment of competent liaison officers and strengthening of the National Research Development Corporation to facilitate a coordinated, all round growth in industrial output.
5. The report was placed on the Table of the House of the People on 6 April 1954.

## 2. Importance of Fundamental Research<sup>1</sup>

Mr President,<sup>2</sup> Kastur Bhaiji,<sup>3</sup> *Bahnon aur Bhaiyon*, I had come to Ahmedabad two and a half years ago<sup>4</sup> and was brought to see the work being done here.<sup>5</sup> I liked what I saw. For one thing, the goal seemed a worthy one as also the work that was being done. Since then I have been getting occasional reports about it. It has gradually expanded its sphere of activities and its contacts with the Government of India. So I knew about its progress, but when I came here I was a little surprised to see the beautiful building standing here—not because a building has been put up, for that is being done all the time, but its interior and exterior have impressed me tremendously. I would like to say that the architects, who were responsible for building this, have done very good work and are to be congratulated.

Well, buildings do not achieve anything. It is true that everything must have a suitable garb and our laboratories especially require proper buildings. I do not want that money should be wasted unnecessarily. But these laboratories of ours, here, as well as the Physical Research Laboratory<sup>6</sup> of ATIRA, are all research institutions which will help us to plan for the future. In a sense, these national laboratories and research institutes, etc., are a bridge between the present and the future and will help us in the transit from the past to the present and from the present to the future. This is how you must look at it for we have to make progress. We have to progress technologically and understand the modern world. But we have to go further and widen our intellectual horizons too. For instance, I am not in the least interested in importing machinery from other countries as was being done in the olden days here in Ahmedabad for personal profit. What I mean is that we must make these things in our own country and train our people in these skills. There can be no appreciable difference to our strength if we keep buying things from outside. I agree that earlier there was

1. Speech at the opening ceremony of the new building of Ahmedabad Textile Industry's Research Association, (ATIRA), Ahmedabad, 10 April 1954. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi. Also from *The Hindustan Times* and the *National Herald*, 11 April 1954.
2. Morarji Desai presided over the function.
3. Kasturbhai Lalbhai was the Chairman of the Council of Administration of ATIRA.
4. Nehru was in Ahmedabad from 29 to 31 January 1951 to attend the AICC meeting.
5. ATIRA was set up in 1947 with the objectives of promoting, facilitating and undertaking research and development of materials, machinery, and products for textile and allied industries.
6. ATIRA had four Research Divisions—Physics and Physical Chemistry Division, Chemistry Division, Statistics Division, and Psychology Division.



no choice, so that is different. I am talking of the present when we need to lay the foundations of technological progress in the country and not depend on Japan or the United States for superficial benefit. These laboratories are basic to our progress because after all technology and science, etc., are the products of man's intelligence. If we do not have adequate arrangements to progress through our own hard work and intelligence, we will always be dependent on others, in technology and other skills. I do not mean that we should compete with others. But we must ultimately strive for complete self-reliance in every way. This is specially necessary in the world of today where strange things are happening and new and more terrible ways of destruction are being devised. The great scientists of the world are busily engaged in putting their entire strength into the task of producing atomic and hydrogen bombs. There is no point in criticizing them for it is a vicious circle and it is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish between good and evil. Even the best of them are engaged in these activities and are unable to extricate themselves. So we come to the bigger questions of politics and of what line India should take. As you know, we have made an effort, with some success, not to get carried away and to stand firmly by our principles in the face of great storms. The world is being lashed by all kinds of storms and it is unfortunate that many countries are being uprooted by them. So the question is whether we have the strength to remain stable in the face of stress. It is not a question of long, involved arguments but of increasing our strength. We must first become strong in mind and heart and patient in any crisis. Then another type of strength is the mental strength without which slogans can be of no avail.

These are some of the big problems before us and the world. All kind of strange things are happening everywhere and nobody can say what will happen in a month or two and when a new threat may arise. Well, whatever it is, we must be careful not to get carried away or give way to panic or fear, nor should we become hostile to other countries. We must go our own way and learn whatever we can from the rest of the world for it is clear that we have to learn a great deal. It is also clear that we are extremely backward and cannot become great merely by being steeped in pride. We have to work hard and learn from others the things which have helped them to advance. We have to learn in great humility, at the same time maintaining our own dignity and self-respect. We have to bear all this in mind. It helps to have officials and others in high posts of prime minister and ministers, etc. But ultimately, the task is far more basic than that and it is necessary to mould people's thinking and expand our technology. Whenever people's thoughts are turned in the wrong direction, we must divert them even if their reaction is one of apprehension. We must foster our basic principles and at the same time root out the superstition which riddles this country even if it angers a few people. Not everything old is good just as not everything new is good. There is good in the old as well as the new

and we must choose fearlessly and throw out the undesirable elements however ancient they may be. We worship many things in the western culture today but they are not necessarily good because they are new. We must take what is good in the Soviet Union and the United States and discard the rest, whatever the other countries may do. It is we who will decide. Our entire policy is directed towards complete freedom to take decisions without giving way to pressures or threats from anyone.

Therefore, the science laboratories have a great role to play, especially the small physical research centre which has been opened here. It is small now but a great task lies ahead. All the laboratories in the country will participate in them. Science has expanded a great deal in the world and the atomic and the hydrogen bombs are its products. We do not want to produce such things. There will be no immediate benefit to the people of Ahmedabad from these laboratories. But it will undertake fundamental research which is necessary for the advance of science in the country. It is a symbol of the new kinds of power being generated in the world today, tremendous forces which we did not even dream of and which could be of great benefit to the world or destroy it. The question mark before the world today is whether we have the wisdom to harness these energies for the good of man or whether we are foolish enough to use them for destruction. This must be borne in mind constantly.

Well, here in ATIRA we have this beautiful building which not only looks good but impresses even in a short tour. I have seen many laboratories and I am convinced that this one will be put to good use for it has been built for the right purpose and the people working here are good.

Anyhow, you are well aware of its objects and goals. It is basically meant for expanding the textile industry, and to do research into the working conditions and methods of improving efficiency and to get better results.

The question of rationalisation in textile industry can be considered only from the point of view of the welfare of the people of this country.

We should be absolutely clear in our ultimate aim when we speak of better and newer machines.

There has been a lot of talk and arguments now about rationalisation. What is the meaning of rationalisation from the fundamental point of view? In the final analysis, rationalisation means that we do the things intelligently. In other words, rationalisation means that whatever you do, it should be done in the best possible way.

When we consider the question of better machines, we should not forget the fact that the welfare of the people of this country and development of man is our ultimate aim. And when we take into consideration this ultimate aim, we will understand that only rationalisation of machines will not do. We have got to rationalise all work. In fact, we have to rationalise the life of the people of this country and in that direction the Planning Commission has been devoting its energy.



The main thing to be kept in mind is that all efforts should be made to see that the people of this country march forward.

We have embarked on a pilgrimage and our companions are not a few hundreds or thousands but 36 crore people of this country. We have got to see that all the 36 crores go forward. It may be that a few might not keep pace during the journey, but it must be certain that we have got to reach our destination together.

Both capital and labour should fully understand that the time has gone for ever when they could get anything they wanted by fighting for it. The country cannot afford to fritter away its energy when it very urgently require to organise and channelise this gigantic energy of the people for constructive purpose, so that the country as a whole go forward.

The machine and technology have amazingly developed, but man's mind which created these machines has not kept pace with the development of technology. This has created the problems of hydrogen bomb and neurosis among the vast number of people of the world.

Day by day the machines develop, technology go forward, but that tends to make man more and more useless, for technology has created such queer problems that man cannot control. We must use our intelligence and knowledge for the development of mankind and not solely in destroying the entire world. This should be the criterion of any technological development or for its introduction in our life.

Institutes of scientific research like the ATIRA are the means through which we can look into the future. Such institutes also help to draw the map of future India. We should also encourage such institutes for the development of the mind of our people as well as to understand the world we live in.

I have no regard for those who buy some machines from America or England and erect them here into a factory to earn profits for themselves. I want that all these machines or anything you want should be produced in India itself. We cannot be proud of a tree whose roots might be in America or Japan but its leaves and branches are in India. We have no other alternative but to develop our minds in such a way that we do not rely on others and develop the country from the roots.

The world we live in is a strange queer world. We have to learn to stand on our own feet without being flown away by this or that storm. The policy of India can simply be explained by the phrase "to stand on our own legs."

India will not be bullied or frightened by anyone nor does she feel any animosity towards any country. She will go on her own way without being perturbed by any extraneous influence.

Both the Soviet Union and America have done many good things which we should accept, but we must keep our head high and not bow before any

particular country. India cannot progress by being unduly influenced by this or that country.

The change in the minds of the people will serve the cause of progress of India better than the work of government officers or the law passed by the legislatures.

The people and the Government in this country should encourage fundamental scientific research even though it does not give immediate benefits to the people. Fundamental research is necessary to develop science and to understand the forces of nature.

Hydrogen and atomic bombs are the "progeny" of fundamental scientific research. The power of science should be used for the good and welfare of humanity and not for destroying civilisation itself.

It is no use speaking irrelevantly about anything for the strength of the country will not be increased by raising the slogans of strength. Again and again we should remember that it is only the strength and development of mind which make the country strong and great.

I am visiting ATIRA after about two and a half years and I find that really a very good work is being done at the Institute. I am greatly impressed by the progress made by ATIRA, and the work done here will not only be useful in this great textile centre, but in the whole country. I hope that institutes like this will help the country in drawing the map of developed India.

### 3. To K.D. Malaviya<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

26th April 1954

My dear Keshava,<sup>2</sup>

M.N. Saha<sup>3</sup> has been repeatedly writing to me for further help for his Nuclear Institute. I referred the matter to Bhatnagar,<sup>4</sup> who wrote to me that the application from Saha had come too late for inclusion in the agenda of the last meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission. They would consider it next time.<sup>5</sup>

1. K.D. Malaviya Papers, NMML. Also available in File No. 17(16)/56-PMS.
2. Deputy Minister in the Ministry for Natural Resources and Scientific Research.
3. Member, House of the People and Founder Director of Institute of Nuclear Physics, Calcutta.
4. S.S. Bhatnagar was the Secretary in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research and Director, CSIR.
5. Saha had told Nehru that he had sent his request for financial help long before and a large number of students of the Institute were facing difficulty because of lack of arrangements.



The real fact of the matter is that Saha has been very casual in his demands. They come at odd times, there is no planning and no one knows exactly how much he will require and when. This upsets our budget and our calculations. Also, I might inform you for your private ear that some of our colleagues here do not think too highly of his Nuclear Institute. The private report of the Sir Alfred Egerton Committee was not very much in favour of it. Nevertheless I want this Nuclear Institute to continue. It can undoubtedly do good work.

I spoke to Bhabha<sup>6</sup> about it the other day and also to Krishnan.<sup>7</sup> Bhabha has sent me a note which is in the file I am sending you. I should like you to discuss this matter with Dr Krishnan and when I come back, we might have a talk about it. You might also, if you like, have a brief talk with Saha himself. As a matter of fact, it is not particularly easy to find this money out of the allotted sum for the Atomic Energy Commission. Therefore Bhabha has suggested that we might recommend it to the Education Ministry. I doubt very much whether that Minister will find this money.

You might, if you like, send for Kaul,<sup>8</sup> Jt. Secretary NR & SR, who might be able to give you more facts.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. H.J. Bhabha was Director, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.
7. K.S. Krishnan was Director, National Physical Laboratory, New Delhi and member, Atomic Energy Commission.
8. K.N. Kaul.

#### 4. Hyderabad Central Laboratories<sup>1</sup>

I have previously written to you about the request made by the Hyderabad Central Laboratories<sup>2</sup> for financial help for development etc.<sup>3</sup> This matter has

1. Note to K.D. Malaviya, 8 May 1954. Copy of the note was also sent to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. File No. 17(129)/56-PMS.
2. Central Laboratory for Scientific and Industrial Research at Uppal (near Hyderabad) was a regional research laboratory for south India working under a coordinated plan in collaboration with the national laboratories, with main emphasis on developmental and pilot project research.
3. Husain Zaheer, the Director, had requested for financial assistance for development of the laboratories and wanted to bring them under the general control of the CSIR.

been pending for a considerable time and no clear decisions have been taken. I think we should expedite this.

2. There can be no doubt that these laboratories have to be encouraged and given the opportunity to do good work. From such accounts as I have had, apart from personal observations, the laboratories have functioned fairly satisfactorily. If there are any drawbacks here and there or any lack of co-ordination with our other national laboratories, these should be remedied. I am clear in my mind that it is desirable to have some kind of general laboratories of this type in south India, apart from the specialised laboratories we have. But it is essential to have proper coordination with the other laboratories so as to prevent overlapping and waste of effort.

3. The questions that arise are:

- (i) what financial help should be given?
- (ii) coordination with our other central laboratories and institutes;
- (iii) the general control and supervision of the CSIR over these Hyderabad Central Laboratories.

4. It seems desirable that there should be a closer connection between CSIR and the Hyderabad Central Laboratories. This will help in the coordination also. What this relationship should be and what measure of supervision etc. we should have, is a matter which can be discussed and decided without much difficulty.

5. This question, however, need not come in the way of our considering the first question, viz., the financial aid to the Hyderabad Central Laboratories. The request of Dr Husain Zaheer in this behalf should, therefore, be processed in the normal way as soon as possible.

## **5. International Control and Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy<sup>1</sup>**

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am glad of this discussion and grateful to Shri Meghnad

1. Statement in Parliament, 10 May 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, 1954, Vol. V, Part II, cols. 7026-7032.



Saha for having initiated it, though I feel that he has perhaps done less than justice to the work done so far by our Atomic Energy Commission.<sup>2</sup>

Of course, it is quite possible and it may be perfectly justified to say that the work may have been, ought to have been bigger, vaster and speedier. That can always be said about any work that we undertake, but quite a large number of fairly competent critics, not very friendly critics either, from abroad have testified to the very considerable work done by our Atomic Energy Commission and have indicated that India has laid the basis for fairly rapid advance in the future.

Naturally, our pace and rate of work is determined by so many factors. Shri Meghnad Saha mentioned that the United States of America spend one thousand crores of, presumably, rupees a year on this, that the United Kingdom spends a hundred crores and other countries spend less. Well, it is perfectly true that our average rate of expenditure as exists is Rs. 1 crore. Now, it is possible, of course, to increase the sum and also increase the other thing, facilities for doing this work. That is a matter of right priorities and giving more importance to some aspects. For my part, I should like to increase very rapidly, to the very full, the geological and like surveys of India. Of course, we have got a geological survey but not that type of geological and mineral survey and other survey which would require hundreds and hundreds of people, competent people, to do it. I confess that I am not satisfied at the rate at which we do these things. Anyhow, I would submit that we have made progress even comparatively speaking—leaving for the moment some half a dozen big nations of the world who have far greater resources and who started much earlier than us. Right at the beginning, may I say that I welcome Dr Saha's suggestion that specialists in this field, that selected scientists who are interested directly or even indirectly in this work, should meet together and gather at a conference or a symposium—whatever you like to call it—to discuss this matter and to make suggestions as to how to make greater progress and what new lines to take up? I entirely agree with him that it is a very desirable step to take. But when Dr Saha goes on to say that this meeting of scientists should take place to draft a reply to President Eisenhower, I am amazed,—to draft a reply to the speech of President Eisenhower delivered before the United Nations, a speech

2. M.N. Saha had written to Nehru in November 1953 about the Atomic Energy Commission, alleging incompetence, lack of focus, mismanagement and undue secrecy of the body. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 194-196. On 4 May 1954 Saha informed Nehru that he wanted a discussion in the Parliament on this matter.

which is worthy of our respect and careful attention.<sup>3</sup> But for a number of scientists to sit down and draft a reply to President Eisenhower does appear to me somewhat astounding.

Meghnad Saha intervened to say that it was to advise the Government of India in drafting a reply.

JN: It comes to the same thing, First of all, I do not quite see why even the Government of India should sit down to draft and send a reply to the speech delivered by the President of the United States to the United Nations. I am not aware of any other government having drafted a reply and sent it. President Eisenhower's speech was, if I may say so with all respect, a fine speech, with generous sentiments and with a proposal which deserves our attention. But the proposal was a vague proposal; it is a vague indication of which way one should look; not exactly a specific proposal. If you want to know what proposals these are, go to the Disarmament Conference or to the Commission dealing with atomic energy matters. You can see there the proposals of the different countries, and then you can consider them. Anyhow, I am glad of this discussion and I would like this discussion, as far as possible, to be separated from the purely political aspects. I know it is difficult to do that. Honourable Members opposite and those on this side talked about banning these weapons. Well, we feel that we should ban or control all these terrible weapons. But it is not quite clear to me how our sentiments in this matter are going to result in that ban, or how a strong speech in this House can result in banning them. Ultimately, sometime or other, they will have to be controlled, if not put an end to. Well, from a good deal of what we know of this world, if one is all the time talking about banning this, who is to bell the cat? It might have been possible if there had been no conflict or collision in this respect—each afraid of the other. Nobody is going to be controlled till he is quite certain that the other is controlled; and nobody is going to be certain till there is much more confidence in each other than there is at present. Each will think: 'Oh, there is some public protestation; secretly, this will not be given effect to.' I am not going into that matter. As I said, it is obviously necessary to control these weapons. But how to control them? How to ban them? That is again another matter of great difficulty. It is all very well to say, control or ban them. Who is to ban them? Who is to control them? International law, as is well known, is rather a feeble instrument even yet. So, let us discuss this question apart from its political

3. Eisenhower, while addressing the eighth session of the UN General Assembly in New York on 8 December 1953, proposed that those countries involved in the production of uranium and fissionable materials, including the Soviet Union, should immediately begin to make joint contributions from their stockpiles to an International Atomic Energy Agency to be set up under the aegis of the United Nations.



aspect although it is intimately tied up with it. One cannot dissociate it; nevertheless, let us consider it apart from politics.

Further, in this twentieth century, in the last generation or two, we have come up against certain explorations of the remotest frontiers of human knowledge and they are leading us to all manner of strange discoveries and strange consequences. Max Planck's quantum theory and, later on, Albert Einstein's theory of relativity, changed the whole conception of the universe. Most people may not realise it even now though they changed the whole conception of the universe and the world. All other things followed. The atom bomb struck us because of the tremendous power to kill. Vast changes in human conception had taken place as my friend Mr K.D. Malaviya suggested. This only came on the scene in 1939 when some German scientists did something, split the atom or whatever they say rather crudely.<sup>4</sup> Soon after, the Americans did it. In America, it was in fact a migrant scientist who did it and in 1942 something else happened<sup>5</sup> and a chain of reactions was established by Italian scientists, By August 1945, Hiroshima fell, as the result of the work from 1939 to 1945.

Since then, of course, tremendous progress has been made in this and the world has been struck by it because it is a terrible thing. Now, therefore, the human mind and human efforts are unleashing tremendous powers without quite knowing how to control them. You will not control these by a mere demand to ban this or to ban that. Nobody can really control the human mind from going on unleashing new things; they will go on doing that. How to approach this problem of control which is of vital consequence is one of the political problems of the day. Behind that lies some measure of lessening the tension in the world, some measure of confidence in each other by the great nations, some agreement to live and let live and not to try to destroy others, to allow each country to live its own life. Unless that approach is made, the only other approach is of conflict and if the idea of conflict is in the minds of nations, then the atom bomb will undoubtedly remain; it does not matter your going on talking about banning it or not.

Now, let us consider these possible issues. It is perfectly clear that atomic energy can be used for peaceful purposes, to the tremendous advantage of humanity. Probably. It may take some years, maybe five years or maybe ten years, but not too long, before it can be used more or less economically. I should like the House to remember one thing. The use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is far more important for a country like India, that is to say, in a country whose power resources are limited, than for a country like France.

4. Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann discovered the process of nuclear fission in 1938 which was made public in early 1939.
5. The first sustained nuclear chain reaction was achieved at the University of Chicago in 1942 by a group of scientists working under Enrico Fermi.

an industrially advanced country. Take the United States of America, which has already tremendous power resources in other ways. It is not so much for them to have an additional source of power like atomic energy. No doubt they can use it; it is not so important. It is important for a power starved or a power hungry country like India or like most of the other countries in Asia and Africa. I say that because it may be to the advantage of the countries who have adequate power resources to restrain and restrict the use of atomic energy because they do not want that power. It would be to the disadvantage of a country like India if that is restricted or stopped. It is a very important factor to remember from the point of view of this so-called international control. It is probably loose talk, this talk of control. Who is to control it internationally? Who are the international nations who are going to control it? One may say, the United Nations. Obviously, there is no other organisation approaching the United Nations in its international scope. And yet, the House knows, the United Nations even now does not include in its scope even the big nations of the world, some of the biggest are kept out of its scope. The United Nations can only control itself. It cannot control any nation which is not in it, which it refuses to admit and with which it would not have anything to do, so that the result will be that you control a great part of the world, but still there is a part of the world which is not controlled by it. That part, over which there is no control, makes all the mischief. You do not control it; it is not, in fact, recognised by you; you treat it as if it does not exist. It will go its own way and upset the apple-cart. Therefore, the question of international control becomes difficult.

Reference has been made in President Eisenhower's speech to this international control. We all agree with the proposition that if it can be so organised, there should be proper use made of the stock of fissile materials, so that all countries can use them for research work or for proper purposes. Well and good. But how is this to be done? There the difficulty comes in. President Eisenhower refers to some agency of the United Nations. That organisation appears reasonable, but then, let us go back and see what the actual proposals are before us in regard to the atomic energy of various countries. These are the latest proposals, at the beginning of this year, of the United States:

"An international control agency shall be set up by the United Nations. It shall hereafter be an independent body outside the control of the Security Council and of the United Nations." The United Nations is merely supposed to set it up and wash its hands away. It becomes an independent organisation. So it is a very important matter as to what an independent organisation is. This organisation will, of course, have an unlimited right of inspection. Agreed, "It shall have the right to maintain its own guards on the territory of any foreign State, licenced to engage in any of the processes of the production of or research in atomic energy." It becomes a super state atomic energy body, maintaining its own guards, armies or small armies, or whatever you like. Then again, "it shall



own and control"—mark these words—"the raw materials mined, the plants in which the ore is processed, and all plants which deal with production of atomic energy wherever they may be situated in any country of the world." This is a very far-reaching provision, namely, that all our raw materials and our mines are owned and controlled by that independent body, which is even independent of the United Nations after it is created. It means tremendous power being concentrated in the hands of a select body. "It shall decide if, when and where and to what extent the various processes may be carried out and in which parts of the world atomic energy plants may be established"—and there are limitations also—"and it shall have authority to issue or withhold licences from countries, institutions or enterprises engaged in any activities relating to the production of atomic energy", and so on.

I read to you some of them and there are one or two others also. This tremendous and vast power is being given to a body which is even independent of the United Nations, which has sponsored it or started it. Who will be in this body? That is an important factor. Either you make the body as big as the United Nations with all the countries represented, or it will be some relatively small body, inevitably with the great powers sitting in it, and lording over it, and I say with all respect to them that they will have a grip of all the atomic energy areas and raw materials in every country. Now, in a country like India, is it a desirable prospect?

When honourable Members talk so much on international control, let us understand, without using vague phrases and language, what it means. There should be international control and inspection, but it is not such an easy matter as it seems. Certainly, we would be entitled to object to any kind of control which is not exercised to our advantage. We are prepared in this, as in any other matter, even to limit, in common with other countries, our independence of action for the common good of the world, we are prepared to do that, provided we are assured that that is for the common good of the world and not exercised in a partial way, not dominated over by certain countries, however good their motives might be. These are the difficulties that arise in this matter.

In President Eisenhower's speech these details are not gone into, but he says that what he calls "normal uranium" should be controlled. I could have understood even control of fissile materials. But President Eisenhower refers to "normal uranium". It is not clear what he means by "normal uranium" ores. So, again we get back to the raw materials. So that, there is this difficulty. We want international control of this; we want fair use of it for peaceful purposes. This is common ground, not a matter for argument. But when we come to how it is to be done, we immediately get into difficulties. I submit it would not be right to agree to any plan which hands over even our raw materials and mines, etc., to any external authority. I would again beg the House to remember this major fact that atomic energy for peaceful purposes is far more important to

the under developed countries of the world than to the developed ones. And, if the developed countries have all the powers, they may well stop the use of atomic energy everywhere, including in their own countries, because they do not need it so much, and we suffer.

We welcome the entire approach of President Eisenhower in this matter. Since he delivered his speech this question has been discussed by representatives of other great powers chiefly concerned, and if they find out any suitable method for creating this international pool, we will be very happy, subject to what I have said, to share with, and give what we can to it.

Dr Saha drew a rather dismal picture of our pitiable state in this matter. He referred to our coal supplies running out. Now, my own information, derived from our best geologists is contrary to what Dr Saha said. I believe there is a dispute between Dr Saha and our geologists, but with all my respect for him, I would take our geologists' word in this matter. Dr Saha is an eminent physicist, but our geologists are expected to know more about coal than Dr Saha.

Here I may say that our geologists' estimate of our coal reserve is:

Total reserves of coal in the Indian rock-formations, upto a depth of 2,000 feet—60,000 million tons.

Total reserves of available coal, of all grades, which are considered workable by present methods—20,000 million tons.

Reserves of coking coal suitable for metallurgical use—1,750 to 2,000 million tons.

Present-day annual consumption of coal in India, of all grades—35 million tons.

Annual consumption of metallurgical grade coal (coking coal used both for metallurgical and non-metallurgical purposes)—about 8 to 12 million tons.

Consumption of coking coal purely for metallurgical purposes—About 3 million tons.

As is well known we are wasting our best coal by using it in our railways, where it is not necessary. Attempts are being made in our railways not to use our best coal. Consumption of coking coal purely for metallurgical purpose is about 3 million tons, while our annual consumption of metallurgical grade coal both for metallurgical and non-metallurgical purposes is about 8 to 12 million tons. This is chiefly because our railways and some of our factories use this high grade coal, because it is easily available. We should curb this down, because our best coal should not be wasted in this way, while other coal is available.

Recent experiments conducted in India by the Fuel Research Institute and private industrial concerns, like Tatas go to show that our second grade coal is capable of improvement to first grade by coal-washing and blending methods. Large scale trials for (I regret I do not wholly understand the meaning of the word which I am going to read) "beneficiation"—making it better. I suppose—



of low grade coal give promise that India's coal resources will prove adequate for all her present as well as future needs.

According to the above summary, assuming that correct methods of mining are employed and waste is eliminated, we have reserves of 2,000 million tons of high grade and coking coal which should last (if the consumption were restricted to use in iron and steel and other metal manufacturing industries alone) for a period of about 650 years. But India is using coking coal today for ordinary furnace and railway purposes, for domestic fuel, and some industrial uses to the extent of about ten to twelve million tons per annum. At this rate the life of coking coal reserves will be reduced to 160 years only.

The position, however, is different in respect of non-coking coal of good and medium quality, the supply of which is such as would last for several hundred years, allowing the present rate of consumption plus a progressively increasing rate for future industrial expansion.

Of course, India's resources in coal are much less than those of the United States or the USSR.

Meghnad Saha, at this stage, said that if India's industrial power was increased ten times, its lifetime would be 650 divided by 10 which was 65 years. This was a very dismal prospect.

JN: The honourable Member is thinking of metallurgical coal. The other coal, even if the industrial capacity is increased tremendously, is enough to last for several hundred years.

Dr Saha put a question, directly or indirectly, as to whether we have the necessary scientific personnel or requisite competence to set up a nuclear reactor. He mentioned that five years ago, we had stated that it would be set up. He is perfectly justified in pointing out that it has not been set up. It is true there has been delay. It was delayed due to certain factors—outside our control. We are setting it up. We have obviously to get some equipment from abroad. We have to get heavy water which we do not produce yet. It was a little difficult to get this heavy water but I believe things are in good shape about the starting of this moderate size reactor.

As for our scientific personnel, we cannot compare ourselves with the great countries but leaving out some of the big countries, we are supposed to be rather good in our scientific personnel even now. We can put up a reactor even if fissile materials are not available from the common pool as President Eisenhower has indicated. It is not that we are entirely depending upon some common pool. Even if some help may not be forthcoming, even if the fissile materials and the modulators do not become readily available, I think we can do it. We have sent several teams abroad and people are being trained both in India and abroad for this purpose. I think we are justified in assuming that this would produce results very soon.

The Atomic Energy Commission has also a small team which is gaining

experience in the use of radioactive isotopes which will become available when the reactor starts functioning, for biological and other research and for medical treatment.

Now, the main purpose in putting up the reactor is to acquire the necessary technical experience which will help us later on to put up power plants for peaceful purposes. Therefore, some of the workers are engaged in gaining experience in some of the technical processes like heat transfer which will be needed at some later stages. The reactor will also help us to produce some of the radioactive isotopes. At present radioactive isotopes are used in biological research for study of metabolism of various elements. For medical treatment radioactive isotopes and special radioactive iodine are used. These are much weaker in intensity of radiation and can be easily controlled. But they have a short life. Their effect disappears soon after. It is also used for metallurgical purposes, to follow the progress of certain reactions. All of these can be purchased from abroad even now for peaceful purposes, but they are so short-lived that even in the course of transit they lose some activity. It is obviously more advantageous to produce them here. We have got, of course, a major division dealing with prospecting for ores and raw materials. Two new divisions have been started, a Medical and Health Division which deals with the protection of workers against the effects of radiation and with research and associated problems, and a Biology Division which conducts investigations on the biological effects of radiation.

Now, honourable Members have mentioned something about our sending some part of the monazite sands or something else abroad. We have sent them abroad, a little of them. Some five or six years ago they were sent abroad without limit; anybody could come and take shiploads of them. We stopped that. I believe even now there is some theft going on occasionally from the coast. We try to stop that by posting guards and in other ways. But we have not considered the question of monazite as a money making proposition, although it is a money making thing. But we used it in exchange for something that we lack for atomic energy development. For naturally we lack things. Naturally, we want something which we can get easily from other countries. So, that we use it as a valuable exchange material. We are in some contact with some foreign Atomic Energy Commissions, notably France and England, chiefly these two countries. I think it first started with the French Atomic Energy Commission, and later England, I do not say intimate contact but we do help each other. We have therefore supplied them. We have occasionally supplied some things to the United States of America, to some other countries too—I do not know at the present moment, I have not got the list here. But generally speaking, what we have supplied is relatively small in quantity. As a matter of fact we do not want to supply these sands as far as possible. We now supply the processed material. We have put up a factory in Travancore-Cochin for



processing that material, and it is much more advantageous for us to supply the processed material than the sands. At Trombay near Bombay we are also putting up a factory. A good deal of work is being done in these matters.

Dr Meghnad Saha said that there should be no secrecy, I entirely agree with him and so far as we are concerned, we want no secrecy. Our difficulty has been that when we deal with another country, whether it is France or England, when they give us any process or any information, they insist on secrecy for their part and we have to agree because it is their custom. We have to take something from them; we cannot get it otherwise; we have to give that assurance. Therefore, we have to keep that assurance. Otherwise, so far as we are concerned, there is no secrecy. It is obvious that in this matter, we are in the first stages of atomic energy work and not so advanced as the Soviet Union or America or England. So, we have really nothing to hide so far as we are concerned.

Dr Meghnad Saha suggested that our Atomic Energy Act<sup>6</sup> came in the way and so it should be scrapped. We have no objection to scrapping it or what is more probably desirable, amending it if necessary. We may come to this House for amending the Act. Let us consider the matter right from the beginning. We are perfectly agreeable to consulting or having a conference of eminent scientists and discussing these matters with them. If they make any suggestion for the improvement of the Act or for the improvement of the work, we shall certainly accept and adopt them. Even now, as a matter of fact, within the compass of this Act, we are trying to improve and expand our work. I might mention that in some way we ourselves have felt that perhaps the Act is not quite adequate and slightly comes in the way occasionally. But, the difficulty is of adding to the legislation that will come up this session or the next session. Finally, we decided not to trouble Parliament at this stage till we are forced to do it and to try to expand our work within the scope of the Act, if we can, to some extent, I can promise this House and Dr Meghnad Saha that we shall gladly pay every respect and attention to all the suggestions that are made individually or jointly.

6. The Atomic Energy Act (1948) enabled the Government of India to control and foster the development, production and use of atomic energy, and utilization and export of radio-active substances like uranium, thorium, plutonium etc.

## V. SPORTS

### 1. First National Games<sup>1</sup>

I send my good wishes to the competitors in the National Games that are going to take place early in March in Delhi.<sup>2</sup> India has a magnificent field for developing athletics and games. We have not done enough in this direction and I am therefore glad that more and more attention is being paid to this. I wish the Games success.

1. Message for the first National Games, New Delhi, 19 February 1954. File No. 9/148/54-PMS.
2. In the First National Games, held in Delhi from 4 to 7 March 1954, twelve hundred athletes participated.

### 2. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20th February 1954

My dear Deshmukh,

This is about the Asian Games at Manila.<sup>2</sup>

It seems to me that it will be desirable for a competent officer of ours to be put in charge of the organisation and management part. He will also look after the funds. In fact, most of the persons going there are our Police or Service men. Probably, a Police officer connected with these games here will be the right person. He will maintain discipline and otherwise see to it that everything is properly organised. At my instance, P.S. Rau<sup>3</sup> has suggested this to Maharaja of Patiala,<sup>4</sup> who has agreed to this and is going to put this forward to the Committee.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 40(212)/51-PMS.
2. About 150 sportspersons from 18 Asian countries participated in the Second Asian Games held at Manila from 1 to 9 May 1954.
3. Adviser to the Rajpramukh, Pepsu.
4. Yadavendra Singh was the President, Indian Olympic Association at this time.



### 3. Flying Clubs<sup>1</sup>

Flying clubs in India perform an important service. To some extent, they have been pioneers in aviation in India. The Delhi Flying Club, in particular, has a long and impressive record. I am sure that these flying clubs all over the country should be helped and encouraged. We are definitely launched in the age of flying and the sooner we adapt ourselves to it, the better. In this work of adaptation flying clubs have to play an essential part.

I send my good wishes to the Delhi Flying Club on the occasion of its silver jubilee.

1. Message to the Delhi Flying Club, 24 February 1954. JN Collection.

### 4. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
26th March 1954

My dear Bidhan,

Some time ago, on the 4th March, you wrote to me and sent me a copy of a letter which you had addressed to Gundevia.<sup>2</sup> I think I have already told you, and you yourself spoke to the Maharajkumar of Sikkim,<sup>3</sup> about going to Kanchenjunga. As for photographs of Everest and Kanchenjunga, I should not like to encourage these very much. If foreigners do it, objections are taken by the Chinese Government as they are bound to fly over the Tibetan territory. It is a risky business, and unless it is very necessary, I do not want to take that risk with our young men at present. There have unfortunately been a number of accidents resulting in the death of some of our fine pilots.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 2(655)/53-PMS.
2. Y.D. Gundevia, India's Ambassador at Berne.
3. Palden Thondup Namgyal (b. 1923); President, Sikkim State Council, 1943-49; President, Mahabodhi Society of India, 1953; succeeded Maharaja Tashi Namgyal as Chogyal of Sikkim, 1963-75; deposed after annexation of Sikkim to India in April 1975.

## 5. Encouragement to Games<sup>1</sup>

I hope that the celebration of Olympic Flag Day<sup>2</sup> will meet with success and our people will help in collecting funds for our athletes who are going to the second Asian Games at Manila and latter to Vancouver.<sup>3</sup> The encouragement of games and athletics is important for us from many points of view. As more attention is now being paid to athletics, our athletes are progressively making good. We should like to give them every opportunity to progress and compete on equal terms with the best athletes of other countries.

1. Message, New Delhi, 1 April 1954. File No. 40 (58)/49-PMS.
2. It was celebrated on 12 April 1954.
3. 7, 671 athletes from 24 countries, including four athletes from India, participated in the fifth British Empire and Commonwealth Games, held in Vancouver from 31 July to 8 August 1954.

## 6. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
15th May 1954

My dear Bidhan,

Thank you for your note of the 14th May, sending me a brochure about the Himalayan Mountaineering Institute.<sup>2</sup> I like this brochure.

On page 5, the constitution of the Board of the Institute is given. After the president, members are mentioned and then your name appears. Later, official members. This is not quite clear. First of all, 'members' is in plural and only your name comes in. Presumably the consulting members include all members. This might have been clearly stated. It would be much better if you were the vice-president.

On page 6, it is stated that the English language would be used throughout as far as teaching and training are concerned. Why should this be so? Of course,

1. File No. 40(3)56-PMS.
2. The Himalayan Mountaineering Institute was officially opened on 4 November 1954. It was set up with the help of the Swiss Foundation for Alpine Research to propagate the history of the Himalayan region, and various aspects of other mountain ranges of the world. The Central Government contributed Rs. 4½ lakh, and the West Bengal Government Rs. 2 lakh towards its capital expenditure.



English can be used, but why should not Hindi be used or, for the matter of that, any other language if necessary. As a matter of fact, the Chief Instructor Tenzing<sup>3</sup> does not know English. Whatever language might be used, it hardly seems desirable to state positively that the English language only will be used.

Yours,  
Jawahar

3. Tenzing Norgay.

## 7. Himalayan Mountaineering Institute<sup>1</sup>

The Mountaineering Institute has already been started in a temporary way. In fact, most of the arrangements are temporary. Even the constitution is temporary. It is this provisional organization that will draw up the final constitution. We need not have any long argument about this temporary constitution.

2. In any event, I think one representative from the Ministry of Defence and one from NR & SR are adequate. There is no point in adding more to this representation.

3. The idea is that the Institute should be non-governmental though started by government and with government representation. Some part of the expenditure, therefore, must come necessarily from non-governmental sources. It is difficult to make any estimate of this at present.

4. The main burden of running this Institute must fall on the West Bengal Government and the Government of India, which means chiefly the Defence Ministry and, perhaps, partly NR & SR. We need not make any commitments at the present stage till we have more accurate estimates. But it seems to me inevitable that at least for the next year we should accept our share of the recurring expenditure. Later we can work it out on the basis of paying for the training of persons from the Armed Forces at the Institute, or otherwise.

1. Note to the Minister of Defence Organisation and the Defence Secretary, 27 May 1954. JN Collection.

## VI. CULTURE

### 1. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

Camp: Kottayam  
6th February 1954

My dear Deshmukh,

Thank you for your letter of February 5.<sup>2</sup> I shall discuss this matter with Maulana Azad on my return.

I do not think the Education Ministry or any Ministry can run the children's art exhibition or Shankar's Children's Number. Shankar has already got a fairly good committee which advises him about these pictures. However, we shall look into this matter later.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 40(258)/53-PMS.
2. Deshmukh had suggested that the Government should render financial assistance from Education Ministry's budget to *Shankar's Weekly* (Annual Children's Number) and children's art competition and in future either Shankar should continue to run the show with annual financial assistance or Education Ministry might take over and run the show.

### 2. Development of Folk Dances<sup>1</sup>

T. Sanganna wanted to know the arrangements made by the Government for scientific study and development of folk dances in tribal areas.

Jawaharlal Nehru: May I answer that question, if you would permit me? If I might correct my young colleague, Government are very much interested in this, and they are taking, not absolutely direct, but nevertheless a fairly intimate, part in this. They are starting a dance academy, a small one, in Imphal in Manipur State; and another they intend to at Shillong for this purpose.

1. Reply to question in Parliament, 18 February 1954, *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People) Official Report*, 1954, Vol. I, Part I, col. 119.



Government are reserving the money that has been obtained from the sale of tickets for these functions, for the encouragement of folk dances.

### 3. Advisory Committee on Writers<sup>1</sup>

This was a very simple matter intended to give rapid help to deserving writers and others who may be in distress. Somehow, it has become more and more complicated and the whole object is being frustrated. Applications for help are being held up for months. At first there was the committee of three of us, namely, Education Minister, Finance Minister and myself. Then it was suggested that we should have others to advise us. All this becomes more and more formalised involving great delay. If it is our purpose to help, perhaps then this should be done quickly.

2. The purpose of having advisers in different languages was not to set up formal committees but rather to get the help of Members of Parliament who happened to be here and who are in touch with writer's fraternity. If we set up formal Advisory Committees, red tape will increase and further delays will take place.

3. I think, therefore, that all that is necessary for us is to keep these names with us and consult them without fuss in regard to the applications that we receive.

4. I agree with the Finance Minister that officials of our Ministries should not be on these so-called Advisory Committees.

5. I do not know all the names given in this list but some names seem obviously out of place as they have nothing to do with writing or with knowledge of writers. The Finance Minister has pointed this out in the case of Shri P.N. Rajabhoj.<sup>2</sup> I entirely agree with him and do not consider him suitable for this purpose at all. Shri N.V. Gadgil<sup>3</sup> is a writer of some repute in Marathi.

1. Minute for the Ministry of Education, 18 February 1954. File No. 40(16)/56-PMS.

2. An M.P. from Maharashtra and a leader of the depressed classes; editor of Marathi weekly *Dalit Bandhu*.

3. A Congress member of the House of the People.

6. As regards the Malayalam, I am informed that Shri Narayana Pillai<sup>4</sup> of the Council of States is not likely to be very suitable. Professor C.P. Matthew,<sup>5</sup> MP, would be more suitable.

7. As regards Miss Nirmala Joshi,<sup>6</sup> she should certainly be consulted both on music and dancing. Others should also be consulted. In regard to dancing Smt. Indira Gandhi should also be consulted.

8. These lists are largely made up from MPs. This was suggested for convenience of consultation. They need not, of course, be limited to MPs. Anyone else easily available in Delhi can be consulted.

9. Therefore I do not think any formal committee should be formed but certain lists, more or less on the lines suggested, should be kept for reference and these persons should be consulted whenever occasion arises. No publicity should be given to this.

4. C. Narayana Pillai (b. 1905); Vice-President, All Travancore-Cochin Library Association; Member, (i) Managing Board, Government Public Library, Trivandrum, (ii) Board of Adult Education appointed by Government, (iii) Kerala Pradesh Congress Executive and Election Committee, and (iv) Trivandrum District Congress Committee Executive; Working President, Travancore D.C.C., 1950; Member, Council of States, 1952-1958; Author of a few books in Malayalam.
5. (1896-1960); Lecturer, Madras Christian College, 1918-21; Member of Group, which founded Union Christian College, 1921; Professor of Philosophy, Union Christian College, Alwaye, 1921-47; principal, Union Christian College, Alwaye, 1947-52; Congress Member, House of the People, 1952-57; Member, Delegation to the United Nations Assembly, 1954.
6. Secretary, Sangeet Natak Akademi.

#### 4. Sangeet Natak Akademi<sup>1</sup>

Whenever a cultural delegation comes here, more especially any delegation interested in music or dancing, the Sangeet Akademi,<sup>2</sup> started by the Education Ministry, should be brought into the picture and consulted. They are the official organ dealing with dance and music and it is right that they should be closely associated with any programme drawn up for such a delegation.

1. Note to I.S. Chopra, Joint Secretary, M.E.A., 20 February 1954. File No. 40(56)/56-PMS.
2. Apart from promoting cultural unity through developing and fostering Indian dance, drama and music, the Sangeet Natak Akademi, was set up in January 1953, to coordinate the activities of regional organisations, promote research, set up training institutions and sponsor, festivals and cultural exchanges.



## 5. Sahitya Akademi<sup>1</sup>

This note<sup>2</sup> may be circulated as suggested. But I am not quite clear in my mind yet as to the basic purpose of the Sahitya Akademi.<sup>3</sup> I do not think it is quite good enough for it to be merely a coordinating agency, though the work of coordination will certainly have to be done.

2. Is it our conception to make the Sahitya Akademi something like the French Academy or its British counterpart? If so, then its scope has to be enlarged somewhat and it becomes a much more important body than a coordinating agency need be.

3. After all, the work and reputation of the Akademi will depend primarily on the kind of persons in it.<sup>4</sup> Other activities follow. No doubt it should have a building of its own as suggested, but all this seems to me something for the future and not for the present. We should not spend money to begin with on brick and mortar.

4. I think it would be a good thing if we could have an informal meeting before the Akademi meets between Maulana Sahib, the Vice-President and myself. But I really do not see how that can be done now in the time available.

1. Note to B.N. Kaul, the Principal Private Secretary, 9 March 1954. File No. S.A. 80. Foreign Academies, 1954, Sahitya Akademi Records. Also available in File No. 40(7)/56-PMS.
2. Prepared for the consideration of the General Council of the Sahitya Akademi by the Education Ministry, the note dealt with the scope and functions of the Akademi.
3. The Sahitya Akademi was inaugurated on 12 March 1954 with the objective to set high literary standards and coordinate literary activities in all Indian languages. It was also to promote cultural exchanges with other countries and maintain liaison with international cultural organisations.
4. The Akademi's General Council consisted of eminent persons in the field of literature, nominees of the Central and state governments, representatives of the universities and one representative each of the languages enumerated in the Indian Constitution. Nehru was the Chairman and Radhakrishnan, Vice-Chairman of the Akademi.

## 6. Republic Day Celebrations<sup>1</sup>

Soon after January 26th last I intended writing down my impressions about the Republic Day celebrations. But a succession of engagements left me no time to do this. It is now more than six weeks since Republic Day. Nevertheless, I think it worthwhile to note down some major impressions.

2. The first impression was that these celebrations were much better and more successfully organised this year than in previous years.<sup>2</sup> I should like to congratulate all those concerned and, more especially, the Defence Ministry and the three Commanders-in-Chief. The tableaux from the states were far better than previous ones and the inclusion of the folk dancers in the pageant was a very welcome addition. Altogether the parade and the pageant were very impressive and our foreign visitors here were greatly impressed. The whole celebration was something much more than a show. It became a symbol of India's progress in various directions. It was also a symbol of India's unity in the midst of diversity. It indicated a spirit of quiet confidence in ourselves and faith in our future.

3. The folk dances were a prominent and much appreciated feature of the celebrations and the idea of several hundred folk dancers from different parts of India coming to Delhi brought home to them and to all of us the richness of our cultural heritage and the unifying bond which held it together.

4. The celebrations in Delhi on January 26th were popular in the widest sense of the term. Vast numbers of people participated and there was a spirit of national rejoicing. From accounts we have received, this was evident in most other parts of India also and, more especially, in Bombay. Republic Day has obviously become one of our major festivals and the public responds to it as such. We have, therefore, to keep this in mind for future occasions and plan accordingly. We have many great popular festivals which are associated with religious traditions. It is a happy sign that a purely national festival should achieve the popularity which Republic Day has already attained. That is a sign of our political growth and maturity, and we have to encourage this trend. Therefore, we have to think of these Republic Day celebrations, both in Delhi and elsewhere in India, in an even bigger way than in the past. Preparations for the next year should begin at a very early stage.

1. Note, New Delhi 14 March 1954. JN Collection.

2. The fifth Republic Day celebrations were marked by pomp, gaiety and pageantry. Along with the parade by 3,500 military men and an impressive fly past by the IAF, 17 tableaux depicting India's cultural multiplicity and progress in agriculture, science and industry were exhibited for the first time.



5. In Delhi the main functions connected with Republic Day are the parade and pageant and the folk dances. There are other features also which attract the public, such as illuminations and fireworks.

6. I have been surprised to learn that no attempt has been made to make full length films of the parade and pageant as well as of the folk dances. Odd shots have, no doubt, been taken to be shown with our topical news. That surely is not good enough and it is a waste of a great opportunity. It seems to me essential that a full length film of these celebrations should be made, preferably in colour. The question of expense should not come in the way because I imagine that such a film would more than pay for itself in India and abroad. Apart from that, it is the finest publicity that we can have. We spend large sums on publicity yielding little result. Here is something, ready made, and we should take full advantage of it. Such a film would be of great value not only in our normal cinema houses, but in our villages where mobile vans could take it. With proper explanations in various Indian languages, it would have a tremendous educational effect. The script would have to be very carefully and imaginatively written to indicate the broad perspective of India's history culminating in this establishment of the Republic, bringing out the diversity and variety of India as well as the great unity of our Republic. This is a tremendous theme which anyhow should be undertaken. The Republic Day celebrations accord a suitable and almost readymade background for all this.

7. The folk dances with their music should really have a separate film for themselves, not merely odd shots, but taking each dance with its music fully and in colour. We really should have full records of the folk dances in India and their musical complements. This not only for record, but for educative purposes and to make different parts of India acquainted with the fact that we have this big folk dance festival during the Republic Day celebrations which affords a unique opportunity. I am surprised that advantage has not been taken of this. So far as the singing or musical accompaniment is concerned, gramophone records could also be made. In this matter the Sangeet Natak Akademi should, of course, be associated.

8. These folk dances have a great popular appeal and yet, surprisingly, the stadium was half empty when they took place. This is bad management. I am sure that with better management far more people who want to see them would avail themselves of this opportunity. Prices should be low enough to allow almost anybody to come. Special arrangements can be made for school children, soldiers and other special categories of people.

9. On this occasion there was some overlapping with the Russian Ballet team. In future we should avoid any such overlapping during the Republic Day celebrations. These celebrations should be devoted to our own dancing, singing, etc., and not to foreign teams. Foreign teams are welcome, but not on that occasion.

10. One of the object of our inviting large numbers of folk dancers and others from distant parts of India for Republic Day is for them to get acquainted with Delhi and for the people of Delhi to get acquainted with them. This applies not only to Delhi, but to other places also where they might go. They are not invited here just to provide a show for people in Delhi, but to create a sense of friendliness and unity. Therefore, it is necessary that these folk dance parties should be given opportunities to go around and see Delhi as well as, where possible, some other places like Agra. These folk dancers seldom have opportunities to come this way and advantage should therefore be taken of their visit to show them round. Any programme made for them should include this.

11. These are some major suggestions that I would like to be considered. There are, of course, many minor points also, but I need not go into them. This note is essentially meant for the organisers of the Republic Day celebrations in Delhi, but as it deals with certain wider aspects, I should like it to be sent to others who might be concerned. I should like copies of it to be sent also to all Chief Ministers of States for their information.

## 7. Symposium on Goa<sup>1</sup>

I am glad to learn that the Konkan Institute of Arts and Sciences of Bombay is sponsoring a symposium on Goa.<sup>2</sup> Goa has come into much prominence for some time past, because it raises a political problem. That problem will have to be solved. We have to remember that Goa, however, is not merely a political problem. It is a cultural unit and it is specially fitting, therefore, that the Konkan Institute is laying stress on the social, cultural and economic aspects of life in Goa. It should be our aim not only in Goa but elsewhere to preserve these cultural areas. They add to the richness and variety of India's culture. Whenever we have referred to the political problem of Goa merging into the Indian Union, we have laid stress on this cultural aspect and emphasized that this should continue even after the merger into India.

I wish the symposium every success.

1. Message to the Konkan Institute of Arts and Sciences of Bombay, 24 March 1954. File No. 9 (148)/54-PMS. Also available in File No. 3012/H/1954, IV, Office of Deputy Commissioner of Police, Mumbai.
2. The symposium, held on 28 March 1954, was chaired by Morarji Desai and Cardinal Valerian Gracias, Archbishop of Bombay was the guest of honour.



## 8. Children and World Peace<sup>1</sup>

You children must look up in the atlas the countries whose children have won prizes in the competition. The competition showed how the children of the whole world can get together at work and play. But when they grow up they tend to forget these things. The exhibits have shown how there is no basic difference among the children's ideas about things in the world. On growing up they come under various influences and learn to think differently of each other and fight wars. The children should remember this in their later life.

1. Speech at a function to distribute prizes won by children of foreign countries and Delhi, in a competition of paintings and writings organized by the *Shankar's Weekly*, New Delhi, 28 March 1954. From the *National Herald*, 29 March 1954.

## 9. Scheme for Manipuri Dancing<sup>1</sup>

This is another matter which exhibits the interminable delays in our work. We have been discussing this, I think, for at least six months or more. The idea was that some beginning should be made immediately, even in a small way if necessary. To avoid financial delays I offered to give the money myself from a fund at my disposal. I spoke to all concerned, including the Chief Commissioner of Manipur.<sup>2</sup> There was the question of the building. While I agreed that a new building would be necessary, I suggested that immediately some hired building might be taken.

2. The whole idea behind the scheme was to encourage Manipuri dancing as well as various folk dances there. In fact, the money I would have given was reserved for folk dancing. I cannot give it for anything else.

3. Naturally dancing includes music, but the essential part is the dancing and not the music, and therefore special emphasis has not got to be laid on music.

4. We go on preparing schemes and having conferences and carrying on long correspondence, without anything being done. I am thoroughly dissatisfied with this whole matter and I do not propose to take any further interest in it or

1. Note to the Principal Private Secretary, 6 May 1954. JN Collection.

2. R.P. Bhargava.

give any money for this, unless something definite and precise is done which meets with my approval. So far as I can see, classical music is not a subject on which any stress should be laid at this stage. It is the dancing, and the Manipuri dancing more especially, that is important.

## 10. Tomb of Abdur Rahim Khan-i-khana<sup>1</sup>

A function was held this evening at the tomb of Khan Abdur Rahim<sup>2</sup> in Nizamuddin. The President presided over it. Many of us went to see the tomb after the function. The building was not in a good condition, though I understand that some repairs were recently carried out.

It seemed to us that an effort should be made to repair this building. This does not mean that it should be changed out of recognition, but that while the present appearance is maintained, a great deal of petty repairs could be carried out to make it look less dilapidated.

It seems even more important to have a garden round it. There has been a good deal of construction work of buildings in that area and a whole township has grown up, called by the uncouth name of "Nizamuddin Extension East". Some steps might be taken to prevent any further extension round about the *maqbara* of Khankhana and these grounds should be laid out properly into a garden or a small park. That will be good also from the point of view of the residents of this new township.

It was suggested that the name of the township should be changed from "Nizamuddin Extension East" to Rahim Nagar. I think this is a good suggestion. Khan-i-khana is a famous character in Indian history, one of the great men of Akbar's Court and time, a great scholar in many languages and a great poet in Hindi. We should pay tribute to his memory at least in this way.

1. Note to the Minister of Education, 8 May 1954. JN Collection. Copies of the note were sent to the Chairmen of NDMC and Improvement Trust, New Delhi. Also available in File No. 40(10)/56-60-PMS.
2. (1556-1627); a renowned Commander of Mughal Army and a great scholar of Turkish, Persian, Arabic, Sanskrit and Hindi. His poems in Hindi have made him immortal and his philosophy strengthened ties between Hindus and Muslims. His works include *Rahim Dohawali*, *Madanashtaka*, *Shringara Soratha*, *Barvai Nayika Bhed*. He also translated *Baburnama* from Turkish to Persian.



## VII. SOCIAL ISSUES

1. To Chief Ministers<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
23rd April 1954

My dear Chief Minister,

I should like to draw your particular attention to the programme and activities of the Central Social Welfare Board.<sup>2</sup> This Board is undertaking three hundred welfare extension projects to be executed by the existing voluntary welfare organisations all over the country. I am not writing in detail about this because you will no doubt have full particulars about them from the Chairman of the Board, Shrimati Durgabai Deshmukh.

2. This attempt that we are making to encourage social welfare activities is, in a sense, rather unique. It is not some Central authority that is doing it all by itself, nor does the burden of this fall on the local social welfare organisations. It is a certain combination of the two, where the Central Board comes in as a helper and adviser and at the same time the local welfare organisations, who are best suited for it, undertake the work. In this way we can utilise the energy, enthusiasm and initiative of vast numbers of persons all over the country. Three hundred organisations will be selected by the Board after a careful consideration. In choosing areas and the manner of execution, the state governments will naturally be consulted.

3. It is important that the states should constitute their state social welfare advisory boards to supervise this work and to be a link with the Central Board. It is suggested that these state social welfare advisory boards should not exceed nine members. Four of these might be nominated by the Central Board and four by the State, the Chairman to be nominated by the state government in consultation with the Chairman of the Central Board.

4. With the formation of the state board, there will be more decentralisation in regard to social welfare work and that will be a desirable development.

1. File No. 17(284)/53-PMS. Also published in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 3, pp. 522-523.
2. The Central Social Welfare Board was set up in August 1953 under the Union Ministry of Education to promote programmes of social welfare especially for women, children and handicapped persons. Its three main functions were: i) to offer financial assistance to the existing welfare organisations; ii) to sponsor and aid new welfare services in uncovered areas wherever needed; and iii) to coordinate the social welfare programmes of various Central Ministries, State Governments and voluntary agencies.

5. There is in India not only a great reservoir of people desiring to do social work but there are quite a large number of organisations which have carried on this work effectively and efficiently. There are many trained persons in social work. Indeed it surprises me that anyone should think of sending our people to Europe or America to learn social work. I am entirely opposed to this. If we have to do social work in India, we have to learn it in the environment of India and not in some entirely different country. We have thus not only a large field to work in but good material. The present attempt is to organise this material to the best advantage and to give it assistance. I am sure that you and your government will welcome this and give it every cooperation.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
16th May 1954

My dear Deshmukh,

Durgabai<sup>2</sup> has spoken to you about the United Council for Relief and Welfare.<sup>3</sup> I enclose a letter which she sent me together with some accounts.<sup>4</sup>

At the last meeting of the UCRW, presided over by the President, it was decided to transfer the production centres to the Social Welfare Board. But it was felt that the UCRW should continue, even though in a small way, for welfare and like activities. I feel also that it is very desirable to get this organisation going. It has done extraordinarily good work during times of emergency and even otherwise and, apart from the work it might be doing now, it is useful to have some such organisation. It is a semi-official organisation which can work more easily than strictly official ones and it brings together numerous other organisations.

1. File No. 29(201)/50-PMS.
2. She was also the Executive Chairman of the United Council for Relief and Welfare.
3. United Council for Relief and Welfare was set up in 1947 by Edwina Mountbatten to coordinate activities of the welfare organisations engaged in relief work for victims of distress, ailment, suffering, natural calamity etc.
4. Durgabai had enclosed the minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee of UCRW held on 7 May 1954. She had also enclosed a detailed estimate for a grant of Rs. 40,000 for the Government's consideration.



Our present estimate of its expenditure for the next year is Rs 40,000/-. Of course, if work expands, it may be a little more, or we may even economise a little. Broadly speaking, it is likely to cost Rs 50,000/- a year apart from emergency. It has been supported in the past chiefly from contributions received from the Prime Minister's Relief Fund and large contribution which Sardar Patel gave of about Rs. 2 lakhs. Also some help from the Rehabilitation Ministry. Recently the Social Welfare Board gave it some money and only about two months ago or so, I gave it Rs. 20,000/- from the Prime Minister's Fund, although that fund is running low.

The question now is what provision we can make for Rs 40,000/- required from 1st of July onwards for a year. The sum is not a large one and there should be no great difficulty. I have just had a talk with Durgabai and she said she would speak to you about it.

I should like a representative of the Home Ministry to be on the UCRW, as Home Ministry is sometimes concerned with some aspects of welfare work. Possibly Education also, though that is not quite so necessary.

I can give a little money from the Prime Minister's Fund, but I would rather not, as there is not much left there. I hope you will have a talk with Durgabai and suggest the best course to be adopted.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To Morarji Desai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
16th May 1954

My dear Morarji,

You wrote to me on May 7, 1954 about the proposal to have a State Welfare Board. In your letter you suggested that the formation of this Board should be entirely the concern of the state governments. Otherwise it will be difficult to give full cooperation on behalf of the State.

I do not think there is any particular difficulty about this matter. You will appreciate that, looking at India as a whole, we have to devise some common approach to this problem of contacts between the state social welfare board and the Central Board. All the states in India, except Bombay, have agreed to

1. File No. 17(284)/53-PMS. A copy of this letter was sent to Durgabai Deshmukh.

the proposal made which is a state board of nine consisting of four nominees of the state, four nominees of the Central Board and one chairman chosen jointly by the Central Board and the state board. As a matter of fact, the nominees of the Central Board will inevitably be chosen in consultation with the state government. In fact, some state boards have already been appointed in this way and there has been no conflict at all. The members of the state social welfare board will be local people and without the full cooperation of the state government, the state board can neither be appointed nor can it function.

The Central Board has sent a number of investigating committees all over India and they have brought a tremendous deal of information about numerous social service organisations. The number runs into many thousands. I imagine that even the state government has not got all this information at its disposal.

I suggest, therefore, that you might agree to the proposal made and the persons to be nominated on behalf of the Central Board will be chosen in consultation with you.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 4. Special Marriage Bill<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am put in some difficulty. I do not want in this measure or any like measure any restraint or limitation on a proper debate. It is an important matter and any feeling that it has been rushed through would not be desirable. On the other hand, not this Bill,<sup>2</sup> but this matter, if I may say so, broadly, has been before this Parliament or its predecessor ever since it began. Hopes deferred make the heart sick. Some of us feel pretty sick at the long delays that have occurred year after year, session after session. It is not the fault of the House; for some reason or other, it has so occurred. Therefore, it is not a question of allowing another day. As the honourable Member Shri Gadgil says, it is obvious

1. Statement in Parliament, 21 May 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, *Official Report*, 1954, Vol. V, Part II, cols. 8049-8054.
2. The Special Marriage Bill (1952) sought to remove the defects of the Special Marriage Act of 1872, and provided for a special form of marriage which could be taken advantage of by any Indian national at home or abroad. The Bill was passed on 9 October 1954.



that we cannot pass it this session. If another day is given to it in the next session, it could not make much of a difference. I agree to that proposal but with this proviso, if I may say so, or expression of wish that nothing will be allowed to come in the way of its rapid consideration in the next session.

I was going to say, Sir, with all respect, that I entirely agree with your desire to give this chance to Members in this way; and, I would not like to come in the way of others who have a special contribution to make on this subject.

Now, I do not propose to take much time of the House but I have been urged to say something and I think I should not restrict myself on this occasion. The urge will not take me to any analysis of the various clauses of this Bill. I do not propose to go into them but just to express myself in regard to a few broad aspects of this Bill.

First of all, this Bill, of course, is a separate thing and does not form part of what is called the Hindu Code series of Bills.<sup>3</sup> It is an entirely separate thing. Nevertheless, it is, of course, connected with the various changes that it is sought to bring about so that it may be considered, broadly speaking, as a part of that approach.

During the last many years we have been—we, meaning this House and its predecessors—considering this matter in various shapes and at least on two or three occasions I gave an assurance to this House that we will expedite these matters. But, somehow or other, my assurance did not produce much effect on the situation; and, in spite of our wishes in the matter, there was and there has been delay. It is true that in a matter of this kind one cannot rush through and one has to give every consideration to various viewpoints in this House as well as outside. Nevertheless, it is rather unfortunate that there has been such considerable delay. Therefore, it is a matter of peculiar satisfaction to me that we are at last coming to grips with these problems in the shape of this Bill and one or two others that are following.

I am not a scholar enough to discuss the niceties or the fundamental points of Hindu law. But, I have dabbled in some broad studies on the subject of law and custom and history and cultural developments and my own conception of Hindu society—as I have gathered it from such reading as I have indulged in—has been that it was always a somewhat dynamic, that it was not a static conception, an unchangeable conception. Indeed the mere fact that in a sense that conception has lasted for a long time is due not to its static character but to a certain dynamism in it which adapted itself to changing conditions.

3. The Hindu Code Bill was divided into several self contained parts, such as the Hindu Marriage and Divorce Bill, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Bill and Hindu Succession Bill. The first was passed in 1955 and the latter two, in 1956. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 17, p. 189 & fn and Vol. 18, pp. 611-612.

Gradually, it became rather static, whether in the further development of the caste system or in various other ways. I believe that it was due to the introduction of this static character that made the Hindu society weak in this country and gradually made it completely—if I may use the word with respect—stagnant, socially speaking, in spite of many admirable qualities and principles which are still followed. Oddly enough, it was a gradual process of becoming static for hundreds of years and the final seal was set upon it with the advent of the British Government in this country. Previously, whenever we talked of Hindu law we always talked of Hindu law and custom. Nowadays one should not attach much value to odd customs, it is confusing. Nevertheless, it was always Hindu law and custom which meant that custom was gradually changing Hindu law. That is, as conditions changed customs developed and they affected the law in practice, whatever it might have been in the ancient texts here and there. Of course, so far as the ancient texts are concerned, there are so many of them that one can quote scripture for any argument and enough. Anyhow, the coming in of the British power, as I said, made the whole conception static by codifying it, codifying it with the help of the most conservative sections of the community they could find. Naturally, if you try to go back to the written word, it did not allow all the changes that had developed and that were developing and so they codified it in a way which might have been suitable a thousand years earlier and all that could not be changed except by legislation as we are trying to change it now. That is to say, the British were not interested in it this way or that way, but they were only anxious to have some kind of peace in such matters so that they could carry on their process of exploitation or whatever you may like to call it. So, the coming of the British power suppressed this dynamic element in Hindu society. In fact, it made it unchangeable except by legislation and in the early days, of course, there was no kind of legislation. What I venture to say is that the essential thing that kept Hindu society going has been a certain element in it, a certain capacity in it, to adapt itself to changed surroundings and to change. It is apparent that society changes. We live in an age which is completely different, if I may say so, from the pattern of age of our fathers and grandfathers. I do not say that there are not certain fundamental principles which may be considered unchangeable; I do not challenge that. But, so far as human relationship and the rest are concerned, to imagine that they are unchangeable although everything else may change seems to me to be wholly and totally illogical. Therefore, society and organisation of society must adapt itself to the changed environment if it is to survive. And, Hindu society, I think, survived to a large extent because it had that capacity to adapt itself. But, apart from the legislation that you may enact, it has, because of various factors, lost that capacity. Therefore, it becomes essential that the only way of doing it is by way of legislation. It is no good going back to the written word of a thousand years or three hundred or five hundred years ago



which were once respected but which took into consideration the conditions then existent. Obviously, conditions of life have been enormously changed everywhere; in India too. Therefore, that argument has no great force. Most of the world's greatest sages and writers have laid stress on the fact that the mere fact that a thing is old does not make it good and the mere fact that a thing is new does not make it bad. We have to consider it in terms of the present day, in terms of the principles and in terms of society as it has developed, apart from what had been intended to develop. We have gone through a process of political revolution in this country, resulting in Independence. We are going through a process of economic change. We have gone through it and will go through it more and more rapidly. There is another aspect, which is equally important, and that is social change, and if you take society, it is an integrated whole. I do not think it is possible for you to think in terms of political change ignoring economic change, ignoring social change. Most people now admit that economic change is as necessary as political change. We all work for that now, but some people seem to think that 'social', using the word in a narrower context, change is something entirely different from political and economic change and can be kept as a close preserve, as an unchanging thing. I submit that this is not the right outlook, because life is an integrated whole. If you change the political context, if you change the economic outlook of it, it invariably follows that the social context also changes, whether you wish it or not, and even if you do not wish it, it changes gradually through discomfort, conflict etc. which compel you to change it. Therefore, a true revolution in a country must take into account the political, the economic and the social aspects of it all together. We may differ as to how to do it, but it is the first question broadly one has to take up now. The person who considers himself a political revolutionary and in the economic sense or in the social sense, if I may use the word without meaning any ill, a reactionary or anything conservative, is not an integrated person; he lives in compartments, something of the type of Jekyll and Hyde business, a bit here and a bit there and will not fit in. An individual may be that and it will only cause some inconvenience and heart-burning, but if society function in this way, it is bad for society to keep on these compartments or keep on the social aspects as untouchable. Take even this problem of untouchability. I cannot quote the sacred books, but many people hold that the sacred books say that this was enjoined on them—many of the things which are related to untouchability—but we came to the conclusion long ago that not only was it unjust and must be done away with, but, as Gandhiji repeatedly said, that if Hindu society must survive, it also must put an end to untouchability, that is to say, this important social change became essential. Even apart from the justice of it, apart from the question of fitting in with the present day things in the country, it became essential even from the narrower point of view of the Hindu society that it must fit itself into the changed

conditions. That argument and that manner of thinking has to be applied to other problems of human relationships also. After all, the biggest problems of the world are those of human relationships, whether it is relationship of one individual with a group, or one group with another group. I think that argument might include every kind of relationship, whether national, international, individual or whatever it is—group with a group is international—and this problem of human relationship is of high importance and we must think and consider how, in the world as it is or India as it is, changing before our eyes politically and economically, can we stop it. Whether we try to stop it or not, it does change, and we must come up and catch up with the these changes. So far as this particular Bill is concerned, as the House knows, it is a permissive measure; it is not forced on anybody's throat. It is a permissive measure and it is quite essential to have permissive measures as a half-way house to other measures that you may take in future. You allow people to do it without forcing it and when at a stage it is established, you take another stage. I do not propose to say anything about the clauses of the Bill. I think that as the Bill has emerged from the Council of States, it would be desirable to make alterations or amendments here and there, not to any big principles but in regard to procedure and other things it is desirable, and when the time comes and if I think it necessary, I might say a word or two about those changes. This is not, we all know, any kind of a party measure. It is a measure affecting all of us. The Bill affects not Hindus only, but is permissive for anybody, but I referred to the Hindu aspect because that aspect comes up before us repeatedly in this and other matters.

I welcome this bill.

## 5. To Rameshwari Nehru<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

23rd May 1954

My dear Bijji,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of the 20th May.<sup>3</sup>

1. File No. 29(87)/48-PMS. A copy of this letter was sent to the MHA.
2. Rameshwari Nehru was Honorary Adviser in the Central Ministry of Rehabilitation and President of Central Advisory Board for the rehabilitation of displaced widows, unattached women, the old and infirm and their dependents.
3. She had enclosed a scheme for the rescue and rehabilitation of women, recovered under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act, and wanted the Government to start a pilot project in Delhi.



I am deeply interested in this matter, but I am convinced that no good will be done unless we proceed on the right lines. From such accounts as I have had, I am not very satisfied with the way the present home for these women is being conducted in Delhi. I do not think that will lead to any success.

The problem is certainly a very important one, but it is also a deep-seated one and cannot be dealt with by superficial methods. Probably special legislation is necessary. If a home has to be built up, it will have to be of a very special kind and attractively run, not a kind of a poor house for waifs and strays.

I am sure that our Home Ministry is interested in this matter, but they would like no doubt to consider every aspect of the way these girls are looked after and treated and made to feel at home. Further, that some openings for another suitable life are presented to them.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 6. To Charan Singh<sup>1</sup>

Camp: The Retreat  
Mashobra, Simla  
27th May 1954

My dear Charan Singh<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of May 22nd.<sup>3</sup>

You know that I attach the greatest importance to the ending of the caste system. I think this is certainly the biggest weakening factor in our society. I also agree with you that finally caste will not go till inter-caste marriages are not unusual and are looked upon as something which is quite normal. I would

1. JN Collection. Also published in *The Hindustan Times*. 12 September 1977.
2. (1902-87); MLA, UP, 1937-77; Minister in the UP Government, 1951-67 and Chief Minister, 1967-68, 1970; member, Lok Sabha, 1977-87; Minister for Home Affairs, March 1977-July 1978; Deputy P.M., 1979; Prime Minister, 1979- January 1980; was associated with Congress 1929-67; founded Bharatiya Kranti Dal, 1967, Bharatiya Lok Dal, 1974, Janata Party, 1977 and Lok Dal, September 1979; author of *Abolition of Zamindari*, *Cooperative Farming X-Rayed*, *India's Poverty and its Solution*, *Indian Economy — A Gandhian Blueprint*, *Economic Nightmare of India: Its causes and cure*.
3. Charan Singh had suggested that to rob the caste of its significance, the candidates for gazetted jobs should be asked to marry outside their caste and this condition should be extended to legislators also.

go further and say that there will be no real unity in the country till our prejudice against marriages between people of different religions also does not go.

But to say, as you do, that we should try to compel people by constitutional provisions and rules to marry outside their castes seems to me to offend against the basic principle of individual freedom. Marriage is very much a personal affair and we are trying to make it more and more a personal affair and to take it out of the old ruts of conventions and customs. What you suggest is definitely a retrograde step from that point of view, although it is meant to encourage a desirable tendency.

We have to create conditions otherwise. The Special Marriage Bill<sup>4</sup> is one such step. Other steps should also follow. Ultimately people marry those who more or less fit in with their way of thinking and living. Indeed any other marriage is a misfit and any imposition from above is likely to lead to disaster in so far as the married couple are concerned. I cannot bring myself to think of the choice of marriage being controlled by legislation or by inducements offered.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. See *ante*, pp. 148-152.

## 7. To K. Hanumanthaiya<sup>1</sup>

Camp: The Retreat  
Mashobra, Simla  
29th May 1954

My dear Hanumanthaiya,<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of the 26th May about the Social Welfare Board.<sup>3</sup>

We have built up, or we are trying to build up, a highly specialised department of social welfare. We have kept it apart from parties and politics and already this department has got fuller information about social service

1. File No. 17(19)/56-PMS. A copy of the letter was also sent to Durgabai Deshmukh.  
2. Chief Minister of Mysore.

3. Hanumanthaiya had written that the constitution of state social welfare boards should be left entirely to the discretion of the state governments as most of the work had to be done by the local social welfare organisations, which came under the state governments. The proposal of the Central Government showed a tendency for over centralization, which was not a healthy sign. The Central Board might make suitable grants to state governments for this purpose.



activities in India than anyone had possessed previously. I believe it is in touch with over 3,000 social service organisations in India and the number is being added to.

A considerable sum of money has been placed by the Central Government at the disposal of this Board, on the understanding that it will function as an expert and specialised body. Naturally, it will work in the states with the close cooperation of the states concerned. If a state does not want it to work, it will not work there. The whole purpose of this new development, that is, the formation of the Central Social Welfare Board, would be defeated if certain sums of money were merely handed over to the state governments. It would have been easy to do so without a Central Board coming into existence.

Therefore, it is necessary to combine the expert all-India knowledge of the Central Board with particular experience and knowledge of the state governments or their representatives in the states, in order to produce the best results.

This has nothing to do with centralisation. It is an expert way of helping the state governments.

So far as the state boards are concerned, as you have said, four members will be nominated by the Central Board. But these four nominations will also be made naturally in full consultation with the state government. We have to produce a board of the best available talent which will work in cooperation with the state government as well as the Central Board. I do not see any difficulty about this matter and, in fact, the other state governments have agreed to this procedure. No one is encroaching on the responsibilities of the state governments. The whole object is to help them.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru





## CONGRESS PARTY





## I. ORGANISATIONAL MATTERS

### 1. Rejuvenate the Congress<sup>1</sup>

We, the Congress workers must follow a new line, a new path, We must learn lesson from the Travancore-Cochin elections.<sup>2</sup> Undoubtedly, in India maintenance of personal contacts pays high dividends. It is of the utmost importance that we remain with the people so that you tell them what is your policy.

We are always faced with the question of our internal organization, that is, the question of discipline, which is essential for any organization. But discipline works only so long as it represents the wishes of the people. Any disciplinary action which represents public opinion over a certain question and which the people think right, is correct and that works. This does not mean that we consult the people for each individual action. What I seek to suggest is that while on the one hand, our organization is to lead the people, on the other hand it is to be in constant touch with the currents and cross-currents in people's minds.

Congress must feel the people's pulse and it must be borne in mind that if the people hold any particular disciplinary action to be wrong and unjustified, then the entire meaning of the action is lost. I and you have to constantly feel how far we are getting away from the people.

There was a time when nobody inside the Congress organization dared to defy it. You had the fullest sympathies and support of the people. If it so happens that those in power seek to keep themselves in power, and those in opposition defy discipline at every stage, then undoubtedly a dangerous situation arises and the people begin to lose interest in the organization. You take one action, another opposes that disciplinary action, then the people no more have respect for discipline. You must ponder over this aspect because ultimately you derive your strength from the people. Congress committees can function and progress only to the extent that they can attract the people.

How can we attract people. There are big elections, in which you are victorious or you are defeated. But generally you are victorious, but now the

1. Speech at a meeting of the executive council of UPCC, Banda, 27 March 1954. The *Economic Review*, a fortnightly journal of the AICC, 15 April 1954. Also published in the *National Herald*, 16 April 1954.
2. In Travancore-Cochin elections out of 117 seats the Congress secured 45, the CPI, 23 and the PSP, 19 seats. A PSP Government was formed with Congress support from outside.

time has come when you have to realize that the inclination of the people can be diverted from you. Now the Congress organization cannot work on its old prestige.

We can rejuvenate the Congress. The main point is how we function and what should be the policy behind our actions. Mere spirit of service is not enough. That is, no doubt, important, but ultimately we shall be judged by our success in solving the problems before the country, and the country will regard those as the best who solve their problems. The condition of the world today is very clear to us.

The Congress is faced with numerous questions. The biggest task for us is our economic problem and to a large extent, we shall succeed in this respect under our Five Year Plan. The quantum of success will largely depend on the increase in our rate of investment for productive work.

We talk of the Five Year Plan. We are also busy in preparing the Second Five Year Plan. Gradually our work is increasing. Whatever we are doing is proper, is worthy of praise but the doubt is whether it is sufficient and enough. The fundamental fact is that we must go ahead with speed. How far a country can progress is to a very large extent dependent upon the amount which it can invest every year in its development work. In a poor and undeveloped country like India, the savings are so meagre that the fundamental problem is how to find money for investment. Two or three paths are open to us—get gifts and loans in the country, or get loans and grants from outside the country.

It is not proper to rely to any considerable extent on outside help, and, in any case, we can never get from outside what we actually require. Then what is the way out? The rate of investment in America and Russia is fairly high. Russia has made remarkable progress during the last 30 years, but it is equally true that the progress there has been through force. The per capita production as also consumption has risen in Russia.

However the question arises as to how we can increase the rate of investment in our productive work. We are constantly grappling with this problem. The states want that the Centre should give them more help. But ultimately the Centre has to find the money from the pockets of people. Our future would, to a great extent, largely depend on how we solve this problem.

Today besides the Congress we have in the country the Communist Party, the Praja Socialist Party and a miscellaneous assortment, the communal groups, etc. The communal parties seek to exploit the backwardness and hunger of our people. However, these communal parties will have to be faced. It would be most dangerous for us to enter into mutual agreement with them. Such an idea of compromise with the communal elements would weaken the Congress. There are the communists but it is evident that the Congress can arrive at no agreement with them, neither on the question of internal policies nor on external policies. The communists in this country are apparently not of this country. They do not



have outstanding personalities. They are involved in a strange dilemma which weakens them. They regard Russia as their guru.

There is no fundamental difference between ourselves and the Praja Socialists. But I feel that the Praja Socialists have lost a great opportunity which they got during recent times. Day-by-day their policies are becoming more and more unrealistic. They have not placed before us any new or fundamental thing about the problems which face us. They, day-in and day-out, talk of nationalization. Nationalization cannot effect the least change in our economic conditions. It might have some psychological effect. We are ourselves not against nationalization. But the practical question is when and how it should be achieved. The main point is to increase our production. It is no use repeating again and again stereo typed phrases from books.

Then there is the question of land. The Bhoodan movement has made a great headway. In spite of the fact that landlordism has been abolished, we have not yet solved our land problem completely; its many fundamental aspects are yet to be solved. The problems which we are increasingly facing every day are mainly economic. We do not find people who look at these problems in a practical and realistic manner.

## 2. To Kamaraj Nadar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
28th March 1954

My dear Kamaraj,<sup>2</sup>

In view of Rajaji's ill health, I had heard vaguely that he was thinking of resigning from the Chief Ministership. He mentioned this in a letter to Balvantray Mehta.<sup>3</sup> He did not, however, write to me about it and I was not quite sure when he might make his decision. Because he has been ill and at his age even small illness is a serious thing, I could not press him to continue. Considering all the facts of the situation, I decided to leave matters to take their course. Indeed, as no reference was made to me directly, I had no occasion to say anything. Now that Rajaji has stated in public that he wishes to resign,<sup>4</sup> we

1. JN Collection.

2. President, Tamil Nad PCC.

3. General Secretary, AICC.

4. It was reported on 23 March 1954 that Rajagopalachari had communicated to the Congress President his desire to quit the Chief Ministership of Madras on health ground.

must accept that. The question then arises about his successor and the sooner this is decided, the better. Uncertainty in such matters is bad and hinders the Government machine from working properly. I hope, therefore, that at the next Party meeting a successor to Rajaji will be finally elected and the matter will not be left vague or uncertain. I hope also that this election will be, if possible, unanimous.

It is clear that Rajaji's resignation and withdrawal from the Ministry is a major event both for the Government and for the Congress in Madras. I have been receiving telegrams from people asking me to induce him not to resign, but, as I have said above, in the circumstances, I feel I cannot press him to continue.

His resignation must not lead to any weakening of our Congress position. It is therefore necessary that firm and early action should be taken to elect his successor and that there should be no delay in this. The public should see that the Congress Party holds together in this matter and has no doubts.

I gather that there is going to be a Party Meeting on the 30th March and the Party is supposed to elect a leader then.<sup>5</sup> I hope it will do so and there will be no postponement of this issue, which will lead people to think that there is some doubt about it. Whatever decision is made, it should be a firm one.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The Congress Legislature Party on 30 March, elected Kamaraj Nadar as its leader by 93 to 41 votes.

### 3. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
2nd April 1954

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for your letter of March 31st.<sup>2</sup> I returned yesterday to Delhi.

2. I saw in the papers the result of the election for the leader of the party

1. JN Collection.

2. Rajagopalachari had informed Nehru that Kamaraj decided to contest for leadership at the last moment. Rajagopalachari advised C. Subramaniam, Finance Minister in his Ministry, to contest for leadership even though it was clear that commanding the position he did, Kamaraj would secure a majority of votes.



in Madras. I had not expected this particular development, and was rather taken aback by it. I suppose, we have to face a bunch of difficulties.

3. I would very much like you to be here to offer us your advice about this and other matters. Unfortunately, you are not coming for the Working Committee meeting and I cannot press you to come because the journey is long and tiring one.

4. I would, however, be very grateful to you if you could, entirely privately, for me, give me some indication of how you think we should consider this question in view of the latest developments.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 4. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
6th April 1954

My dear Rajaji,

I have received your three letters of April 3rd, 4th and 5th. Yesterday, the Parliamentary Board had a full talk with Kamaraj Nadar. We made it perfectly clear to him that there were only two alternatives, namely, he should either accept the Chief Ministership and resign from the Presidentship of Pradesh Congress Committee or he should resign from the leadership of the party and continue to be the President of the Pradesh Congress Committee. Also that it was improper for the Chief Minister not to be the leader of the party. Kamaraj was not quite clear as to which of these alternatives he should choose. We have left it at that. He is going back tonight to Madras.

Thus the basic position that you laid down in your letters has been made perfectly clear. Other steps will depend on Kamaraj's choice. In either event, that is, whether he becomes Chief Minister or agrees to someone else becoming the Chief Minister, the next step of forming a Ministry will not be particularly an easy one.

The situation is obviously not a happy one, but there it is, and we have to face it. We cannot permit the Madras Government or the organisation go to pieces. We shall, therefore, give him such help as we can and I have no doubt that you will also help him to the extent possible in the circumstances.

1. JN Collection.

I am prepared to ask Balvantray Mehta to go down to Madras in case his presence there can prove helpful. Should you think that he should go down, please send me a word by telephone or telegraph and he will go immediately.

Thank you for your letter of April 4th about the occurrences in Malabar.<sup>2</sup>

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 28 March the Malabar Special Police opened fire at a riotous mob killing two and injuring six persons. The mob had gathered near Naduvattam Mosque in Kozhikode taluka with the intention of attacking a religious procession scheduled to pass by it. The Police was stated to have opened fire in self-defence.

## 5. To N.V. Gadgil<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
6th April 1954

My dear Gadgil,<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of the 5th April has rather surprised me,<sup>3</sup> Your not being invited this time to the Working Committee meeting had nothing to do with what you have imagined. In fact, I did not clearly know that you had not been invited. Some time back, it was suggested to me that a number of new persons, chiefly Presidents of Pradesh Congress Committees might be invited for a change and some of the old invitees might be reduced in number. I agreed with this idea. Later, a list was put up before me which I rapidly looked through and passed. I did not give any thought to your name being in it or not in it.

Also the question of the States Reorganisation Commission was not at all an important issue before the Working Committee. In fact, it was rather casually brought up because of enquiries made. I think that the resolution we had passed,

1. File No. G-1(a)/1954, AICC Papers. NMML.
2. Prominent leader of Samyukta Maharashtra movement.
3. Reacting to the CWC resolution of 5 April barring Congressmen from joining other political parties on the issue of reorganisation of States, Gadgil wrote that he was not invited to the meeting of the CWC adopting the said resolution because the CWC did not wish to entertain any view which was not in consonance with its own. He wished to know why the Congress was diffident in eliciting support from other parties on such a 'historic' issue.



after much discussion, is a very good one.<sup>4</sup> You must have misunderstood it. We have given perfect freedom to individuals and groups, majorities and minorities, all to express their opinion fully to the Commission. What we have said should not be done is public joint action by Congressmen with other bodies. If this is permitted, it would mean Congressmen associating themselves in some places with the Communist Party or the Hindu Mahasabha or any other organisation. We can hardly sit down and draw a list of organisations with whom the Congressmen should associate themselves in this matter and another list of those organisations with whom they should not. The only safe course was for them not to present joint memoranda with other parties.

That does not mean that they cannot privately confer with any individual or group. Even similar memoranda can be produced, but mixing up with other parties in a public agitation or in joint memoranda would inevitably prove very embarrassing to Congressmen. Congressmen function under some discipline; others have no such discipline. Even on a public platform others may say much more than a Congressman would say and that would embarrass Congressmen.

Remember also that we have to deal with the whole of India. We have had much trouble in Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal resulting often in violent conflicts.<sup>5</sup> We wanted to keep the Congressmen away from this. But, I repeat, that we have given the fullest freedom to Congressmen to express their views to the Commission.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. The resolution adopted by the Congress Working Committee in New Delhi on 5 April 1954, stated that all Congress Committees and Congressmen have full freedom to represent their points of view before the States Reorganisation Commission but, were expected neither to carry on agitation nor "join in a common platform with other political parties in the expression of view on this question."
5. Orissa claimed Seraikella and Kharsawan areas and West Bengal claimed Manbhum, Purnea and Santhal Pargana districts of Bihar, which often resulted in violent conflicts in these regions between supporters of these claims and the state authorities. See also, *Selected Works* (second series) Vol. 24, pp. 249-251.

## 6. To Sri Prakasa<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12th April 1954

My dear Prakasa,

I returned to Delhi this afternoon<sup>2</sup> and saw your letter of April 9th. I have also met Kamaraj Nadar and had a talk with him. He was rather disturbed at the fact that some kind of statement had already been issued by you about the new Ministry.<sup>3</sup> He wanted this done tomorrow after everything had been settled. In fact that is what you yourself had written to me in your letter. However, it does not matter very much.

I am very glad to learn that Kamaraj went to Rajaji for his blessings and Rajaji melted and embraced him and promised to help him.

The Cabinet that Kamaraj suggests appears to be a good one. I do not yet know what the distribution of the portfolios would be but presumably Subramaniam would be Finance Minister. Probably he will also function as the Leader of the House....

I pointed out to Kamaraj that there was no Brahmin in the Cabinet and that it would be desirable to have one. He could not think of a suitable person, but he promised to have one as a Deputy Minister. I also told him that it was very necessary to have a Moslem as well as a woman. He said that both might come in as Deputy Ministers. As for the Moslem, the only name that one can think of is that of Allapichai.<sup>4</sup> I am not sure if he will become a Deputy Minister, Kamaraj thinks he will.

Kamaraj, apparently, thinks of having nine Deputy Ministers. But I told him to begin in a slow way and not to exceed five at the most. If necessary he could add to them later.

This is the present position. I have given you the names he mentioned to me. You must get these directly in writing from him. I think it would be better if you did not issue any statement till you had received something in writing from him.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Nehru was in Mumbai on 11 April. See *ante*, pp. 25-38.

3. A Communique issued by the Raj Bhavan on 11 April said that the Governor had approved the five names for appointment as Ministers proposed by Kamaraj Nadar and that he would accept the resignations of Rajagopalachari and his colleagues with effect from the forenoon of 13 April and would swear in the new Ministers the same day.

4. A.M. Allapichai, a former Muslim League leader, who joined Congress later and became a minister in Madras Cabinet.



When I pass through Madras airport on Friday next,<sup>5</sup> I have asked Kewal Singh, our Consul General in Pondicherry, to see me.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Nehru was on his way to Chidambaram to attend the PEN conference at the Annamalai University.

## 7. Deterioration in Bihar Congress<sup>1</sup>

Yes, please send a copy of this letter<sup>2</sup> from Shri Vasudev Prasad Singh to Sri Babu,<sup>3</sup> Anugraha Babu,<sup>4</sup> Mahesh Babu<sup>5</sup> and Deep Babu.<sup>6</sup> Tell them that we are greatly concerned about this deterioration in Bihar so far as the Congress is concerned and we must look deeply into it. Or else, the whole organisation will collapse and go to pieces.

You will remember that the Working Committee wanted a report on this on behalf of PCC. You might also ask for a report about the present working of

1. Note to the General Secretary, AICC, 13 April 1954. File No. P.B. 3/I, 1954, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. Vasudev Prasad Singh, a member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly had written that after the Corporation elections, the effigies of Bihar Congress leaders like S.K. Sinha, A.N. Sinha, Sundari Devi, Rampyari Devi were burnt in Patna. He suggested that if the Congress wished to do well in the Assembly and Parliamentary elections, it should withdraw from the zila board elections and utilise the time in reorganising the party, which was being alienated from the people by the action of the State Government.
3. Sri Krishna Sinha, Chief Minister of Bihar.
4. Anugraha Narayan Sinha was the Finance Minister of Bihar.
5. Mahesh Prasad Sinha (b. 1901); took part in the freedom struggle and was jailed in 1920, 1930, 1940 and 1942; Member, All India Congress Committee, since 1924; Chairman, Khadi Board; Minister for Industry, Transport, Information and Revenue, Government of Bihar, 1952-67.
6. Deep Narayan Singh (b. 1894); jailed several times during freedom movement; Member, Bihar Legislative Council, 1937-39; Member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-50; Congress Minister in Bihar, 1937-50 and 1952; Interim Chief Minister of Bihar, February 1961; Minister for Irrigation, Power and Information in Bihar, 1962-63.

the PCC and the DCCs there: how many are functioning; how many are closed up; who is in charge of the PCC Office, i.e., some senior person, because the President is, of course, a busy man and cannot give much time to it.

## 8. Discipline within the Organisation<sup>1</sup>

I have gone through all the bulky papers relating to the disciplinary action against Jag Parvesh Chandra, MLA of Delhi.<sup>2</sup> All these papers leave no doubt in my mind that Jag Parvesh has been behaving in a highly improper way for a considerable time past.

1. Over a year ago, his behaviour was considered at a meeting of the Delhi Congress Party and a resolution of strong disapproval was passed.<sup>3</sup> Thereupon he tendered an apology to the Party which was accepted, and he also withdrew some highly objectionable letters which he had written to the Leader of the Party.

2. After another month, that is, in March 1953, the Party had again to consider his behaviour. Again a resolution of strong disapproval was passed by the Party and a warning given to him against a repetition of such defiance.

3. It appears that this kind of behaviour continued<sup>4</sup> till ultimately matters came to a head in March, 1954.

4. I shall not at this stage go into any details. I only wish to record my present reaction after reading all these papers. These reactions are clear. Jag Parvesh has been continuously functioning in a highly irresponsible and

1. Note, 19 April 1954. File No. PCD-6/1954, AICC Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.
2. on 23 March 1954, Jag Parvesh Chandra was suspended for six months by the Delhi Congress Legislature Party on disciplinary ground.
3. During discussions on the Chief Commissioner's address, in the Delhi Legislative Assembly on 24 February 1953, Chandra strongly criticised the Government for not having any definite policy priorities and alleged a tremendous increase in crime during Congress rule in Delhi State.
4. In October 1953 alongwith 10 MLAs Chandra sent a requisition to the CLP alleging corruption and nepotism by the Chief Minister, relating to multipurpose cooperative housing societies, grant of liquor license, nominations to NDMC, and appointment of hony. Magistrates. Despite the Chief Minister's replies, the dissidents continued asking questions in the Assembly, which were highly embarrassing to the Government.



indisciplined manner and his speeches and activities undoubtedly lower the prestige of the Delhi Government and the Congress. Judging him by his letters as well as the reports of his speeches, he does not appear to be balanced in the least and seems to be anxious to attain some kind of notoriety. His letters and explanations chiefly consist of interminable quibbling and avoidance of the main issue, charges against the Leader and occasionally against the Whip,<sup>5</sup> and indicate a consistent campaign against the Leader.

5. Whether some of these charges against the Leader are correct or not, is another matter and can be considered separately. The main charge is authoritarianism and the impropriety of a whip asking him not to put supplementaries.<sup>6</sup> Jag Parvesh's conduct has to be judged apart from his own charges against the Leader.

6. Looking therefore, at all these papers carefully, it seems to me that the Executive Committee had justification in taking disciplinary action against Jag Parvesh.

7. Apart from this, I have feeling that the Leader might have dealt with this matter in a somewhat different way during the last stages. This does not diminish Jag Parvesh's impropriety.

8. The main thing, however, is that the Delhi Congress Party is badly split up over this and other issues. Before taking any final decision, I propose to see some of the principal members of the Party as well as the President of the Pradesh Congress Committee.<sup>7</sup>

5. Mangal Das.

6. On 15 March Jag Parvesh Chandra was issued a whip restraining him from asking questions and giving any statements in the Assembly. On 16 March several MLAs refused to ask questions standing against their names, in support of Chandra.

7. C.K. Nair.

## 9. Muslim Congressmen in Bihar<sup>1</sup>

Shri Mohammed Noor, Deputy Minister, Bihar, saw me here and the picture he gave me of the Muslims in Bihar and in the UP, was alarming from the political point of view. Gradually they are being squeezed out both of the services and even of the Congress organisation. Among the Congress delegates from Bihar, there are only five or six Muslims out of over four hundred. Some of the oldest Congress Muslims, including Dr Mahmud, failed to get elected.

1. Note to the General Secretary, AICC, 22 April 1954. JN Collection.

The result of all this is a deep frustration among the Muslims. There are of course many causes for this.

I am very much concerned at this situation which is drawing the Muslims into other folds, usually the communist. Anyhow, they are becoming anti-Congress just in a spirit of resentment against the Congress Government and the Congress organisation.

You can certainly write to the Bihar PCC and try to find out how many Muslims there are in the PCC and the DCCs etc.

## 10. Internal Differences in Ajmer Congress<sup>1</sup>

The Ajmer Government and the Congress Party in the legislature have been giving us continuous headaches, almost since their formation after the General Elections, and more especially for the last year or more. Repeated attempts have been made by us in Delhi to compose the differences that had arisen and to speed up the work of the administration. Unfortunately these attempts have not met with success and these internal differences have reached a stage of acute crisis. The Ajmer Government cannot be considered to be an efficient Government and progress of work in the past has been very dilatory. The Community Development Projects scheme in Ajmer was one of the least successful. In fact, for a long time, practically nothing was done there. I might mention that some little progress had been made there recently.

2. While this was the general background of lack of efficiency, the fact of internal dissensions within the Cabinet and within the Congress Party has led naturally to an even more marked deterioration in the working of the governmental machinery. When there is conflict at the top, this inevitably reflects itself in the Party and in all the grades of the governmental apparatus. Thus, the time has come when clear decisions must be taken. Those decisions cannot be easy ones and whatever new step might be taken, might well lead to some new kind of difficulty because the whole basis is weak. Even so, the existing position cannot be tolerated.

3. Two or three factors have to be borne in mind. The Congress Party in the legislature has a considerable majority over the opposition. But, as recent experience has shown, it has no great cohesion, nor are the general standards

1. Note to Balvantray Mehta, 25 April 1954. JN Collection.



high. After the elections, there were a few additions to this Party from the Kisan Sabha and the Purusharthi Panchayat. These new members were not Congressmen previously and, therefore, they did not have the same sense of discipline or a sense of cohesion.

4. Right at the beginning, there were two claimants for the Chief Ministership, Shri Haribhau Upadhyaya and Shri B.K. Kaula. It was ultimately decided that Shri Haribhau Upadhyaya should be the Chief Minister and Shri Kaula, the second Minister. Later, a third Minister was added, Shri Brij Mohan Lal Sharma. Although the election of the leader of the Party, who became the Chief Minister, was unanimous at the time, it appears clear that Shri Kaula did not accept this decision whole-heartedly and evidently considered himself, and still considers himself, more competent and suited to the post. There was thus a tendency for him not to give that full cooperation to which the Chief Minister was entitled from his colleague. In the latter stages this lack of cooperation became more acute and, in fact, there was a continuous tug-of-war between the Chief Minister and Shri Kaula.<sup>2</sup> This struck at the very root of the leadership of the Chief Minister and the joint functioning of a Cabinet. Gradually a group emerged, which openly worked for a change in the Chief Ministership, that is, a group which wanted Shri Kaula to become Chief Minister. It must be presumed that this group had the passive support at least of Shri Kaula himself. In these circumstances, the working of the Government became progressively more difficult.

5. Another remarkable feature of the situation is that the Speaker, Shri Bhagirath Singh, has been an active Member of this dissident group in the Party. From any point of view, a Speaker's participation in this kind of group politics and attempts to change the Government is obviously most objectionable. I believe that the General Secretary of the AICC informed the Speaker some time ago that he must keep apart from such activities. Nevertheless, he has continued to indulge in them. A Speaker cannot, while he is the Speaker, participate in normal party politics, much less in group politics within the Party. All he can do is to remain a primary member of the Congress and no more. He should not participate in the party meetings of the legislature. This point must be clearly understood, for any other course will bring discredit on the high position of the Speaker.

6. I do not propose in this note to go into the various charges and counter-charges brought against each other by the Ministers or by the dissidents. So far as the administrative inefficiencies are concerned, there is a great deal of truth in these charges. As I have said above, the administration has lacked competence.

7. Nor do I propose here to go into what might be called personal charges

2. See *Selected Works*, (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 381-382.

or criticisms. I am greatly disappointed at the fact that, in spite of the repeated endeavours on my part, no marked effect has taken place in the internal situation in Ajmer. In a small Cabinet like that of Ajmer, there should be complete cohesion and cooperation. In fact, the distribution of portfolios, though necessary from an administrative point of view, need not indicate too marked a separation of functions and as far as possible there should be a joint consultation and consideration of all problems. No Minister should consider himself in isolated charge of his portfolio.

8. The second point to remember is that the chief minister is the head of the administration and the whole system of democratic parliamentary government depends upon the fact that the chief minister is the key-stone. Therefore, the chief minister has a right to have the full loyalty and cooperation of his colleagues. If he is not good enough to be chief minister, then ultimately some change will have to be made. But so long as he is the Chief Minister, he must have this loyalty. Indeed the ministry must function jointly and each member should support the other in the Assembly, in the Party and in the public, whatever internal differences in opinion there might be. Such differences can be discussed privately in cabinet, but not otherwise. If differences become too great or concern some vital matter of principle, it is for the minister concerned, who does not agree with the chief minister, to resign from the cabinet and then put forward his viewpoints in the party. So long as he is a member of the Government, he must support that government and his chief minister. These are general principles of parliamentary and party government.

9. It is clear that in the present instance of Ajmer, these principles have not been adhered to. The Chief Minister has, I believe, often made mistakes in the administration and work has not been upto the standard required. There has been dilatoriness. But the major difficulty appears to have been the continued lack of cooperation between the Home Minister and the Chief Minister. If the Home Minister felt unable to give his cooperation to the Chief Minister, then the only correct course for him was to resign from his office. Of course in a party government like that of the Congress, not only the local Congress organisation has to be considered but the Central Parliamentary Board comes into the picture. The Central Board comes even more into the picture in a small state like that of Ajmer and the proper course is for difficulties to be referred to the Central Parliamentary Board. In a sense, this has been done on several occasions, but the advice given by the Central Board has not produced much effect.

10. A party government ultimately can only carry on when it has a majority in the assembly and when it has also a majority in the party itself. There is no doubt that the Congress Party as such has a considerable majority in the Ajmer Assembly. But the question has arisen as to whether the present Government has a majority in the Party itself or rather, to put it differently, whether the



Party desires a change in the leadership and if so, what further steps should be taken.

11. Since the General Elections, two and a quarter years have passed. That is, about half the period of the life of this Assembly is over. The future of Ajmer State itself, as a separate entity, is doubtful and it is certainly conceivable that after the report of the States Reorganisation Commission, it may be decided that Ajmer should form part of a larger state. Recent events in Ajmer have not encouraged the people that this State can function satisfactorily as a separate entity. In any event, the members of the Assembly, the Party and the Government must have realised that in a sense they are on trial. In spite of this, they have failed to function with even a moderate degree of cohesion.

12. Normally speaking, it would be undesirable at this stage to change the leadership and the composition of the Government for the remaining period of two years or so. Any change would bring about not greater stability but probably even less cohesion and disruptionist forces would continue to work. Therefore, unless there is some special reason for a major change, no such change appears advisable. However, if circumstances compelled a change, then it has to be faced and the consequences taken, whatever they might be.

13. The course I would have suggested and which I would suggest even now, if it is accepted whole-heartedly by the parties concerned, is that the present leader should continue, the present Government should also continue, but certain changes in portfolios should be made. This would be subject to important matters being considered by the Cabinet and decisions taken by it, and the Ministers working as a team and in a spirit of cooperation. This would mean that all group formation and wrangling must stop during this coming period at least.

14. While the Party is directly responsible for choosing its leader, it must be remembered that the Party itself is an organ of the Congress organisation. That organisation is represented by the Ajmer Pradesh Congress Committee and by the Central Parliamentary Board. It is a relevant factor as to what the Pradesh Congress Committee thinks of a change, because that Committee is supposed to represent public opinion in that area. A decision by the Party, which may go contrary to public opinion, is not likely to lead to stability or to have the confidence of the public.

15. In the present case, I understand that the Pradesh Congress Committee of Ajmer is not in favour of a change in the leadership of the Party. That is, therefore, a relevant consideration though not a final one.

16. It has to be remembered also, as I have mentioned above, that the Party at present consists of some newcomers, who have not the cohesive spirit or of discipline of old members of the Congress.

17. Any attempt to change the leadership of the Party now might or might not succeed. In either event, probably, the difference in voting, if it came to a

vote, would be very small, perhaps one or two. A result arrived at in this way would hardly be a satisfactory one and disruptionist tendencies would continue, more especially if the general body of public outside also does not approve of a change.

18. For all these reasons, my recommendation would be and is, as I have said above, that no major change is desirable at present and all Congressmen must work in a spirit of discipline without the formation of groups and that they must put before themselves the welfare of this little State and not the interest of this little group or that individual. At the same time, some matters deserve to be considered afresh, such as, a rearrangement of portfolios must be considered by the Cabinet as a whole. Certain other matters could also be decided to promote efficient and cooperative working.

19. While this was the view I formed when I met a number of Ministers and MLAs of Ajmer<sup>3</sup> and I still hold to that view, I am a little doubtful now as to whether this will be acceptable to the persons concerned. I understand that Maulana Azad saw a number of the dissident MLAs from Ajmer and advised them more or less on the above lines, but that they were not prepared to accept his advice. I am surprised and somewhat distressed to learn that they should have thus rejected Maulana Saheb's advice. Anyhow, if that is so, then we cannot think in terms of cooperative working as we would have liked to suggest. Any such cooperative working must have not verbal support but whole-hearted approval.

20. If, therefore, my suggestions above are not accepted in a true spirit and with the full intention of acting upon them, then the only other course is for a suitable opportunity to be given to the Party to decide the question of a leader. For this purpose, a full Party meeting will have to be held on a date to be fixed by the AICC office and a senior representative of the AICC will have to be present there. That date will have to be some time later, roughly about a month from now. The meeting so held will be a private meeting. Previous to that, the representative of the AICC will take necessary steps to have this meeting.

21. It must also be clearly understood that no Minister can in any way support or vote with an opposition group at the Party meeting or elsewhere. Therefore, if a Minister feels that he should support an opposition group and cannot give his loyalty to the present Government, then he should resign previously. After resignation, he will be free to act like any other member of the Party.

22. Therefore, the first step to be taken is to get a clear answer from the members of the present Government as well as the dissident members of the Party as to whether they are prepared to accept the recommendation I have

3. 12 MLAs from Ajmer met Nehru on 14 April 1954.



made above, that is, no change in the leadership, but various other changes in the portfolios etc., as might be recommended by the Central Parliamentary Board. If this is to be accepted, it has to be done whole-heartedly and there is to be no further group working as in the past. If this is accepted, then obviously the question of a Party meeting to consider a change in the leadership does not arise.

23. If the above recommendation is not accepted, then the other course suggested will have to be followed and for that the AICC will lay down the procedure. In that event the present Ministry must hold together and support each other fully. If any Minister is unable to give that support, he should resign.

24. The Speaker must in no event in future take any part in Party activities.

## 11. To Haribhau Upadhyaya<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
4th May 1954

My dear Haribhauji,

I understand that Shri Balvantray Mehta sent you a copy of my note on Ajmer. In this note I had suggested two courses. If the first course was not agreed to by the Ministers concerned as well as the party, then the only alternative was for the responsibility to be cast on the party. I understand from Maulana Saheb that some of the dissident members have now expressed their regret at their not accepting his advice and are likely to see him again.

If that is so, then the question of adopting the second course that I had suggested, that is party meeting to elect a leader, will not arise. But it must be clearly understood that a new approach must now be made to Ajmer problems, more particularly by you and other Ministers and also by all the members of the party. That approach must be fully cooperative and the burden of it lies chiefly on you as Chief Minister because your responsibility in this matter is necessarily greater than that of others.

Balkrishna Kaula has sent me a letter which I have just received, and this was done after he had received a copy of my note. In this letter he assures me that he does not covet any position and is anxious to do everything for the discipline and solidarity of the party. He says that it is true that he has been distressed at the way many things have been done in Government and the slowness of various activities which are held up. It was this that has been worrying him. According to him he has been anxious to give you full

1. JN Collection.

cooperation, but that you have not treated him with confidence that a colleague deserves.

I do not wish to enter into this argument, but if we have to function differently in future, then there must be this feeling and exchange of confidence among the Ministers especially.

He says that he has written me a personal letter because he does not want me to have bad opinion of him as he values my good opinion above everything. I have however mentioned this fact to you.

In the course of his letter he mentions the case of an editor of a paper who made false allegations against him and certain police officers. These were apparently sent to me also. If they were false allegations then action should have been taken against this editor. That has been our firm rule.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 12. To Abul Kalam Azad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9th May 1954

My dear Maulana,

Haribhau Upadhyaya has just been to see me. He discussed chiefly the coming AICC meeting in Ajmer and the arrangements to be made there.

We then discussed other matters relating to his Ministry and work. It seems to me that the first thing is for everyone there to realise fully, that is not only the Ministers but the Party and the public, that there is going to be no change and all this talk of change and no-confidence etc., has been dropped completely. There must be a feeling of stability. Although the dissident Congressmen had told you that they would not proceed with their no-confidence motions etc., this fact is not generally known. I do not want a public statement to be made about it, but it should be generally known. Otherwise that feeling of stability will not be evident. This is most necessary also because of the coming AICC meeting etc.

I had mentioned to you yesterday or the day before that I thought a reallotment of portfolios was desirable. I think so still. But I feel that this must not be done at this moment, as otherwise it would mean that the dissident

1. JN Collection. A copy of the letter was sent to Balvantray Mehta.



Congressmen have forced this change. That will create a bad impression. Also any such change should, I think, come from the Chief Minister himself and there should be no suggestion that it has been imposed upon him by us from here. I feel, therefore, that for the moment there should be no talk of this. Some time later Haribhau himself should make the suggestion to his Ministers and, as is usual, consult the Chief Commissioner and then come to a decision after mutual consultation.

As for what the change should be, I think the best course will be to leave the matter also to the Chief Minister in consultation with his other Ministers and the Chief Commissioner. I do not think we need press for any particular change.

Haribhau told me that you had suggested an immediate change and, more especially, that of the portfolio of general administration. For the reasons mentioned above, I think that this immediate change should be avoided and in fact that no mention should be made of it, as this might give a wrong impression. Also the actual portfolios etc., should be considered later by the Ministers themselves. It would be far better if we did not interfere in this. We should try to avoid in future giving an impression of dictation from here. This takes away from the prestige and authority of the Government there and people tend to run up here with every kind of complaint.

I hope you agree with this. In view of your talk with Haribhau, I have told him that I shall be writing to you on this subject. He will be going to Simla from here for some conference. The other Ministers should not be told anything about this.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 13. To Presidents of PCCs<sup>1</sup>

Camp: The Retreat  
Mashobra  
Simla  
26th May 1954

Dear Comrade,

At the last meeting of the Working Committee, it was suggested that I should send you monthly letters dealing with some of our problems from the Congress

1. File No. P-27 (a)/1954, AICC Papers, NMML.

point of view. The idea was excellent and I entirely agreed with it except for the fact that it might not be easy for me to keep up this practice. I have often thought of writing to the Presidents of the Pradesh Congress Committees, but unfortunately, owing to stress of work, I have postponed this. I shall endeavour in future to write from time to time, though I shall not promise a monthly letter.

2. I am writing this from Mashobra near Simla, where I have come up for five days. Even these five days in the Himalayas are working a change in me, as the mountains, and more especially the Himalayas, always do. This is not so much because of the cooler climate but rather what I might call the feel and the look of the place. There is something smoothing and solid about a mountain and its deep valleys, and if one sees, as I do now, the snow-covered peaks in the background, time and space assume a different perspective and the problems of today do not appear quite so overwhelming, as they do in the plains below.

3. I look back on the record of the Congress, with its ups and downs, and its success and failures. It is a proud record in spite of our failings. But such a record brings with it tremendous responsibility. Even today the responsibility of the Congress all over India is very great. The governments that the Congress runs are important. But behind the governments is public opinion, the opinion of millions of people. It is the function of the Congress to guide, mould and to be guided by this public opinion, to discipline it and help it to work in right channels. That is the real strength of the country and of the government. If any people in government imagine that they are above this public opinion or above the Congress, then they are greatly mistaken and the very foundations that they stand on might be swept away.

4. I have been convinced of the high importance of the Congress functioning today, carrying on its work of unifying and integrating India, laying stress on peaceful and cooperative methods, and carrying our people along the line of progress. We are not a sectarian body consisting of the elect. We are fellow-travellers with the people of India. That means sometimes that our pace may be a little slower than we would like it to be. It is easy for a group to lay down fine policies, but such policies should bear relation to the multitude of facts that surround and confront us. At the same time the need for rapid progress is evident. The greatest danger to India and to the Congress is a feeling of complacency that all is well. All is not well in the world or in India today.

5. Recent developments in the international sphere, more particularly in relation to Indo-China, have brought a new crisis and, as I write, issues of vital importance to the future of the world are being debated at Geneva. During the last few years, there have been frequent crisis and alarms of war. We have managed to survive them. Probably the present crisis, is a more dangerous one than any we have had before. The next two or three weeks or even less may indicate whether we go towards some peaceful settlement or towards the great disaster that all have feared.



6. I mention this international aspect because we have to consider our own problems in the light of this overriding situation. It becomes more important than ever that our country should be disciplined and should hold together in every way so that we can face any crisis and any development with all our strength and courage. That responsibility has to be shouldered by everyone in India in greater or less degree, by every party and group. But, inevitably, the responsibility of the Congress is far greater than that of any other group or party. Not only do we control the Government but, what is more important we are the inheritors of that tradition which Gandhiji built up and which brought India freedom.

7. Therefore, the first thing to be borne in mind by Congressmen is the gravity and urgency of this moment and the demands that it makes upon our organisation as well as upon all of us individuals. Shouldering this heavy responsibility, we have to keep faith with that tradition, keep true to our ideals and principles, and work for the strengthening and advancement of the people of India. We must not lose ourselves, as unfortunately we often do, in smaller problems or in petty disputes. While we adhere to our basic principles, we should always seek the cooperation of others to work out those principles and not function in a sectarian manner. It is true that it is difficult for us to cooperate with those who basically differ from us, but there are large numbers who may not be in the Congress but who are broadly in sympathy with those principles, and with them we should always endeavour to cooperate.

8. For any organisation to be effective, it must have discipline and effective work to its credit. That discipline need not be the narrow discipline of a sect, but it has to be an effective discipline; otherwise, the organisation becomes just a loose collection of human beings with no clear purpose or will to work. I have noticed with deep regret conflicts among Congressmen in some states. Where such conflicts occur, regardless of the merits of the question, there is narrow-mindedness and lack of vision, and sometimes there are group loyalties or caste considerations. Both have no place in a great movement, both are disruptive. Ours is a work of construction, not disruption.

9. We have always to remember that our great country exhibits a wonderful variety not only in physical features and geography and climate, but also in human beings, their languages, customs, backgrounds and urges. We have to keep this broad picture in view and not seek to impose something on one part of the country which may not suit it and which may create a feeling of suppression. Freedom functions in a different way. While discipline is essential and a certain uniformity necessarily follows, the rich variety of India has always to be understood and maintained. Only in this way does disciplined freedom flourish. We are a vast community of free individuals joining together in great national tasks, restricting that individual freedom only when it comes up against the larger freedom that we cherish.

10. There are many religions in this country, several of hoary antiquity, each has an honoured place in this country and each must have a sensation of freedom. That is why the Congress has always been opposed to what we have called communalism which is the narrow and bigoted villagers' outlook mixing with politics to the detriment of both religion and politics. In particular, the great majority of the people of India, who are Hindus, must always remember that the interest and the well-being of the minorities are their sacred trust. If they fail in their trust, then they injure not only the country, but themselves. They go against the past tradition of India and, more especially, that great tradition which Gandhiji has bequeathed to us. Therefore, we have to take particular care that in the various activities of the nation, whether it is in the working of government, and its services or in our elections or in the organisation of the Congress, the minorities have an adequate and respected place.

11. In particular, we must fight wholeheartedly against those narrow divisions which have grown up in our country in the name of caste, and which weaken the unity, solidarity and progress of the country. Gandhiji gave first place to the uplift of the Harijans. That is essential, but that is only a symbol for the equality of all our people and for the elimination of the pride and privilege of caste.

12. The language issue has assumed a new importance because of the work of the Commission for the Reorganisation of States. I would draw your particular attention to the resolutions passed by the Working Committee in regard to this matter.<sup>2</sup> There is grave danger of this issue disrupting our national life and promoting a sense of disunity. We want all our great languages to flourish. If, however, there is rivalry between them and any attempt to suppress one at the cost of another, then both will suffer and our national unity will be affected. Again, a heavy responsibility rests upon Congressmen to see to it that we do not allow this matter to take this wrong course. That is why the Working Committee has laid great stress on the avoidance of public agitation and on considering this question calmly and objectively.

13. Hindi has been acknowledged both by our Constitution and by the people at large as the only possible language for all India purposes. That is a great triumph for which credit must go not to the Hindi speaking areas, but rather to the other areas. It was their consent that brought about this great achievement. In our arguments and disputes about petty things, we must always remember the unique fact of this tremendous agreement about Hindi. Having achieved that, we must proceed constructively. The fact that Hindi has been recognised as our all India language does not mean that it is superior to our other great languages, which are also national, though not all-India in that sense. Hindi has become<sup>3</sup> an all India language for obvious reasons, because of its

2. See *post*, p. 261 fn. 3 and 4.



extent at present in India. For the rest, Hindi is a great regional national language like the other languages. All have to be encouraged. We shall no doubt try to develop and encourage contacts between all these languages, but there is always a little danger in developing any language artificially. Language is a living, vital, throbbing and pulsating thing. It is not the dictionary makers that make a language, but the people and the writers and the poets and the singers. Dictionary makers are useful and necessary, of course.

14. It is essential that no language should have a sense of suppression. That is why I have regretted greatly the needless conflict between Hindi and Urdu. There is no rivalry between them. Hindi is dominant and supreme, but Urdu is a precious heritage of ours, typically the product of India. To try to suppress it in any way and not to allow it full opportunity of growth in its own way, would be a tragedy which will injure Hindi itself in the end. From any other point of view, it would be a still greater misfortune for it to lead large numbers of people to believe that they are denied justice and freedom.

15. Our basic questions are after all economic and the land question is the most important of all. We have gone a good way in the direction of putting an end to zamindaris, jagirdaris and the like. Yet, even this step has not been completed in some states. But that step itself is not the final step and others have to follow. Ultimately, as the Congress has often said, there should be no intermediaries of any kind between the state and the cultivator. Also, we move progressively towards limiting the extent of a holding. Any hard and fast rule is difficult to make because of the difference in conditions in various parts of the country. Also we have always to bear in mind that production must not suffer.

16. The Second Five Year Plan will gradually take shape in the coming year or so. We want it to be of the people's making in which, to some extent, millions share. In that work, Congressmen can give a great deal of assistance. Also in the work of the Community Projects and National Extension Service, which have begun so promisingly in a great part of India. We must all cooperate to the fullest extent.

17. I would like to draw your attention especially to the recent resolution of the Working Committee on the National Plan Loan.<sup>3</sup> This loan is intimately bound up with our capacity for progress in the future and with our creating that feeling of self-reliance which is so essential. It is not a loan for the rich only, but for all who can afford even to give a small sum. We should like millions of people to participate in this loan or in the smaller certificates issued, and thus become partners in the great task of building up a new India.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. See *ante*, pp. 78-80.

## II. ELECTIONS IN TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND PEPSU

### 1. Historic Destiny of Congress<sup>1</sup>

I am interested in the elections in the State<sup>2</sup>, but I wanted to tell you about the other big problems facing the country, because India is on the march. We want to move still faster and therefore have to face risks and new problems. These could not be solved by shouting slogans but only by hard work. The Congress has a great and historic destiny to fulfil. It represents the strength and urge of the Indian people. In the present context we have got to work for great causes in India and the world. If we do not, we are in danger of not surviving.

I am surprised that the people belonging to other parties are criticising the Congress. Organisations which have no inherent strength or ideals have combined into a group to oppose Congress. They are like a garment of bits and patches and they call it a garment for India to wear. I do not think so. I appeal to your intelligence to consider these issues dispassionately. We are for the moment agents of destiny. In this context our only duty is to strengthen the Indian National Congress and through it the nation. That is why I have come to you to put this before you. I am not much of a party man and not even a politician, but I am passionately devoted to the cause of India and to me all parts of India are one.

I left Allahabad in the morning and reached the south-west corner of India in the afternoon. At Allahabad I saw nearly 40 lakhs of people assembled to participate in the Kumbh Mela. I always respect people who act with a particular faith, because where there is faith, there is always something to respect. The Kumbh Mela, reaching back to the dim ages of the past brings to my mind the vast panorama of India's history. I think of the unity and diversity of the country and the tremendous factors contributing to both. The big question before us is about the future of the nation, what is going to happen to the people who work for its unity and the others working for its division and faction with small-mindedness. History would give the answer.

1. Speeches during election campaign in Travancore-Cochin, at Chittoor and Trichur, 4 February 1954 and at Kottayam, 6 February 1954. *The Hindu*, 5 and 7 February 1954. Extracts.
2. The elections were held from 15 to 26 February 1954, following the defeat of the Congress Ministry headed by A.J. John, on a vote of confidence on 23 September 1953. John was asked by the Rajpramukh to continue in office till the elections were held.



We have to build the future on the basis of cooperation and hard work, and in such manner that it would be consistent with the traditions of India for peace. I cannot understand how any person could ask me to pursue a policy of imitating another country, be it Russia, America, China or any other. Certainly, we have to learn from other countries and we are prepared to do so. But the policy that we pursue should be one suited to the traditions and genius of the country. If we look around we would find a world full of bitterness, hatred, violence and fear. It is amusing to see how the great and powerful countries are afraid. That is not the tradition of India. Not that our tradition had always been non violent. It is true that India had produced great warriors and military minds and might produce them again. But nevertheless, the genius of India, the things that made her great and persevered through the ages of history have been something different. The greatest names to my mind are those of Buddha, the lord of peace, Asoka who gave up war in the midst of victory, Akbar, who worked for unity and integration of India, and Mahatma Gandhi.

All these great men thought in terms of building the unity of India and the spirit which symbolized India. Looking at the great and powerful nations—piling up armaments and atom bomb, glaring at each other and threatening each other, full of hatred and fear—I wonder what would be the ultimate result of all this. How does it matter if one country is stronger than another, if one achieves victory over another in a war which destroys civilization itself. What answer do we have for this?

India might be weak or strong. Whether it was strong or weak she had never known the habit of surrendering to superior forces against her own wishes. That had been the lesson we had to learn in the Gandhian era, namely, to stand up for truth as we saw it, regardless of the consequences. In the context of world events today, India's still small voice is going out. We would not allow it to be smothered by any great country. India would try to act in accordance with her judgment and her voice without the support of great arms or money power would still go far in the world because there are many who hear it.

I have no strength excepting what the people give me for the time being. I consider what I have got as representing your urges, and aspirations and that way it symbolises your desires and hopes as an embodiment of the Indian people. I can therefore speak as the proud leader of a proud nation. A new bright star appeared on the horizon five years ago and as it was increasing in brightness and as time went by, India and her people become the inheritors of a great past. It was a great opportunity for her people to act in this great and significant period of world history. What I say is important and therefore listened to and not because of our armed strength.

The alliance of parties opposed to the Congress is based on negation and frustration. Such alliances of parties, diametrically opposed to each other in principles and fundamental approaches to problems, are not the way to build

up the future of the country. Excellent people have gone hopelessly astray and have formed this combination. The elections to Travancore-Cochin is a revelation to me because people disagreed on fundamental issues, held diametrically opposite views, and yet combined together out of frustration. The combination of weak people would not be good for the country. The country wants some positive content to achieve things.

I am amazed at the temerity of those people who indulged in immature criticism of our foreign policies and suggested things which are fantastic nonsense. The Congress might have committed mistakes. I do not say that the Congress was perfect. But I would tell you that the Congress has served the country in a tremendous way before the achievement of Independence and afterwards. It is easy to make a list of failures and virtues of individuals and also of nations. But the point is how best we could achieve the object we have been striving for. There are vultures in the world who want to feed on us if we are weak and unwary. We have to be careful and achieve economic progress. I am convinced that we have to strengthen the Congress for this purpose.

If you imagine what might have happened if the Congress was not there at the time of the transfer of power and the Congress had not stood up by the country and prevented its being split up, you would realise its great achievement and its great record. The Congress has fulfilled the great destiny in the past and I am sure that it has a destiny to fulfil in the future also. It is for these reasons that it seems to me that you should support the Congress. There had been some difficulty in the past in the Pepsu and others have tried their hands, but nobody could carry on properly. In this context you should think about the unity of the country. I have come here to explain to you the position and to appeal to your intelligence to exercise your vote correctly. I would only ask you to think correctly and act correctly.

Today, I appeal to you to give a considered and clear verdict, whether you approve of the Congress Government's policies at the Centre and the State or not.

The freedom that we have achieved was only one stage in our great journey. This freedom has given us opportunities for doing things as we want. It is for us to utilise these opportunities in the best manner possible. When a great country like India begins to function, it makes some difference to the world. Therefore the rest of the world is anxious to know how India would function. It is a major problem of the world today to know what India would do tomorrow or the day after. It is a major problem for the people of India also. How are they going to mould the destiny of India? After all when we got Independence, we stumbled and fell sometimes, but it did not make much difference because when we stumbled we got up again and marched ahead. We were not frightened. We had enough energy. In fact, every fall found us more strong. That was the context in which I want you to consider these problems.



You must be wondering what kind of man I am to have come here with the intention of talking about elections and hardly talking about it and indulging in the history, geography and the charm of India. I do that deliberately to make you realise how I thought about these matters. Elections are important as far as they concern the larger issues. Otherwise they are of no great use to me. I would like to tell you, if I had the time, of many other things, the great work which we have undertaken in India—the great factories that are coming up, the ship-building yard, the aeroplane factory, the locomotive factory, the machine tools factory, the fertilizer industry—all basic industries, out of which other industries would grow. We have to remember all this because the people are constantly criticising the Government.

I can say confidently that the Government of India, in the last five or six years, have done remarkable things. I want to tell you about the tremendous development that has been effected and the great changes proposed to be brought about in our agriculture by means of the Community Development Projects and National Extension Service. All this constitute the subject when I come to talk about elections. Elections are not questions affecting a few individuals.

I do venture to submit for your consideration that by and large the result of the Congress administration during the last five or six years has been very creditable. It is the opinion of all impartial observers. But, I am not satisfied with that. My attitude is not one of complacency. We want to go further and much faster. The Indian people are a peace loving people. We have the spirit of "live and let live" and the spirit of tolerance. That I think is a very valuable quality. It is a quality which comes from the maturity of a race and from long experience. I feel so, because I feel the modern tendency of upsurge of violence which makes people think of violence in politics and also indulge in acts of violence. There is nothing more dangerous than that.

We had General Elections all over India a few years ago. People said, India is illiterate. How can they have elections on adult franchise? The world was amazed at the magnificent success of the elections. The illiterate Indian voters behaved much better than others because they had their seeds rooted in the past culture and tradition. Here is an example of the strength of our race. We have another election now and they are going to conduct it in good humour on all sides. So far as I know, I hope you will all conduct it with good humour.

Elections are apt to make the people excited. But you must remember that that excitement is not made use of by anyone to do any wrong actions. We have a reputation for being a dignified people. We must remember Gandhiji's teachings that we must not resort to wrong means to achieve even good things. These elections are supposed to be free and fair, so that any person can decide for himself and give his vote as he likes. Certainly you can listen to views, but no undue pressure is to be exercised on any one....

In this connection, I should like to mention briefly a matter that has been

brought to my notice by the members of the opposition parties here. They wrote to me about the circular that the Bishop had issued.<sup>3</sup> The circular, I believe, is in Malayalam. I cannot read Malayalam. I have seen a summary of it in English. It is not in my province to criticise what the Bishop does or what the Bishop does not do. I am interested in what a Congressman does. The Bishop knows how to discharge his duty. He is as much a citizen as anybody else and has the right to express his views. His opinion may be wrong or right. Personally, I do not like mixing up religion with politics. In a sense I have been fighting against it. I have been fighting for what is called secular politics, especially in free India.

Today all religions recognise some kind of economic doctrine. In a sense communism itself is a religion and people believe in it with an intensity of faith without any logic or reason even as they believe in fate. It might even be said that the reactions to communism in some countries is taking the shape of anti-communism and is viewed with that deep impulse, which might be called a "religious urge." When people begin to talk about things, not quietly or reasonably but almost with a blind passion, it ceases to be a reasonable argument. So far as the circular issued by the Bishop is concerned, I do not see how I could go into that matter. I would only say that all persons intimately concerned with the elections should make it completely fair and free. Nothing should be done that should amount to exercise of pressure. As Congress President, I am interested in the Congress winning the elections in Travancore-Cochin. I am afraid if this great organisation does not function effectively in India, it will not be good for India.

3. The Bishop of Travancore had issued a circular asking the people to vote for Congress party. It was alleged by the Opposition that the Bishop was "using his high office and threatening excommunication to ensure a Congress victory."

## 2. Reasons for Supporting Congress<sup>1</sup>

I have come here today not to ordain, nor even to beg that you must vote for

1. Speeches during election campaign in Pepsu, at Rajpura, Sirhind, Doraha, Phagwara, Kapurthala, Adampur and Patiala, 12 February 1954. From *The Tribune*, 13 February 1954. Extracts.



Congress candidates.<sup>2</sup> I do not want to do either of the two things because I am just one of you. I, however, unhesitatingly advise you to vote Congress because it is the only organisation in India today, which has shouldered the responsibility of building up India and is fit enough to continue shouldering that burden for many more years to come.

I appeal to you to cease thinking in terms of one province or one community and to have a broader vision, and think and act in terms of one great India, to be a citizen of which is a matter of great pride. Each one of you has a status not because you belong to this village or that, to this community or that group, to Pepsu or to Punjab. You have a status because you have the proud privilege of being citizens of free India.

You must understand and appreciate the fact that there were problems of much greater importance which relate to the building up of India of the future, than the communal issues raised by sectarian organizations, whether among the Hindus or the Sikhs. The brave people of Pepsu and Punjab had displayed great initiative and courage in working their own way in life and that was why they had spread all over India and even in countries abroad. Most of you living in Pepsu and Punjab had suffered greatly because of the Partition and yet it was a matter of satisfaction and pride that you have begun to live once again through your own efforts with whatever help the government could make available.

I hesitate in telling you what your duties are, for you are not only brave and courageous, but you have made a most useful contribution for the uplift of the country after Independence.

I regret that people here, in spite of their bravery and courage were apt to be divided and split in groups and are easily misled into listening to false slogans which are being raised by people in the name of religion. I appeal to you not to listen to any communal slogans raised by communal parties, whether Hindu Mahasabha or Jana Sangh among Hindus, or Akalis among Sikhs or, if there exist any such Muslim group, among the Muslim. The slogans raised by these parties weaken the country which you must all strive to build up.

In Pepsu, you have experience of those to whom administration was entrusted for some time, but such persons failed miserably.<sup>3</sup> Instead of peace and prosperity, there prevailed complete chaos and it seemed that evil had its

2. Elections were held in Pepsu from 18 to 20 February 1954, following dissolution of the United Front ministry on 1 March 1953, because its leader G.S. Rarewala's election was held invalid by the Election Tribunal. Consequently Pepsu came under the President's rule for eleven months, during which period delimitation of constituencies and updating of electoral rolls were undertaken.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 275-278, and Vol. 21, pp. 170-171 and 300.

way, because a wave of terror created by the increasing number of dacoities and murders spread.

I assure you that the President of India took over the Pepsu administration last year because conditions here were miserable, endangering the life and property of the citizens. Return of the reins of government to the people's elected representatives had been promised by the President of India to the people of Pepsu, when law and order were reestablished. It was in fulfilment of that promise that the electorate of Pepsu had been asked to elect their representatives. You must choose your representatives, not on the basis of any communal consideration, but in the context of greater India.

Religion is a very noble thing. It is a noble sentiment. True religion preaches unity and love. But those who exploit and drag the fair name of religion into their plan for seeking smaller advantages, are responsible for giving a bad name to religion and lowering its value.

I am distressed to say that politics in Pepsu have been of the meanest type before the President's rule. In 40 years of my active public life, I have not known of such dirty politics elsewhere. It is horrifying to know how people are available for sale and how easily they are bought over. In this State, the government had been run by buying over people from this side or that side. I had thought that people who had indulged in that kind of game would rather sit hiding themselves with shame that they had brought such a bad name to Pepsu and their country, but it has amazed me to find that they are out once again to mislead the electorate in the name of religion and to ask them to vote for them. If you want peace and order, in Pepsu, you must refuse to listen to such people.

I must say with feeling of equal regret that among the Sikhs in the Punjab and Pepsu there is a section of the people who have developed an art of telling lies and they never speak the truth even by chance. Such people try to exploit the innocent masses in the name of religion, though their only object is to seek a few jobs in the government here and there. I concede that every community must get its full share in the services and must be given a fair deal. But every one must know that if all the services were given to one community, it would not solve the problem of India or the problems of poverty and backwardness of the people of Pepsu. What is required is to improve the economic position of the people by adding to their resources and increasing production, whether in the fields or in the factories. That alone would make them feel happy. A free people such as the people in India are, thanks to the light and guidance of our great leader, Mahatma Gandhi, must now pool all their efforts to grow up to be bigger people and think of a greater India. This they can do by thinking of the welfare of the country as a whole and not of one community or one group, because in India now people belong not to this community or that, but they really belong to India as a whole.



Our communist friends who always continue thinking and acting in terms of the inspiration which they get from another country, even though they happen to live in India, yet they do not think in terms of the well being of its people or the welfare of the country. These communists, with whom no one can compete in the matter of raising slogans and making false promises because they have no responsibilities to discharge, and they would never get such an opportunity—are out to do nothing but create chaos. This was what some of them did in Pepsu when the previous Government was in office. They wanted to live on chaos and by telling innocent and ignorant masses not to believe that India was making any progress.

I very frankly accept any one criticising the Congress or blaming the Congress Government for its policy for certain acts of omission or commission, but what I cannot understand, is that any party or person in our country should be engaged in the effort always to discredit India by telling the world outside and the people of our own country that no progress had been made in India.

How can any one believe that these communists have any love for India. They carry a flag in our land which is the flag of another country. We may show full respect to that flag. But one feels distressed to find that the people of our country should be carrying that flag in a free and independent India, instead of having some different flag as a party flag. Their action is clearly the action of persons who would like to implant the flag of a foreign country on our heads....

Our country had produced great men, both statesmen and saints and yet it was a matter of sorrow and shame that India had been under subjugation of foreign people for a long time. That had resulted from the fact of the divisions created among Indians in the name of religion and by those who wanted to usurp power. India had become weak always on that account and therefore, fell an easy prey to those who wanted to come and rule over our country. I am pained to say that in the long history of India, there had been a number of examples of the betrayals of our own country by our own people. It had happened a number of times that because of our own quarrels outsiders had been invited to come and plunder our country and also to govern it. India had never been so great and united as today. There exists oneness in the whole country, from the snow covered Himalayas to the warm south down to Cape Comorin. In spite of the differences of the people, of their spoken languages and of their customs, there exists a unity which is unique indeed and the India of today is undoubtedly never so big as after Independence.

In free India we have given equal status to all men and women, irrespective of their creeds or their religions. Their one object today should be to help in the building up of that India, to be a still bigger country and a greater country, of which they should all be proud.

I am proud to be able to say that India has made such progress during

these few years of its Independence that it has become the envy of many. I am aware of the fact that some countries are jealous of the progress that India has made and others have started thinking of the great and important position which India may occupy in the affairs of the world tomorrow. Yet we should not stop here but continue to make still bigger and united efforts to add to India's prosperity and wealth, by producing as much as is possible in factories and fields. I regret to say that as it has happened, we have looked more to the production of population, which must be stopped, for the greater the population, the greater their need would be, which India in her present position is not able to provide for, as successfully as free countries should do for its children, who are really the India of tomorrow.

Let me say quite frankly that we do not want to enter into any war against any country, whatever its relative strength may be. We want to live in peace with everyone, for we are concerned with the development of our country, rather than fighting with or against anyone. India wants to become great not in order to attack any neighbouring country, but that it may add to the world movement for peace and happiness. It is a changing world where such marked revolutionary change have taken place during the last few years. The duty of creating an atmosphere of peace is vested on India's shoulders, which it must discharge. That duty could be discharged only if we could be strong enough to stand on our own legs without depending upon any other country.

You must have heard of the USA-Pakistan Military Pact.<sup>4</sup> I do not doubt the intentions either of America or Pakistan. But I feel it my duty to declare that such a pact in itself is a wrong step and is bound to result in creating a very unhappy situation. India do not want that Pakistan should not progress or America should not be able to produce even more than what it is doing today and thus add to her wealth. India is, however, opposed to a situation of which the results could be bad. I earnestly appeal to you to create unity and strength in yourselves to face any kind of situation that may endanger the freedom of the country. I must say that while we do not want to be unfriendly with any country, if any country attacks our land we shall be prepared to face that country and fight back with all the possible weapons that we may have at our disposal.

We hear a lot of slogans about the Punjabi Suba. I am not concerned with the creation of a province here and there. I believe in the unity of India and I look at all problems from the bigger issue of India and not of any single province. Yet, the Government of India has appointed a Commission<sup>5</sup> to look into that question and I do not mind whatever the recommendations of that

4. See *ante*, p. 13, fn. 6.

5. See *ante*, p. 10, fn. 5.



Commission might be. But I am sorry to say that some people in Pepsu and Punjab seem to raise this kind of slogan in a very queer manner. Sometimes their demand become very active and at other occasions, the demand is not voiced with any kind of vigour. That itself shows that it is a weapon to exploit people's sentiments.

Congress is older than I am. I take a special pride in the fact that the Congress has such a glorious record and therefore it deserves all our support. There are some friends who were with us for long and have now left us and are now supposed to be our opponents. I have no quarrel with them. In fact, personally, I have the privilege of their warm personal friendships. In the affairs of a country, however, personal friendships do not matter so much, because I feel that the Congress policy is the only right policy to be pursued, which can bring prosperity and happiness to our land. Empty slogans and false promises will lead us nowhere nor would any attempt to create chaos in the country produce any results. I therefore, desire that those who believe in the welfare of India and want the country to prosper, must all support the Congress.

I want to make it clear that I do not want the people to support the Congress merely because I want them to do so. I would ask them to support the Congress only if they feel convinced of the cause which the Congress espouses against the mushroom growth of parties—particularly in Pepsu—parties which have no economic programmes to give excepting that they could either exploit the religious sentiments of some people, or could mislead them by making false promises and by telling them that India had not really achieved freedom.

These friends, seem to think even now that freedom is not achieved unless there is violence, that is, people fly at each other's throats and there is loot and arson. It is a matter of regret that they deny the fact of India having achieved freedom. The *inquilab* of which they all talk, means a change for the betterment and for the good of the people and when that *inquilab* had actually come through, some of these friends thought that it had not, because the government of the country, which was the Congress Government, was able to establish law and order in India so soon after the change had taken place.

The Partition had undoubtedly brought agony and sorrow and the brave Punjabis and the people of Pepsu had to face a very unfortunate situation. We are however, proud to be able to say that while existing peace and prosperity did not come in Russia even after many years of the Revolution, we were able to establish peace within a couple of years of the freedom of our land. I have no doubt that given another 6 or 10 years of peace, India will go a very long way on the road to peace and prosperity.

Let me say that there is one enemy against which I want to lead 36 crores of my countrymen to wage a relentless war. That enemy is poverty, hunger and unemployment. I am not concerned so much with the petty issues raised by the communal organisations because I want to see the 36 crores of people of my

land once again living in peace and prosperity by working and working hard, in factories and in the fields. I tell you, that India have only recently taken a turn and is now out of the slumber resulting from subjugation of centuries and with the cooperative effort of the people, the country is bound to stand up heads and shoulders above and to be the pride of not only of our people but also be the envy of the whole world.

I request you to make your own choice and return the Congress to power, so that you may have a stable government and may be able to do something constructive. You must learn a lesson from what happened in the past and in order to be able to run the administration through your duly elected representatives, you must vote for the candidates of that party alone, which would be able to form a ministry, wherein no one would be available for sale. I admit that even some of the Congressmen had misbehaved previously but the Congress is now determined to see that none of its people indulge in that kind of disgraceful game of crossing and re-crossing the floor in the legislature. I am sure that if the Congress is returned to power there will be no more of dacoities and the lives and properties of the people will not be endangered. The President's rule has established peace and respect for law and order within some months and I am sure that the people of Pepsu would desire that that kind of peaceful atmosphere should continue. This would happen if the Congress is returned to power because it has a programme and a plan for the emancipation of the poor masses in the form of land reforms and in getting for them water and electricity, so that their wastelands may be turned into smiling fields—not only in Pepsu, but in Punjab, and Rajasthan also. The Congress is the only organisation in India today whose government have given a new life to the history of India. We have now solved our food problem and are also able to set up factories, where railway engines and aeroplanes are being built, which had been a matter of dream only in the period of our subjugation. The Congress deserves your support on the grounds of principles and not only on the basis of personalities.<sup>6</sup>

Now we are thinking of preparing the next Plan for the following five years. That Plan should be made out not in Delhi but in the villages because I am convinced that without the progress and prosperity of the villages, India cannot make any progress worth the name.

I invite those who differ from the Congress policy to convince me that it is against the interest of India. But certainly the policy of either violence or of raising false slogans is not the policy which any well-wisher of India should desire. I ask the people of India to write their own history by their own actions, and become a big people again. What Gandhiji preached has been proved to be true and his teachings are the mainstay of India today. To him we owe our

6. In the 60 member Pepsu Assembly, Congress secured 37 seats with 43.3% of votes polled, and formed a ministry under Raghbir Singh on 8 March 1954.



freedom and we cherish the memory of this great leader with gratitude and we pay our homage to him in all humility.

If I had the time, I would have loved to sit with the students here and tell them how happy I feel when I am with the citizens of tomorrow. I am a *musafir* on a long journey and a *musafir* can't wait for long at one place. *Jai Hind*.

### 3. To A. J. John<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
28th February 1954

My dear John,

I have sent you a telegram today which was fairly full<sup>2</sup> and I hope gave you an adequate answer to your question to me on the telephone.

Dr Katju and I are quite clear that we must stick fully to constitutional proprieties. This is not only the right course to adopt but is the only possible course consistent with our dignity. Any other course would lead to trouble.

The issue would be very simple if there is a compact majority party, whatever that may be. In that case the leader of the majority party is invited to form a government and does so. If the Congress is the majority party, there is no difficulty. If, however, no single party has a definite majority, then presumably attempts are made to have a coalition cabinet.

I am proceeding on the assumption that the Congress is not the majority party after the elections. If that is so, then you must tender your resignation immediately after the elections, even though the Congress Party might be the biggest single party. In the circumstances, we cannot say that because the Congress Party is the biggest, therefore it must continue. Indeed it cannot because it would be defeated immediately.

What is not quite clear to me is whether the UDF can be considered a compact enough party for the purpose of forming and running a government. That will have to be seen and much will depend upon the attitude of the PSP

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to the Rajpramukh, Travancore-Cochin and K.N. Katju.
2. In this telegram (not printed) Nehru advised John that in case Congress failed to get a majority, he should submit his resignation to the Rajpramukh and advise him to invite the leader of the majority party to form the government after getting all the particulars of their strength.

That attitude again is dependant on two factors—Pattom Thanu Pillai<sup>3</sup> and the National Executive of the PSP. It is none of our concern what the internal difficulties of the PSP are. They will have to come to some decision. Presuming that the PSP decides to cooperate with the communists in the formation of government, then we must treat them as a single party for this purpose and recognise them as such. If they are in a majority, then obviously they must be given the chance to form a ministry. They must indicate who their leader is.

I imagine that in such a case, probably Thanu Pillai would be put forward as the leader of the joint parties. If so, Thanu Pillai will have to be sent for by the Rajpramukh and asked to form a government. If somebody else is chosen as leader, he will have to be sent for, whether he is a communist or whatever he might be.

The point is that the Rajpramukh should satisfy himself that the government to be formed has a clear majority behind it, whoever might be the leader.

If, by any chance, no clear majority is in evidence, then the only course is for some combination or coalition to be made, if that is possible. The Rajpramukh should give a chance for such a coalition to be made.

While these preliminary talks are taking place, inevitably you should be asked to carry on. I do not want this period to be more than a very few days and it should be made clear that you have tendered your resignation and the Rajpramukh is exploring the avenues to form a new ministry.

It may be necessary for the Rajpramukh to see the leaders of different groups separately to find out how they stand so that he can himself judge as to whether a stable government can be formed or not.

I am inclined to think that the PSP will not be very happy at the turn events are taking. Some of their leaders will not like a coalition with the Communists to form a government, others will approve of this. Whatever their final decision is, I think that Thanu Pillai will be in favour of combining with the Communists to form a government and it is likely that his wishes will prevail in the end. Possibly he might even go as far as to reject the advice of the National Executive of the PSP and insist on forming an alliance with the Communists.<sup>4</sup>

3. Leader of the Praja Socialist Party in Travancore Cochin Assembly.

4. The PSP National Executive decided on 11 March at Madras not to form any alliance with the UDF or the Congress. Yet, on 14 March the Travancore-Cochin State Legislature Party of the PSP resolved that in order to keep the Congress out, the Party was ready to support the Leftists. This was strongly disapproved by the National Executive. Finally on 16 March, Pattom Thanu Pillai formed a ministry with Congress support from outside.



All these are possibilities. It is difficult to know what the shape of things will be and all I can do is to give you the broad lines of approach. You must keep us fully informed of developments so that, whenever necessary, we can advise you. The point is that no impression should be created that the Congress Party is anxious to stick on to office in spite of being in a minority. That will be bad. If the question of coalition comes up, there can be any number of permutations and combinations.

We do not even know what the final election results will be though I imagine that you will not get more than about 50 seats. That is obviously not enough to form a government.

Please share this letter with Madhavan Nair.<sup>5</sup> I am anxious that our Party and the Congress organisation should behave with dignity and not do anything which is not in good taste. We must be good losers, if we have to lose. We should be able to take the ups and downs in our stride and not worry too much. Perhaps what happens in Travancore-Cochin does good to the country as a whole and tightens up the Congress organisation. Nothing is more dangerous than complacency. Naturally I am sorry for our lack of success in the elections but that sorrow is momentary and only pulls me up to function with greater vigour in the future. That should be our reaction.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Rajpramukh because I think he should know how our mind is working.<sup>6</sup> He will have to make decisions and perhaps difficult decisions. This letter should help him. I repeat that we should be kept informed of every development.

Madhavan Nair and the Congress organisation worked hard for these elections. He deserves full credit, even though success did not come to him.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. President, Travancore-Cochin Pradesh Congress Committee.

6. In another letter to John on 1 March 1954, (not printed), Nehru advised that if called by the Rajpramukh to form a ministry, he should refuse and advise him to call someone who could muster a fair majority. Nehru insisted that the fact that it was John's advise to do so should be brought out in a public statement by the Rajpramukh.

#### 4. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9th March 1954

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for your letters of the 6th and 7th March.

About Planning etc., I appreciate your view-point.<sup>2</sup> The question, however, is not so much about the detailed control which, I agree with you, may be very undesirable, but rather of an approach to the question.

Regarding Travancore-Cochin, I do not see any way out at the present moment, such as you suggest.<sup>3</sup> It is not a question of our eating the humble pie, and we would be perfectly prepared to do so in the nation's interest. But Pattom Thanu Pillai has taken up a definite attitude and he is prepared to go ahead with it even in spite of directions from the PSP National Executive. In fact, we have let it be known to Thanu Pillai that we are friendly towards him.<sup>4</sup>

We have to face the situation as it is and act accordingly. If not today, we shall have to face it some other time. Perhaps, today we are better situated to face it. I do not think any terrible result will follow, but anyhow we have to face the consequences.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Rajaji in his letter of 6 March had written, "I fear a church is growing round the God of Planning and the voice of the Saviour will be overwhelmed and swallowed up by expert priests before we have made any significant progress."

3. Referring to the results of Travancore-Cochin elections, Rajaji wrote on 7 March that it was sometimes necessary to eat the humble pie to save a major evil and opined that Pattom Thanu Pillai would be quite a good Chief Minister and it would be worthwhile for the Congress to work in coalition with him and his Party, in order to prevent the communists from coming to power.

4. Madhavan Nair had already stated that the Congress would prefer to support a PSP ministry from outside, since "they have much in common" with the Congress policies.



5. To K.P. Madhavan Nair<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
11th March 1954

My dear Madhavan Nair,

Thank you for your two letters of the 6th March.<sup>2</sup>

2. I am glad that you are going ahead with the Congress organisation and appointing some full time workers. The election result, though very disappointing, may well do good in the end.

3. I do not yet know what the PSP is going to decide today in Madras.<sup>3</sup> But, whatever the decision, it seems to me that there will be instability in government.

4. One thing seems to me clear—that many people who would like to be with the Congress, feel that Congress is too conservative and does not go fast enough in regard to land or general economic policy, hence, workers and younger people generally are attracted to the PSP or to the Communists. We have to pull ourselves up in this matter.

5. If by chance some kind of a coalition ministry is set up with Thanu Pillai as its head and communists cooperating, then you may have to face progressive measures brought up by them.

6. Our attitude generally should be not to just create trouble but of judging each measure on the merits; more especially, with the PSP and Thanu Pillai our relations should be friendly.

7. On a proper analysis of the voting, the Congress has done far better than in general elections in 1951. In 1951, the Congress secured 36.1% of the votes polled and got 40.7% of the seats. In recent elections, the Congress secured 45.2% of votes, but got only 38.5% of the seats. I think that you should give enough publicity to these figures. It is quite absurd for the people to say that the Congress has been defeated or is worse off than it was.

8. The communists, I gather, got less votes than last time.<sup>4</sup> In fact the only people who have done better are the PSP<sup>5</sup> and next the Congress.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was also sent to the General Secretary, AICC.
2. Explaining the election results, Nair had written that the fact of many important District level and State level Congress leaders contesting the election, a division of votes on caste and religious lines and communal propaganda against Congress by opposition parties, were the main reasons for Congress defeat.
3. See *ante*, p. 194, fn. 4.
4. The communists had got 16.5% of the votes polled and had secured 23 seats.
5. The PSP had got 16.2% of the votes polled and had secured 19 seats, as against 14.3% votes and 11 seats in the General Elections.

## 6. Telegram to Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin<sup>1</sup>

I have received your message. If Pattom Thanu Pillai is prepared to form Ministry on assurance of Leader of Congress Party of general support to that Ministry, you can invite Thanu Pillai to form Ministry. This means formation of purely PSP Ministry with support in Assembly of Congress Party generally and perhaps some others but opposed by UFL party. Position must be clearly understood by Thanu Pillai and agreed to in writing.

2. If, however, Thanu Pillai not prepared to form Ministry in these circumstances and is willing to support from outside UFL Ministry then position is entirely different. In event of UFL Leader coming to you and stating that he can form Ministry with support of PSP you should reply that you should like to make sure of position from PSP before you can give final decision. You should then send for Thanu Pillai and ask him how far UFL Leader had stated the position correctly and whether PSP was prepared to support as a whole UFL Ministry. Thanu Pillai should be asked to give his opinion in writing.

3. If Thanu Pillai's Party does not agree to support UFL Ministry then there can be no question of UFL Ministry. If, however, PSP willing to support UFL Ministry in writing position will be difficult as both together will total just half of membership of Assembly. Nevertheless, in such circumstances, it is desirable for you to ask UFL Leader to form Ministry with support of PSP Party.

4. Such a Ministry is not likely to be stable but it is better for it to be formed at this stage and face their difficulties which will begin with election of Speaker. We can watch further developments later.

5. In the event of UFL and PSP cooperating in this matter it will not be right to prevent them from formation UFL Ministry. I have thus suggested to you two possible alternatives depending upon attitude that Thanu Pillai takes up. Whatever decision Thanu Pillai makes should be given in writing to you.

1. New Delhi, 15 March 1954. JN Collection.



## 7. Interference in Elections by Catholic Priests<sup>1</sup>

E.K. Imbichibava enquired whether A.K. Gopalan in a telegram to Nehru referred to a circular issued by the metropolitan of the Catholic Church in Travancore-Cochin.

Jawaharlal Nehru: There was a reference to this, and a number of other allegations were made.<sup>2</sup> This matter, if I may say so, was raised in the other House by an honorable Member there and I undertook to refer the matter for enquiry, because I have received a large number of complaints from both sides—from either side against the other. A little later I received a copy of a note from the Election Commissioner in which he had dealt with it. There were, I suppose, about 15 to 20 complaints against the Congress and about 50 to 60 complaints against the Opposite Party to the Congress. So I received a note which I forwarded on, because the matter had been raised in the House of the People,<sup>3</sup> to the Speaker. The Election Commission, in its report, as a whole, said that the election had passed off remarkably peacefully and there had been some minor incidents and they were being enquired into but on the whole they were peaceful. As for the circular letter or something which the Archbishop issued, attention was drawn to the fact and I have seen it. I don't know what the honorable Member wants to say about it except this. It is not a question of any of us agreeing or disagreeing with what he had said but whether he committed a breach of the law or not as a citizen. The matter had been up before the Election Commission; there had been a similar letter before them and they had decided that that was not a breach of the law.

P. Sundarayya wanted to know whether the Election Commission had already given its verdict on the reference made by the Government about that particular circular issued by the said Archbishop.

JN: He did not say anything about that circular. The Election Commissioner dealt with the cases of interference in the election. He said nothing about that circular. What I am saying is that on a previous occasion—not in this election—in the previous election a similar case had come up before the Election Commissioner and on that he gave that decision.

1. Reply to questions in the Council of States, 17 March 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, *Official Report*, 1954, Vol. VI, cols. 2999-3001.
2. See *ante*, p. 186, fn. 3.
3. On 23 February.

P. Sundarayya asked whether the Government's attention had been drawn to this particular circular in which there was the threat of excommunication for all voters who vote for any other party except the Congress.

JN: I have seen that.<sup>4</sup>

4. Nehru had also received separate complaints from Travancore-Cochin in this regard. One Aviratharakan, MLA, telegraphed: "Catholic priests of Ezhupunna Church denied holy rites to my wife on the ground that I stood as an independent candidate opposing Congress...." Nehru sent these to John and Madhavan Nair for investigation and wrote: "this kind of behaviour of Catholic priests appears to be very improper" and hoped that they would see to it that this was not persisted in.



## STATE MATTERS





## 1. Problems of Andaman and Nicobar Islands<sup>1</sup>

I saw Reverend Richardson<sup>2</sup> of the Nicobar Islands today. He has, I presume, met you and told you of his simple problems.

2. I think we must do something to facilitate communications between the Nicobar and Andaman Islands and India. It is absurd for our MP there not being able to come here because of the lack of communications.<sup>3</sup>

3. Richardson was somewhat agitated about what he called the introduction of free trade in the Nicobars. By this, he apparently meant that we were permitting any odd persons from outside to set up shops there.<sup>4</sup> I do not know what the facts are. But I think that this small community in the Nicobar Islands, in all about 13,000, should be protected from exploitation and should be allowed to develop themselves. If our petty shopkeepers go there, they will bring in a bad influence and upset the internal economy. These people in the islands are simple and deserve encouragement. The obvious thing to do is for us to develop some simple type of cooperatives there. We should supply them with their simple necessities like textiles, tools, tobacco, etc., at reasonable rates. Our Agent in the Nicobars could easily organise this as well as the sale of their produce like copra etc.

4. Richardson is going back so as to be present there when the President arrives.<sup>5</sup> He will be present at Port Blair. He would naturally like to go to the Nicobars. The only way for him to get there in time will be to accompany the President himself in his ship. I hope this will be possible.

1. Note to the Union Minister for Home Affairs, 20 February 1954. File No. 28(42)/49-PMS.
2. John Richardson (1896-1978); leader of the Nicobarese, teacher and catechist, Car Nicobar, 1912; Assistant Bishop and Commissary to Bishop and Metropolitan of Calcutta (Bishop of Nicobar Islands), 1950-66; nominated Member of the House of the People, 1952-56. Member of the Chief Commissioner's Advisory Committee.
3. The sole means of communication of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with India was through wireless.
4. When the British reoccupied the Nicobar Islands after the World War II, the trade in these islands was run by a licenced trader. To take over the trade activities, the Nicobarese on the advice of the Chief Commissioner, started setting up village cooperative societies to pool their resources. Since 1948, trade in the islands was run on this cooperative basis by discouraging outsiders from setting up shops etc.
5. Rajendra Prasad visited Andaman and Nicobar Islands from 10 to 14 March 1954.

## 2. Border Areas of Uttar Pradesh<sup>1</sup>

The development of the area in UP on this side of the Tibet border has been important for us. It has become an even more important matter now for a variety of reasons. Various recommendations have been made from time to time, but evidently we do not get moving. The matter, I understand, rests somewhere between the Home Ministry and the External Affairs Ministry. The Planning Commission is also apparently concerned. Defence and Transport Ministries are no doubt also interested.

2. We must get this moving. I have just received a letter from the Chief Minister of UP<sup>2</sup> together with a comprehensive scheme for this area. I presume the Planning Commission is considering this scheme. I am particularly interested in the roads, because without the roads nothing else can really be done. I suggest that immediate steps be taken to consider, firstly, the construction of roads in this area, and secondly, the several recommendations.

3. I suggest that SG might take this matter in hand and get in touch with the Ministries concerned as well as the Planning Commission.

4. I am sending the papers sent to me by the Chief Minister of UP.

1. Note to the Secretary General and the Foreign Secretary, 20 February 1954. File No. 17(96)48-PMS.
2. G.B. Pant on 17 February wrote to Nehru drawing his attention to the development of Indo-Tibet border area, particularly the means of communication there. The matter was taken up with the Central Home Ministry in August 1951 and proposals in regard to development schemes as well as for construction of roads in Tibetan border areas were sent to MHA and MEA and a comprehensive scheme was sent to the Planning Commission by the UP Government.

## 3. To Sampurnanand<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

24th February 1954

My dear Sampurnanand,<sup>2</sup>

I have come across a report of some questions asked in the UP Assembly about the activities of foreigners in the hill districts of the UP. You did not

1. JN Collection.

2. Home Minister, UP.



answer these but said that it is not in the public interest.<sup>3</sup> Normally speaking, we answer such questions here, though occasionally some piece of information might not be given. Not to answer these questions is to produce a sense of mystery. However, we should like to have the real answers to these questions from you so that we might compare them with our own information.

Probably the Chief Secretary<sup>4</sup> will be formally asked to send this information.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. On 19 February in response to a question by Bhagwan Sahai about the alleged antinational activities of foreigners on the Indo-Nepalese and Indo-Tibetan borders, Sampurnanand said that it was not in the public interest to disclose the names and activities of foreigners who visited the districts of Naini Tal, Garhwal, Tehri and Almora.
4. K.P. Bhargava.

#### 4. To Bhimsen Sachar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
25th February 1954

My dear Sachar,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of December 23rd.

Some little time ago, some complaints from MPs about Choudhary Devi Lal,<sup>3</sup> MLA, were sent to your Government. Your Chief Secretary has replied saying that there is nothing much in them.

I must say that I have continued to receive complaints against Choudhary Devi Lal from various sources and I think I wrote about it to you once. The impression I have got is that Choudhary Devi Lal functions as a rather undesirable type of boss in his area and threatens people who do not fall in line with him. You will remember my writing about this matter in connection with a deputation I had once.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy was sent to Principal Private Secretary.
2. Chief Minister of Punjab.
3. Devi Lal (b. 1914); member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1952-67; member, Haryana Legislative Assembly, 1974-80, 1987-89; Chief Minister, Haryana, 1977-79, and 1987-89; member, Lok Sabha, 1980-82 and in 1989; Deputy Prime Minister, 1989-92; Union Minister of Agriculture and Tourism, 1990-91.

## 5. To T. Prakasam<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3rd March 1954

My dear Prakasam,<sup>2</sup>

I have been terribly busy lately and I have been unable to write to you, although Andhra has been very much in my mind. The situation there is obviously a difficult one and requires all our tact and wisdom. The report of the Prohibition Enquiry Committee has posed a problem which will add to your difficulties.<sup>3</sup> The personnel of the Enquiry Committee<sup>4</sup> was perhaps not wisely chosen. Then, the recent decision of the Assembly on the question of the location of the High Court<sup>5</sup> also indicates how precarious your majority is.

As Governor Trivedi<sup>6</sup> was here, I had a long talk with him. You know that we sent him to Andhra specially because of his great experience. We were thinking of taking him into the Planning Commission, but the need of Andhra seemed to us to be greater. Normally we would not have appointed him to another Governorship and, as it is, we have sent him there for a year only. The whole purpose of his going there was that he should be able to help you in these difficult initial months of the new State. He did exceedingly good work in the Punjab after the Partition when a new province had to be built up. The ministry there took his assistance in many matters and there was full cooperation between them.<sup>7</sup>

I gather that he has not got much to do in Andhra and that his help is seldom sought. In fact, he feels that he is hardly doing any useful work there except touring about occasionally. That seems to me unfortunate, because it means rather wasting him there and not utilizing his experience which would be very helpful indeed in building up a province.

1. JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh.

3. The report, submitted on 17 February, revealed that prohibition in the State had failed completely. It strongly recommended reduction of duty on local brews like toddy and arrack and liberalisation of permit system for foreign liquor vends. The revenue thus earned were to be spent in development works. The APCC disapproved of these suggestions.

4. The Committee, appointed on 6 January 1954, consisted of S.V. Ramamurthy as Chairman, Justice P. Satyanarayana Rao and N. Ranganadhan as Members.

5. A resolution sponsored by Prakasam for location of Andhra Pradesh High Court at Vishakhapatnam was defeated on 1 March in the Assembly and an amendment suggesting Guntur in its place was carried by 67 votes in favour and 66 against.

6. C.M. Trivedi.

7. He was Governor of Punjab from August 1947 to September 1953.



I have an idea that normal work is not progressing as smoothly as it might in Andhra and that there is an element of casualness in dealing with problems. If this is so, this will come in the way of progress and a stable administration.

I suggest that you might have a full and frank talk with Trivedi on his return. Also of course with Sanjiva Reddy.<sup>8</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. N. Sanjiva Reddy was the Deputy Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh.

## 6. To N. Sanjiva Reddy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3rd March 1954

My dear Sanjiva Reddy,

I enclose a copy of a letter<sup>2</sup> I have sent to Prakasam. I have written to him moderately, but I feel much more strongly. I think that affairs in Andhra are not being managed properly at all and everything is done casually without adequate preparation and thought. The Governor is not utilised and I have an idea that most of the ministers also do not function as they should.

I realise that you have to pull on with Prakasam and any break would create grave difficulties. I do not wish, therefore, that there should be any break. But surely an attempt should be made to put an end to this casualness.

There is no point in my keeping Trivedi there if he is not useful and fully occupied.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. See the previous item.

## 7. To Mishrilal Gangwal<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
11th March 1954

My dear Mishrilalji,<sup>2</sup>

Just before I went to Madhya Bharat,<sup>3</sup> I received your letter of March 5th about the law and order situation in Bhind and Morena Districts.<sup>4</sup> Yesterday I met the deputation from Bhind. Your note proved very helpful to me in speaking to them.

It seemed to me that many of these people felt that they were being neglected owing to the dominance, as they said, of the Indore element in the Government. I hope this impression will be removed. Now that you have got a new IG of Police, a combined and concerted attempt should be made to deal with this law and order situation.

I agree with you that the use of the Preventive Detention Act is indicated in such circumstances. But would it not be better for you to use it in a larger way than you have done?<sup>5</sup> Obviously there are many people who are interested in these dacoities, etc.

Since my return from Madhya Bharat, I have not been well. I swallowed too much dust there and I have had a touch of fever since yesterday.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of Madhya Bharat.
3. Nehru went to Madhya Bharat on 7 March on a two-day visit to lay the foundation of the Gandhi Sagar Dam on the Chambal.
4. Dacoit menace in the two districts of Bhind and Morena was rampant in this period.
5. On 11 March, Home Minister of Madhya Bharat informed the State Legislative Assembly about arrest of 17 persons from Bhind and Morena districts under the Preventive Detention Act. They were suspected of aiding and abetting dacoits. Since their arrest, the Minister stated, there were signs of improvement.

## 8. No Reservation of Specialised Posts<sup>1</sup>

I enclose a letter from the Chief Minister of Punjab.

1. Note to the Minister for Home Affairs, New Delhi, 16 March 1954. JN Collection.



2. I do not understand why objections should have been taken to what is called the decadring of the posts of Registrar and Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies. Presumably this is supposed to be in the interests of the services. I think that in this matter or in any other matter, interest of work is far more important than that of the services. Whenever and wherever a better man is available outside the services for a specialised post, it should be open to a government to engage him. This idea of reservation of specialised posts for the services is out of date. Of course, it may often happen that a person trained from the services is suitable, and he only should get that post.

3. In the Punjab, there has been a succession of failures in the department dealing with cooperative societies.<sup>2</sup> Even that should lead to the conclusion that some expert should be appointed to it.

4. Apart from this, I think that a state government's views in such matters should prevail. They are responsible for the proper functioning of various departments under their care.

2. The cooperative movement in Punjab suffered from lack of adequate trained staff and proper supervisory mechanism, which inhibited the growth of the movement in the State.

## 9. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
17th March 1954

My dear Kailas Nath,

I enclose copy of a letter<sup>2</sup> I am sending to Morarji Desai about the nomination of an Anglo-Indian representative to the Bombay Legislative Assembly. Anthony<sup>3</sup> and Barrow<sup>4</sup> are seeing me this afternoon. I shall listen to them without committing myself in any way.

1. JN Collection.
2. Alongwith the letter, Nehru had also sent a copy of a note by Frank Anthony, of 17 March, regarding nomination of the Anglo-Indian representative to Bombay Assembly. Anthony had argued that since it had been a practice to choose the representative from among the members of the All India Anglo-Indian Association, the Bombay Government should nominate one from the panel already submitted to it by the Association.
3. Frank Anthony, an Anglo-Indian leader, was a nominated member of the House of the People at this time.
4. A.E.T. Barrow (1908-1990); teacher and educationist; member, Central Advisory Board of Education, 1966-79; Honorary General Secretary, All India Anglo-Indian Association 1952; Member of the House of the People, 1950-70, and 1977-87.

I suppose that Morarji Desai is rather angry with Anthony because of the aggressive attitude taken up by Anthony in regard to Hindi-English.<sup>5</sup> Generally speaking, Anthony has been making a nuisance of himself in Parliament, as you well know. I propose to tell him so, but the question of the nomination remains.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. On 16 December 1953 the Bombay Government issued an order prohibiting the admission of non-Anglo-Indians to Anglo-Indian schools. Anthony considered that Morarji Desai, a staunch pro-Hindi advocate, instigated this move in order to close the English-medium Anglo-Indian schools, where 60% pupils were non-Anglo-Indians. He challenged the legality of the Bombay Government order in Bombay High Court and won.

## 10. To Bisnuram Medhi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
19th March 1954

My dear Medhi,<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of March 11th.

It is true that some time ago a telegram or letter came to my secretary from Silie Haralu<sup>3</sup> asking for an interview with me. A reply was sent that I was too busy to grant an interview for some weeks. He was further asked to inform my secretary as to what he wished to see me about.

He has just addressed my secretary again and stated that he and his delegation will reach Delhi on the 6th April and has sought an interview with me.

It has been my consistent practice to grant interviews to anyone, and more especially, those who may oppose us, subject to time and convenience. I would not like to break this old established practice of mine, because that is an essential part of my approach to the public, whoever they might be, and I am sure you would not like me to do so. I learnt this from Gandhiji, who never refused an interview to anybody.

1. JN Collection. A copy of the letter was sent to the Governor of Assam.
2. Chief Minister of Assam.
3. A Naga leader of the liberal moderate group which opposed violence; Secretary of the Naga National Council after T. Sakhrie's death in 1956.



This has nothing to do with our attitude towards the demand of Naga independence.<sup>4</sup> There is no question of changing our firm opinion in regard to that. But because we are quite clear about our position, there need be no fear of expressing it whenever occasion arises.

I meet communists who are doing great mischief. Nevertheless, I do not refuse to see them, if they wish to see me and I do not see how I can apply a different rule to the Nagas or anyone else. Therefore, if they come here and seek an interview, I shall see them, I cannot deal with my people through deputy commissioners and the like. My contacts are direct with the humblest.

It is quite possible that these Naga National Council leaders might exploit their visit to Delhi or their interview with me. That risk has to be taken. Our strength and our prestige are big enough to ignore such matters.

There is a larger approach to this and like questions. It should always be our endeavour to deal in a friendly way with all classes of Indian people, including those, who are misled or who oppose us. We have to win them over and even if we do not win them, our general attitude creates a good impression on others. There are only two ways of dealing with people. One is the authoritarian way relying on authority and strength only, and the other is a friendly approach. Of course, both ways have to be applied in varying measures. If there is law and order situation, far greater emphasis is laid on the former. But even when the second has always to be there, or else we are not functioning as a democracy or in line with our old policy which Gandhiji has taught us.

Recently we had a significant example of how to deal with rebellious tribes near the Tibetan frontier in the NEFA.<sup>5</sup> The British would have dealt with them in a particular way and bombed them probably and otherwise killed many and set fire to their villages etc. We functioned in a different way and there was very little of killing or destruction. The result has been exceedingly good. We have not only established our authority in those areas but done so in a permanent way and affected the minds and hearts of those people by our friendly and generous approach.

We are living in difficult times with international situations always on the verge of crisis and the possibility of wars etc. Border areas and border tribes have always to be remembered in this connection. Force and authority go some

4. Naga National Council under A.Z. Phizo had been demanding independence for the people of Naga Hills and in a plebiscite held on 16 May 1951 by the NNC on this issue, it received overwhelming support from the Nagas.
5. The reference is to the incident of 22 October 1953 in Subansiri district in NEFA when Daffa tribesmen killed five Assam Rifles men. For Nehru's statement on this incident in the House of the People on 21 November 1953, See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 307-310.

way but not very far when a crisis arises. It is ultimately goodwill that counts. No doubt behind the goodwill there should be the strength of government. But it is the goodwill that is important, not so much the strength. We have adult franchise. No authoritarian government can function for long when every person has a vote.

I have endeavoured to explain to you my broad approach to all these problems, wherever they might arise in India. I am sure that this approach is the right one and will pay us dividends. The British Government dealt, for several generations, with the North West Frontier and never succeeded there. They spent large sums of money; they sent many military expeditions, but the people in that area remained outside their grip. We must learn from all this.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 11. To Bhimsen Sachar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20th March 1954

My dear Sachar,

I had previously written to you about certain labour matters in the Punjab and the differences between the INTUC organisation there and the Punjab Government.<sup>2</sup> I continue to receive complaints from the INTUC, and recently Amarnath Vidyalankar,<sup>3</sup> MP, wrote to me at length on this subject.<sup>4</sup> I understand that he wrote to you also last month.

It is difficult for me to go into these matters personally, and indeed, I do not wish to interfere. I have been approached both as Congress President and

1. File No. G-44, AICC Papers, NMML. Copy of this letter was sent to S.N. Agarwal.
2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 23, pp. 160-61.
3. (1902-85); writer and journalist; Professor of History, National College, Lahore, 1925-26; Editor, *Punjab Kesari*, 1930-33; President INTUC, Punjab, PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh, 1947-56; member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1950-51, 1957-62; Minister for Education, Labour and Languages, 1956-62; member, Lok Sabha, 1952-56, 1962-67 and 1971-77; publications include: *Bharat Ka Naya Itihas*, *Evolution of Mankind and Its Implications*.
4. Vidyalankar had written on 30 January that the Punjab Government, in league with rich industrialists, was showing indifference to the cause of the working class. Citing examples of non-implementation of awards and decisions of the Punjab Industrial Tribunal, he wrote, the Government was "deliberately subverting its prestige and power."



as Prime minister. I feel, however, that it is very undesirable for these differences to persist between the INTUC and the Punjab Government. This will only give opportunities to the communist element in labour to exploit the situation.

I would like you particularly to apply your mind to this matter. The All-India Headquarters of the INTUC have also been approaching me on this subject.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 12. To T.T. Krishnamachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20th March 1954

My dear T.T.,

...I can hardly discuss the intricacy of Madras politics in this letter. There is much happening there that I do not like at all, and Rajaji's methods might perhaps be partly responsible for the unfortunate position that exists.

But there are two matters which should be considered apart from Madras politics. One is the latitude that a Central Minister should enjoy in criticising the state government's policies.<sup>2</sup> Every one of us in the Central Government has intimate contacts with a state and indirectly with its government. Most of my life's work has lain in the UP. There is a great deal that has happened and is happening in the UP with which I thoroughly disagree. I have discussed this matter with Ministers there as well as the Congress Committee. But I do not criticise the government or its policies in public.

It is manifest that if we criticise each other, there is going to be complete chaos in the public mind about our policies. It is a good rule that Central Ministers do not criticise each other. The same rule applies, or should apply to the Central Ministers and State Ministers, or Ministers from different states *inter se*. There is no other course for any kind of organization which pretends

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Criticising the new scheme of education sponsored by Rajaji in Madras, on 7 March, at Kumbakonam, Krishnamachari said: "I am not sanguine as some big people are about the results of the new education experiment. I strongly feel that there is no warrant for spoiling your education." He also said that successful solution in a laboratory enclosed in a glass house might not stand the test of its application in the wider world. The Rajaji formula was like that.

to maintain any internal discipline. If a Central Minister criticizes a state, the latter will criticise the Central Minister, and this will lead to controversy.

As for the education policy which Rajaji has sponsored,<sup>3</sup> I cannot speak for conditions in Madras. But that policy is an aspect of Basic Education which is the proved policy of our Government. The Madras proposals, as you know, were referred to a special High-powered Committee of Educationists.<sup>4</sup> They expressed their approval of them. The Education Ministry here approved of them. The Central Advisory Committee of Education also approved of them and advised other states to follow that example.

At the Governors' Conference recently, the Madras proposals were not directly discussed, but the present system was discussed and thoroughly disapproved of and generally the basic system was approved. Most of our discussion in the Governors' Conference related to higher education. But some references were made to primary and secondary education.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Madras Elementary Education scheme was criticised on the ground that it attempted to perpetuate caste based crafts. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 287-290.
4. A four-man Committee under R.V. Parulekar submitted its report on 23 November 1953.

### 13. To K. N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
2nd April 1954

My dear Kailas Nath,

I had a message from Rajaji today, brought by Chandrasekhara Aiyar.<sup>2</sup> Rajaji is much concerned at the growth of communal feeling in Madras especially. He has in mind the Dravida Kazhagam movement.<sup>3</sup> As you know, in Malabar

1. JN Collection.
2. Chairman, Delimitation Commission.
3. The Dravida Kazhagam movement was an attempt at lower caste assertion in politics dominated by high caste people. Avowedly it agitated against the dominance of the Aryan-north over the Dravidian-south and discouraged every thing associated with the north, such as Hindi, Brahminism etc.



the communal situation is also bad.<sup>4</sup> On one side there are the old Muslim Leaguers and on the other the RSS and like people.

Rajaji has suggested that our Home Ministry might send a circular to all states saying that any person actively encouraging communalism or creating bad blood against other communities should be severely dealt with. He thinks that such a circular might pull up some governments. No doubt, he is thinking of the future Madras Government also.

I do not know if a circular of this kind would go very far, but even if it does a little good, it might be worthwhile sending it.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. See *ante*, p. 164 fn. 2.

#### 14. To Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9th April 1954

My dear Sri Babu,

... I am getting very deeply concerned at the growth of this conflict between Bihar and Orissa over the question of Seraikella.<sup>2</sup> This will poison the relations of the two States for a long time if it is not handled carefully now. We cannot deal with these matters in the police way. The only way is for us to consider them at the highest level, i.e., by the Chief Ministers.

Of course, if crimes are committed they have to be dealt with and the police has to function. But in such matters there is always a tendency on both sides to over-reach the other, and that makes matters much more difficult.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Copy of the letter was sent to Kailas Nath Katju. Extracts.

2. Seraikella a princely State, became a bone of contention between Bihar and Orissa since its merger with Orissa on 1 January 1948 and subsequent transfer to Bihar on 18 May 1948 by the States Ministry. The tribals instigated by the previous rulers of the place launched a merger movement with Orissa. The Ganatantra Parishad of Orissa, a political party which since its formation in 1950 championed the cause of Oriya people living in outlying areas of Bihar—was agitating for reintegration of Seraikella into Orissa at this time.

## 15. To Bhimsen Sachar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
14th April 1954

My dear Bhimsen,

I had a talk with K.C. Neogy<sup>2</sup> today, in the course of which he mentioned his visit to Bhakra-Nangal and Chandigarh. He also spoke to me about some recent steps you have taken about the nationalisation of road transports.<sup>3</sup> He wished to discuss this with your Minister in charge, but apparently he was not available.

I do not know all the facts, but, generally speaking, it appears inadvisable to put in our limited resources at this stage in schemes of nationalisation, unless this can be abundantly justified. The steps taken by some governments in this direction have not yielded much result.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. PB/38, Bhimsen Sachar papers, NMML.
2. Member, Planning Commission.
3. The Punjab Government proposed to nationalise 42 public transport routes by the middle of June 1954.

## 16. TO G.B. Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
15th April 1954

My dear Pantji,

I hate to give you trouble. But there is one matter which I think you can help me in. I hope even this will not take up much of your time.

This relates to the Madhya Bharat abolition of jagirs<sup>2</sup> etc. The whole thing has gone through all the various phases for some years. The Act was passed by the Legislature after the fullest consideration by the Planning Commission, States

1. JN Collection.
2. The Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act was passed in the Assembly on 26 October 1951 and received the assent of the President on 27 November 1951. On 7 December 1951, 44 jagirdars appealed to the High Court and got an injunction. The High Court rejected the appeal on 4 December 1952.



Ministry and others. It went up to the High Court and most of it was declared *intra vires*, though some sections were declared *ultra vires*. It went up to the Supreme Court which decided in favour of the Government.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the Act has been given effect to and the jagirs taken charge of by Government.

After all this, really nothing more remains to be done. But for some time past, the representatives of the Jagirdari Association of Madhya Bharat have been approaching me in this matter and saying that they will abide by what I say. Sardar Angre,<sup>4</sup> who used to be a shining light in the Hindu Mahasabha but is somewhat reformed now, has been coming to me. I have told him how difficult and even absurd it would be for me to interfere in any way at this stage in any event. He said that he realised this, but wanted this favour that I should consider this matter and then give my opinion. I told him that in order to please him, I would give it a broad consideration, but there was very little chance of my interfering. Indeed it seemed to me improper at this stage to bypass the Legislature and the Supreme Court and everything.

The whole thing really resolves itself on a question of friendly handling and not really of interfering. These jagirdars of Madhya Bharat, as you know, are not very wise, but they are great sticklers on their dignity.

I wonder if it would be possible for you just to see some papers and then advise me. As you took a lot of trouble on the Rajasthan matter,<sup>5</sup> your name immediately strikes one. I do not want you to go into detail or to hear big deputations etc. So far as I am concerned, this is a formality I wish to go through to create a friendly impression.

It is to be remembered of course that in order to be friendly to a few, one may become unfriendly to a large number. It would indeed be difficult to make any marked change without creating an uproar among large numbers of people in Madhya Bharat.

I am enclosing some papers, which include a memorandum from the Jagirdars' Association<sup>6</sup> and a note on it by the Madhya Bharat Government. The note is fairly full. I would suggest that you might glance through these. If you wish to have any further information on a particular subject, you can write to me and I shall get it from the Madhya Bharat Government or the Jagirdars' Association.

3. In February 1954.

4. Sardar Chandroji Sambhaji Rao Angre; leader of Hindu Mahasabha, member, Council of States, 1952-1954; General Secretary, All India Landowners' and Jagirdars' Association; President, Madhya Bharat Krishak, Zamindar and Jagirdar Sangh; died in 1978.

5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 224-226.

6. This memorandum was adopted by the Association on 26 March 1954.

Please forgive me for this trouble that I m giving you.<sup>7</sup>

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Pant in his reply of 21 April informed that in view of the Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeals of jagirdars and Madhya Bharat Government's attitude in this matter, the entire question seemed to be closed and concluded.

## 17. To Raghbir Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20th May 1954

My dear Raghbir Singhji,

When you saw me the other day I asked you about your work and I was happy to learn from you that the law and order situation was good and that your Cabinet was functioning as a team. You know very well that Rau<sup>2</sup> had done an excellent piece of work in Pepsu. In fact, he has been given a very unusual reward by the President for his work in Pepsu—Padma Vibhushan—our new award. This is rarely given.

It is not an easy matter for any government to follow a period of efficient administration and progressive legislation such as took place in Rau's time.<sup>3</sup> That tempo has to be kept, or else, there will be unfavorable comparisons. One of the things we are especially pleased with is the land legislation that was passed<sup>4</sup> for Pepsu. Land policy is specially important all over India and we have to keep on advancing. It is the abolition of the zamindari in particular, and it has not ended this problem. It is under consideration of the Planning Commission and the Congress Working Committee and the Government.

Brishbhan<sup>5</sup> came to see me today and I had a general talk with him. In the

1. JN Collection.
2. P.S. Rau, after imposition of President's rule in Pepsu was the Adviser to the Rajpramukh from March 1953 to March 1954.
3. Twelve Acts were passed by the Presidential Order during Rau's tenure as Adviser, which included the Pepsu Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1953; Pepsu Abolition of Malkiyat Rights Act, 1953; Pepsu Occupancy Tenants Act; Pepsu Land Acquisition Act 1953; Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act; Pepsu Betterment Charges and Acreage Rates Act etc.
4. The Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1953, aimed at giving the status of full proprietor to as many tenants-at-will as possible. The Act gave the tenants the option to buy land under their occupancy and fixed the permissible limit for personal cultivation at one-half of the area owned by a landowner.
5. Brishbhan was the Finance Minister of Pepsu.



course of this talk I asked him about this land legislation. I was a little surprised to learn from him that there was some tendency to allow this Pepsu land legislation to lapse and also the reclaimed land might be given back to the landlords. Any such policy would, I think, be disastrous. It would involve the prestige of the Central Government and the Congress which were committed not only to the larger policy but to these particular measures adopted for Pepsu. These measures were carefully considered by the Planning Commission.

I hope that your Cabinet will think in this way and will go ahead with the land legislation initiated during Rau's regime by Presidential orders etc.

Your Cabinet is a good one and contains men of integrity and ability and it is essential that your Cabinet and Government should be progressive from the point of view of social and economic policy and, in particular, land policy which is basic for us. Whenever you have any difficulty, I hope you will refer to us because we attach great importance to this matter.

I also suggested to you, and I wish to repeat, that there must be the closest consultation in regard to every matter among all the members of the Cabinet.

When Rau was there, I understand that he removed your Director of Cooperative Societies because he considered him inefficient. I understand he has been reappointed to that place now. I do not know the person concerned, but I have great confidence in Rau's judgment. A person removed for inefficiency is not normally put back. I should be glad to know what are the facts.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 18. To Brahm Perkash<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21st May 1954

My dear Brahm Perkash,<sup>2</sup>

I have not answered your previous letter, but I spoke to you about it at the Party last evening.

I have now received your letter of the 20th May.<sup>3</sup> When I spoke at your

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of Delhi.
3. Brahm Perkash had enclosed cuttings of newspaper reports of Nehru's speech at the Delhi State Political Conference, interpreting that Nehru was opposed to the formation of Delhi State as envisaged in the memorandum submitted to the State's Reorganisation Commission on 24 April 1954, by the Delhi State Government, suggesting inclusion of parts of UP, Punjab, Pepsu and Rajasthan.

Conference, I did not wish to express any opinion about the merits of any province becoming bigger or smaller, but unconsciously my words must have carried a certain hint of disapproval about all these agitations and, more especially, about the agitation for a Maha Delhi. It is a fact that I do not approve of this particular proposal. But I do not propose to go about saying this. I disapprove of it because I think that Delhi being the national capital should remain a small area. It should not be the capital of a large province. I need not go into the reasons for this. It was these reasons that induced people in the United States to make Washington D.C., a small area.

As for your reference to the agitation in the UP, this was started by a number of UP MLAs, who proposed a division of the UP, and the northern districts being joined on to Delhi and some districts in the Punjab. I remember Pantji speaking to me about this matter. He was distressed about this move and said that he did not want any agitation on this issue this way or that way, but what was he to do when a definite initiative had been taken by others? I told him that while I disapproved of this agitation it was open to him to express his views against that proposal. Naturally when this matter takes the shape of a public argument, people express themselves strongly.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 19. To Ajit Prasad Jain<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21st May 1954

My dear Ajit,<sup>2</sup>

I had a small deputation today consisting of N.C. Chatterjee,<sup>3</sup> M.N. Saha and another person. They spoke about refugee rehabilitation in the eastern region and gave me a note and a pamphlet. I enclose both. The main argument was that we had spent a lot of money on the western side and not enough on the east. They pointed out that Rs 2,45,00,000 out of the grant for rehabilitation in West Bengal had lapsed last year.

M.N. Saha said that an objective study has been made of conditions in West Bengal. This disclosed that the steps thus far taken were very inadequate.

1. File No. 29(96)/50-PMS.

2. Union Minister of Rehabilitation.

3. Hindu Mahasabha leader, member of the House of the People.



It was suggested that a parliamentary committee should investigate the eastern region and suggest measures.

They were not complaining of your Ministry or indeed of the West Bengal Government.

Chatterjee said he had spoken to you about some of these matters and especially suggested that your Deputy Minister Bhonsle<sup>4</sup> should be posted in Bengal, together with some Finance Officer with authority to give sanction and expedite matters.

It does seem to me that it would be desirable to pay special attention to the eastern region now that you are gradually finalising the western part. Perhaps the best course will be for yourself to go there for some time and give a push to things. It might be advisable to leave Bhonsle there for a longer time.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. J.K. Bhonsle.

## 20. To Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>

Camp: The Retreat,  
Mashobra, Simla  
24th May 1954

My dear Sri Babu,

On my way to Mashobra today, I paid a visit to the President at Simla and had a talk with him.

Rajendra Babu was particularly concerned about one matter. I understand that he has written to you about it. This is in regard to the zamindars who have been dispossessed in Bihar or who are being dispossessed now. Apparently no compensation has been given to them yet. They have lost all their income of rent. Even those whose properties have not been taken over by the state thus far, are totally unable to realise any rent from their tenants. The result is that these zamindars have no income at all and have received no compensation with the consequence that they are in great distress. I am told that because some of them could not pay their revenue in time, under the Sunset Law, their properties were auctioned and nobody was prepared to bid for the simple reason that

1. File No. 80/53, President's Secretariat. A copy of this letter was sent to Rajendra Prasad.

there was no income left in these properties. As a result, the Government put up a bid of a rupee or so and acquired the properties. This was technically within the law, but, in the circumstances, it does appear to be very unjust.

You will remember that some time ago I wrote to you about a Muslim zamindar, belonging to an old family, who had approached the President. You were good enough to reply to me in some detail and to show that this man was heavily in debt and therefore there was no question of paying anything to him. This again was legally perfectly correct, but the fact remained that he was suddenly reduced to complete penury. Many zamindars are in debt, but since there is an income, they can carry on and perhaps gradually they can pay back the debt.

I do not of course know all the facts and only write from such insufficient data as I possess. It does seem to me on this data that we are treating these dispossessed zamindars rather harshly and reducing them to a state of poverty. This was not our intention. Of course they cannot maintain their previous standards, but the whole purpose of giving them compensation was to enable them to carry on with moderate comfort. If compensation is delayed, there is a gap period, when they have no resources and they can hardly carry on at all or educate their children.

I shall be grateful if you will give thought to this matter.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru









1. To Amrit Kaur<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
1st February 1954

My dear Amrit,

Thank you for your letter of February 1 about missions and missionaries.<sup>2</sup> Certainly I shall gladly discuss this matter with you.

As I have told you, I view this matter entirely from the political angle and, politically, I am wholly opposed to any extension of American influence in India. We have at present a vast number of Americans in India performing in various ways some sort of intelligence work. I have no doubt that many Americans here are good. But hardly any of them agrees with India's policy at present.

To allow Americans to function in the frontier areas is particularly undesirable at the present stage. This has nothing to do with Christianity.

You mention the growing anti-Christian feeling both in Manipur and elsewhere. That is so to some extent and we have to combat it. But it is not a wise policy to add to missionaries when there is this hostile atmosphere. That merely makes the position of the existing missions a little more difficult.

You meet many bishops and missionaries and what they tell you is no doubt partly true. But it is not a full picture. It is after all a one-sided account. I am speaking about the political aspect only.

In Bombay, we have definite evidence about certain activities of some of the Jesuits, which are very prejudicial to India. Naturally I cannot shout about these things. But we have spoken to the Cardinal on the subject.

All this is really an aspect of misguided nationalism. The RSS is carrying on a virulent propaganda against missionaries.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Amrit Kaur, the Union Health Minister had complained about the increasing anti-Christian atmosphere all around, particularly in Manipur and wanted Nehru to do something about it. She did not like Nehru's position on foreign missionaries. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 322-325. She also felt that Katju's views in this regard did not correctly reflect the Government's policies and wanted this matter to be taken over by MEA from MHA. For Katju's views, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, pp. 238-239; and Vol. 24, pp. 330-332.

## 2. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
17th February 1954

My dear Kailas Nath,

You have been receiving many letters from Rajkumari Amrit Kaur about the position of Christians and foreign missionaries in India.<sup>2</sup> Sometimes she has forwarded copy to me. We have not liked making herself a kind of representative of Christians in India and yet I do not see how we can object to it because she is in touch with various people of the Christian persuasion and naturally they write to her.

I am worried about this matter, more especially because of the idea that is spreading in the North Eastern areas where there is a substantial Christian population, as well as in some areas in the south etc. There may be not much justification for it, but there is a feeling that some kind of anti-Christian policy is being pursued by Government. I think it would be desirable to consider this matter fully in Cabinet and lay down general rules that should govern our policy in regard to missionaries here as well as those who wish to come here. Perhaps your Ministry could draw up a note on this for this purpose.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Katju replied to Amrit Kaur explaining his Ministry's position regarding various cases mentioned by her. He also clarified about the misconception surrounding his own views on the subject.

## 3. To Ravi Shankar Shukla<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20th March 1954

My dear Shuklaji,

You sent me with your letter of the 27th January a note on the activities of Muslims in Madhya Pradesh. I am sorry for the delay in acknowledging it.

There are all kinds of trends among the Muslims in India and some of them are undoubtedly objectionable. I think, however, that we should not be

1. JN Collection.



led away by these and we should try to judge the broad situation objectively. If Muslims generally in India are unhappy or dissatisfied, then the fault is ours and not the Muslims'. This indeed would apply to any large group of persons. The Muslims in India have suffered a tremendous shock from the Partition and its consequences and it was and is upto us to make them feel that they are completely at home in India and their interests lie in India and not elsewhere. If we fail to do so, it is not much good our saying that Muslims are being misguided by some of their leaders.

It is a fact that there is a great deal of frustration in the Muslim mind in India. I am not referring to people who may be pro-Pakistan. There are not very many like that. But conditions have arisen in India, which bring continuous pressure on the Muslims in various ways. There is the question of employment in government services, All India and state. There is even the question of education facilities in colleges and the rest of it. Even in business there is pressure against them. It is not surprising, therefore, that they lack security for the future.

Reference is made in the note you have sent about the Muslim demand for Urdu. This is a very important matter, because it affects the Muslims psychologically more than almost anything else. According to our educational policy, we should give full facilities for learning Urdu for those who want it. This has nothing to do with opposition to Hindi which stands firmly in its place as our national language. I am afraid that our general policy has not fitted in with our declared educational aims and has undoubtedly created a deep sense of frustration among the Muslims.

We seem to forget that the Muslims form a very large number of people in our country and it is a major problem for us how far we win their goodwill. The whole of the Kashmir question largely depends upon the reaction of the Muslims in India.

The recent elections in East Pakistan have created a new situation in Pakistan which may be favourable to better relations between India and Pakistan. Public feeling in Pakistan is, on the whole, friendly to India. Much depends therefore on how we deal with our Muslim countrymen in India.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 4. To P.V. Cherian<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
24th March 1954

Dear Dr Cherian,<sup>2</sup>

I have received your letter of the 22nd March.

I am myself rather concerned at the fact that Indian Christians have been returned in small numbers in our elections. As you perhaps know, every effort was made by us to encourage the representation of minorities. I do not like the idea of any kind of communal or reserved representation. But certainly I shall exert such influence as I have to see that they are properly represented.

In the Foreign Service, people come in through competitive examinations. I know there are some Christians in it. I do not quite know what you mean by saying that they have no prominent place in it. Naturally, newcomers have to gain experience before they occupy the higher posts.

There is no question of the loyalty of the Christian community. Of course, like other communities, they are loyal. Where else could their loyalty go? It is true that in some places unfortunately, mostly in the North and in the tribal areas, there is some feeling against some activities of Christian missionaries, who are almost always foreign missionaries. Sometimes there has been some justification for this, because those foreign missionaries indulged in what might be called anti-Indian activities. Of course, this does not apply to all of them and certainly does not apply to Indian Christians.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2(238)/48-PMS. A copy of this letter was sent to the Minister of Home Affairs.
2. P.V. Cherian (1893-1969); Surgeon, General Hospital and Professor, Medical College, Madras, 1927-48; Mayor of Madras, 1950; Chairman, Madras, Legislative Council, 1952-64; Acting Vice-Chancellor, Annamalai University, March-May 1955; Governor of Maharashtra, 1964-69; he was President, All India Conference of Indian Christians.



## 5. To Ravi Shankar Shukla<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9th April 1954

My dear Shuklaji,

You wrote to me some time ago about your intention to appoint a committee to consider the question of Christian missionaries etc.<sup>2</sup> In that committee, it was your intention to put a representative Christian. I welcome your idea. How far have you proceeded in this?

I continue to get complaints from the Catholic Regional Committee which has its headquarters at Nagpur. In February last, I received a letter and memorandum from them.<sup>3</sup> This memorandum was really a copy, the original having been sent through to you. I thought, that perhaps the original would reach me through you and, therefore, I did not acknowledge the letter of the President of the Catholic Regional Committee.

Now I have received another letter from him in which he refers to "the incredible record of sufferings, harassments and disabilities to which tribal Christians have been subjected in Madhya Pradesh".<sup>4</sup> I have no doubt that the account he has given me is greatly exaggerated and one-sided. Still the fact remains that this appears to be the belief of these Catholics. The Catholic Church is a very powerful international organisation, and, even in India it is the strongest and best organised Church, especially in the south. It appears to me desirable that something definite should be done and the only proper way to deal with this matter appears to be the appointment of a good and high class committee which must, of course, include a Christian of eminence who can be considered a proper representative of Christians.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 33(111)/52-PMS.
2. Madhya Pradesh Government, on 14 April 1954, constituted a Committee comprising Bhawani Shankar Niyogi, as Chairman; Ghanshyam Singh Gupta, Seth Govind Das, Kirtimant Rao, S.K. George as members and B.P. Phatak, as member-Secretary, to enquire into the questions of conversions and use of missions for political and extra-religious objectives.
3. On 14 February a 10-point memorandum was submitted to Nehru.
4. G.X. Francis, President of the Catholic Regional Committee representing Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, had written about anti-Christian official reports, propaganda by the press and the official media and collapse of secular structure in that part of the country. He also wrote that "starred question relating to wanton acts of desecration of chapels have so far not elicited any reply on the floor of local Assembly." He requested for the appointment of an impartial enquiry committee at the earliest.

## 6. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22nd April 1954

My dear Kailas Nath,

I enclose a letter from Amrit Kaur. This question of Manipur is presumably under your consideration. I do not know the exact position there. But in the tribal areas, there are large numbers of Christians and we should avoid making them alienated or disgruntled.

I entirely agree with Amrit Kaur that the Committee that Shuklaji has appointed in Madhya Pradesh is not a good Committee at all. I happen to know S.K. George<sup>2</sup> whom they have put in as a Christian. He is no good from this point of view.

What has happened to my suggestion that a paper might be prepared for the Cabinet?

I have received a long telegram of protest from the President, Catholic Regional Committee of Nagpur about the position etc. of the Committee appointed by the Madhya Pradesh Government.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 33(111)/52-PMS.
2. S.K. George was a professor in the Commerce College at Wardha.

## 7. To N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar<sup>1</sup>

Camp: The Retreat  
Mashobra, Simla  
29th May, 1954

My dear Shri Chandrasekhara Aiyar,

...You have written to me about Christian Missionary activities.<sup>2</sup> I have been much concerned with this matter from both points of view, for and against

1. JN Collection. Extracts
2. Aiyar contended that conversions usually took place for a variety of reasons, such as rise in social status, material gain, employment etc. Though the missionaries contributed substantially in the fields of education and medicine, these were also used to further proselytisation. He felt that big Hindu industrial Houses like Birla, Dalmia and Singhanian would give in plenty for this cause, for favourable returns.



them. I have dealt with this matter more from the political point of view. I think this is the right approach. I have no doubt that these missionary activities will become less and less, that is, foreign missionaries coming here. If, during the British period, they did not achieve great results, it is very unlikely that they will achieve them now. In fact, that is the case in other countries also. I am, therefore, not worried about this matter. I deal with it from the political point of view as well as in some other ways. From the social point of view, the only real way to deal with it is for us to improve our social structure. It is not the Birlas and the Dalmias who can meet the situation by spending money. It is we, all of us, who are to blame.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru





## PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS





## 1. To G.V. Mavalankar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
18th February 1954

My dear Shri Mavalankar,<sup>2</sup>

Please refer to your letter of the 10th February regarding the position of Speakers.<sup>3</sup>

Generally speaking, I agree that we would develop the convention you have suggested. But I can well imagine difficulties. We are in the early stages of our democratic institutions and assemblies and it cannot be said that a person elected as Speaker in the first instance was necessarily the best choice and should, therefore, continue indefinitely. But I agree that we should try to adhere to this convention. I shall put up this matter before the next meeting of the Working Committee and I hope that we shall issue some general instructions to our Congress parties in the states.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. PG-49/1951-54, AICC Papers, NMML. A copy of this letter was sent to the General Secretary, AICC.
2. Speaker, House of the People.
3. Mavalankar had suggested establishment of a convention about the Speaker being reelected without contest. He proposed that the Speaker's seat should not be contested in general elections, and if returned to the legislature, he should be reelected as Speaker. He felt that unless the Speaker's position was strengthened it would be futile to expect other wider conventions such as that the Speaker should not take part in politics, to be established.

## 2. To Raghubir Sahai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
16th March 1954

My dear Raghubir Sahai,<sup>2</sup>

I have the letter dated the 15th March signed by you and some other MPs about payment to MPs.

1. File No. 32(395)/52-PMS. A copy of this letter was sent to S.N. Sinha.
2. Raghubir Sahai (1896-1988); advocate; member, Budaun Municipal Board, 1922-25; Member, AICC and UPCC, for many years; Member, UP Legislative Council, 1928-30; UP Legislative Assembly, 1946-51; member, House of the People, 1952-1962; author of *Life in an Indian Jail*.

I agree with you that this question should be settled soon. I am sorry there has been so much delay. Unfortunately no progress can be made till the report of the committee of MPs dated the 4th August 1952, is referred back to that committee. This should be done as soon as possible and then the question can be considered by that Committee *de novo*.

Personally, I am agreeable to a monthly salary and a smaller daily allowance; also free railway passes to Members. What the salary and allowance should be is a matter for careful consideration. Obviously the practice in British or other foreign parliaments hardly apply to conditions in India.

As for railway passes, so far as I know, only the Member gets a free pass in other countries and no others.

If there is to be a daily allowance in addition to the monthly salary, it is not clear why a free residence etc. should be provided. This is not normally done elsewhere so far as I know. I am referring your letter to the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs.<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. S.N. Sinha.

### 3. Parliamentary System<sup>1</sup>

The Secretariat of our Parliament celebrated 25 years of its existence last January. During these 25 years, our Parliament has undergone many changes. In the beginning, it was hardly a Parliament and was only a pale imitation of it, but, since the coming of Independence, it has been the sovereign Parliament of India.

By our Constitution, we are committed to the democratic parliamentary system of government. In these days of rival ideologies and international conflict, we have tried to keep apart from these clashes of opinions in the international sphere and have tried to seek a path for ourselves and we have decided to base our Constitution and governance on the democratic parliamentary system. That system appears to us to have obvious virtues. Its critics point out that it is rather slow moving in these dynamic times which require a rapid change from

1. Message on the completion of twenty-five years of Parliament Secretariat, New Delhi, 14 April 1954. JN Collection.



the old to the new. Ultimately the system which yields large dividends in the shape of the well being and advancement of the people, will probably survive in every country.

Will the parliamentary system in India yield these dividends? The future alone can answer. But I am convinced that this is basically the right system for us, even though it may be necessary to make minor variations in it by amending our Constitution so as to remove any obstructions to our progress. I believe that it is suited to our national genius and the extension of this democratic system right down to our panchayats takes us back, to some extent, to our past periods of history. Thus, in a sense, it has its roots in the past, even though the modern forms of it may be new.

The modern world offers us tremendous problems, among them, the problem of securing individual liberty in the context of the highly specialised and centralised administrative and other machinery which has become inevitable today. Without that specialised machinery, we cannot function as an efficient and prosperous nation. Without individual freedom we lose what is of the greatest value in life.

The development of technology has again led to problems of colossal magnitude. In the final analysis, this development is embodied in the hydrogen bomb, and the vital choice before the world is great progress on cooperative lines or conflict and utter destruction.

How then will the parliamentary system face these problems? I think that it will face them successfully and triumph in the end.

#### 4. Decorum Before Parliamentary Committees<sup>1</sup>

I have seen the note<sup>2</sup> of the Parliament Secretariat. There can be no doubt that persons appearing before Parliamentary Committees should observe decorous behaviour and they should be instructed accordingly.

1. Note to the Principal Private Secretary, 21 April 1954. File No. 32(10)/56-57-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. The Parliament Secretariat had issued this note to all Ministries on 23 March 1954 with the Speaker's approval. It intended to collect at one place the conventions and decorum to be observed while giving evidence before Parliamentary Committees. The procedures governing these proceedings were cumbersome and the note sought to apply a uniform code of conduct for official as well as non-official witnesses.

2. The rules and the language given in May's *Parliamentary Practice*,<sup>3</sup> it must be remembered, are derived from old times and, though the principle may be still applied, the language is archaic which has little relevance today in that context. "Saucy" will not be used now by any modern writer in this context. There is no reason why we should adopt archaic language in any instructions that we issue.<sup>4</sup>

3. Also asking anyone to bow twice before anyone is a relic of old procedure in the UK Parliament which can be traced back to behaviour in Court. I doubt if this has any relevance in, or is the practice of, any other Parliament. It is right that a person appearing should bow before the Chairman or perhaps perform the *namaskar*. But to ask him to do this twice brings in an element of courtly procedure.

4. As a normal practice, it would perhaps be more desirable for Parliament Secretariat to deal with the various Ministries of the Government of India in such matters through the Home Ministry.

3. By Thomas Erskine May.

4. The note said that the word "saucy" was taken from May's *Parliamentary Practice*.

## 5. To D.K. Kunte<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
5th May 1954

Dear Shri Kunte,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of the 4th May. I have no doubt that whatever you may have said in a public speech<sup>3</sup> must have been moderately worded and not embarrassing or compromising in any way. But it does seem to me odd that a Speaker should also be the Chairman of the Boundary Committee of the Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad. Obviously, this Parishad deals with important

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Chief Minister, Bombay.

2. Dattatreya Kashinath Kunte (b. 1908): joined Civil Disobedience movement in 1930; courted arrest several times; member, Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1937-40, 1946-'57; Speaker of the Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1952-56; member, Lok Sabha, 1967-70.

3. Kunte was the Chairman of the Boundary Committee appointed by the Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad, a body agitating for a United State of Maharashtra. While addressing a public meeting at Belgaum on 27 April he appealed for reorganisation of states on a linguistic basis and said that Belgaum with a majority of Marathi-speaking population rightly claimed to be included in United Maharashtra.



political, and sometimes controversial issues. A Speaker has to keep apart from such issues. We do not have Speakers as members of our elective Congress Committees. How then can a Speaker be associated with some other organisation of a political and controversial nature? Also, delivering speeches, however moderate, would somewhat compromise the position of the Speaker, who should be above controversy.

Nijalingappa<sup>4</sup> told me that you participated in meeting of which the Chairman was a communist. I do not know how far this is true. But this kind of thing does produce confusion in the public mind.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. S. Nijalingappa was the President of Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee.

## 6. Question of Privilege<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: As you have been good enough to say that you will consider the matter and have some occasion to discuss it if necessary, I would only submit one or two matters which might be considered by you and the House, before you decide.

The first point is that the incident<sup>2</sup> referred to has nothing to do with this House. It has occurred outside. And it is a question whether a Member of this House behaving or misbehaving outside should come and seek the shelter of this House for his behaviour or misbehaviour outside, which has nothing to do with this House.

The second question is an inquiry<sup>3</sup> has been put to him to say whether he said something in his capacity not as a Member of this House, but outside.

1. Reply to questions in the Parliament, 12 May 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, Vol. V, Part II, 1954, cols. 7165-7169.
2. *The Statesman* and certain other English newspapers of Delhi reported on 11 May 1954 that at the concluding session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha at Hyderabad on 10 May 1954, N.C. Chatterjee speaking on the Special Marriage Bill, referred to the Upper House, as a body of elders behaving irresponsibly like a pack of urchins.
3. Secretary of the Council of States, S.N. Mukerjee, served a notice on N.C. Chatterjee pointing out that this had raised a question of privilege on the ground that it constituted a reflection on the proceedings of the House and a violation of its rights and privileges.

These two matters have to be borne in mind. It is very easy to refer to privileges of this House and that House, but there are some things which occur outside these Houses, and an inquiry about them is normally made, and I suggest that some action will be taken on the basis of that inquiry. When we do not know what that action is, it seems rather premature and going beyond the facts of the case.

The Speaker wanted to know how action could be taken by either House in respect of statements made with regard to the other House, whether inside or outside that House.

JN: Outside the House has nothing to do with the House. If a member does something outside the House, it is in his capacity as a citizen, not as a Member of the House. The Hindu Mahasabha is not a part of this House yet, I know.

The Speaker intervened to say that the question to be considered was what should be the proper procedure, whether it should be by direct action or at the instance of the other House or through some other procedure.

JN: The present question is whether an inquiry about the veracity of a report is justifiable or not. That is the only question. I do not know what procedure is coming, when an inquiry has been made.

The Speaker said that the House would have an opportunity of discussing and deliberating in regard to proper procedure in such matters.

C.C. Biswas, the Law Minister asked if the procedure would include an inquiry whether it was open to Chairman of the Council of States or the Speaker to direct a Member to confirm or deny a statement reported in newspapers.

JN: The only question one must remember is—it is always an interesting proposition to consider the possibilities, probabilities, inferences and what may happen—whether an inquiry can be made as to the correctness of a report. That is all that has been done. I really fail to understand what all this pother is about.

The Speaker said that the only question was the nature of inquiry and the correct procedure.

K.S. Raghavachari and S.V. Ramaswamy spoke about checking of fact with a view to take action about it.



JN: May I say a word, Sir? I was present in the Council of States, when this happened. An honourable Member got up and drew the attention of the Chairman to a report of the speech in *The Statesman* or some paper, and the Chairman then said, "I can take no action on it, I can only enquire whether this report is correct or not, then the matter might be considered." "The only question is", the Chairman said, "I do not know if this report is correct, merely reading the newspaper you may say anything, but I should know whether the report is correct or not." All that he said was, "I shall enquire if the report is correct." That is all that has taken place.

## 7. Procedure for Privilege Motion<sup>1</sup>

In view of the announcement made by the Speaker of the House of the People and Chairman of the Council of States concurring in it, a joint meeting of the Committees of Privileges of the two Houses should be held as early as possible. This joint meeting will consider and lay down the procedure to be adopted when a motion is made affecting the privilege of the House.

2. If a motion has no reference to the other House or to any Member of the other House, then it will naturally be considered by the Committee of Privileges of the House concerned. The procedure to be laid down is when such a motion made in the House affects in any way the other House or any Members of the other House.

3. If such a motion is made, let us say in the House of the People, and it affects the Council of States in any way or a member of the Council of States, then the Speaker will first consider whether there is *prima facie* any justification for that motion. If he does not think that there is any justification for it, he will reject it right at the start. If, however, he thinks that *prima facie* there might be some justification, he will refer the matter to the Chairman of the Council of States for a preliminary enquiry about the facts, where such is necessary.

4. The same procedure will be adopted if the original motion is made in the Council of States and affects the House of the People or any member thereof.

5. When such a reference is made by the Speaker or the Chairman to the

1. Observations on the procedure for privilege motion, New Delhi, 14 May 1954. File No. 32(424)-53-PMS. Also available in the *Report of Joint Sitting, Minutes and Appendices*, August 1954. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi.

other, that other person, that is, either the Chairman or the Speaker, will make this preliminary enquiry from the member concerned about the facts. If, as a result of this enquiry, it appears to him that there is no breach of privilege, then he will record his opinion and convey it to the head of the other House. There the matter will end. Also if a member concerned expresses his regret and the head of the House conducting this preliminary enquiry is satisfied that this expression of regret is adequate for the purpose, there the matter will end.

6. If, however, the head of the House concerned, to whom this reference has been made, considers that a further enquiry is necessary, then he will refer this to his own Committee of Privileges.

7. Where there is any indication of conflict on this point between the two Houses, the matter might be referred to a joint meeting of the two Committees of Privileges.

## 8. To C.C. Biswas<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22nd May 1954

My dear Biswas,

A letter by a Member of the British Parliament, appearing in the *London Times* of May 17, will interest you.<sup>2</sup> This deals with the delimitation of parliamentary constituencies. I enclose two copies of this letter, as perhaps you might like to pass on one to P.K. Kaul.<sup>3</sup>

2. This letter raises some of the questions that have been raised here in our own Parliament in connection with the work of the Delimitation Commission. I know nothing about this business and I was not even present when the discussion took place in Parliament. But this letter in the *London Times* set me thinking, as it seemed to echo some points of principle which, I believe, have been raised in our own Parliament.

1. File No. 16(9)/56-PMS. A copy of the letter was sent to K.N. Katju.
2. Arthur Skeffington, Member, British House of Commons, discussed the consequences of the British Parliamentary Boundary Commission's activities and had written that frequent changes in constituencies might lead to their being regarded as mere administrative units of electors rather than individual divisions with their own traditions and history. Frequent changes, he commented, blurred the unity and history of constituencies and hence the manner and method of constituency delimitation should be reconsidered.
3. P.K. Kaul (1890-1970) was a member of the Delimitation Commission.



3. Let us be quite clear, to begin with, that there is no question of challenging the integrity and ability of the Delimitation Commission. I have no doubt that the proper way to delimit constituencies is through an impartial body and the Commission, as appointed, is a good one.

4. The question that arises and which has been mentioned in the enclosed letter to *The Times*, relates to our conception of a constituency. Is a constituency just an administrative unit of electors or is it something more? If the question is considered purely administratively and geographically, then some logical division would no doubt be made, which could be justified in a variety of ways. But if a constituency is something with an individuality of its own, with its own traditions and history, then the approach becomes somewhat different. Our democratic process is not merely a mechanical method of registering votes of individuals, but rather something different. A candidate or a Member of Parliament is supposed to develop intimate relations with his electors and his constituency. Indeed he becomes associated in many ways with his constituency. In the UK Parliament the Member is not referred to by name but by his constituency. Both the Member and his electors belong to constituency. The whole party system revolves round constituencies, and thus a democratic structure is built up on this basis. If the bond between the electors and a constituency or between the Member and his constituency does not exist, then some essential part of the Parliamentary system is affected and we only have a mechanical replica of it.

5. I am merely putting down some ideas which have been in my mind and which were confirmed by reading the letter in *The Times*. This has nothing to do with what the Delimitation Commission might or might not have done because I have no idea of what they have done. But there is a possibility that the Commission, proceeding quite logically and scientifically, might ignore this essential point which ties a constituency to a group of electors and to a candidate or a Member.

6. Of course, changes have to be made in constituencies from time to time and sometimes changes have to be fairly big ones. Also, we have hardly had time, since our Constitution, to build up historical traditions connected with a constituency. But the principle nevertheless holds and if we do not build up these conventions now, we shall have to face the same difficulty on every occasion.

I hope to see you and P.K. Kaul tomorrow, Sunday, at 4 p.m.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru





## MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATION





## I. GENERAL

### 1. No Barricades for Security Arrangements<sup>1</sup>

Ever since I have come back from my tour in Travancore-Cochin, I have been wanting to write to you about the security arrangements made there. Owing to stress of work, I have been unable to do so. As this question has a wider application, and I am frequently abroad, I want to draw your particular attention to it.

2. I was horrified to find that not only at the meetings but even at wayside halts, a double barricade with barbed wire was erected. The use of barbed wire was so extraordinarily foolish that I cannot conceive of any intelligent person having ordered it. And yet, I find that the Travancore-Cochin Government expressly ordered barbed wire. On several occasions, very serious accidents were barely avoided because of this barbed wire, and there was danger of many children being badly hurt. In fact, even I suffered a minor scratch. It was pure good luck that some serious catastrophe did not occur. Children were usually put in front and a huge crowd assembled behind pushing forward. The result was that children were pressed against the barbed wire.

3. This use of barbed wire exemplifies the type of mind which thinks about these security arrangements. I want that mind to be changed. Otherwise there are going to be difficulties in future because I shall go outside all these arrangements and ignore them.

4. It is not merely a question of barbed wire but of the very extensive and expensive arrangements made in the shape of double barricades even at wayside halts. As a matter of fact, there were many other wayside halts, which had not been previously announced, where naturally there were no such arrangements. That was as it should be. There should never be any barricades at wayside halts. At the most, there should be a string or rope stretched out on either side of the road just to help in keeping order. The arrangements normally made for my public meetings have generally been successful and might continue, except for the fact that the distance of the rostrum from the public or rather the first barricade should not be more than 30 feet. Sometimes I find an enormous expanse between the rostrum and the public, which makes the meeting perfectly

1. Note to the Minister of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 1 March 1954. JN Collection.

ridiculous. This expanse is maintained even though I might be on the third floor of a building.

5. Apart from the objectionable nature of these barricades at wayside places, they were very expensive. I suppose the expenses fell on the Congress. I was told that sometimes the barricades at each place cost about Rs. 500/-. Probably I must have seen at least hundreds of barricades. Thus, a very considerable sum was absolutely wasted and in fact did harm to the tour and irritated people.

6. Therefore, no such barricade should ever be put up except at the public meetings. They should not be more than 30 feet away from the rostrum. Small children should be allowed to come between the rostrum and the barricade.

7. I find that other arrangements made for me, more especially in regard to food, are far too elaborate. This is waste of money, waste of time and waste of energy. Sometimes special caterers are brought from some distant city into the wilderness. I do not like this at all, I do not want any special type of food. I should like to take the food of the place, whatever it may be, provided it is devoid of spices and chillies.

## 2. To Jagjivan Ram<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
11th March 1954

My dear Jagjivan Ram,<sup>2</sup>

I am in bed with some indisposition which is an unusual state for me.

I am writing to you about the Indian Airlines Corporation, as I am greatly worried about it. You have had many months of it and we do not seem to have got going.<sup>3</sup> The other day, Shankar Prasada<sup>4</sup> came to see me and told me that he was taking charge. I wished him well. But I have not been able to understand why one of our best officers, B.C. Mukharji,<sup>5</sup> could not succeed in getting work done there. Mukharji has done well wherever he has been put. It was because of his special qualities and our desire to find a really good man for the Indian Airlines, that we consented to his removal from his previous post. Indeed,

1. JN Collection.

2. Union Minister of Communications.

3. The Indian Airlines Corporation came into being on 1 August 1953.

4. Chief Commissioner of Delhi till now.

5. Bhabani Charan Mukharji (b.1901); joined ICS, 1925, served in Orissa and Bihar; Chairman, Indian Airlines Corporation, from August 1953 to March 1954; Chairman, Nangal Fertilizers and Chemicals from August 1955 to June 1957.



it gave rise to some criticism, and now we have to shift him again. No doubt, he has been ill, but that was hardly the reason.

I cannot quite make all this out, and am very anxious that the Indian Airlines should be conducted with great efficiency and security. There is a growing impression that there is neither efficiency nor security about them and that even the organisation has not been properly set up yet.

I do not know how the Indian Airlines are supposed to function. They are an autonomous corporation. Why should they not go ahead like any other autonomous corporation and make their arrangements? If they fail in anything, we know who is responsible and take steps accordingly. I hope that they are not treated as a department of Ministry.

There is a good deal of talk about these matters and some has reached me. Hence I am writing to you. I am told that attempts are being made to appoint certain particular individuals even though they are not considered competent or desirable by others. I hope you will look into this matter, because our whole reputation is at stake.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To A.C. Guha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
19th March 1954

My dear Guha,<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of March 17 about Central Government employees,<sup>3</sup> particularly of the Customs and the Port Trust and the Prohibition Act in Bombay.

1. File No. 35(41)/54-PMS.
2. Union Deputy Minister for Finance.
3. Guha had written about the steps to be taken against some Central Government employees of the Customs and Port Trust in Bombay, who were convicted for offences under the Prohibition Act. In view of difference of opinion between the Bombay Port Trust and the Bombay Government, a reference was made to the MHA whether the Central Government employees should be amenable to state government laws. The MHA opined that all public servants were expected to obey laws which were in force in the area where they were serving. It was also pointed out that contravention of laws should be taken notice of departmentally and even after conviction by a court the person concerned could be legally punished departmentally on the basis of conviction alone, without following the procedure laid down for departmental enquiries.

I have read the papers attached. The Home Minister's opinion seems to me quite clear on this issue. Anyhow, I have no doubt about it. I entirely disagree with the point of view of the Bombay Port Trust in this matter. I think it is completely wrong. Every Central Government employee must abide by the state government's laws and regulations. It would be an impossible position if the Central Government employee was supposed to be above the state laws in any matter.

In regard to Prohibition, more especially, it is not merely a question of law but a question of decency and suitable behaviour. If a Central Government employee cannot act in accordance with the broad policy of the state government, then he cannot function satisfactorily in that place. The state government can well ask us to send someone else in his place and to remove him from that State as he sets a bad example.

To suggest that even disciplinary action should not be taken against a Central Government employee because he has not offended against the Sea Customs Act, is so manifestly wrong that I am amazed that any responsible officer should put forward this plea. I think he should be told very clearly that he should change his whole outlook on this subject.

I do not see why you have any doubt about the Home Ministry's attitude. It seems to me quite clear and in line with what I have said above, though I may have expressed myself more strongly on this subject.

I entirely agree with you that this rule should apply to all Central Government employees, whether they are in the Railways or the P&T Department or any other. The actual punishment normally is the business of the head of the department. But that discretion has to be exercised in accordance with the rules and directions given in like cases.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Home Minister and also to the Minister for Railways and the Minister for Communications.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 4. To Amrit Kaur<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20th March 1954

My dear Amrit,

In your letter of March 1, you refer to the desirability of appointing a committee

1. JN Collection.



to examine the working of village panchayat systems in different states. I do not think that the Central Government should interfere in this way in what is essentially a state government matter. But it should be possible to get data from the State Governments about the working of village panchayats. Conditions differ in various states.

I am asking the Home Ministry to try to collect this data. Our Planning Commission would also be interested in it.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. Recruitment for Specialised Posts<sup>1</sup>

Thank you for sending me this note. I have glanced through the file, though it is not necessary for me to do so, and these matters had best be dealt with by you. My own approach to this question is somewhat different and I think it is always good to take competent men from outside the Services for specialised posts. That tones up the Services. The Foreign Service is becoming a very specialised Service and inevitably training counts. Yet I am all against making it too rigid and I want competent men to come into a Foreign Office post at any stage. Naturally this is not often done, but the door is left open. The real question is who can do that particular piece of work most effectively. Success in that work is more important than anything else. It is desirable to train up an enthusiastic officer for that post. But the real test is what a person has done and what experience he has of that particular activity. If a person is appointed for a year or two years and he does well, then it would obviously be unwise to push him out merely in order to provide the post for some Service man. The whole outlook should be success in work.

The other day in the Cabinet we decided that promotion should be by merit and not by seniority. Further that, as our confidential reports of officers are not very satisfactory, we should keep special record of some bright officers and also a special record of some particularly dull officers, who will not deserve promotion to any responsible post and who may indeed be discarded if they do not function properly. Both these lists will be relatively small lists and most

1. Note to the Minister of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 20 March 1954. JN Collection.

people may come in between, who may or may not justify themselves in future. I think Service men should realise that security in the Service depends on continued competence and efficiency and that they will not get promotion and indeed they may not continue in the Service if they fall from even normal standards.

In regard to the Punjab Cooperatives, I have come in touch with them in various ways during the last three or four years and have been much disappointed at the work done there.<sup>2</sup> I have in fact written to the Chief Minister about it on several occasions.

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 19, pp. 164-65 and Vol. 20, p. 197 and also see *ante*, p. 209.

## 6. Unsuitability of "Closed Service"<sup>1</sup>

When I said that the IFS should be considered a "closed service" it was in a particular sense, that is, that officers belonging to the other Central Services, who hold IFS posts, should be absorbed formally into the IFS. I did not mean that in any other sense it should be a "closed service". I think that this conception of closed service is not suitable for us under the present circumstances. Every service should not be made rigid, and, if necessity arises and if a particular person is found obviously suitable, it should be open to us to take him into the service. This may not be done often, but the door should be left open. I am here referring not only to persons functioning in other services but even persons outside all services.

2. I am not impressed by the argument that those in the service might be prejudiced by such additions or their promotion might be affected. The sole test must be merit for promotion. A person who is taken into the service at a later stage can only come in on the basis of outstanding merit. If that merit is present, then other considerations become secondary....

1. Note to the Secretary General and the Foreign Secretary, 22 March 1954. JN Collection. Extracts.



## 7. Challenges in Administration<sup>1</sup>

Mr Chairman,<sup>2</sup> Mr Director<sup>3</sup> and friends,

The first problem that one has to face on such an occasion as this is what language to speak in. Coming fresh from Parliament today, where there was some impatient talk on the language issue, this was fresh in my mind. But then I found an initial difficulty in speaking in Hindi. I do not know how I can say in Hindi "The Institute of Public Administration". I have no doubt that there is a very good word, but I do not know it.

Our Chairman, Shri V.T. Krishnamachari, has given us a lead in this matter as to how we should look upon this Institute. Many of you have already joined this Institute, or are on the point of joining it. A number of you have been intimately connected with the administration in its various aspects and are naturally interested in it; I am also interested of course, though my connection with administration has been relatively limited. Even though, as Shri Krishnamachari said, I may be the head of the administration, the head is so far removed from other parts of the body, that I can hardly see the tail!

When the administration becomes more and more elaborate then arises the problem of the administrator. Inevitably as the state becomes more complicated, the apparatus of the state becomes more complex, and the more complex it becomes the more difficult it is properly to know its various departments. For my part, as I say, apart from these few years when I have been connected as Prime Minister with administration, my contacts were of a different kind.

Now I am not quite sure if it is advantageous or not to come into contact with the administration at the top without any personal knowledge of the other rungs of the ladder. I suppose it has some advantages also, although it has its own obvious disadvantages. The advantage is that perhaps one might escape that feeling of functioning in a particular routine which inevitably must come if one functions for a large number of years. The result is any person like me is constantly coming up against these two urges which come into conflict with each other—the urge of the disciplined administrator, and the urge of a person who is administered and who wants things done for himself or for the group or for the country.

1. Speech at the inauguration of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 29 March 1954. From the Press Information Bureau.
2. V.T. Krishnamachari, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission was the Chairman of the Indian Institute of Public Administration.
3. D.G. Karve was the Director and ex-officio member secretary of the IIPA.

One virtue I possess in common with others, and that is, having come into contact for a large number of years with most of the human beings in this country, both individually and in groups and in multitudes, one develops a certain sense—the sixth sense or call it what you will—in regard to what they might be feeling and what they might be wanting. In other words, it is the feeling, if I may say so, with diffidence of a physician having his hands on the pulse of the multitude. The pulse acts faster or slow, but it tells you little about the emotional reaction of that individual. Anyhow that is helpful to me, and it is also a hindrance trying to make oneself receptive to that feeling among others. It is helpful if one feels emotionally aware of it, though one might not be fully able to describe it. At the same time one might be led away into a slightly wrong direction by this emotional reaction. On the other hand, if you have not got that emotional reaction, that does not mean that you have not got it at all.

It does not matter how terribly competent you are in the routine, because administration like most things is, in the final analysis, a human problem—to deal with human beings, not with some statistical data. Statistical data help in understanding. But there is no danger that the administrator at the top—not so much at the bottom, because he comes into contact with human beings—may come to regard human beings as mere abstractions. There is that danger at times to both, types of societies, whether it is what might be called capitalist society or communist society. The communist talks a tremendous deal about the masses, the toiling masses. The toiling masses become some abstraction apart from the human beings in them. He may decide something on pure theory, which may lead to tremendous sufferings to those toiling masses.

The administrator may think in the abstract of the people he deals with, come to conclusions which are justifiable apparently, but which miss the human element. After all, whatever department of life you deal with, or whatever department of Government you deal with, it is ultimately a problem of human beings and the moment we forget that, we are driven away from reality. That is why in order not to drift away too far I take the opportunity of going out of Delhi from time to time to satisfy a craving to see people other than those I see in offices, at least to talk to some of them and thereby maintain some contact with them; in short, to develop an emotional awareness of this collection of human beings, 360 million human beings in India. I am, however, surprised at this multitude, their enormous variety, their difference and their unity and all that.

The Institute of Public Administration has to function in the context of a society or country which is dealing with a multitude of problems and ever changing problems. The whole conception is that we are living, as we have always been living, in changing times. It may be that they change more rapidly now than they had in the past. Therefore, it is always necessary to keep up with these changing conditions of human beings, whether in the world or in



this country. That is quite essential. There are many things that the government does. Now when we do a thing, it looks odd why we did not do it long ago, e.g., in the manner laid down in this prospectus of the Institute. I read the prospectus and it crept into my mind how far in doing all these things, with a measure of thoroughness we might not miss the human element. Of course, you cannot provide for that in the prospectus. But there is a danger that our experts, our professors, our economists and others, who are exceedingly good at the particular subject in which they are experts, sometimes become rather inexpert in understanding even a single human being, much less a crowd. It is just like a botanist good at his science but having no pleasure in flowers. So, how to bring about this human touch in understanding the problems of administration? You know I have been connected with the External Affairs Ministry, and we choose with some care, after examination, a number of young people for Foreign Services, train them for a year and a half, and send them to foreign countries. They are a good bunch as a whole, but it has been striking me for some time, how little they know of their own country—these people who go far away. Of course they know their family or their town or their village. The European history or some period of European history, may be good for specialised study but there is precious little of the history of Asia. Progressively we shall have to deal with the countries of Europe or America. But the balance has shifted now.

Again I am giving you an example from my personal knowledge. We started the Foreign Service six years ago, and through sheer habit we attached greater importance to the well-known countries of Europe and America. Of course they were important, some of them very important, like the United States, England and Russia—they are the important powers today by any standard. Nevertheless, from the point of view of our foreign missions these countries of Europe cannot be more important than some countries of Asia. Gradually we came to the conclusion that we have to judge things not from some distant outlook, looking at the world as it is, but from our geographical position as well as our own particular interest. A neighbour of ours which is, not, let us say, one of the greater powers, may be more important to us than one of the great powers. The relative importance of our missions gradually began to change in our minds, and Asian countries became more and more important from that point of view because we have to deal with them and their problems are our problems. Actually great countries of the world like America, Russia and England are all important. But our neighbours are more important to us than outside countries. So you see a certain shift.

Now so far as I know our educational courses have not kept pace with the shift of opinion, and we still study more and more the history of distant countries than of our own neighbours. I think that we should understand and study much more the countries of Asia now. We must, of course, study Europe, obviously,

because Europe has played, is still playing, and will play an important part undoubtedly. But again the balance will shift somewhat. I gave you one particular example of this.

Shri Krishnamachari told you very rightly how in two respects more especially we have changed completely. At first, orders were issued from Whitehall for governing India in all important matters. That has all changed. We have got a fairly well established democratic system. Obviously that does not fit in with the outlook of the system of administration some years back.

Then there is the second question. We are aiming at the welfare state and rapid development. That does not fit in with the type of rather static mentality which the governing class or governing apparatus had, many years ago. We have to change, and we have to change our methods of thinking.

Behind all this lies something of which I feel that although we talk about it a lot, we are not, most of us, really emotionally aware. That is the fact that we are living not only in the atomic age, but under the shadow of the hydrogen bomb. Now that is a terrific fact of which even the newspapers are not emotionally aware. You see what has been happening in the last fortnight. There was this hydrogen bomb which exploded at Bikini<sup>4</sup> I do not know what Bikini is like but I am sure it is somewhere in the Pacific, a little island. Gradually in dribblets we are getting some information about it. The information is to the effect that this explosion of the bomb took by surprise even those who watched and exploded it. No one knows how many people suffered, because apart from the suffering caused by the impact, it is a kind of creeping thing which may affect a week, a fortnight or a month later, which may make you blind ultimately, which may upset all kinds of internal organs, which may affect the waters of the ocean and life in it. In other words, we do not know many details; these are just coming to us.

Some Japanese fishermen and others have suffered. They are afraid to eat fish. The Japanese have now a great problem. They have to give up eating fish because of the radioactive substance which might injure them. Now what does this mean?

It is a visible indication that man is using powers today, which are going out of his control completely. That has been said in a rhetorical way but now it is a fact that human beings are unleashing forces which are completely beyond their control after they are unleashed. I am reminded of a story which many of you might have known. It is the story of a jinn coming out of the bottle, and then getting out of control.

I mention all this because it has an intimate relationship to all our problems which are overwhelming. We may talk about war and peace; we may talk about

4. See *post*, pp. 445-449.



this bloc or that bloc; we may talk about being neutral or outside the scope of war but the overwhelming fact is common to everybody, which everybody should realise, whether he belongs to this bloc or that bloc or to no bloc at all. Now, you may have heard about this hydrogen bomb that there are certain reactions in a number of countries, notably in Japan which has suffered from it. But even in other countries, in England, in Australia, and a number of other countries, there is a strong reaction suggesting that there should be no more experiment with this hydrogen bomb, no more unleashing of these forces which we do not know how to control. The ash that might come up from them might go thousands of miles, and create reactions and problems to human beings there.

I believe the next experiment is going to be a bigger show. Even the makers of it do not know the effects of it. Again, there are the statistics; the hydrogen bomb is a hundred times stronger than the previous atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The present hydrogen bomb is thousand times stronger. There is bound to be some outcry from some wise and thinking people to stop it. They say vehemently; "stop this experiment". Up till now, we were afraid of a great war which would inevitably involve the use of atomic or hydrogen bombs but now even before the war, forces are being unleashed by way of experiments, which may do havoc and which may not be controlled at all. I must say that I entirely sympathise, perhaps many of you also will too, in this demand or request which has been made in England and in several other countries, that this type of experimenting should stop. I hope that people and those in authority will give attention to it. That is going to be a terrible weapon in their hands; whether it is going to be used in future I do not know. But this experimenting with it is becoming a very dangerous use of it.

I drifted from the subject of your Institute of Public Administration to the atomic and hydrogen bomb. I wanted you to appreciate that there is an intimate relationship between the two. The link is the human being whose betterment, whose welfare the administration seeks to achieve. Again many of you here are what are called Service men, that is those who have joined a particular Service here in this country, have spent a greater part of your career in it and gained experience and all that. It is right that Service people should have various things attached to services like security, this, that and other. That is right. Nevertheless, in the old days the administration from top to bottom was a Service administration. Therefore, the outlook of the administration was a Service outlook. The most complicated rules were made for the protection of Services. But somehow it seems to me that it was forgotten that the services were meant to achieve something and not merely to exist as Services. That is to say, while the Services will have to be protected, the test is human welfare. The test is to be, in other words, the welfare of the masses of the people who think that we are their ministers.

I think it is necessary to emphasise this because I do not think that the old

idea has completely ceased to exist. It has changed of course and I should like to pay a tribute to our Services, because they have acted remarkably under new conditions. I am not complaining of them, but rather complaining of a mental approach to these problems which we have inherited and which we cannot easily get rid of.

I speak, as you notice, not as a person very expert in administration, but a person naturally interested in it very much, and seeing some aspects of administration which in the limited sense of the word are not administration at all, and yet which are very important, I think, because administration is meant to achieve something, and not to exist in some kind of an ivory tower following certain rules of procedure and Narcissus-like, looking at itself with complete satisfaction. The test after all is the human beings, just as if I had to address a municipality, I would venture to remind them that the test is not the few palaces of the rich but the slums of the poor. So I hope that this Institute of Public Administration will no doubt look into many important problems which confront us and which have to be dealt with not in a casual lackadaisical manner but scientifically, expertly, with knowledge and all that. But it is always to be remembered that it is the human society and the human beings that should gain the results that you achieve for the betterment of human beings.

I have to say that I inaugurate this Institute. I say so and I wish it success.

## 8. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
15th April 1954

My dear Kailas Nath,

Aruna Asaf Ali<sup>2</sup> came to see me today and entreated me most earnestly that we should permit Dange<sup>3</sup> to go to Peking for the May Day celebrations. Her argument was that the Peking people had invited a number of trade union leaders of various trade union organisations in India, including the INTUC, the Socialist trade unions as well as the AITUC (which is Communist dominated). Dange

1. JN Collection.
2. A freedom fighter, social and political worker. At this time, she was working actively with various trade union groups and progressive movements without being affiliated to any political party.
3. S.A. Dange, prominent CPI leader; founder member of the CPI and AITUC.



was invited in his capacity as President of the AITUC and it was not fair to pick him out when we were allowing the other trade unionists to go.

Also, she added that so many important communists had been allowed to go, Gopalan<sup>4</sup> and others, and so there was no particular point in not allowing Dange to go. Dange anyhow had gone and could go to Europe, so why not allow him to go to Peking.

She assured me that the communists who had been going abroad did not discuss politics at all or, rather, they were not encouraged to do so because the Soviet policy was to pull them up when they discussed Indian politics. In fact, the Indian communists who had gone there had been told not to misbehave in India and had been pulled up by the Soviets which had completely changed their policy in regard to India and the Indian Government. They had privately confessed that they had been mistaken in their judgement of India and they were now much more favourable to the broad policies of the Indian Government. Therefore, these people who went abroad came back with a more vivid realisation of realities than they possessed in India. In any event, she assured me that Dange or others would not indulge in any activity which we might consider objectionable.

What she objected to was our allowing a considerable number of trade unionists of various persuasions to go there and picking Dange out alone.

I told her that in this matter we normally accepted the advice of the state government and did not overrule it.

I am passing this on to you because there is something in what Aruna said to me. We allow so many people to go that it makes little difference if another odd person goes or not. Dange can, if he so chooses, go abroad even now *via* Europe. In the new international situation that has arisen, there is little doubt that Dange and his like will not indulge in any anti-Indian activities.

I have personally no objection to his being allowed to go, but you can decide as you choose fit.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. A.K. Gopalan, CPI leader and Member of the House of the People.

## 9. Recruitment and Training for Indian Foreign Service<sup>1</sup>

The question of recruitment and training of persons for the IFS has been before us for some time and there has been much noting on this. As a matter of fact, this question is a broader one and relates to all persons recruited for the senior Services, though it may be necessary to give a special bend to persons meant for the Foreign Service.

2. Recruitment is through the UPSC on the basis of an open competitive examination. For the present, we might accept this, although some suggestions have been made in regard to this.

3. The questions that arise are:

- (1) the syllabus for the examinations; and
- (2) the subsequent training that should be given.

4. The present syllabus, including both compulsory and optional subjects, does appear rather out of date and not fully in keeping with present day conditions. We tend to carry on the old traditions under British rule even in regard to our education. Thus, far more stress is laid on European and especially British History than on Asian History in its wider sense. It is clear that we must train our people to look at things with a different perspective which is more in keeping with present day conditions. Shri K.M. Panikkar<sup>2</sup> took part in the selection of IFS candidates in 1950. He was struck how little the candidates knew about India and even less about Asia. They had a fair knowledge of European History. In fact, their whole outlook was coloured by the British point of view. There was an absence of an all-India mind, which should be so necessary in members of all India Services.

5. This is the fault of our education and partly of the syllabus laid down for our all-India examinations, which encourages the wrong subjects and almost ignores other subjects, which are much more important.

6. I think, therefore, that we should take early steps to revise this syllabus generally for all our senior examinations and, to some extent, particularly for IFS. A small but competent committee should consider this. The committee might consist of representatives of External Affairs Ministry and Home Ministry plus two or three others. Probably Shri K.M. Panikkar would be a useful addition to that committee.

1. Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary, Minister of Home Affairs and Cabinet Secretary, 20 April 1954. JN Collection.
2. He was a member of the States Reorganization Commission at this time.



12. Ajmer News

14/4/54

Ram Chandra  
Rajwade

5 reasons -

1. Wooden ghader - individuals - vacillates  
teaching support from more reliable sources  
underwrite agencies.
2. We found fault to him but we have found.  
Complete failure of work. Organisation  
& elections.
3. Last year found numerous methods to  
make Ajmer a viable one. Very leadership.  
But this year greater dependence on caste  
as a result of, very moves.  
Coop. Societies - Education etc.  
Basic schools - 3 schools 2 teachers.  
Nepotism in appointments.
4. All answers to carry on construction program.  
But there is no plan - no policy.  
Partly relations into confusion - No  
meetings to discuss general policies - plans etc.
5. Leader not able to follow even ordinary procedure.  
No capacity - no faculties.

we kept quiet for a year half.

We are anxious to have a man who can harness our  
energy.

We are spending far more per capita than anywhere else  
in India =

Spirit of leaders - missing - Reactions helped.

1 Community Project = 1 Education block.  
C.P. Village level workers - do not know place where they are  
supposed to work. C.C.C. is a reservation village!  
Education block not so typical



AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, NEW DELHI, 29 MARCH 1954



7. The next point to be dealt with is that of training of those selected for the Foreign Service. Some five years ago or more, Cabinet accepted a scheme of training for the Foreign Service. In this scheme the principal stress was on foreign training. We have found that the result of this is that a person, who passes the examination and joins the Foreign Service, gets very little chance in later life to learn much about India. He serves abroad mostly with some spells at headquarters. Therefore, it has been suggested that we should revise this scheme of training and lay greater stress on training in India rather than abroad. It is not proposed that foreign training should be stopped. It is recognised that it is important, but the whole emphasis should shift. This matter might also be considered by a committee, possibly the same committee as will consider the syllabus.

8. It is suggested, and I entirely agree with this suggestion, that new entrants to the Foreign Service should spend at least six months at some district headquarters in India to gain experience of the administrative machine and, even more so, of the people and their problems. It would be preferable if they are sent to a place where there is a Community Project or a National Extension Scheme functioning. I think this particular matter might be taken in hand immediately. We have four such new entrants and we could send them to district headquarters for six months at least separately. This will require a reference to the states concerned, apart from a Cabinet decision, as this will involve a variation of a previous Cabinet decision.

9. The question of language for the examinations for the All India Services was recently considered by the Congress Working Committee and a resolution was passed on this subject<sup>3</sup> as well as on the larger question of language and medium of instruction in schools and colleges.<sup>4</sup> These resolutions have been generally welcomed and we might accept the one relating to the examinations for All-India Services for our own guidance. I am attaching a copy of this.

10. I suggest that External Affairs Ministry, in consultation with Home Ministry, might draw up a summary for the Cabinet on the lines suggested

3. The resolution on examination for all India services, passed on 5 April 1954 in Delhi, recommended progressive steps to make Hindi the language of the examinations for All India Services. In the first stage option was to be given to examinees to use Hindi, English or any principal regional languages and in the next stage, in addition, a compulsory Hindi paper for candidates whose language was other than Hindi and a compulsory paper in some other Indian language for candidates whose language was Hindi. English was recommended as a compulsory subject for all.

4. Another resolution passed on 5 April recommended Hindi as a compulsory subject at various stages in schools and colleges and the mother tongue as the medium of instruction at primary stage and the regional language, at secondary and college stages.

above, with greater details wherever necessary. This summary should guide us as an appendix the Congress Working Committee Resolution on examinations for All India Services.

## 10. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22nd April 1954

My dear Deshmukh,

Your letter of April 21st about the affairs of the Bharat Insurance Co.<sup>2</sup>

I confess that I view these whole transactions with considerable prejudice against the Dalmias because of their dubious activities in many fields and I would hesitate to accept their word unless there is adequate evidence to support it. However, as you have stated, there are two alternative courses for us to adopt<sup>3</sup> and you yourself feel that, taking all factors into consideration, including the interest of the policy-holders, it would be the better course not to appoint an administrator but to get Dalmias to give certain undertakings, as detailed in paragraph 13 of your letter. I think that the course you have suggested is the better course, provided Dalmias are prepared to give all those undertakings.<sup>4</sup>

1. JN Collection.
2. C.D. Deshmukh had written that the main charges against Bharat Insurance Company were: (i) that the company transmitted large funds periodically to S.P. Jain and Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Company for the ostensible purpose of investment but really to make illegal use of the money; (ii) that government approved securities purported to be held under Section 27 of the Insurance Act were actually never purchased; (iii) that heavy investments were made in other Dalmia concerns at share prices which bore no relation to their market value; and (iv) that property was purchased from other Dalmia concerns at inflated prices.
3. Deshmukh had written that the two courses were either to appoint an administrator under Section 52A of the Insurance Act, or to accept Dalmia's offer to manage the company with ample safeguards to secure policyholders' interests. Deshmukh favoured the second course.
4. Deshmukh had suggested that the appointment of an administrator should not be pressed if Dalmia was willing to give the following undertakings: (i) a legal agreement, binding on the Dalmia Company concerned, should be executed to the effect that these properties should be repurchased by the Government at prices paid for them by 'Bharat'; (ii) a nominee of the Government would be appointed Director of the Company; (iii) the Company would appoint in due course an auditor approved by the Government; (iv) the Company would submit periodical returns about its business as prescribed by the Controller.



Normally it would not be necessary to put this up before the Cabinet and I do not think we need trouble to make it a formal matter for Cabinet to consider. Nevertheless, as you say, in view of the interest which this case has aroused, it would be desirable for you to make a brief statement in the Cabinet about it and about the course you intend to take.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 11. Passports for Christian Missionaries<sup>1</sup>

Although this matter has come up before me previously, I do not know all the facts. I do not understand why a passport for going abroad should be refused. When we issue passports to well-known aggressive communists, there is no reason why we should refuse it to Christian missionaries even though we do not like their activities much. You will remember the point raised by Dr Lanka Sundaram today about passports.<sup>2</sup>

2. I have always felt that our saying, as the Home Ministry has sometimes said, that a person should not be given a passport because he is likely to speak ill of our country abroad, is not a good enough reason.

3. Anyhow, in this matter the Home Ministry apparently has agreed to issue the passport. I think that someone from External Affairs should write to the Chief Secretary of Madhya Pradesh Government and inform him that External Affairs and Home Ministry have no objection to the issue of a passport to Dr E.C. Bhatt.

1. Note to the Secretary General, 15 May 1954, JN Collection.

2. Lanka Sundaram stated in the House of the People that there was no legal power with the Government to withhold passports or prevent anyone from leaving India. He also said that certain American Missionaries were operating within the innerline in UP which was determined in 1873 as about 75 to 40 miles from the border and in Assam sometimes 100 miles from the frontier. Lanka Sundaram urged that this line should be altered in the interests of "more adequate security."

## 12. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
23rd May 1954

My dear Kailas Nath,

Thank you for your two letters of May 18 and 20 enclosing some correspondence with Professor Mahalanobis<sup>2</sup> in regard to two employees of the Indian Statistical Institute. I have also received some other papers in this connection from the Finance Ministry which contain some notes including a note by you.<sup>3</sup>

2. As I read your letters, I remembered somewhat similar cases, which had arisen in England and even in the United States some years ago. In England a rule was made that communists should not be employed in work of a secret or confidential nature. This was four or five years ago. An argument arose in universities and in certain government offices about the retention in service of some persons who were supposed to be communists. In spite of the strong prejudice against communists and at a time when relations between the Soviet and the UK were strained, objection was taken against the removal of these young men from some posts which were not considered of a confidential nature. Since then, of course conditions have greatly changed in the United States and an average person who is not a communist but who happens to have rather radical opinions, is a suspect. The recent case of Dr Oppenheimer<sup>4</sup> has brought matters rather to a head.<sup>5</sup> In France, the Head of the Atomic Energy Commission till the last year, I think, was Joliot-Curie, a notorious communist. He was removed from that position last year.<sup>6</sup> In England, a few of the most eminent

1. JN Collection. A copy of the letter was sent to C.D. Deshmukh.
2. P.C. Mahalanobis was the Director of the Indian Statistical Institute and Hony. Statistical Adviser to the Union Cabinet at this time.
3. Since 1943 Mahalanobis had appointed a number of persons in the ISI who were members of the CPI and by the 1950s there were at least 50 members of the CPI among the staff of the ISI. The MHA had objected about keeping two of these employees in the ISI.
4. J. Robert Oppenheimer (1904-67); physicist; Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 1943-45; Chairman, General Advisory Committee to U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1946-52; Director and Professor of Physics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 1947-66.
5. As a known left-wing sympathiser Oppenheimer was regarded by the Los Alamos Security forces as a security risk. As he was opposed to the US hydrogen bomb project, he was suspended from secret nuclear research in 1953.
6. Jean Frederic Joliot-Curie, a member of the French Communist Party was appointed the High Commissioner for Atomic Energy Commission of France in 1946 and dismissed from the Commission in April 1950.



scientists, like J.B.S. Haldane,<sup>7</sup> are well known communists or fellow travellers. But the British Government considers it worthwhile not only to allow them to continue in their posts, but actually to seek their help in scientific matters.

3. India is not England or France or America and there is no particular reason why we should follow the example of other countries. But we can learn something from them. We have certainly to be careful about allowing any person to continue in a post from where he can do mischief in such cases. We should take no risks, but to lose the services of competent scientists and the like in other ways need not be necessary and, in fact, might prove injurious to us. We have not got many trained and competent men.

4. A large number of young men and women are or pretend to be communists, and yet, many of them settle down to very staid and sober activities as they grow older and forget about their communism. Sometimes, even confirmed communists change their views and even become aggressive anti-communists. To make it difficult for them to change might well be to encourage them to remain communists. To lose a really competent and skilled person in this way would be a peculiar loss.

5. Therefore, in deciding this matter, one has to consider the confidential nature of the work and at the same time the kind of man a person is. A police report gives us some factual data which helps, but it does not tell us what the man is like. I have received police reports about men I have known intimately. I felt I was in a far better position to decide about them than the person who wrote the report, even though the report might contain correct facts.

6. A professor in a college or a university or a teacher in a school should not normally proceed against in regard to the young men in his charge, except in special cases, on the basis of police reports. He has to judge from his own personal knowledge of the individual and try to improve him. This applies to any research institute where young men work. It is the man in charge who is in the best position to judge from personal contact. He may be mistaken and he should take into consideration the information that a police report might give him. But that is only partial data to judge a person. *Prima facie*, the Indian Statistical Institute does not contain any secret information. It works completely in the open and often does field work. The question of using secret information there does not arise. The other question might arise of giving a certain status to

7. John Burdon Sanderson Haldane (1892-1964); geneticist; Professor of Genetics, 1933-37 and of Biometry, 1937-57, London University; migrated to India in protest against Anglo-French invasion of Suez in 1957; served in Indian Statistical Institute, 1957-61; Director, laboratory of genetics and biometry, Bhubaneswar, 1961-64. Author of *The Causes of Evolution* (1933); *The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences* (1938); *Everything has a History* (1951). With the outbreak of Spanish Civil War, he joined Communist Party in 1938 and in the 1950s left the Party as a result of Soviet recognition of T. Lysenko, a Russian agriculturist, who refused to accept the existence of gene.

a person. The persons engaged there usually possess special ability. They are the kind of men or women who count in a country and it would be a great pity if no opportunity was given to them to do their specialised work and engage their minds thereby and thus to force them to become completely frustrated and perhaps subversive. There may be a slight risk, but the risk is there any way. Ultimately the man who knows them best has to judge, always taking care that no opportunity for any mischievous activity is given. We can hardly dub a young man for ever as dangerous and not give him an opportunity to divert his mind and activities into better channels. The policeman is naturally not interested in all these considerations. A teacher or a head of an institution of young men is very much interested. The two young men concerned, as far as I can make out, are very young and in the early or middle twenties. Apparently, not only Mahalanobis but also Deshmukh as well as a number of senior colleagues of Mahalanobis in his Institute were of opinion that these young men should continue in their work provided proper precautions were taken that they had no access to any confidential papers or information. I do not think we can expect anything more from them.

7. You yourself refer in your letter that if Professor Mahalanobis had said that these people were harmless or their retention in service would not in any way be detrimental to security, you would understand. That is exactly what he says and says so after consulting his senior colleagues. You object, however, to his adding that he does not think it proper to discharge the young men on the basis of a secret report. I think you have put some meaning to this sentence which Mahalanobis probably did not intend. I would not take any action against a man whom I knew personally merely on the basis of a report I received. That report would put me on enquiry and make me vigilant, but I would finally judge from a number of other factors which were in my knowledge.

8. This is not a question of the declared intentions of the Communist Party but of an individual who may have belonged to the Communist Party or may still belong to it. That individual may change his opinion, given the opportunity, and, in any event, it is desirable for that individual to be engaged in hard intellectual work which normally would keep him away from other activities.

9. There is another aspect to this question. In such an Institute, which employs hundreds of young men, as in a college or university, any action that we might take might well have the opposite effect to that intended. It might agitate people's minds and even make many of the young men more inclined towards communism as a reaction to what had been done. Where the risk is obvious, then action has to be taken, whatever the consequences. But in other cases, all the other factors have to be balanced.

10. The Indian Statistical Institute is one of our finest organisations with a world reputation for good work and Professor Mahalanobis is probably among half a dozen leading statisticians of the world. He has built up this Institute and



knows each individual in it personally. His opinion, therefore, is of considerable value in such matters. The police report has done good, in that it has warned him and made him careful for the future.

11. You refer to his wife being till recently a member of the women's section of the Communist Party.<sup>8</sup> I do not quite know which section you refer to. But there is a women's organisation rather closely connected with the Communist Party. To my knowledge, in the past, a number of women in the Congress belonged to it at one time. They no longer belong to it. Many people, consciously or unconsciously join these organisations for fellow travellers because they attract people with energy and enthusiasm.

12. Professor Mahalanobis is at present away in Europe. He is likely to return by the end of June. If necessary, we can talk to him more about this matter on his return.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. Nirmalkumari (Rani) Mahalanobis was a member of the communist mass organisation for women—Paschim Banga Mahila Atma Raksha Samity (West Bengal Women's Self-Defence Association), which came into being in 1943 and was engaged in famine-relief work in Bengal.

### 13. To Chief Ministers<sup>1</sup>

Camp: The Retreat  
Mashobra, Simla  
24th May 1954

My dear Chief Minister,

The other day a question was asked in the Madras Assembly about the expenses of a brief visit I paid to Madras State in October last.<sup>2</sup> The answer was that this cost the State something in the neighbourhood of Rs. 90,000. As far as I remember, I spent about three days in Madras State.

I was shocked and upset to learn that my visits on tour cost so much. I cannot understand why this should be so. It was said that this was for security reasons. Security may be very necessary and I have no complaint about it. But

1. A special letter in addition to the fortnightly letters, printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed) *Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-64*, Vol. 3, pp. 550-51. Also available in A.D. File No. T.R.S.-1154, Maharashtra Archives, Bombay.
2. Nehru toured the Madras State from 2 to 4 October 1953.

if, in the name of security, we spend such vast sums, then there is obviously something very wrong somewhere. I shall hesitate to go anywhere if I am so costly.

Whenever I have protested in a state against the elaborate arrangements made for me, I have been told that they are merely carrying out the directions of the Home Ministry in Delhi. When I ask the Home Ministry, they admit that they have issued full instructions, but they add that there is no reason why a certain common sense should not be applied and, in any event, why such large sums should be spent.

This is an important public matter and it has drawn considerable public attention as well as criticism. For me, it is painful.

Apart from security, I have found that the other arrangements made for me are much too elaborate and costly. Instead of adding to my convenience or comfort, they disturb and distress me. I have often pointed this out in the states I have visited.

I am writing to our Home Ministry on this subject,<sup>3</sup> because it has become essential that this should be carefully looked into and it should be made quite impossible for these heavy sums to be spent. Indeed, I just cannot understand how all this money can be spent on security or other arrangements.

I shall be grateful if you will look into this matter. My future tours etc. will depend greatly on how far I am satisfied about arrangements made for me and the cost of them.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. See *post*, p. 273.

#### 14. To Nawab of Bhopal<sup>1</sup>

Camp: The Retreat  
Mashobra, Simla  
25th May 1954

My dear Nawab Saheb,<sup>2</sup>

I received your letter of the 24th April just about a month ago. I did not

1. JN Collection. Copies of the letter were sent to K.N. Katju and the Chief Minister of Bhopal.
2. Muhammad Hamidullah Khan.



acknowledge it immediately, partly because I have been overburdened with work during this last month and partly because I wanted to go into all the facts of this particular matter before I replied to you.

2. I must say that I read your letter with regret. Apart from the argument that it contained, the whole tone of it struck me as unfortunate. All that we had asked you was to supply information about your foreign assets. This request had been made to all the Princes and the information had been received from them. Only you had not sent this information. As I wrote to you in my previous<sup>3</sup> letter, I could not understand how the terms of any agreement could be construed to mean that it was your right and privilege not even to supply ordinary information to the Government,<sup>4</sup> which every citizen is supposed to give. No one else had challenged this right.

3. On reading your letter, it seemed to me that you were all the time thinking of special privileges and hardly paying any attention to the obligations that go with every privilege. For my part, I do not believe in any privilege for any person at any time. But I recognise that certain agreements had been entered into and that they should be honoured. We shall endeavour to honour them. That does not mean that we should ignore the obligations that necessarily apply to every citizen of India as well as to every person having a special privilege.

4. Apart from this particular question, it seems to me that you have not appreciated the revolutionary changes that have taken place in India, as well as in a great part of the world and, indeed, the fact that the world today continues to be in a state of ferment and change. No man can say what the face of the world will be like even ten years from today. Even as I write to you, discussions of vital importance, involving peace and war on a prodigious scale are taking place in Geneva. The fact that the great changes in India took place largely by consent of the major parties concerned does not minimise the importance of this historic change. It was the good sense and, if I may say so, the wisdom of the people concerned that brought about these changes largely by consent. The old static order of British rule in India and the Princes protected by that British rule ended finally, and a new order came into existence, with an essential dynamic of its own.

5. As I wrote to you in my last letter, I was not much interested in a lawyer's argument, though law has its place in society. Nevertheless, because you raised that argument, I have taken the trouble to go through all the relevant papers in this connection. Having done so, I have again come to the conclusion

3. On 14 April 1954 (not printed).

4. The Standstill Agreement of August 1947 signed by Bhopal at the time of accession, laid down that all agreements and administrative arrangement as to matters of common concern specified in the schedule, then existing between the Crown and the States, should continue 'until new arrangements in this behalf were made.'

that the request of our States Ministry for information regarding foreign holdings was completely justified and has nothing to do with any privilege or any guarantee. In a statement which you gave in connection with the agreement of the 30th April 1949,<sup>5</sup> you said:

"In regard to foreign holdings it is very difficult for me to give any definite figure as I myself do not know what the exact position is at the moment. I have to go abroad to settle many matters connected with these holdings and then alone I would be in a position to give you any idea. I have explained this position to you and, I believe, you appreciated it."

6. The position thus was that at that time you could not give exact information. This meant that later you would supply this information. But you have at no time made a full disclosure. I can understand that the very multitude of one's belongings makes it difficult to know what exactly one possesses. The French have a saying: "*embarras de richesse*"<sup>6</sup>. Nevertheless, surely it is always possible to give fairly correct information. Indeed this has to be done by every income-tax payer every year and he cannot plead ignorance of what he owns.

7. This was over five years ago and one would have imagined that this period was quite adequate to gain the information necessary.

8. Subsequently, you wrote to the States Ministry that since prior to 15th August 1947, no order by the Government of India requiring a statement of foreign holdings or their surrender would have had any application to you, this position should continue. You added, however, that you would be prepared on a voluntary basis to cooperate with the Government and given the required information provided that your foreign assets then standing to your credit as well as the incomes thereon should be immune from any demand on the part of the Government of India for surrender; but that new assets that may be created after the 1st January 1950 might be treated as liable to surrender in an emergency. To this a reply was sent that there was no intention of requiring you to surrender the existing assets or any reinvestments of those assets, but that future earnings on the existing assets should be credited to the Indian Foreign Exchange Pool in return for an equivalent payment in rupees. It appears that you did not agree to this formula, though later you appear to have made an oral statement that you would agree.

9. Since then, many reminders have been sent to you, but no information has been forthcoming.

<sup>5</sup>. The Agreement stipulated taking over of the administration of Bhopal by the Union Government through a Chief Commissioner.

<sup>6</sup>. Embarrassment of riches.



10. On the 20th October 1952 you wrote as follows:

"No such declarations were necessary in my case before independence or even later. It was an immunity and privilege recognised by the Government of India before and upto the 14th August 1947 and is covered by Article II of my agreement."

11. In paragraph 6 of your letter under reply, you have said that "as soon as one or two questions that are still pending, have been satisfactorily resolved and adjusted, and I do not see the least difficulty in reaching an agreement on them, I shall lose no time in preparing a statement showing my foreign assets and placing it before you." I do not know to what questions you refer, unless they are those relating to the liability to surrender these foreign assets to the Indian Foreign Exchange Pool.

12. We have already informed you that we have no present intention of asking you to surrender the corpus of the foreign holdings at the time of the merger of the State in 1949. As regards the income accruing from the corpus and any new acquisitions of foreign assets, the position we have taken up with all the other Princes in India is that these assets are liable to be taken into the Indian Foreign Exchange Pool in payment of an equivalent amount in rupees. You will not surely expect special and different treatment in this matter. Whether we ask you or the other Princes actually to transfer this income or new acquisition to the Foreign Exchange Pool, is a matter which will have to be decided, keeping in view the needs of the country. But we are quite clear that the liability to transfer them must remain. That is the present position.

13. In your letter under reply, paragraph 4, you say that "I further disclosed the full value, at the time (July 1949), of my assets." This statement, I understand, is not wholly correct. You declared then these assets to be worth Rs. 22,29,809. This was obviously not a complete disclosure of foreign holdings. Indeed, you said as much at the time and in your present letter you indicate that your foreign holdings in the sterling areas is not expected to be much beyond a crore of rupees. Apparently this does not include foreign holdings outside the sterling area.

14. You will appreciate therefore that the position that the Government of India has taken up is completely justified from any point of view. I can understand that because some of the companies you are interested in are at present in liquidation, you may not be able to state exactly what the position is in regard to them. But this does not apply to any full disclosure.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 15. Remembering Departed Patriots on Republic Day<sup>1</sup>

I received a letter from General Cariappa<sup>2</sup> some days ago suggesting that as a part of Republic Day celebrations on January 26th, we should observe one minute's silence in memory of those who gave their lives in the struggle for India's freedom. He suggested that the proceedings should start with this one minute's silence and that this should be observed simultaneously all over India or, at any rate, at the principal places.

2. I sent a copy of General Cariappa's letter to the President. I give below his reply:

"I have received your letter No. 288-PMH/54 dated May 21, 1954, enclosing a copy of General Cariappa's letter to you dated the 14th instant regarding observing one minute's silence during the 26th January celebrations in remembrance of the departed patriots. I agree with the idea and suggest that the Government might pursue the matter and consider details. As regards the particular suggestion for observance of one minute's silence, it may be considered along with any other that may be made when the actual form with all its details is being considered."

3. I think General Cariappa's idea is a good one and deserves fuller consideration. I rather doubt if we could make this one minute's silence an all-India affair at the same time. We might suggest that in all places where a parade is held, there should be this one minute's silence.

4. Anyhow, I should like this matter to be considered further, more especially by the Republic Day Committee.

1. Note to the Secretary General, 26 May 1954. JN Collection. A copy of the note was sent to the Personal Private Secretary.
2. K.M. Cariappa was the Indian High Commissioner to Australia and New Zealand.



## 16. Security Arrangements for Prime Minister<sup>1</sup>

I have written to you repeatedly about what are termed the security arrangements for me. I find that in spite of my efforts, many totally unnecessary steps are taken which embarrass me and the public. For instance, if I go from Mashobra to Simla, the whole route is lined up with policemen, traffic is suspended and both tourists and businessmen suffer.

2. It seems to me that this kind of arrangement is completely unnecessary and, in fact, undesirable. From the security point of view, it means broadcasting the fact that I am passing through, which is bad. Normal intelligence calls for no one to know previously that I am passing. The result is that there are no crowds, no obstruction of traffic, and I simply pass through. On the other hand, if policemen are posted throughout the route and people are pushed out of the road for some considerable time, everybody knows about it and most people are greatly inconvenienced. In fact, I have found that even Ministers have been held up because I was to pass through.

3. I have given this Simla instance, but this applies to every other place I go to. Routes should not be lined up with police and traffic must, on no account, be suspended. The only exception to this should be on special occasions in great cities when I have a function or other, where the police have to make arrangements to control the crowds.

4. I should like very specific instructions to be issued about this matter to all state governments because whenever I raise this question with them, I am told that they have to carry out Centre's instructions.

5. As I have often said, I am not against security arrangements. I am against excessive elaborate and sometimes undesirable arrangements. Usually an escort car accompanies me with policemen in it. That surely is quite enough and it is not necessary for traffic to be suspended and policemen posted all along the route.

6. This matter is very important for me, because unless I feel sure that my visits are not a nuisance to me and to others, I shall have to restrict greatly my touring.

1. Note to the Minister of Home Affairs, 28 May 1954. JN Collection.

## II. REFORM MEASURES

### 1. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
4th March 1954

My dear Deshmukh,

I have just received your letter of March 3rd, about Ashok Chanda's note.<sup>2</sup>

For a long time past, the subject of administrative procedures have come up before us. We have discussed them repeatedly in Cabinet and many Ministers have suggested changes in them to expedite business. When the Appleby Report<sup>3</sup> was discussed in Cabinet on several occasions, again the same matter was brought up because Appleby had laid stress on it, and more especially on financial procedures, which according to him involved delay and waste of time and energy and even money, in the sense that many senior officers were involved in considering petty details. The matter was discussed in the Planning Commission too. All of us appeared to be agreed that this matter had to be gone into thoroughly. We function today under rules made not only in pre-Independence days, but long ago, mostly by the Secretary of State. Conditions are obviously different now and it is a natural presumption that those rules require revision and change.

This matter was discussed again in the Planning Commission during your absence and it was pointed out there too that there were considerable delays because of the procedures adopted both at the Centre and in the states. Thereupon I thought it would be helpful to us if all these rules were considered as a whole, so that the ground might be prepared for Cabinet to go into this matter. Obviously Cabinet could not go into the details, but they could consider more easily a compact note on the subject. To appoint some kind of a formal committee or commission for this purpose seemed to me to make ourselves a victim of the same elaborate and delaying procedures which normally afflict us. The matter would be decided by Cabinet and by no one else. Therefore, all

1. JN Collection.

2. Ashok Kumar Chanda, Secretary to the Ministry of Production, was asked by Nehru to enquire into delay in execution of projects and large sums of unspent money allotted to projects. On 10 February Chanda in a note made some recommendations to accelerate execution of projects and minimise lapse of budgetary allotments. Deshmukh, disagreeing with most of Chanda's recommendations, commented that hastiness and lack of proper consultations had made those recommendations either irrelevant or ill-conceived.

3. Paul Appleby submitted his report on public administration in January 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 23, pp. 153-56.



we wanted was a competent consideration of these problems and a note prepared for Cabinet with such recommendations as might be considered feasible and desirable.

Thereupon, I asked Ashok Chanda to undertake this work in consultation with the Secretary General and Cabinet Secretary, who were two of the most senior and experienced Servicemen with us. The procedure, I pointed out, was to be rather informal so as not to get tied up with formalities. I asked Ashok Chanda to expedite this process because, in any event, it was for Cabinet to consider whatever he wrote. It was open to him to make any recommendations in consultation with Pillai<sup>4</sup> and Sukthankar.<sup>5</sup> Chanda presented that interim report about some matters to me, which I sent on to you. Whether we agree with any recommendations of his or not, it is for us to decide in Cabinet. But there is no limitation on him by terms of reference or otherwise to make any recommendation.<sup>6</sup> I gather that he consulted both Pillai and Sukthankar, as well as the two senior Finance Officers<sup>7</sup> that you mention before making the report, and had discussions with them. I believe he had discussions with Appleby also. These discussions need not necessarily lead to correct conclusions. That is for us to decide. But they form the basis for our consideration.

The questions he has raised and the recommendations he has made, can be considered as matters of general principle, even without going into specific instances. A procedure can be considered desirable on its own merits. Of course, it is helpful to judge from specific instances also.

I have myself found both in the External Affairs Ministry and the Defence Ministry, with which I have been connected for some time, that enormous delay takes place in deciding relatively petty matters, petty in so far as the sums involved are concerned. Innumerable notes are written. Sometimes, to my

4. N.R. Pillai was the Secretary General, MEA at this time.
5. Y.N. Sukthankar was the Cabinet Secretary and Secretary, Planning Commission at this time.
6. Chanda recommended that (i) budgetary demands for grants should be based on standing charges, expenditure on current projects with provision for supplementary demands; (ii) broad and overall financial scrutiny in the Finance Ministry but detailed scrutiny at expert level in the administrative ministries who should be provided with internal financial advisers; (iii) Planning Commission should review quarterly progress of projects; (iv) the states should accept full financial responsibility for a specified number of schemes; (v) instead of detailed scrutiny the examination by the Centre should be confined to a broad administrative scrutiny, by concerned Ministry and the Planning Commission, to ensure that the projects were within the plan frame-work and a broad financial review based on certificates of the states' finance departments that the schemes were in accordance with standards and rates prevailing in the states.
7. M.V. Rangachari, Joint Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance and S.K. Bhattacharya, OSD, Central Board of Revenue.

knowledge, two or three years have elapsed before a decision was taken. All this delay was due to a difference of opinion between the Ministry concerned and the Financial Adviser or the Finance Ministry. Quite apart from the question as to who was right or wrong, any such long delay and enormous expenditure of time and energy in deciding a matter appears to me to be wrong somewhere. The time of Ministers and senior officials is valuable, and if it is spent in petty matters, that is rather a waste of it and, to some extent, major matters must necessarily suffer.

Also, I have found, in the Defence Ministry especially, (and I imagine this might apply to other Ministries too), that the present procedure makes the Ministry rather irresponsible. They draw up the estimates without really taking care how far they can justify them from a larger point of view. They imagine that that is the duty of the Financial Adviser or the Finance Ministry. That appears to me a wrong approach. A Ministry must function more responsibly and must be able to justify what they put forward, not only by itself, but in the context of the Government of India as a whole. This rather irresponsible attitude appears to have arisen because they do not feel responsible in this matter and that responsibility rests somewhere else. The final decision may rest somewhere else, or ultimately with the Cabinet, but each Ministry must function responsibly and must, therefore, be given that responsibility.


Another factor that has come to my notice is that Financial Advisers attached to Ministries function in an atmosphere of mutual hostility, that is to say, between the Ministries and them. That is not a good way of doing things. The Financial Adviser, of course, must give his independent opinion as clearly as possible, But the whole atmosphere that has grown up is one of conflict and trying to pull each other down.

These matters have to be considered by the Cabinet. I do not know where the Speaker comes into the picture, or even a Parliamentary Committee.<sup>8</sup> It is not the Speaker's function, or even Parliament's function, to revise our administrative procedures. Any matter of policy, of course, might be referred to Parliament. There also the Speaker as such does not come in. It is for the Cabinet to come to its decisions and it would be desirable to inform Parliament of them. If Parliament has to say anything about it, there can of course be a discussion.

All these matters of administrative procedures have been with us for a long time in various ways. The new situation that has arisen in the country, both from the point of view of the US aid to Pakistan, and the Travancore-Cochin elections, makes it more incumbent on us to revise our procedures so as to be able to get things done as rapidly as possible. I have recently met

8. Deshmukh had suggested that the work of studying the matter and making recommendations be assigned instead to a Parliamentary Committee, to be appointed by the Speaker.





WITH SAYID NURI-EL-SAID, NEW DELHI, 22 MARCH 1954



WITH SAO HKUN HKIO AND U KYIN, NEW DELHI, 14 FEBRUARY 1954



some of our chief ministers from our big states. They have laid stress on this especially and told me that they would like to revise their procedures and are waiting for our lead in the matter. To some extent, I suppose they are bound by our own rules.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
5th March 1954

My dear Deshmukh,

Thank you for your letter of March 5.<sup>2</sup> I am sorry to get it and I am a little puzzled at it. What is the decision about financial control with which you do not see eye to eye? We have come to no decision. All that has been suggested is that the present administrative rules should be fully considered with a view to improvement wherever necessary. Unless you think that the mere consideration of this matter is wrong and is a vital question, I do not quite know how financial control is affected. I gathered from your last letter that you did not approve of some proposals made by Chanda. You are perfectly entitled not to approve of them. I have no idea what the result of our full consideration of those or other proposal might be. Is consideration of a proposal a matter for extreme difference of opinion?

I am writing this to understand exactly what leads you to think that some vital change has been made. You would be perfectly justified in arriving at any decision if some vital step against your wishes is taken. But, surely, among colleagues, matters are discussed fully. Usually some way out is found. If, unfortunately, no way out is found, then naturally one faces the consequences, whatever they might be.

I really wish to understand why you have written as you have done because all this seems rather odd to me.

1. C.D. Deshmukh Papers, NMML.
2. Deshmukh wrote: "It is clear that we do not see eye to eye in this vital matter of financial control. I therefore wish to be relieved of my responsibilities as Minister for Finance and Member, Planning Commission, as early as possible, and the sooner the better", and "I would also request you to mention this matter at the next Cabinet meeting whereafter I shall consider myself free to announce in Parliament and outside that I have tendered my resignation."

I need hardly say that I would respect your wishes. Indeed, if you feel so strongly about it, it would be improper of me not to do so. But colleagues have to show certain forbearance to each other both for personal and public reasons and vital decisions, which have a public aspect and not merely a personal one, deserve the fullest consideration and consultation.

As I have said above, your wishes necessarily must be respected. But I do not quite know what I am supposed to tell in the next Cabinet meeting. The least we can do is to consider these matters calmly and at leisure so that the decisions we arrive at will at least have as much thought as we can give to them, jointly and separately.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
19th March 1954

My dear Deshmukh,

Thank you for your letter of the 17th March.<sup>2</sup> You have taken a lot of trouble to send me a number of papers and copies of old letters. I have seen these.

In my letters to you, which were sent in answer to your letters, I think I have made it repeatedly clear that I am all in favour of the strictest financial scrutiny of government expenditure. I think that it is our duty to see that there is no waste or laxity in this matter. The only question that has troubled me often in the past is the manner of doing it most effectively and efficiently. The general impression I have gathered is that our method of working is cumbrous and does not yield proper results. What exactly can or should be done, is another matter, which no doubt requires the most careful consideration. It was with a view to give this consideration that, as a result of a discussion in the Planning Commission one day, I thought of getting all this material collected and reviewed so that it might be easier for us to consider it.

1. C.D. Deshmukh Papers, NMML.

2. Deshmukh had enclosed a copy of Cabinet orders of 16 January 1954 and his letter of 29 January in which he referred to the importance of examining concrete cases. He complained that neither Chanda nor Nehru attached any importance to such an enquiry but jumped to the conclusion that financial procedure needed modification.



This subject has been often before us and more especially when we considered the Appleby Report. In fact, our consideration of the Appleby Report was not quite completed at the time.

I have jumped to no conclusion yet, as you suggest, except that our administrative procedures should be fully examined with a view to improvement. Surely no one can say that they are perfect. I believe in many other countries procedures are different and have changed from time to time.

Each of these matters no doubt should be considered carefully in some detail as soon as we have the full picture before us.

I am sorry you feel as you do and I hate the idea of adding to your troubles and worries. Let us consider these matters quietly and at leisure and then come to such conclusions as we think right and proper. That is the least we owe each other. As I have written to you, whatever you finally decide will have to be respected.

As you know, I have not been too well recently and you have not been well either. I suggest that both you and I at least might take full rest during these two or three days of holidays and then we can meet and have a talk.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 4. Question of Administrative Reforms<sup>1</sup>

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Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### Question of Administrative Reforms<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: In the last two or three weeks, or whatever the period may

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The worst feature when such an argument or controversy takes place in public is that the prestige of our Ministries and may be, our senior officers, might suffer. It is a bad thing. If a wrong is done by anybody, we should naturally deal with the wrong, but this business of having overall criticism, which is sometimes indulged in Parliament too, is not right, because it has no particular meaning, and also a bad effect. We must always maintain, if I may say so, the prestige of the Government as a whole. That does not mean that Government does not make mistakes. In that case, catch hold of the mistake and rectify it. Among our Ministries, obviously, one of the basic and one of the most important Ministries is the Finance Ministry and anything that undermines in the people's mind its position or prestige in the slightest degree is a bad thing. We must not encourage that.

Now, as I said, those misunderstandings have been removed and there the matter ends. But I should like to take the party into my confidence as to some steps that I took in this matter.

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Now, as I said, those misunderstandings have been removed and there the matter ends. But I should like to take the party into my confidence as to some steps that I took in this matter.

For the last—I should say—two years, the question of administrative reform or the reform of administrative procedure, has been before us—before the state governments and before the Central Government. We have discussed the matter constantly and indeed we have taken steps from time to time in order to meet the new situation. Some of the state governments have also taken steps in the same direction. Some of them have appointed committees and have got their reports. This matter has also been considered on several occasions by the Planning Commission and the Cabinet.

You perhaps know that we have started an Organisation and Methods Division whose chief function is to keep wide awake about administrative procedures. And it has started functioning. It will be very helpful, and that is other steps too.

In this connection there are two factors to be borne in mind most particularly. One is the fact that we are a democratic, parliamentary government. When most of these rules were framed, they were framed before the present constitutional structure came into existence. It does not mean that the rules are necessarily inapplicable now; but they have to be looked at from a new point of view, the point of view of a democratic, parliamentary structure. Most of the rules are the old Secretary of States Rules. The second is that we are a Government which has undertaken large developmental plans. That is, we want to push ahead in doing things, in effecting development, etc., and that too, quickly.

Now, that depends of course on the policies, etc., that we lay down, that is, the Five Year Plan and other things. That also depends on the machinery for implementation, chiefly in the states, partly here. These two factors are new factors, new compared to the British Government days. The first fact is that the Government is now different; it is democratic, parliamentary. The second fact is that there is a certain dynamism in the situation. We have to keep pace with



and we have to see, as I said, apart from providing policies, what is the best way of implementing them, so that delays might be avoided. Often it is the fault of nobody, but the fault may be of some rather heavy working system. The previous system had no big development in view and no dynamic outlook and the rest. That is why you will remember that a year or a little more than a year ago Mr Appleby presented a Report. I do not mean to say for a moment that because a foreigner presents a report it is better than one presented by an Indian. We have other reports, and sometimes better. But it so happens that the Appleby Report brought matters to a head in our minds. It was in a concise form and many things were mentioned in it, many criticisms were made, many proposals given of our governmental system—he spoke highly of it—broadly speaking. And he also laid emphasis on these very two factors of the present governmental system in regard to administrative procedures, which, he said, was very well adapted to the previous Government, was not wholly so adapted to these two factors of democratic functioning, which encourages—it is not so much from the top—which encourages initiative, etc. and the developmental aspect which has to be pushed ahead.

It was as a result of numerous discussions in Cabinet that we came to certain conclusions which have been given effect to, one of them being the Methods & Organisation Division; and another also—it is not a governmental body—is this Institute which I opened the other day,<sup>3</sup> the Institute of Public Administration, which is semi-governmental; and some things in the inner working too, and the Methods & Organisation Division will go into these more thoroughly.

In discussing these matters in Cabinet or otherwise I have the sensation—and may be others also—that we were up against a maze of rules, etc., about which I knew precious little. I was not brought up in those rules, nor do I take kindly to too many rules and regulations. So I felt I could not get a grip of these things. So, I think it was in January, I said: what are these rules, let us have a look at them. Well, four or five fat books were put before me, printed books, containing rules, Fundamental Rules, Supplementary Rules, Civil Service Rules, etc. I felt it would be quite impossible for me to read them or to understand them—I will have to devote my whole life to it—and I felt I must try to educate myself in regard to the principal things about this matter so that, one could come to grips with this subject and then deal with it in the proper form.

Then I consulted some colleagues and others, and I said that a broad survey, a broad review of all these Rules should be made for my benefit and, if necessary, later for the benefit of my colleagues, so that out of that survey we could decide on the process in a formal way, whether to go ahead and what to

3. See *ante*, pp. 253-258.

do. This is the background material. I will read some extracts from the Note I wrote then. This was on the 17th January:

"I find that the various rules, procedures and regulations under which we are functioning are very old. It may be that some minor changes had been made in them subsequently, but in the main they remain what they were, and it is obviously desirable to have a complete overhaul so as to make them fit in with present conditions. Mr Appleby pointed out the necessity of adapting the present administrative apparatus to the tasks we have undertaken now, which were no part of the administration previously. It is not surprising, therefore, that we have to face all kinds of difficulties and delays when we try to function under a set of rules framed long ago under entirely different conditions. I suggest, therefore, a review of:

- (1) the Civil Services Classification, Central and Appeal Rules, with a view to their adaptation under the Union and the state governments in regard to conditions of employment and conduct, discipline, appeal, etc;
- (2) the existing arrangements for manning higher Secretariat posts under the Union and the state governments, with a view to securing maximum administrative efficiency, flexibility and interchangeability;
- (3) Fundamental Rules and Supplementary Rules, with a view to revising and codifying them;
- (4) the existing financial procedure with a view to expediting government business."

I have said previously in this Note—this was addressed to the Cabinet Secretary—and I had previously said that I want this to be done informally and without fuss. I did not want too much formality and committees sitting and all that, taking a long time, and long notings. I wanted certain facts to be collected.

"This review should take place especially from the point of view of expediting the implementation of our Five Year Plan and the various projects that we have undertaken or may undertake."

Then the last sentence was, I said that this initial and informal review might be undertaken by, instead of a committee which will take time, a single senior officer and then we can consider the material he gathers, all the suggestions he makes, as we like; it is for us to determine. That would be the background material, and I suggested to the Cabinet Secretary the appointment of Mr Ashok Chanda for this purpose. That was the end of it.

Then the Cabinet Secretary, after a few days or thereabouts, held a meeting of a large number of Secretaries to consider also, not this review business on this, but to consider specific cases where delay had occurred to find out how they could avoid that delay. They appointed a Committee of five Senior Secretaries to consider this matter, informally again, so as to help us to find



out — not with an intention of finding fault with anybody — where things get stuck up and for what reason.

In all these matters you will remember the rules are very well. The best of rules can be worked badly, or the worst of rules can be worked well. It all depends on the personnel. Then about two weeks after that Mr Ashok Chanda sent me what he called a preliminary note on financial procedure.<sup>4</sup> I put it by. Then, some two or three weeks later—I was not even aware that it was in my papers—he sent a second note on what is called “Decentralisation of authority and functions.”<sup>5</sup> A third note of his has just arrived on “Railways,”<sup>6</sup>—it deals with delays and other matters that occur in the Railways. Three or four other notes are under preparation by him and may come in about a month’s time.

This is background material that we are collecting, so that having got all this, I can consult my colleagues and see how we can tackle the problem. Besides his report, I have got some notes from Mr Appleby.<sup>7</sup> All this we hope will help us to pick and choose as to the steps we should adopt in deciding the normal and formal procedure of the processing of the subjects concerned through the Ministries. The two Ministries most concerned with these matters are likely to be Home and Finance, and to some extent the Railways. For instance, the latest note that I have got deals largely with the PWD. There are in fact, half a dozen Ministries which come into the picture. Meanwhile the Secretaries’ Committee is carrying on its work and I have requested the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, Shri V.T. Krishnamachari—I have been in touch with him from the beginning—with the help of his colleagues in the Planning Commission, to examine how delays occur in implementation of schemes, so far as he and the Planning Commission know, and to suggest how those delays

4. See *ante*, p. 275.

5. Sent on 24 March, the note suggested some adjustments in the work of two centralised organisations—the Directorate General of Supply, CPWD and the indenting Ministries.

6. The note on reorganisation of Railway administration recommended: (1) separation of functions of policy and administration from those of technical control; (2) restoring of technical control and coordination; (3) separation of finance and accounting organisation of the railways; (4) appointment of high level finance officer on each railway under administrative control of general manager; (5) revival of the post of Accountant General of Railways; and (6) a chief controller of standards and research who would be the Chief Technical Adviser in the Ministry.

7. On 16 March Chanda sent a note on decentralisation of the control of expenditures recorded by Appleby, which criticised the prevailing system of expenditure control preventing ministries from developing administrative competence. Suggesting decentralization of financial control, it stated that Finance Ministry should exercise no precise control at all over actual expenditures but should authorize total amount for programmes broadly conceived. It could exercise more important and useful influence through its role of passing judgment on requests for annual or additional appropriations.

could be avoided. These are various approaches to this problem essentially preparatory to a formal consideration. There is no question of any far reaching decisions being taken immediately. In fact they have not been considered even. The papers come in; they may be read and put by. They have not been considered, because we are just collecting material. That is about all in regard to this matter.

It is of course a purely administrative matter. But it affects our folk. The state governments also are very anxious. Some have already taken step, for instance the Bombay Government, the Uttar Pradesh Government. I do not know about the others. All of them have been writing to me, not now, but for months past, asking the Central Government to give a lead in this matter, for two reasons, one is because many of the rules and regulations are the Central Government's even though they apply to the states, the second is, so that there might be some uniformity. All of us in the Cabinet have considered this matter many times, attaching the greatest importance to it, because ultimately the best of policies can be slowed down and can be made less effective if the procedures hold them up or delay them. What has been held up, and how it has been held up are matters to be considered and solved.

One can look at this question from a larger or broader point of view of theoretical approach to the problem, but a more effective way is to find out factually why a thing has been held up and remove the causes of obstruction for the future.

I might in this connection mention that I have received notice of a Short Notice Question which I shall have to answer in the House today. In fact the Short Notice Question, apart from one or two factual enquiries, wants to know why there has been a leakage and who is responsible for it. Now it is very difficult for me to say who is responsible for the leakage of a confidential paper. This matter as to how leakages occur has troubled us a lot in the Cabinet. Papers meant for the Cabinet are circulated to a number of persons, Ministers and probably pass through their Private Secretaries and Personal Assistants. So the circle of people seeing them increases and it becomes exceedingly difficult to spot where a paper gets out. It has sometimes happened that even before the Cabinet has considered a paper, some people outside have come to know of it. We are going into that matter again and probably we shall limit the circulation of these papers and the range of people who get them. This Short Notice Question deals more or less with that.

C.D. Deshmukh at this stage said that as far as reform of administration including financial procedures was concerned, the objectives were same— (1) to remove causes of delays, (2) to do so without damaging the prestige of any Ministry, not only the Finance Ministry but any administrative Ministry, (3) to modify after examination the pattern of financial scrutiny



or financial control to gain essential objective i.e., to avoid wastes, to secure economy, and to ensure a judicious distribution of rights and responsibilities as between the other Ministries and the Finance Ministries. Deshmukh also said that he initiated the invitation to Appleby. He withdrew his resignation also.<sup>8</sup>

JN: This matter is over. But there are just one or two matters, not directly connected with it. Take the question of foreign advisers. I may quite frankly tell you that I am getting a little apprehensive of too many foreign advisers coming with every subject. Most of them have really come under some scheme or other, Point Four or something, and because we were not paying for them we did not think much, we thought after all it does not cost us much, if a man is coming, let him come. That is not good enough, because the coming of foreign advisers itself may have a certain effect, may be good or not good. Having said that, there is the other aspect of it that we should not retire into our shells and be afraid of an independent outlook or advice being offered to us. It does help, because after all we live in this environment and get used to some things and do not see them in that perspective. But there are subjects, for instance, shall I say, social work. I think it is perfectly unnecessary, if not worse, for me to get Europeans and Americans or others to advise us as to social work. I have said that a person who wants training in social work should spend some time at Sewagram. My point is not that a foreign adviser is not able; he may be able; that depends upon your choice. He may be a very good man, but the background of India he is unacquainted with. He is acquainted with another background. I know that difficulty arises even when we send students abroad. Suppose we send a student to America or England for study in social work. He will learn much to help him, but the danger is that when he comes back he comes with an entirely different background and finds it difficult to fit himself into this village background of India. He wants all kinds of magnificent apparatus, equipment and so on which we have not got. So he is frustrated. On the other hand, obviously, in a technical job we want the best technical advice. If it is a big scheme like the Bhakra-Nangal project it is absolutely no good my saying or your saying that we must have Indians and no others. It has no meaning. Of course I want Indians. I am glad to say we have Indians and we are getting more and more Indians trained in that. But if we have not got a person with that experience—it is not book learning, it is not an examination—if we have not got a person with that particular experience of a big enough job, I have no hesitation in getting a man from outside and,

8. On 7 April after a talk with Nehru, he agreed not to press his resignation.

much to my regret, pay him very heavily. Because, although we may pay him, if he is good, it is far less than the good that we get out of him. We are paying heavily for an expert at Bhakra-Nangal,<sup>9</sup> very heavily. I first hesitated. But the fact is that he saved Rs. 10 lakhs by some change he made—several years' salary of his—and everything by some improvement, some change he made, or by the fact that he provided the apparatus. We were going to get it from America. He said "I can get it manufactured in the Amritsar workshop" and he went there and got it done.

That is important enough, but the real thing is you arrive at a stage in any department of activity where quantitatively the thing becomes so big that the quality of it changes. To give you a military example, I was once in Spain during the time of the civil war. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the Republicans lost that war ultimately. However, I was there a guest of the Republican Government. This was in 1938. They had built up an army of 900,000 on their sides, they had excellent men and excellent officers. The Foreign Minister told me we have good Colonels, we have got even good Major Generals. But once it comes to a person commanding say 100,000 or 200,000 persons, unless you have that tremendous experience of carrying on a war with so large a number of persons spread over, attending to their feeding, attending to their logistic requirements, and taking quick decisions as things develop, they found it difficult to find such a man. You cannot keep the whole picture in mind, unless you are trained for it. That is the work of a trained General Staff. General Franco in those days had the help of the General Staff of Germany and of Italy and German General Staff were famous for their long experience in this matter, while the Republicans had no help from any General Staff. In spite of our having very good younger officers and others, we cannot in two or three years produce a man with the General Staff mind to grasp the whole scheme of things.

Whether you take the Bhakra-Nangal or the Damodar Valley, these schemes are so big, so tremendous, that one mind, unless it is very experienced, cannot keep grasp of it. The result is that while one part is going ahead another stops, something is not done in one part, which delays the other and the whole thing keeps out of gear. If we really get a first class man who can do the job, it is a tremendous gain not only in executing the project, but also in helping to train our own people. In Damodar Valley we got an American;<sup>10</sup> we paid him pretty heavily. But since he has come, there has been a tremendous improvement. He

9. H. Slocum, US expert in construction of dams, headed the technical advisory team to the project during 1951-55.

10. A.M. Komora, Chief Engineer, DVC.



is a nice man not only as an engineer, but also in training our people. We are paying him heavily; but it is worth while paying him.

No doubt we ourselves can learn, through, trial, error, waste and all that. So that where they are essential, we must not hesitate to take foreign advisers. The question of nationalisation does not arise. They come as foreigners to advise us for one or two years, whatever the period may be.

Now take this question, to which Mr Deshmukh referred, of his inviting Mr Appleby. Well on a subject like this they can very well give their viewpoint. After all we know our administrative system. Why should we ask a foreigner to come and advise us? Can't we, who are working, know it? Of course a completely outside mind may help in bringing a new outlook to bear on the subject. But he looks at it from a different perspective, with his experience of other places and surroundings.

I entirely agree with the Finance Minister when he said that we should not get lost—that is what Mr Appleby also says—in petty details. That is an important matter. It is obvious that the chief function of any government, and more especially the Finance Ministry of the Government, is to scrutinise, with a view to seeing that public funds are not wasted and are applied to the best advantage. If it does not do it, it is no good. On the other hand, if one is engrossed in petty details, big things run away. While you save the pennies the pounds may run away. Therefore, the question comes of concentrating with the strictest scrutiny on the bigger things, applying one's mind to them and making proper and adequate arrangements for their scrutiny, but in a decentralised way.

Now, here are these very big river valley schemes. Nothing is more wasteful than delay. I am not giving you accurate figures, but speaking from memory, I think in the Bhakra-Nangal scheme, they spend about Rs.8 lakhs a day in salaries alone. I am not sure of the figure, but I think it is round about that. You delay for ten days something, you may not delay the whole thing, you are wasting at the rate of Rs. 8 lakhs a day, which is a tremendous amount. If it is delayed for a month, you just calculate what the delay has cost you. So, one has to balance these things. Delay is the most wasteful thing; delay in administrative matters makes it much more easy for corruption to creep in. Once there is delay all kinds of things come in. The speedier the decision, the lesser the chances of corruption. Therefore, it becomes important to take quick decisions. You can even take the risk of a wrong decision about petty matters, provided you hold on to big matters.

One thing more. This is a purely, if I may say so, governmental matter, administrative procedure, and has to be dealt with at governmental level. Members of Parliament are constantly coming in touch with the administration in various ways and they can help us, not by running down this and that, but constructively by pointing out the nature of delay and where it has occurred, and by making suggestions.

## 5. Review of Financial Control<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: During the last three years, the Government have given much thought and consideration to the problem of improving administrative procedures. Ever since Independence, the activities of the various departments of government had increased greatly and many new departments had been opened and new types of activities undertaken. Several entirely new Ministries had come into existence, such as the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of States and the Ministry of Rehabilitation. The work of other Ministries had also increased greatly. Vast schemes and projects were undertaken and new industries, entirely under state control, were started. Thus Government, both at the Centre and in the states, was becoming more and more involved in social and industrial undertakings. The administrative set-up was progressively adapted to meet the requirements of this new situation, and, on the whole, this was done with some success. But difficulties often arose and the rules under which the administration functioned had been framed long before Independence when these new activities were not envisaged.

The constitution of the Planning Commission and the emergence of the Five Year Plan involved further a new approach to many of our problems in addition to adding to the duties and responsibilities of both the Central and state governments. Questions arose as to how far the old Civil Service Regulations, Fundamental Rules, Supplementary Rules, etc., fitted in with the existing conditions and the democratic set-up of the country as well as the new problems which government have to face. A number of enquiries were made into different aspects of these problems. At the request of the Cabinet, Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar had considered various administrative problems and presented a report.<sup>2</sup> Mr Appleby, who had been invited to advise us on administrative matters, presented a report<sup>3</sup> last year which was placed on the Table of this House and was subsequently published.

1. Statement in Parliament, 19 May 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States) Official Report*, 1954, Vol. VI, cols. 6780-6785. Also available in JN Collection.
2. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Minister without portfolio in 1949, in his *Report on Reorganization of the Machinery of Government* had highlighted the need for organizational and procedural changes in the set-up of government machinery, since there was "insufficient coordination in the framing of policies and plans and inadequate speed and efficiency in their execution..."
3. See *ante*, p. 274.



These reports were examined carefully by the Cabinet and a number of recommendations made were adopted. As a result of this consideration, it was decided to set up an Organisation and Methods Division in the Cabinet Secretariat and to establish an Institute of Public Administration. This has been done.

At a meeting of the Planning Commission held in January last, it was pointed out that only a small part of the funds allotted for various projects had been used. There had been a shortfall in expenditure both in the states and in the Central Ministries. Community Projects and the National Extension Service had evoked a very satisfactory response from the public and it was felt that no delays in administrative procedure should come in the way of the quick implementation of our plans. The Cabinet also was concerned with the delay in execution of some projects and the shortfall in expenditure.

It was felt, therefore, that an examination should be made into the causes of delay and an improved procedure should be evolved and, wherever necessary, changes made in the administrative organisation. I felt that, in the initial stage, this could best be done by a single officer rather than by a committee or a commission. Also that such an examination should be initially of an informal character. On the 17th January, I wrote a note on this subject suggesting a review of:

(1) The Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, with a view to their adaptation in the Union and State Governments in regard to conditions of employment and conduct, discipline, appeal etc.

(2) The existing arrangements for manning higher secretariat posts under the Union and State Governments with a view to securing maximum administrative efficiency, flexibility and interchangeability.

(3) Fundamental Rules and Supplementary Rules with a view to revising and codifying them; and

(4) the existing financial procedure with a view to expedite government business.

I added that this review should take place especially from the point of view of expediting the implementation of our Five Year Plan and the various projects that we have undertaken or may undertake in the future. I appointed Shri Ashok Kumar Chanda, then Secretary, Production Ministry, and selected to be the next Auditor-General, to undertake this review.

Shri Chanda was to consult especially the Secretary General, Shri N.R. Pillai and the Cabinet Secretary, Shri Y.N. Sukthankar.

About the same time, a senior Secretaries Committee consisting of:

Sarvashri H.V.R. Iengar, H.M. Patel, K.R.K. Menon, T. Sivasankar,

P.C. Bhattacharya, S. Ranganathan, S.B. Bapat, M.V. Rangachari, and R.C. Dutt<sup>4</sup>, was appointed at a meeting of all the Secretaries of the various Ministries, with a view to consider the question of expediting the disposal of governmental work and implementation of schemes included in the First Five Year Plan. The Cabinet Secretary was Chairman of this Committee.

The Finance Ministry has also undertaken a scrutiny of financial procedures.

The Planning Commission also undertook consideration of these questions and had a series of meetings with the representatives of the Central Ministries as well as the Advisers of the Planning Commission on Programme Administration.

Shri Chanda has recently completed the task allotted to him. He has presented reports to me on the following subjects:

- (1) Financial Control<sup>5</sup>
- (2) Delegation of authority and functions<sup>6</sup>
- (3) Reorganisation of the Railway administration<sup>7</sup>
- (4) The Services.<sup>8</sup>
- (5) The Pay Structure;<sup>9</sup> and

4. Iengar was the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry; Patel was the Secretary, Ministry of Food and Agriculture; Menon was the Secretary, Ministry of Finance; Sivasankar was the Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation and Power; Bhattacharya was the Financial Commissioner, Railway Board; Ranganathan was the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply; Bapat was the Joint Secretary and Establishment Officer, MHA; Rangachari was the Joint Secretary (Economic Wing), Cabinet Secretariat and R.C. Dutt was the Joint Secretary, MHA.

5. See *ante*, p. 275, fn. 6.

6. See *ante*, p. 283, fn. 5.

7. See *ante*, p. 283, fn. 6.

8. In this note sent in May, Chanda stressed the need of the all India technical services, in the States and Centre in the areas of agriculture, forest, medical and engineering, and recommended constituting these services either as Central Services with provision for deputation to States, or as common civil service divided virtually into departments.

9. In this note sent in May, Chanda recommended readjustment in the higher pay levels which were out of tune with general economy of the country and advised to invite pre-1931 ICS and IPS officers of the superior services to retire and be re-employed in corresponding new pay-scales with provision for drawing pensions separately in addition to new pay.



(6) The Secretariat.<sup>10</sup>

The last report reached me two days ago. These reports are under examination and will be used as background material for the consideration of these problems, in addition to the other material that we have received.

Among the subjects under review are the feasibility of the devolution of more financial powers to Ministries and other administrative authorities and the questions of pre-audit. It is also under consideration how far it is desirable to include in the proposed expenditure in the Budget only such items as have been previously scrutinised fully and accepted.

All these enquiries have been of an informal nature, with a view to avoid any rigidity of procedure or outlook. It is proposed to consider all this material and then prepare summaries on different subjects for the consideration of the Cabinet. The enquiries are not yet complete and a proper consideration of the material received will take some further time. It will serve no useful purpose to lay any papers on the Table of the House at this stage as many of these papers are, as I have said above, of an informal nature and meant to serve as background material for the consideration of these problems.

The Organisation and Methods Division have initiated a combined operation to improve the speed and quality of work done in the Secretariat. A selected deputy secretary has been appointed as the O and M Officer in each Ministry and each department and in every branch of expenditure finance. These officers have started detailed inspections and case studies to see how far the prescribed methods and procedures are, in fact, being followed and how they can be improved to secure greater efficiency. The work of the O&M officers is supervised and coordinated by the Director of the O&M Division, who also brings them together periodically for exchange of ideas and experiences. The regular inspection and review of the speed and quality of work will also facilitate the proper training and development of personnel at all levels and enable good work to be recognised and rewarded and bad work punished.

The Institute of Public Administration will bring together officers engaged in administrative processes as well as citizens affected by them, set up joint

10. Chanda in this note recommended that ministers should not be burdened with day-to-day minor administrative matters as it restrained initiative and responsibilities of officials; functions of policy-making and execution should be separated to maximum extent; heads of departments should have a measure of authority delegated to them; post of additional secretary was irrelevant; five-tiered office was not efficient enough to dispose of expanding business of government.

teams for detailed study of the different aspects of public administration, and thus promote cooperation and understanding of each other's needs and difficulties.

## 6. Village Panchayats<sup>1</sup>

The Working Committee have noted with appreciation the progressive introduction of the panchayat system in various parts of India. This is not only in keeping with the ancient tradition of India but is suited to present-day conditions. A modern state tends inevitably to become more and more centralised. This tendency should be balanced by the growth of local self-governing institutions, so that the mass of the people should themselves participate in this business of administration and in other aspects of community life, social, economic and judicial. This can best be done by the development of panchayats in the villages of India. These panchayats should have administrative function as well as a judicial function.

2. The Committee particularly welcome the establishment of *Nyaya* or judicial panchayats which should reduce the burden on the regular courts and make justice available on the spot in a considerable number of relatively petty matters and thus make it both speedy and inexpensive also.

3. Such panchayats should be developed throughout the country in accordance with local conditions and traditions and represent the entire community in the area concerned, irrespective of caste or creed....<sup>2</sup>

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru and adopted by the Congress Working Committee, New Delhi, 23 May 1954. JN Collection. Extracts. Also published in *Congress Bulletin* 1954, p. 185.
2. The Congress Working Committee appointed a six-member committee consisting of Kailas Nath Katju, Jagjivan Ram, Gulzarilal Nanda, Gurmukh Singh Musafir, K.D. Malaviya and Shriman Narayan Agarwal to consider this question in all its aspects.









## 1. Manufacture and Purchase of Aircrafts<sup>1</sup>

Without taking a tragic or an alarmist view of the situation (and I do not think that we should take any such view) it is clear that we must be wide awake and prepared for possible developments and their consequences. I do not think that it will be an easy matter for Pakistan to build up an adequate trained personnel for a large increase of its Air Force and, more particularly, to man the later types of aircrafts, which require special training. But it is quite possible that some of the later type of aircraft, which are better than ours, might come into the possession of the Pakistan Air Force. Even a few such aircrafts would be a danger to us, though not perhaps as great as one might be led to expect. Nevertheless, we have to keep this in mind.

A difficult choice has often to be made. The right course is to develop the manufacture of aircraft in India, even though that aircraft might not be of the latest type and might be non-combative. Relying on this production gives a country a basic strength which it can never have if it relies on purchases from abroad. This applies more particularly on a defensive war or a war in which aircrafts have to function within relatively short distances.

On the other hand, the possibility of immediate danger or danger in the near future cannot be provided for by some long distance programme of production and hence something has to be done to meet this danger. Whatever may be done to meet a near danger of this type, ultimately comes in the way of a more solid preparation for defence in the future. It is a temporary expedient which does not add to the basic strength of our defence.

That is the problem one has always to face. In resolving it, one has to make some reasonable estimate of when danger can threaten us. The time limit is important. I think that we should:

- (1) keep as fully informed as possible of developments in Pakistan, more especially, in regard to the Air Force there;
- (2) pursue our basic programme of aircraft manufacture as rapidly as possible;
- (3) investigate possibilities of purchasing better types of aircraft wherever they might be available. In doing so, we need not exclude any country, though we should proceed a little cautiously in this matter. In the final

1. Note to the Ministry of Defence Organisation, 21 February 1954. JN Collection. A copy of this note was sent to the Defence Secretary.

analysis, there is no reason why we should not purchase aircraft from the USSR, if they are adequate for our purpose, fit in with our establishments and training, and are not wholly beyond our capacity, financial or otherwise. In purchasing aircraft from the USSR, one has to remember that we cannot easily shift over to completely new types which should involve upsetting our present day arrangements.

We should certainly, therefore enquire from various countries, to begin with, the UK and European countries. I would just at present avoid the USA, till we know more about their aid to Pakistan and the development of the political situation. Sweden is a country which might well be approached in this connection. As for the USSR, we should proceed very cautiously and let it be known privately that we are prepared to consider suitable offers provided they fit in with our requirements.

Probably, Interceptors are more necessary for us than other types, that is, in addition to what we have. So far as Bombers are concerned, we should think in terms of relatively short distance bombing.

## 2. Defence Services<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: For the last two years or so, I have been fairly intimately connected with the defence forces and the Defence Ministry in this country. Even previously, I have felt it my duty to maintain contacts with them, and with some of our senior military advisers. But, during these two years those contacts have been necessarily more continuous and more intimate. I should like to say, therefore, right at the beginning, of the high opinion I have formed of our defence forces and of our various defence establishments in this country. I am not merely saying something in the formal sense of the word. It is my belief that we have a very high class of persons in our defence services from the top downwards.

During these six years and a half since Independence, our defence forces have practically been built up anew. Of course, they were built up on the old

1. Speech in the course of debate on demands for grants of the Ministry of Defence in the House of the People, 25 March 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, *Official Report*, 1954, Vol. II, Pt. II, cols. 3055-3068.



foundation, it is true. But, as the House will remember, immediately after Independence, the Army was split up and a part of it went to Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> Very soon after, came the military operations in Kashmir and other operations. All kinds of varied activities have had to be undertaken by our Army or by our Air Force or by our Navy. The House knows well, of course, about the recent episode of the Custodial Force in Korea<sup>3</sup> to which reference has often been made here. Our Air Force has, continuously for a long period, been engaged in dropping supplies in parts of our North Eastern border, Assam. Our Army has occasionally engaged itself in helping people to grow more food. They might not have grown a terrific quantity of food but the whole point was that the Army, apart from being an efficient and disciplined Army, has come nearer and nearer to the people, as we want it to come and to remove the barriers which may exist between them and the people. We have to maintain two things: one is the discipline of the Army and the other is a feeling of oneness between the Army and the people. So, I should like, and I am sure the House will agree with me, to pay a tribute to the efficiency, loyalty, and discipline of our Armed Forces.

I should like the House to remember that even though we live in times of peace, many of our young men are continually facing a measure of danger. In the Air Force especially, in every Air Force in the world, accidents occur and valuable lives are lost. That is the payment we have to make for the continuous efficiency, continuous training and experiment. It is an exceedingly sad thing if a young man who has been trained for years, lost his life; sad from every point of view, national as well as personal. Yet, we have to face these difficulties.

There have been and there can be a great many criticisms of the Defence Ministry because the Defence Ministry covers a vast field of activities. Nobody can say that every activity they indulge in is done in a perfect manner, without mistake or without errors; of course there are errors. We welcome criticisms and welcome more especially if honorable Members draw our attention to any particular matter which we can remedy. I would not go into those matters. I have seen the cut motions and they are overwhelming in number, a multitude of them. I shall not deal with them because some of my colleagues will no doubt refer to the important points raised in this debate. I should like to refer only to a few basic issues which always face us.

2. The Armed Forces were divided on communal-cum-optional basis in the approximate proportion of 1:3 between Pakistan and India. A scheme was worked out so that predominantly Hindu or Muslim Units went to India and Pakistan respectively and individuals of the other communities serving in such units were given the choice as to which Dominion they wished to serve.
3. On 18 August 1953 the Indian Army sent the first contingent of the Indian Custodial Force to Korea to assist the UN, the North Korean and Chinese Command to implement the Korean truce agreement. The Force remained there for about six months.

One thing I should like to say, and that is that the growth of defence industries in this country has been particularly satisfactory. All of them are not functioning; some of them are in the process of being built up. I think that our record in that respect is very satisfactory, because, ultimately the defence depends on the growth of industry generally and more especially the defence industry. More and more the art of warfare becomes mechanised; technical improvements come in daily. It becomes necessary to rely more and more on these technical improvements. One cannot ultimately rely upon technical improvements that you purchase from abroad. That is dependence on others which can be cut off at any moment. Therefore, the real test of our advance in defence is the growth of defence industries in the country. Human beings we have in plenty. They are very good, very brave material. But numbers have seldom counted in the past except in the sense that they give the morale in a big crisis. Of course, properly trained people can be of great help, ultimately, it is the technically trained men and equipment that count.

When we talk of technically trained men and equipment, immediately every person will think of the latest developments in the art of warfare in which reference has been made so often. They may be summed up in one word though they are many, atomic bomb, hydrogen bomb, etc. But, there are innumerable other developments which do not find their way into the papers, of which, if some war comes, we shall hear. Because the latest developments, of course, are secret. No country is going to give publicity to them. They cannot very well hide the explosion of a hydrogen bomb. That is too big a thing. Perhaps that may be hidden too, so that the latest weapons are secret. They are not used lest the other party might get to know of them. But, even the known weapons of the latest type are terrible enough. It has come to this that except very few countries, no other country can afford to have the latest weapons. The differences that have grown in the defensive or offensive power of states are much greater now than they ever were because only very few countries can afford to have those defence weapons.

Take as an example these atomic weapons. I do not know how many countries have them, in what quantity, but in effect very, very few countries possess them—apart from the major two countries, perhaps two or three or four others, in some quantity, in a small way, not really in a big way.

Now, where are we in defence when we cannot possibly think at the present moment of these latest weapons? Obviously, we have not got the atom bomb. We do experiment with atomic energy, and we have got a fairly competent, high class Atomic Energy Commission. It has no value from the war point of view at the present moment. It has a good deal of value from the experimental point of view, of using atomic energy for civil purposes. In fact, in a recent report of world developments in atomic energy, India was specially mentioned as the country in Asia which has developed this, not the weapons I mean, but



atomic energy, has greater development than any country in these particular areas. We may leave that out from the point of view of war. I am merely mentioning this, that we want to be in advance from the scientific and technical point of view in these matters, because these count in the end; and we want to be, as far as possible, self-sufficient—no country is absolutely self-sufficient—but as near self-sufficiency as possible in regard to our need. Now, self-sufficiency again depends, well, primarily on your having certain mineral and other resources which are necessary for warfare and for industry. Either we have those minerals or we have not got them. If we have not got them, we have to get them from elsewhere. Well, we have them; we are not certainly self-sufficient, but we have them in fairly large quantities, in sufficient number of them. Some we have not got. Anyhow, we are more favourably placed than most countries, and we do not yet know the whole. Perhaps we might have more of them. We have had geological and other surveys in the country, but we have never had an absolutely hundred per cent, full survey of every part of the country. We are now, therefore, trying to carry out those surveys and they are necessary from the point of view of defence and of course, from the point of view of industry.

Now, in planning or thinking of our defence, what pattern should we adopt? I cannot go into this in detail of course but I should like the House to have certain broad considerations in view. We talk of defence. Every country talks of defence. Nevertheless, there are two aspects of defence. One is defence, and the other is offence. In war it is rather difficult to draw a line between defence and offence, obviously. Nevertheless, one can prepare the country for offensive war, or, essentially, for defensive war. When I say offensive war, I mean offensive war at a distance, because offensive war on your borders is defence. It does make a difference. Some of the great countries of the world prepare themselves for offensive war at great distances in fact they practically cover the world. Now, obviously both from the point of view of our desires in the matter and our capacity, we do not propose and we have not intended to build up defence forces for a long-range offensive war. They are essentially defence forces so far as we are concerned. What does long-range offensive war require or might require? Let us say, an expeditionary force. In the old days of British governance in this country, they used to keep an expeditionary force to be sent abroad, not to India's benefit of course, but for their own benefit in case there was a big war, or to go to other countries, and Indian forces have gone to Western Asia, South East Asia and the Far East, to Africa and to Europe. The first thing we decided was, because we do not think in terms of offensive war at a distance, we need not think of this.

Take another example. In the air do we require long-distance bombers to go far afield and bomb distant countries? Well, from the point of view of defence, we do not. From the point of view of practical approach to the problem,

they would be out of place. One long distance bomber could be replaced by or would cost as much may be as, twenty, thirty, or fifty normal aircrafts and the normal aircrafts are much more useful to us in defence than one long-distance bomber. We may not have even the industrial background for the long-distance bomber.

I am merely putting certain considerations which perhaps are not in the minds of some honourable Members, so that some of the problems we face may come before them.

Therefore, the pattern of our defence is, if I may repeat, defence, and not aggression or long-distance attack, and that applies to whether it is the Army, or Air Force or Navy, and on that depends, to some extent, the type of weapons that we have to get. Of course, all these things have to be balanced with various other factors. One cannot make one rule the absolute rule, but generally that is our approach.

The second approach is that we should depend, as much as possible, on what we can ourselves produce. Again, we cannot produce things suddenly. It takes a little time. But this leads to two conclusions. One is that we should try to produce the things necessary as soon as possible. The second is that, on the whole, we prefer reliance on something that we can produce and not on something even better that we might get from abroad. That again cannot be an absolute rule, and we have to get that something better when we can get it from abroad, but there are strict limitations to that. But, generally speaking, we would depend upon what we do or can produce in the near future, because, dependence on something that we can get from abroad, though it becomes inevitable to begin with, is really not a safe dependence, because, after all, you may not be able to get it; and, if you depend too much on that, then you become helpless, when you cannot get it. Therefore, it is better, in the final analysis, that you should think of, if I may use the word, I do not like to use it—very much second-rate in the normal sense, of course, on which we can rely and which we can produce ourselves rather than something for which we have to depend upon others and which we may not get in time of need.

As I said, these are broad approaches which have to be balanced by other factors.

Seven years ago, just about the time of Independence, our Army was a good Army. We had a good, small Air Force, and the beginnings of a Navy, small beginnings, but fairly good and efficient, however small it was. Even that was split up. We had about that time, I do not know the exact number, but in the Army I think there were about 8,000 foreign officers, a large number, of course, that was the result of the War, the after-effects of the War and we hardly had a person in our Army—an Indian—above the rank of a brigadier. We had to build up this Army from the top downwards and, after all, we had a fairly big Army. I said fairly big, but I should like to correct myself. Our



Army, considering the size of the country, is not big. Of course, it is better to have an efficient and relatively small Army, than large numbers who are not very efficient. This is obvious. But I want to make this quite clear because some people seem to imagine, and some of our foreign critics always say, that because of some considerations, say because of Kashmir, because of other things, we keep a bloated Army, or we spend too much on our military and defence expenditure. Now, it is true that we spend a large sum, as the House knows on defence expenditure. But the House will please remember that as everything has gone up in price, defence equipment has gone up very greatly, not only in the normal sense of everything going up in the price, but because every technical advance is expensive and it is not normally a kind of thing which you can bargain about, for either you get it or you do not get it, or you produce it yourself. In spite of all these factors, and in spite of our desire to have as efficient an Army, Navy, and Air Force as possible, I think that it would be correct to say that we have not added very greatly to our defence expenditure. It can be compared with other countries, whether in numbers or whether in expenditure, and considering the size of our country the many responsibilities that inevitably our defence forces have to shoulder, I do not think the expenditure, involved in it is very great. It is undoubtedly great from the point of view of our desire to have as much money for developmental and other purposes. That is true, but there are certain limits beyond which we can hardly go, if we have to keep an efficient Army, Navy and Air Force. We have, far from increasing the size of our Army, always aimed during the last few years at reducing it somewhat. In fact we did reduce it. But I really confess that I do not see any great reduction in future. I am not thinking in terms of fighting or war, but there are certain limits beyond which we can hardly go, for such a great country like ours.

Of course, as some honourable Members have suggested from time to time we should encourage what might be called the second line defences, and the rest. That is a different question entirely, and we should do that, of course, from other points of view, not so much from the point of view of modern fighting—I do not think our second line defences are much good for that—but for something which is equally important, for performing the numerous duties, not in the fighting line, but behind, and that is very important both because they are important in themselves, and because they release the fighting forces from other duties.

So, we had to face six or seven years ago, this difficult position of our Army breaking up after Partition, thousands and thousands of foreign officers, chiefly British, going away, remember they were eight thousand in number, and our officers, good as they were, having had no previous experience of high commands—there were a few colonels, or maybe a few brigadiers about—and on top of all that, we had these Kashmir operations, which were very difficult,

in a difficult terrain under difficult conditions. Well, we survived all that; we not merely militarily survived it, but I believe that our Army and Air Force, both of which were concerned in these operations improved themselves in the process—if I may say so—by this training.

During this period, first of all, a very large number—thousands—of British officers left us. We had very few left, maybe, I do not know, some hundreds to begin with. And this process of their going back and being replaced by Indian officers has gone on continuously. We have had questions asked repeatedly about British officers or others in our services, and answers were given about their numbers.<sup>4</sup> As a matter of fact, in the Army, there are a few—I forget the number, maybe about a hundred or so—but even those numbers are rather deceptive. In the Army, about which I am talking, there is not a single officer, I believe, who is in any executive position. There are a few—in our ordnance factories, and some as instructors in some of our academies and the like. We have had till recently a senior officer as an Adviser, he is leaving in a few days, and a very good adviser he has been. We have had in the Air Force and in the Navy senior British officers in command because both the Air Force and the Navy, frankly speaking, require expert and experienced guidance. I should like to say—and I say so from personal experience, not only of these two years, but of the last six or seven years—that these senior officers that we have had in the Army, Navy and the Air Force have done us exceedingly well, and I should like to express my high appreciation of the loyal way and the efficient way in which they have worked for us. The House must remember that, so far as our Air Force is concerned, within a few days, the present Air Marshal is retiring, and an Indian will be the head of our Air Force.<sup>5</sup>

Our Navy is small, and we really had to build up from scratch. It is not a question of passing an examination merely, but it requires experience of training in all kinds of conditions, technical and other; and one cannot produce a trained person suddenly out of a hat. We have been connected more specially in regard to the Navy, with the British Royal Navy, in the sense of receiving training, sometimes joining their manoeuvres, and receiving our equipment and the rest. Without some such experience, we would have been far more backward than

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, p. 315.

5. In 1953 the Chief of Naval Staff & Commander-in-Chief, Dy. Commander-in-Chief, Flag Officer (Flotillas), many other officers in the Navy and Chief of Air Staff and Commander-in-Chief of IAF, were British. By 1954 only two senior British Officers in the Navy were the Chief of Naval Staff & Commander-in-Chief, Indian Navy and the Flag Officer (Flotillas). After Air Marshal S. Mukerjee took over as Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the IAF from Air Marshal G.E. Gibbs in April 1954, the number of British officers serving in the IAF became negligible.



we are. We could only have that experience from some other navy, and the obvious thing was for us to have it from the British Navy, because our pattern of development of the Navy, and for the matter of that, of the other forces as well, was the British pattern. We had developed that way, and unless we reject that pattern and adopt some entirely different pattern, it is obviously desirable for us to improve along the pattern that we had followed thus far—and it is a good pattern. Naturally it will gradually be changed to suit our own conditions. That is bound to be that and it is being changed gradually in many ways. But in many matters especially technical, one cannot start anew, and one has inevitably, if you want expert guidance, which you do not possess, to get experts and specialists to guide us, from abroad. It is a question then of choice, where to get and whom to get. Honourable Members often ask these questions, how speedily we can have our own experts, of course, we want our own expert, in every field of technical or other activity, and they are taking the places of foreigners fairly rapidly; but the fact remains that we can profit by expert guidance from abroad and I think it would be, if I may say so, folly for us to remain backward in any matter, because we are afraid of getting that expert guidance from abroad in any matter, whether it is industry, whether it is river valley scheme, or whether it is something else.

So, in these four or five years out of these difficulties we have emerged, and we have at the present moment in our defence services, a very good machine. Naturally, the persons responsible for it are many senior Indian officers and others who are in charge, but in a great measure, more especially in the Navy and the Air Force, a great deal of credit for that must be given to the British officers who have helped us during these years.

Now, I referred to the pattern of our development which necessarily, had to be on the old lines, unless we scrapped the old lines and started afresh. If we start afresh, what pattern do we adopt? We cannot adopt, if I may say so, an Indian pattern, because there is no Indian pattern of modern warfare. It is a technical thing. It will grow gradually as our scientists grow and others grow and our experience grows. Gradually, we may have some kind of an Indian pattern; that is a process of growth. We have to adopt some pattern, recognised pattern. The recognised patterns are those of countries which have developed defence services, whether it is England or America or Russia or one or two other European countries. Now as we had so far adopted the British pattern in our Army organisation, it was natural for us to continue that. It was good enough. We can change it when we want, here and there. But to have upset it completely would have meant really upsetting our defence apparatus completely and that would have been foolish. We can and we do change it here and there and we will, no doubt gradually change it. Those honourable Members who criticise our having British officers and others are hardly likely to tell us not to have any experts, but presumably they think that we should have experts from

some country other than England. There is another difficulty. If you get experts from some other country than England, except for specific activities for which we can certainly get some scientists or some technical men from another country, if you get others, they do not normally fit in with that pattern which has developed here, because they are used to another pattern, apart from their individual ability. So that we might have to change the pattern, the basic pattern, in order to get the others to fit in! As I said. When the need arises, we will change the pattern here and there, and no doubt we want to change it to some extent. But all these factors have to be borne in mind when honourable Members consider how we have been functioning in the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

Now, we have attached very great importance to the development of defence industry, and in developing defence industry, we have made, I am free to confess, a number of mistakes, as we are bound to. We should not be afraid of making mistakes. We have sometimes to put a plant which is exceedingly good but of which we cannot take full advantage now; if I may use the word, that plant is too good for us, that is, we are not adequately developed to use that plant fully. Of course, we will use it later on fully, but not for the moment. Therefore, in a sense, we are not using to their fullest capacity the plants we have got. Now we are engaged in trying to find out how to use them to their fullest capacity for civil purposes, whenever necessary. Indeed they can be made use of and various committees and others are considering this matter. I think that is important both from the point of view of our general production and of making those plants useful at all times, and not merely in war time. That is our general industrial approach to these problems.

In regard to the Territorial Army<sup>6</sup> and the NCC,<sup>7</sup> I have stated previously in this House that it is our intention to expand them as rapidly as possible, keeping always in view a certain measure of efficiency. If there is one thing in the history of India that is striking from the military point of view, it is that normally the rulers of old days relied on numbers. Sometimes, they also relied on reckless courage. They seldom relied on discipline, and hardly ever on

6. Recruitment to the Territorial Army was started in October 1949 on zonal basis—India being divided into eight zones. All able-bodied persons between 18-35 years were eligible for recruitment. This Army was responsible for anti-aircraft and coastal defence. Service in this was considered as part-time employment, pay and allowances were admissible only for duration of training, courses of instruction and attachment to regular Army units.
7. Formed in 1948, the National Cadet Corps imparted military training to boys and girls from schools and colleges and organised social service camps.



technical advance. Any proper military history of India would show how every invasion of India was due to two things: one, technical advance in the invading army, their equipment or arms, and another, greater cohesion and discipline. Our armies in those days were vast hordes, elephants and horses, mules and donkeys and men and women a whole sort of palace marching on. If something went wrong there was chaos and all the courage of our brave men was not enough when the chaos came and when there were better technical weapons against them. Babur came to India: Babur had the better gun. That is the chief explanation of Babur's victory. He had a small army, a highly trained army, which could not retire, which could go nowhere; it had either to win or die. But the main thing was that he had the better gun and the gun triumphed through all the courage of the Rajputs.

So we must not think in terms of vague numbers. Numbers are good for national activities of course, but we have to discipline them. We must build up a disciplined army, technically good, and behind that should be the second line forces, the Territorial Force, the Home Guards and the rest, which do other duties in times of difficulty and trouble.

These are some of the points which I venture to place before honourable Members for them to consider this question of defence from this wider viewpoint.

### 3. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12th April 1954

My dear Deshmukh,

You wrote to me on the 11th March 1954, about the National Cadet Corps. This was in answer to a letter I had sent you.

This matter, as you know, has been referred to both in the Cabinet and in Parliament. In both the places there has been considerable eagerness for us to go ahead with military training. In fact much stress was laid in Parliament and even in our Party separately, for some kind of compulsory military training. It is patently absurd to talk about compulsory military training in India, at this stage at any rate. But there is a possibility to extend this training in the Territorial

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to the Ministry of Defence Organisation and Defence Secretary. Extracts.

Army, NCC and in their auxiliaries. To this reference has been made in the Parliament etc., and this was also discussed in the Governor's Conference,<sup>2</sup> where all the Governors strongly supported the proposal for a number of reasons. It was a very small step in the direction of the public demand. Apart from other reasons, stress was laid on its effect on students' discipline in our universities and possibly high schools. The main reason, however, in the public mind is the new situation that has developed vis-a-vis Pakistan....

In case of war or military operations, obviously, regular armed forces come to the front and they have to be kept up to the mark, but more and more we have to think of reservoir of trained men who can help to build up second and third lines of defence when need arises. They can take the place of many regular army officers and men engaged in what might be called home work. Thus more people from the regular army will be released. But the main thing is to tone up our younger generation and also to give them an outlet in the right direction, for their energies which often drift into wrong channels. There is a good deal of enthusiasm in the country which we should channel.

I have had this matter examined fully in the Defence Ministry and they have sent me a long note. Indeed, they have sent me a draft letter which I am supposed to send you. But I do not see why I should trouble you with that long letter. I suggest, therefore, that Finance Ministry might agree to this proposal to expand the NCC. It is possible, of course, that Defence Ministry might save money and apply it to this end but that would depend on certain factors. If the stores and equipment we propose to buy during the current year do not wholly materialise, we shall save money. If they do, we may not have much in the way of savings. Therefore it is better to consider the NCC separately. We are having a meeting of the Central Advisory Committee of the NCC on the 24th April.<sup>3</sup> I should like a decision to be arrived at by this date, so that we can discuss it with them.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. See *ante*, p. 214.

3. The Central Advisory Committee meeting presided over by Nehru on 24 April, recommended that special efforts should be made to expand the girls' division of the corps.



#### 4. Naval Policy<sup>1</sup>

I have read these notes,

It is true that conferences can be overdone. Nevertheless, the conference approach is always a helpful and friendly one. These conferences need not always be formal ones.

I agree that there is always a likelihood of a British officer rather thinking in terms of the British Naval outlook and applying that outlook to India. It is clear that geographically and otherwise, the positions are entirely different. The whole conception of British Naval policy was: (1) freedom to get food supplies and other imports from abroad; and (2) for this reason as well as other important reasons, to have a certain control over the seas. That policy as such could not be maintained after other countries grew in naval strength. Nevertheless the traces of that policy continue. Also the UK has colonies, dependencies, etc., spread out all over the world. So far as we are concerned, we have no intention of sending expeditionary forces to other countries or to have any operations, military, naval or air, far from our country. The whole conception of our defence forces is one for defence, that is, round about our frontiers.

That means that our Navy will at no time be charged with protecting the sea routes for us or to bring in food supplies etc. Indeed, this is completely beyond our capacity. Our Navy has to perform the smaller but very important task of protecting our ports and making it hot for any enemy ships which seek to attack us.

This also leads to the conclusion that we do not normally require big ships (except for training and like purposes). What is far more important is a number of small but swiftly moving ships, well armed. Normally speaking again, long distance submarines are not a necessity for us. This applies to an aircraft carrier also, which is really needed for attacking distant places. It is very expensive and we could utilise that money much more effectively by having more land-based aircrafts.

*Mutatis mutandis*, this approach should be applied to our Army and Air Force also. That is, we do not want long distance bombers, though they will have to go some distance if need arises.

This is not only a question of broader policy but a policy suited to our capacity. If we ambitiously go in for a few very expensive weapons, to that extent we cannot have a number of cheaper ones which really might be more useful to us for the type of defence that we envisage.

1. Note to the Defence Secretary, 12 May 1954. JN Collection.











## 1. Cable to B.G. Kher<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 239 dated February 9.<sup>2</sup>

Kashmir Constituent Assembly was constituted to draft Constitution for Jammu and Kashmir State.<sup>3</sup> In drafting this Constitution, it is inevitable to deal with question of relationship with India and what part of our Constitution applies to the State. These matters were considered in 1952 with Shaikh Abdullah and his colleagues and an Agreement was arrived at then.<sup>4</sup> That agreement had only been partially given effect to. The Constituent Assembly is now giving effect to the whole Agreement as also dealing with certain financial matters which had long been pending.<sup>5</sup> It was quite natural for Kashmir Ministers to discuss many minor constitutional issues with our legal advisers here. I hardly saw them in this connection. The whole purpose of Constituent Assembly is to draw up Constitution which cannot ignore relationship with India. Otherwise no Constitution can be drawn up. So-called ratification of accession is merely repetition of previous status, on basis of which Constituent Assembly and Kashmir Government have been proceeding. It does not add anything to previous position.

These questions were raised in 1952 when Constituent Assembly was formed. We made it clear then that while it was open to Constituent Assembly to decide as it chose, Government of India were naturally bound to commitments

1. New Delhi, 11 February 1954. JN Collection.
2. B.G. Kher, the Indian High Commissioner in the UK, had written that Kingsley Martin, the editor of the *New Statesman and Nation*, was agitated over the reports of ratification of Kashmir's accession to India as the Kashmir Constituent Assembly could not commit the whole of Kashmir. Friends of India in the UK felt embarrassed that Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir who had visited Delhi (27-31 January 1954) was acting as India's "stooge". Kher sought Nehru's guidance and view on this matter.
3. The elections to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly were concluded on 15 October and the Assembly met on 31 October 1951.
4. Known as the Delhi Agreement, this dealt with the basis of Jammu & Kashmir's association with India. It was announced by Nehru in the Parliament on 26 July and 5 August 1952 and by Shaikh Abdullah in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1952. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 19, pp. 211-217.
5. On 3 February, besides considering the reports of the Basic Principles Committee and the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, the Kashmir Constituent Assembly also considered the financial arrangements agreed upon during Bakhshi's visit to Delhi from 27 to 31 January 1954. According to these, the Union Government would have the right to impose the customs duties, income tax and certain excises, which were the concern of the State Government till now, and would compensate for the resultant financial losses.

made by it and stood by offer of plebiscite under suitable conditions.<sup>6</sup> That position remains unchanged.

It is true that Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad has delivered strong speeches and expressed his views unequivocally.<sup>7</sup> That is his party's and his Government's view and it is open to him to express it. Government of India has not changed its position at all in this matter. It is true, however, that in view of reported American military aid, difficulties have arisen in pursuing procedure of settlement discussed by me with Pakistan Prime Minister.<sup>8</sup> Until we know definitely what exact position is likely to be in regard to American aid to Pakistan, it is difficult for us to take further steps in this matter.

6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 17, pp. 423-424.
7. In a public meeting in Delhi on 28 January 1954, he said: "Kashmir's alliance with India is complete and final—constitutionally, legally and morally—and no power on earth can break that alliance." On 6 February he declared in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly that Kashmir's accession to India was "final and irrevocable and no power on earth, not even the Security Council could challenge it."
8. During discussions between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in Delhi from 17-20 August 1953 it was agreed that: (1) certain preliminary issues should be considered by the two Prime Ministers directly in order to arrive at agreements in regard to them, in the absence of which progress in holding plebiscite in Kashmir could not be made; (2) in order to decide the preliminary issues and take action in implementation thereof Committees of military and other experts should be appointed to advise the Prime Ministers; (3) the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April 1954; (4) on formal appointment and induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office by the Kashmir Government he would examine the situation and report on them and then make proposal for preparations to be made for holding plebiscite in the entire State.

## 2. To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

14th February 1954

My dear Bakhshi,

...I have received your letters of February 9 and February 13. As for the latter letter dealing with you finances,<sup>2</sup> I thought a very full discussion had taken

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad stated that in order to balance the State budget for 1954-55, the Centre should give a grant-in-aid of Rs. 250 lakh instead of Rs. 210 lakh offered by it to meet the loss of revenue incurred by the State under the new financial arrangements.



place when you were here and I do not quite know how I am to open the subject with the Finance Minister. I am sending your letter to Vishnu Sahay<sup>3</sup> to have it examined.

Your other letter of February 9 raises a very important issue about which I shall write to you at greater length later. I have no desire to belittle the decisions of your Assembly.<sup>4</sup> But it is patent that neither I nor the Government of India can unilaterally end an agreement not only with Pakistan but with the UN. This is not a question of my giving any new categorical assurance but of cancelling such commitments as we have made publicly to the world. Quite apart from the morals of it, no country can do that without the fullest justification. If we did so, we would hardly have any place left in the United Nations or in any assembly of nations, and we would be condemned almost unanimously. Even looking at this question from the point of view of consolidating the position internally in the Jammu and Kashmir State, you have to consider the fierce reaction all over the world against us, against your Government and in favour of Pakistan, in the event of our openly repudiating what we have repeatedly stated. I have no doubt that this matter will be brought up before the Security Council almost immediately. I am afraid you and your colleagues are rather ignoring certain vital aspects of this question.

When the Constituent Assembly was first elected, our position was clearly stated by B.N. Rau in the United Nations.<sup>5</sup> To that, we have adhered throughout. We have then said that it is open to the Constituent Assembly to decide anything and that they had a perfect right to do so, but our international commitments would naturally remain.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Special Secretary to the Government of India for Kashmir Affairs.

4. On 6 February 1954 the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir ratified the Kashmir's accession to India and adopted the recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee. These were: (1) the State would comprise such territories as formed part of it on 15 August 1947, (2) while retaining its autonomous character the State would remain acceded to India, (3) sovereignty vested in people to be exercised by the agents of the State except in regards to matters ceded to the Union Government, (4) the resolution of the Constituent Assembly of August 1952 providing for elected Head of State would remain operative. Other recommendations related to Legislature, High Court, Public Service Commission and amendment of State Constitution.

5. On 1 March 1951, B.N. Rau, the Indian Representative in the UN, said that Jammu and Kashmir was a unit of Indian Federation and the State was entitled to frame its constitution and for that purpose to convene a Constituent Assembly of its own people. So far as India was concerned, the main purpose of the Constituent Assembly would be to provide a proper elected legislature for the State.

### 3. To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
25th February 1954

My dear Bakhshi,

I have not yet replied to Mohammad Ali's letter about Kashmir.<sup>2</sup> Partly I have been much too busy to deal with it; partly I was waiting for developments in regard to US aid to Pakistan. This latter matter has now been settled and some kind of an announcement will be made soon by the US Government.<sup>3</sup>

This is, of course, a serious development for us, as for others, we do not, however, propose to take any hasty action in regard to it.

I wrote to you a few days ago<sup>4</sup> about some books that have been sent to Shaikh Abdullah and which have been returned. I was much surprised and somewhat distressed at this because it struck me as an exceedingly wrong thing to do. It is a small matter, but it indicates the kind of approach which is being made. When Sadiq<sup>5</sup> was here, I spoke to him about Shaikh Saheb and pointed out to him that it seemed to me essential that we should gradually bring about some normality. One such step which seemed to me desirable was for you to visit Shaikh Saheb. The view taken about such matters in Kashmir appears to me to be very limited and to ignore the future completely.

In this connection I have been distressed to see some pamphlets issued in Kashmir about Shaikh Saheb.<sup>6</sup> They seemed to me to be in bad taste and not even good propaganda: The average person who read them reacted strongly against them. To some extent, the credit of your Government suffered.

Some time or other, we have to face this problem of Shaikh Saheb. We may not take a basic step soon, but one should always act in a way so that any future step may not be made more difficult. All kinds of developments are

1. JN Collection.

2. See *post* pp. 319-322.

3. See *ante*, p. 13.

4. On 20 February 1954. Not printed.

5. G.M. Sadiq, President of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly.

6. *Conspiracy in Kashmir*, a pamphlet issued in the name of Social and Political Group, Srinagar, stated that Shaikh Abdullah during his visits abroad in 1948, 1950, and 1951 established contacts with foreign intelligence and diplomatic services who had broached the idea of an independent Kashmir. The pamphlet also charged some Americans with having brought Abdullah and his pro-Pakistan associates into contact with people across the ceasefire line. Another pamphlet, *Review of: 'Conspiracy in Kashmir'*, by Ghulam Mohammad Mir and Manohar Nath Kaul, supported the view expressed against Abdullah in *Conspiracy in Kashmir*.



taking place and even Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's progressive release<sup>7</sup> has some bearing on the future.

I wrote to you that I had seen Tariq.<sup>8</sup> I asked him to stay with me and he has been in my house for the last two days. I have had very little time for any proper talk with him. Before he goes, I shall have a full talk because I think he is a sensible boy. Whatever step we may have to take politically, we should always avoid producing a feeling that we are filled with animosity. That never helps. Courtesy and a friendly approach always pay dividends.

Suppose Shaikh Saheb expresses a wish to see me. He has not done so, and I have no reason to think that he will do so. But if he does so, how am I to refuse it? It is for this reason also that I feel that it would be a good thing for you to see him even briefly. Also you should issue orders that he be treated with every courtesy and all normal facilities should be given to him. When Tariq goes back to Srinagar, I hope you will meet him.... The reports in the papers that I have received some message from Shaikh saheb are of course quite wrong.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was arrested on 15 June 1948 and released from custody on 6 January 1954, but was kept under house arrest in the Circuit House, Rawalpindi.
8. Tariq Abdullah (b. 1937); second son of S.M. Abdullah; member, Jammu and Kashmir Tourism Development Board, Managing Director, Jammu and Kashmir Tourism Development Corporation Limited, 1975-82; Special Adviser to the Chief Minister, 1984; edited the *Correspondence between Late Shaikh Abdullah and Governor, Jammu and Kashmir, 1977*.

#### 4. Plebiscite Administrator<sup>1</sup>

I think you might send the following reply to Dayal's telegram No. 64<sup>2</sup> dated March 2, 1954:-

1. Note to the Secretary General and Commonwealth Secretary, New Delhi, 3 March 1954. JN Collection. The telegram was issued on 4 March 1954.
2. Rajeshwar Dayal, Permanent Representative of India in the UNO had enquired whether Nehru's statement regarding US Observers (see *post*, pp. 335-343) would apply to C.W. Nimitz and F.P. Graham. Dayal had also written that although the Observers could be withdrawn or replaced by the Secretary General without reference to the Security Council, but he was likely to say that he could not act on an unilateral objection. Dayal was to meet the Secretary General on 4 March.

"Your telegram 64 dated March 2. Prime Minister's statement regarding American Observers in Kashmir<sup>3</sup> does not directly apply to Nimitz<sup>4</sup> or Graham,<sup>5</sup> but it has been made perfectly clear previously that no representative from a great power can be accepted as a Plebiscite Administrator.<sup>6</sup> Such Administrator, when the question comes of his appointment, must be from a small and more or less neutral country. Nimitz ceased to function long ago<sup>7</sup> and so far as we are concerned, there is no question of his continuing.

As for Graham, the question of his functioning as Mediator in future does not arise at present.<sup>8</sup> US military aid to Pakistan has affected the entire question of Kashmir which has to be considered afresh in new context."

3. On 1 March 1954 in Parliament. See *post*, pp. 335-343.
4. Chester W. Nimitz was nominated as Plebiscite Administrator by the UN Secretary General on 22 March 1949.
5. Frank P. Graham was appointed UN Representative for India and Pakistan by the Security Council on 30 April 1951.
6. During discussions with the Pakistan Prime Minister in August 1953, Nehru had suggested replacement of Nimitz by a person hailing from the smaller countries, as the Plebiscite Administrator because of the involvement of the major powers in Cold War.
7. Nimitz was expected to assume charge on the conclusion of the truce agreement which could not take place and hence Nimitz could not be inducted into office of Plebiscite Administrator.
8. Graham in his report to the Security Council on 27 March 1953 did not ask for any further extension of his tenure and recommended direct talks between India and Pakistan.

## 5. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram No. 62 dated March 2,<sup>2</sup>

2. Thus far we have only asked Dayal to bring to Secretary General's notice formally part of my statement referring to US Observers in Kashmir. We are making no formal demand at this stage and hoping that Secretary General

1. New Delhi, 4 March 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon had stated that US reaction to Nehru's reference to withdrawal of US Observers in Kashmir was that request for such withdrawal had to be made to the UN, who alone could decide. UN felt that without an official communication from India in the matter, they knew nothing about it.



might take action himself for withdrawing US Observers.<sup>3</sup> We cannot obviously agree to these Observers continuing indefinitely. If necessary we shall make formal request for withdrawal later. We propose to deal with Secretary General only in this matter. Our object is to proceed in a way which will cause him least embarrassment. We shall await his reactions before considering any other step.

3. It will be desirable for you to see him informally and explain our position and find out his reaction.

4. My statement has created strong and favourable impression in India. No doubt, it will have somewhat upsetting effect in Washington, London, etc. I felt that in this matter we must take up a clear and forthright attitude. I should like you to inform us of general reactions and your own suggestions.

3. In accordance with the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948, UN Military Observers were appointed to supervise the observance of ceasefire in Kashmir. In response to UN Secretary General's request, 12 UN Members viz, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Uruguay and USA assigned officers from their armed forces to serve as military observers. Nehru's concern was only about 18 Americans serving in the UN Military Observers group.

## 6. Withdrawal of US Observers<sup>1</sup>

I suggest that the following telegram be sent to Dayal, Indiadell, New York in answer to his telegram No. 67 dated March 4:-

"Your telegram 67 dated March 4<sup>2</sup>. It is quite clear that we cannot agree to the continuance of the US Observers in Kashmir. Indeed, the Kashmir Government will refuse to give them any facilities. They have

1. Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, New Delhi, 5 March 1954. JN Collection. The telegram was issued on 6 March 1954.
2. Dayal had informed that he informally ascertained the UN Secretariat's reactions to the question of withdrawal of the American Observers from the Principal Director, Security Council, who said that Indian attitude would cause embarrassment to the Secretary General and that the Observers in Kashmir were not in capacity of representatives of any country but on behalf of the UN and finding their replacements would be difficult.

had a good deal of trouble with these Observers in the past<sup>3</sup> and this new development makes it now impossible for us to have those Observers. It is not our fault that the Secretary General is embarrassed, that is the fault of the US Government which decided to give military aid to Pakistan. To give military aid to one party to a conflict and when armies stand on either side of the ceasefire line is obviously a breach of neutrality. No person coming from that country can be considered as disinterested or impartial by us. The argument that US officers are functioning not as US nationals but on behalf of UN is flimsy in the extreme. In any event, these persons are *personae non grata* and even as such they have to be removed. Our position must be clearly and firmly stated to the Secretary General. A formal demand should be made if informal approaches do not yield any result."

3. On 11 August 1953, the Jammu and Kashmir Government charged the UN observers for inciting the pro-Abdullah demonstrations and warned them that their diplomatic immunity might be withdrawn.

## 7. Policy towards Kashmir Issue<sup>1</sup>

You have seen the letter I am sending to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.<sup>2</sup>

2. Apart from the line we have adopted there, I do not know what you would consider a tough policy. Perhaps you refer to other matters. Our policy must, of course, be a firm one but the expression of that policy should be courteous and aim at some peaceful way out. We should not adopt a rough language of some of the other countries.

3. As for our relations with the Anglo-American bloc, the first thing to remember is that we have to treat the UK and America separately and not as if it was one entity. Even the approaches might well be different. For the present, there is no special reason why we should bring the UK into the picture as it has now arisen. The US, of course, is right in the middle of it. Our policy in regard to economic aid from the USA, will have to be carefully considered.

1. Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, New Delhi, 5 March 1954, JN Collection.
2. See the following item.



There is no suggestion that we should stop that aid immediately, but every step concerning it will have to be carefully and separately considered.

4. I am much concerned at the growth of American activities in India.<sup>3</sup> Most of these activities are anti-India.

5. New from Nepal<sup>4</sup> in this respect is most disturbing.

3. See *post*, pp. 489-490, and 492-493.

4. See *post*, pp. 452-453.

## 8. To Mohammad Ali<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

5th March 1954

My dear Prime Minister,

... 3. I presume you have seen the correspondence which has passed between President Eisenhower and me and the statement I made in Parliament on the 1st March.<sup>2</sup> For facility of reference I am enclosing a copy of this statement. This will give you an idea of how we feel about the decision of the U.S. to give military aid to Pakistan and how, in particular, this has a direct bearing on the Kashmir issue.

4. In your last letter, and in some of your previous letters,<sup>3</sup> you have expressed your surprise at my connecting the US-Pakistan talks concerning military equipment with the Kashmir dispute. I have tried to point out to you the intimate connection between the two.<sup>4</sup> I can only repeat that the decision to give this aid has changed the whole context of the Kashmir issue, and the long talks we have had about this matter<sup>5</sup> have little relation to the new facts which flow from this aid. There is a basic difference between economic aid and military aid. The purpose governing military aid is different from that applicable to economic aid, the consequences are also quite different. More particularly, if two countries have actually been conducting military operations against each other in the past and are in a state of truce, military aid given to either of them is an act unfriendly to the other and not in keeping with neutrality.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. See *post*, pp. 335-343.

3. On 17 December 1953, 14 January and 4 February 1954.

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 434-38, 444-47 and 450-52.

5. See the next page.

5. You yourself have stated that this military aid will help in solving the Kashmir issue.<sup>6</sup> This can only mean that you wish to settle this issue by force of arms or by threat to use arms, unless the preliminary issues still outstanding, such as the quantum of forces, are settled to the satisfaction of Pakistan. Similar references have been made by others<sup>7</sup> also, which indicate that it is in connection with India that Pakistan has asked for and received this military aid. You will appreciate, I hope, that this is not only a very serious matter but that it changes the whole approach to the Kashmir problem. It takes it out from the region of a peaceful approach for a friendly settlement by bringing in the pressure of arms.

6. For a long time past, our two countries have discussed certain essential preliminaries without which no step towards a plebiscite could be taken. These preliminaries, *inter alia*, were concerned with the quantum of forces to be kept in Kashmir. Now that the pressure of arms has taken the place of the previous peaceful and cooperative approach and an abundant supply of military aid is coming to Pakistan from the United States, what we said at a previous stage about this quantum of forces has little relevance. We can take no risks now, as we were prepared to take previously, and we must retain full liberty to keep such forces and military equipment in the Kashmir State as we may consider necessary in view of this new threat to us.

7. The Official Committees, which met previously, considered this and connected issues<sup>8</sup> and even then could not arrive at an agreement. There is no purpose whatever in their meeting after this new development.<sup>9</sup>

6. In an interview published in the *US News and World Report* on 11 January 1954, Mohammad Ali said that a settlement of the dispute with India over Kashmir would be more difficult to reach at first, but he was convinced that ultimately a military aid agreement with the USA "would make a settlement easier." See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, p. 451, fn. 4.

7. For example, on 15 January 1954 Sardar Ibrahim Khan, the former head of "Azad Kashmir Government" said in Karachi that if India feared that US aid might be used in Kashmir it should settle the dispute peacefully by agreeing to appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator in Kashmir and quantum of troops for the period of plebiscite.

8. The joint committees of civil and military experts, formed in accordance with decisions made in Delhi during discussions between Nehru and Mohammad Ali from 17 to 20 August 1953, met in Delhi from 21 to 29 December 1953 and discussed the following preliminary conditions necessary for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir: (1) creation of



8. I appreciate what you have said about the Plebiscite Administrator.<sup>10</sup> But we cannot proceed to this appointment when even the preliminary issues have not been settled and there is little prospect of their settlement in the near future.

9. It is a matter of deep regret to me that, after our attempts to find a peaceful settlement of this difficult problem of Kashmir, a new series of events should have upset our calculations and prevented any future progress. It is not merely the Kashmir question that has become much more difficult, but a serious threat has arisen to India's security. We must take a grave view of these developments.

10. You have referred to Mr Ghulam Mohammad Bakhshi's speeches<sup>11</sup> and the decision of the Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State in regard to the State's accession to India.<sup>12</sup> Ever since the Constituent Assembly came into being, more than two years ago, our position in regard to it has been perfectly clear and has been stated in the Security Council and elsewhere. We said then that the Constituent Assembly was perfectly free to decide, as it liked, in regard to the State's accession or other matters, but, so far as we were concerned, we would abide by our international commitments. There has been at no time any question of our repudiating the decisions of the Constituent Assembly and indeed we have no right to do so. That elected Assembly has every right to express its wishes in any way it chooses. So far as we are concerned, the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State was legally and constitutionally complete in October 1947 and no question of confirming or ratifying it arises. Nevertheless, we had said that the people of Kashmir should be given an opportunity to express their wishes about their future, and we had agreed to a plebiscite under proper conditions. We have adhered to that position throughout, subject always to those conditions, which would ensure a fair and peaceful plebiscite. It is because those conditions have not been agreed to that delay has occurred.

11. I have not with me the texts of Mr Ghulam Mohammad Bakhshi's

10. Mohammad Ali in his letter of 4 February had written that he was prepared to reach immediately an agreement with Nehru to select a new Plebiscite Administrator in replacement of Nimitz.

11. See *ante*, p. 312, fn. 7.

12. In his letter of 24 February Mohammad Ali stated that the endorsement by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly of the proposal that Jammu and Kashmir accede to India violated the Delhi Agreement and India's commitments under UNCIP resolutions.

speeches<sup>13</sup> and I cannot judge from extracts taken out of their context. But, in any event, it is open to him to express his views as he chooses.

12. I would again repeat to you that the acceptance of military aid by Pakistan from the US has given an entirely new turn to the Kashmir dispute as well as to events in Asia. It is not India only that feels this way but other countries also, and it is a matter of the deepest regret to me that Pakistan should have embarked on a course which not only vitiates the atmosphere of peaceful cooperation so laboriously built up between our two countries but also imperils the freedom of Asian countries and brings in the intervention of a foreign power in Asia.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad addressing public meetings at Kalyani on 23 January, in New Delhi on 28 January and at Jammu on 7 February had said that Kashmir's accession to India was irrevocable and the Kashmir Constituent Assembly was meeting only to fulfill formalities of Kashmir's unbreakable bond with India and the plebiscite suggested by UN negotiator was a stratagem to drag Kashmir towards Pakistan.

## **9. Indian Forces in Kashmir and US Military Aid to Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

In my letters to the Pakistan Prime Minister, I stated that there was no point in officials meeting to consider the preliminaries to the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator.<sup>2</sup> If the officials could not agree on the last occasion, when the US military aid was not so much a live issue, much less were they likely to agree now. I made it clear that those preliminaries, more especially, the question of the quantum of forces on our side in Kashmir, had to be viewed on a new standpoint and we were not prepared to lessen our forces in view of this development. In other words, we want perfect freedom to make such dispositions of forces in the Jammu and Kashmir State as we consider necessary in view of the addition of strength to Pakistan by the military aid.

1. Note to the Commonwealth Secretary, New Delhi, 19 March 1954. JN Collection.  
2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 450-52; and *ante*, p. 320.



This is now the approach to one of these important preliminary issues. If that issue could be settled on the lines we have suggested, that is, leaving us free to keep any number of forces there that we consider proper (and the number would depend on the situation as it develops on the other side), then the next step can be taken and other preliminaries can be settled.

We have not basically changed our position in regard to Kashmir. It remains what it was, including the question of a Plebiscite Administrator. But a Plebiscite Administrator will have to be clearly a neutral and impartial person. We cannot consider any American even a neutral now, apart from our previous objection to a representative of the great powers. The Plebiscite Administrator can only be appointed after the preliminaries are settled. We are, therefore, stuck on the preliminaries which have taken a new aspect because of this military aid.

That is more or less the position at present.

Of course, all these new developments, including the elections in East Pakistan and their consequences, have to be watched.<sup>3</sup> The present moment is one of complete flux in Pakistan and till we see what emerges out of this, it is difficult to take any steps forward.

So far as a 'No-War declaration' is concerned, I have repeatedly put it forward<sup>4</sup> and there is nothing more to be said on my part. If Pakistan agrees to that on the lines suggested by us, we would certainly consider the question. Our High Commissioner<sup>5</sup> can, when opportunity arises, repeat this position of ours. He need not ask the Pakistan PM to write to me especially and put forward his proposals. My letters have already been sent and it is upto the Pakistan PM to send a reply when he chooses.

3. See *ante*, p. 97.

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14, Pt. 1, pp. 31-34, 65-67; Vol. 15, Pt. 1, pp. 316-317, 322-326; Vol. 15, Pt. II, pp. 303-307; Vol. 20, pp. 349-354 and Vol. 21, pp. 495-496, 498-500.

5. M.S. Mehta.

## 10. To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22nd March 1954

My dear Bakhshi,  
Recent events in Pakistan, and more especially the result of the elections in

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Vishnu Sahay.

East Bengal, have shaken up Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to say what changes might take place there. But one thing is certain that the old order has ended and something new will take its place. The position is very confusing and very unstable. It is possible that the military might play a more important role so that a new Central Cabinet might be formed. There are some disruptive tendencies in Pakistan which have become very obvious. But I do not think these will lead to any major change.

The East Bengal leaders have more or less expressed themselves against the US aid to Pakistan,<sup>3</sup> but it is the Army that wants the aid and they will take it, in spite of East Bengal. Nevertheless, the US Government is undoubtedly shaken up by these events.

In the changes that are likely to come in Pakistan, it is possible that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan will play a fairly important role. I do not mean that he will accept any office. But his popularity at present is undoubted and the East Bengal people will play this up.<sup>4</sup> In the Frontier Province the position is very unstable.<sup>5</sup>

I merely mention all this so that we might keep it in mind and look into the future. I cannot say how all this will react on the Kashmir problem. Some reaction there is bound to be. A new Central Government in Pakistan will

2. The defeat of the Muslim League in East Bengal, having 56 per cent of the total population of Pakistan, led to demands for the resignation of the Central Government and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly dubbed as unrepresentative. These demands were rejected by Mohammad Ali who said in the Constituent Assembly on 20 March that Provincial elections were held for deciding the character of the Provincial Government and the electorate was not called upon simultaneously to decide the character of the Central Government or the Central Legislature.
3. The Awami Muslim League (the leading party in the United Front) was hostile to acceptance of US military aid, which the provincial President of the League, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani denounced on 19 March as a "slave pact" with the "American imperialist war mongers."
4. Addressing the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 20 March, Ghaffar Khan said that for solidarity the people of Pakistan should respect one another's rights, interests and distinctive features and that six years ago also he had said that after establishment of Pakistan the country had no need for the Muslim League. "The recent elections in Bengal at last proved this contention," he added.
5. On 21 March 1954 in Karachi, Khan Abdus Samad Khan, the renowned leader of Baluchistan, demanded creation of Pakhtoonistan by grouping together the Paktoons of Baluchistan, NWFP, the tribal areas and Political Agencies. Earlier on 20 March Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan had also reiterated the demand for Pakhtoonistan in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.



probably make a new approach and possibly even a more friendly approach. It is conceivable that Badshah Khan might also, at a later stage, have something to say about it. He has been very cautious in his pronouncements and is not likely to rush in.<sup>6</sup> But with a new Government, it is conceivable that he might wish to discuss this matter with us. I am mentioning all this so that we might keep these possible developments in mind.

Suppose, later, Badshah Khan wants to meet you and suggests also his meeting Shaikh Abdullah. He would not do this of course in the near future, but there is always the possibility. What then are you to say? I cannot myself see how we can refuse him permission at that stage.

All this leads me to the conclusion that we should gradually prepare our minds for possible developments and take such minor steps now as might help later. You will remember that I suggested to you once to see Shaikh Abdullah casually and thus to bring some normality into the picture. When D.P. Dhar<sup>7</sup> was here, he said something about Kilam<sup>8</sup> visiting Shaikh Abdullah. I think that was a good idea.

I am merely mentioning these matters to you so that we can think about them and prepare the ground.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. In a press conference in Rawalpindi on 7 January 1954, Ghaffar Khan said that he had twice offered his services to the Pakistan Government to go to Kashmir to meet the people there to bring about a settlement, but nobody listened to him. When asked about his views on the dispute now, he said, "you know what is my position in Pakistan now."
7. Deputy Home Minister of Jammu & Kashmir at this time.
8. The reference is to Jia Lal Kilam, a leader of the Kashmiri Pandits and one of the founder members of the National Conference.

## 11. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3rd April 1954

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 3rd April<sup>2</sup> enclosing a copy of Mridula Sarabhai's<sup>3</sup> letter.<sup>4</sup>

Mridula has, ever since August last, taken up an attitude strongly in opposition not only to Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad's Government but also to the Government of India's policy in regard to it. Indeed, even before the incidents of August 1953 in Srinagar, which resulted in the removal of Shaikh Abdullah, she was opposed to Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad and some others in the Kashmir Government. The change-over there came to her as a great shock<sup>5</sup> and she was convinced that there was a deep conspiracy. I confess that I did not like the way things were done at the time in Srinagar and I have not fully approved of some other developments.<sup>6</sup> But by and large, I have felt that matters in Kashmir were drifting to a grave crisis in August last and something had to be done. Also that our Government had no alternative, in the circumstances, but to support Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad's Government. We have done that and we propose to continue doing it.

I have repeatedly drawn the attention of Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad to the activities of some persons in Kashmir which I thought were not desirable. More particularly, I have strongly advised against any propaganda against Shaikh Abdullah. Some recent pamphlets that were issued in Srinagar seemed to me in

1. JN Collection.
2. Rajendra Prasad solicited Nehru's advice regarding his proposed visit to Jammu, scheduled for 10-13 April in view of Mridula Sarabhai's advice that he should not go to Jammu and address the Constituent Assembly of Jammu & Kashmir. He pointed out that his programme of visit did not include any such address to the Constituent Assembly.
3. A prominent social worker. She denounced the dismissal of Shaikh Abdullah from the prime ministership of Jammu and Kashmir and, his arrest on 9 August 1953.
4. Sarabhai had in her letter of 29 March, stated that Shaikh Abdullah, was a victim of conspiracy and the present regime was going on a wrong path and that they had secured support of National Conference by terrorizing them. The people who had lost faith in the present regime would be further demoralised if the President of India addressed the Constituent Assembly and visited Jammu.
5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 23, pp. 309-20.
6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 23, pp. 327-28.



very bad taste. They were not officially issued by Government, but I understand that some Government members were sponsoring them. I wrote to Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad on this subject also.<sup>7</sup>

The Kashmir situation has been and is a very difficult one. There can be no doubt that Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad has coped with this with great vigour and success and he and his Government deserve credit for it. The difficulties continue. I give advice privately when some matter comes up before me, but I realise that it would not be fair for me to lessen in any way the responsibility and discretion of Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad and his Government. It is they who have directly to face these difficulties. We have either to support them fully or not to do so. There is no half-way course.

Mridula, I think, has convinced herself of conspiracies and the like and takes a very exaggerated view of the situation. I have, during the past few months, spoken to her quite frankly and told her that her attitude was wrong and harmful. But she is so convinced of her own rightness that my words have not carried much weight. Ultimately I told her that she should not discuss this matter with me at all, because that did no good. Having explained my own viewpoint, I did not wish to suppress her in any way and she could do what she liked.

I think that it would not be right for you at this stage to cancel your visit to Jammu. You should go there as planned. But, as I ventured to write to you before, you should keep aloof from any political turn that might be given to your visit. Even deputations with memoranda might not be agreed to, as publicity will no doubt be given to those memoranda. If any organisation wishes to present a memorandum, it might be desirable to tell them to send it directly to the Government of India or the Government of Kashmir.

Perhaps you might have a letter sent to Mridula that you cannot cancel your visit to Jammu which was fixed long ago and which had nothing to do with any political development and that you are not going to address the Constituent Assembly or otherwise participate in any political activity.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. See *ante*, p. 314.

## 12. To Ali Yavar Jung<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
15th May 1954

My dear Ali,<sup>2</sup>

This morning our newspapers here came out with the President's order about Kashmir.<sup>3</sup> They have given big headlines stating that this finalises the question of Kashmir. I have no doubt that Pakistan will make much of this and there will be some kind of a hue and cry there which might be reflected in some other places too. As a matter of fact, this President's Order is nothing very new. It was two years ago that we discussed with the Kashmir Government about certain matters affecting their Constitution and ourselves, which had been left undetermined and uncertain. As the Kashmir Constituent Assembly were drawing up their Constitution, it became necessary to state precisely what their relationship in regard to certain subjects was with India. This did not affect the basic question at all. An agreement was arrived at two years ago with Shaikh Abdullah and others.<sup>4</sup> A part of that agreement was the Sadar-i-Riyasat coming into the picture. Shaikh Abdullah gave effect to that part of the agreement relating to the Sadar-i-Riyasat<sup>5</sup> but not to any other part.<sup>6</sup> In fact, this was one of the points which created much dissatisfaction.

Some months ago, this question was taken up again as the Kashmir Constituent Assembly had to define precisely the subjects. The basic principle

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to V.K. Krishna Menon and Secretary General. Extracts.
2. India's Ambassador to Egypt.
3. On 14 May 1954 the President of India under Article 370 of the Constitution issued an Order superceding the earlier Constitution Order of 1950 envisaging the following: (1) The State Legislature was authorised to legislate in regard to immovable property, settlement in the State, and employment; (2) the Fundamental Rights enumerated in the Indian Constitution were to apply to the State, subject to the right of the State Legislature to provide for preventive detention in the interests of security of the State; (3) the State's Land reforms legislation was protected; (4) extended application of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India was provided for; (5) financial relations between Government of India and Kashmir were placed on the same footing as other component States of India and the State's customs duties were abolished; and (6) no decision affecting the disposition of the State was to be made by the Union Government without the State Government's consent.
4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 19, pp. 211-17.
5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 397-98.
6. Particularly relating to fundamental rights, appeals to the Supreme Court in case of denial of these rights and the action to be taken by the President under Article 352 of the Constitution.



was that Kashmir had joined the Indian Union on three subjects, namely, foreign affairs, defence and communications. The question, however, arose as to what was included in these three subjects and also what were certain other necessary consequences of joining the Union, quite apart from the three subjects. It was this that was decided in its broad aspects with Shaikh Abdullah but he did not implement it. So, this matter was taken up by the Bakhshi Government some months ago, and there were prolonged discussions in regard to petty details chiefly relating to financial matters, customs etc. A settlement was arrived at<sup>7</sup> and it has now been given effect to by the President's Order. This does not affect the assurances we have given internationally in regard to Kashmir. We cannot come in the way of the Kashmir Government or the Kashmir Constituent Assembly expressing its own opinion. We have made it clear to the United Nations previously that, so far as the Government of India are concerned, we hold on to those assurances.

It is true that there is a deadlock in regard to the implementation of those assurances. That deadlock occurred on account of the US military aid to Pakistan which changed the whole context of our discussions with Pakistan. There was the question of the quantum of military forces to be kept in Kashmir. We told Pakistan that this question has to be reviewed again in view of the military aid they were going to get from the US. Anyhow, there was this deadlock and this continues. What I want to make clear is that, so far as we are concerned, we have not gone back on any assurance that we have given. It is true that circumstances have changed and we do not quite know how it may be possible to take any further steps in this matter.

I am writing this to you just to give you some broad understanding of the position, as it might well be raised in Egypt and you may be asked about it.

I hope you and your wife are well.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, during the conference with Indian leaders in Delhi from 27 to 31 January 1954, had agreed to certain tentative arrangements with regard to the Delhi Agreement of 1952. Under this, the Union Government would have the right to impose custom duties, income tax and certain excises which in past were the concern of Kashmir Government for which Kashmir would be compensated by Union Government. The Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction in disputes between Kashmir and the Union Government with regard to fundamental rights and issue of *habeas corpus* and *mandamus* writs. The Supreme Court would enjoy appellate jurisdiction only in other matters.





## RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN





## I. US MILITARY AID

1. Repercussions of Military Aid<sup>1</sup>

... Now, I should like to refer to the proposed US aid to Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> Recently the House has seen that there has been a Pact between Turkey and Pakistan<sup>3</sup> and it is said that this is likely to be followed by some kind of arrangement between the United States and Pakistan for military aid. I spoke about this matter in December last,<sup>4</sup> before the House adjourned, and expressed our concern about it. That concern was not so much due to any ill-feeling against Pakistan—it was not at all due to that—and certainly not due to any ill-feeling against America. But, I felt then and I have felt strongly ever since that this step is a wrong step and a step which adds to the tensions of the world, to the fears of the world, a step which if it can be justified at all, can be justified only on one ground that it is a step towards peace and that it is a step towards ensuring security. No doubt I am prepared to accept that that is the feeling governing some of the people behind this step. But, I am quite clear in my mind—I need not labour that point, it is obvious—it seems to me that instead of adding to the security of the world or of Asia, it adds to the tension in Asia. It adds to the feelings of insecurity in Asia and it adds, therefore, to the fears and apprehensions in Asia and elsewhere. Therefore, it is a wrong step from the point of view of peace or removal of tensions. It may be that from some military point of view—I am no soldier—it may be justified. I cannot say that. But, I do submit that soldiers are very fine persons, and soldiers are very necessary,

1. Reply to debate on President's Address in the House of the People, 22 February 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, 1954, Vol. 1, Part II, cols. 431-434. Extracts.
2. On 22 February 1954, the Pakistan Prime Minister announced that his Government had approached the US Government for military assistance but had not offered any military bases to the USA. On 25 February US President agreed to comply with Pakistan's request and on 19 May the Defence Assistance Agreement between Pakistan and USA was signed.
3. The Governments of Pakistan and Turkey issued a joint statement on 19 February 1954 announcing that they had "agreed to study methods of achieving close and friendly collaboration in the political, economic, and cultural spheres as well as of strengthening peace and security in their own interest..." Mohammad Ali described the agreement as "the first concrete steps towards strengthening Moslem world." Ultimately, Pakistan and Turkey signed an agreement on 2 April, 1954.
4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 558-570.

at any rate, in the present day world, but when it comes to the judging of world affairs through the soldiers' eyes and ears, it is a dangerous thing. A soldier's idea of security is one thing; a politician's or statesman's may be somewhat different. They have to be coordinated. When war comes, the soldier is supreme and his voice prevails almost, not quite. But when it comes to the soldier's voice prevailing in peace time, it means that peace is likely to be converted into war.

How then do we balance? Here is this kind of evil enchantment over the world which prevents us from going in the right direction; here is the world with all the strength and power in it to solve the economic problems, poverty and all these things. For the first time in history, it has got strength and power to do it. But, instead of proceeding to do that and having a better future for the whole of humanity, we have these fears, and tensions and representation for war, and maybe war itself. It is an extraordinary thing.

How are we to lessen these tensions? Not by thinking in military terms all the time. I agree, and I accept this, that no country can ignore the military aspect. No country can weaken itself and offer itself as a target to some other country to take advantage of that weakness. Having accepted that, nevertheless, if one is to try for peace, it is not by talking of war, by issuing threats and by all the time preparing for war in a rather loud and aggressive way, whatever the country involved might be.

I have stated before that the Prime Minister of Pakistan, I believe and I am convinced, earnestly wishes, as I do, that there should be good relations between India and Pakistan. I have no doubt about his motives in this matter and I hope he has no doubt about mine. It is not a question of motives. If a step is taken which necessarily has some harmful results, all the best motives in the world cannot prevent them. Mr Mohammad Ali has made various statements about this matter. He has stated, first of all, "why should India object?" Of course, they are a free country; I cannot prevent them. But, if something affects Asia, India specially, are we to remain silent about it, if something, in our opinion, is a reversal of history after hundreds of years? We have thought in terms of freeing our countries, and one of the symbols of freedom has been the withdrawal of foreign armed forces. Of course, there may be a lack of freedom even then possibly, but, anyhow, an external symbol is the withdrawal of armed forces. and whatever the motive, I say the return of any armed forces or anything like it from any European or any American country is a reversal of the history of the countries of Asia. It was suggested some two or three years ago in connection with Kashmir—and I saw it was suggested by somebody only the other day—that some other countries send forces to Kashmir, some European or American country, whatever forces they might be. We rejected that completely because, so far as we can see, on no account, whatever the occasion may be, are we going to allow any foreign forces to land in India.



Now, that is our outlook, and that is something more than Indian outlook. It is an outlook, which, if I may say so, applies to the whole or a large part of this continent of Asia and therefore we viewed with apprehension—we viewed with regret as one views something which may not be perfectly clear but which is pointing in a wrong direction—this business of military aid coming from the United States to Pakistan. I am sure the United States Government had not these considerations before them because they think, naturally, in their own environment, and that is the difficulty. I dare not, and I am not prepared to express my opinion except in the most philosophical manner, about problems, distant problems, of Europe. I do not consider myself justified. But I do consider myself justified in expressing opinions about my own country, and to a slight extent, about my neighbours, and to a slightly less extent about Asian countries, not because India has the slightest desire for imposing its views or wishes on any other country—I have denied that; we seek no leadership; we are going to have no leadership over any other country—but because we have passed through similar processes of history in the last two hundred years or so, because we have had similar experiences; therefore, we can understand each other a little better. Therefore, if I speak, to some extent I may be in tune with some of my neighbour countries. If the Prime Minister of Burma speaks, he, or the head of any other country round about, is likely to be in tune with my thinking—I do not say I am the leader of Burma or the Prime Minister of Burma is the leader of India—because we have had this common background, common experiences. Therefore, it has led us to think to some extent in a common way, because we have common problems.

Now, the problems of Asia, therefore, have to be solved, and great powers and others should necessarily, because they are great powers, have a great interest in solving them, but if the great powers think that the problems of Asia can be solved minus Asia in a sense, or minus the views of Asian countries, then it does seem to be rather odd....

## 2. India and Military Aid<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Speaker, Sir, I am grateful for this opportunity to make

1. Statement in the House of the People, 1-March 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, *Official Report*, 1954, Vol. I, Part II, cols. 963-974. Extracts. Also available in the *Congress Bulletin*, 1954.

a statement in regard to a matter which is no doubt in the minds of most Members of this House as well as many people in the country. This relates to a recent letter which I received from the President of the United States of America, together with a copy of a statement which was issued by him. I received the letter on the 24th February, and both that letter and the statement, I believe, appeared in the public press on the morning of the 26th February. Honourable Members have seen those and I do not propose to read them, but for facility of reference, I am placing copies of that letter and that statement, as well as a copy of my reply, on the Table of the House.

Letter from the President of the United States of America to the Prime Minister of India delivered on February 24, 1954:—

“My dear Mr Prime Minister,

I send you this personal message because I want you to know about my decision to extend military aid to Pakistan before it is public knowledge and also because I want you to know directly from me that

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“My dear Mr Prime Minister,

I send you this personal message because I want you to know about my decision to extend military aid to Pakistan before it is public knowledge and also because I want you to know directly from me that this step does not in any way affect the friendship between our two countries. Quite the contrary, we will continually strive to strengthen and enduring friendship between our two countries.

Our two Governments have agreed that our views are in accord. It has also been understood that in the existing circumstances and our belief in how to deal with them it is the right and duty of sovereign nations to make their own decisions. Having studied long and carefully the problem of aggression in the Middle East, I believe that the interests of Pakistan and Turkey<sup>2</sup> about security problems are not only of Pakistan and Turkey, but also of the whole free world. Improvement in Pakistan's defensive capabilities will serve these interests and it is for this reason that our Government's views on this subject are elaborated in a public statement. I will release, a copy of which Ambassador Allen<sup>3</sup> will give you.

What we are proposing to do, and what we are not doing, is not directed in any way against India. And I am sure that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will take appropriate action, both in accordance with my constitutional authority,

2. See *ante*, p. 333, fn. 3.

3. George Venable Allen (1903-1970); American diplomatist; American Vice-Consul, Jamaica, 1930; US Ambassador to Nepal, 1953-54; Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, 1954-56; Director, Foreign Service Institute, 1960-68.



within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression. I believe the Pakistan-Turkey collaboration agreement which is being discussed, is sound evidence of the defensive purposes which both countries have in mind.

I know that you and your Government are keenly aware of the need for economic progress as a prime requisite for stability and strength. This Government has extended assistance to India in recognition of this fact, and I am recommending to Congress a continuation of substantial economic and technical aid for this reason.<sup>4</sup> We also believe that it is in the interest of the free world that India have a strong military defense capability and have admired the effective way your Government has administered your military establishment. If your Government should conclude that circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our mutual security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetic consideration.

I regret that there has been such a widespread and unfounded speculation on this subject. Now that the facts are known, I hope that the real import of our decision will be understood.

I am, my dear Prime Minister.

Sincerely,  
Dwight D. Eisenhower

Statement made by President Eisenhower:-

On February 19, Turkey and Pakistan announced their intention to study methods of achieving closer collaboration on various matters, including means designed towards strengthening peace and security. This Government welcomed this move and called it a constructive step towards better ensuring the security of the whole area of the Middle East. The Government of Pakistan has now asked the United States for grant of military assistance.

I have said repeatedly that regional groupings to ensure security against aggression constitute the most effective means to assure survival and progress. No nation can stand alone today. My report to the Congress on June 30, 1953 stated that we should strengthen efforts towards regional, political, military, and economic integration. I,

4. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 4 June 1954 said that, of the proposed general economic aid to be given by the USA, \$ 85,000 out of \$ 306,400,000 was for India and asked the Committee to support this request despite disagreements on foreign policy matters between the USA and India.

therefore, under the authority granted by the Congress, am glad to comply with Pakistan's request, subject to the negotiation of the required Mutual Defence Assistance Program agreement. This Government has been gravely concerned over the weakness of the defensive capabilities in the Middle East. It was with the purpose of helping to increase the defense potential in this area that the Congress in its last session appropriated funds to be used to assist those nations in the area which desired such assistance, which would pledge their willingness to promote international peace and security within the frame work of the United Nations, and which would take effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to peace.

Let me make it clear that we shall be guided by the stated purposes and requirements of the mutual security legislation. These include specifically the provision that equipment, materials or services provided will be used solely to maintain the recipient country's internal security and for its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area of which it is a part. Any recipient country also must undertake that it will not engage in any set of aggression against any other nation. These undertakings afford adequate assurance to all nations, regardless of their political orientation and whatever their international policies may be, that the arms the United States provides for the defense of the free world will in no way threaten their own security. I can say that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression. I would also consult with the Congress on further steps.

The United States earnestly desires that there be increased stability and strength in the Middle East, as it has desired this same thing in other parts of the free world. It believes that the aspirations of the peoples in this area for maintaining and developing their way of life and for realising the social advances close to their hearts will be best served by strength to deter aggression and to reduce the fear of aggression. The United States is prepared to help in this endeavour, if its help is wanted.

My reply<sup>5</sup> has not yet been published. It is a relatively brief reply and so I shall read it out to the House.

5. Sent on 28 February 1954.



"Dear Mr President,

I thank you for your personal message which your Ambassador in Delhi handed to me on February 24th. With this message was a copy of your statement in regard to the military aid being given by the United States to Pakistan. I appreciate the assurance you have given. You are, however, aware of the views of my Government and our people in regard to this matter. Those views and the policy which we have pursued, after the most careful thought, are based on our desire to help in the furtherance of peace and freedom. We shall continue to pursue that policy."

That is the reply. I should like to add a few more words in regard to this matter. In his letter, President Eisenhower, as the House knows, gave certain assurances, and stated what his objectives or motives were. I have at no time in this House challenged any individual's or any country's motives—I cannot go behind their motives. We have to consider facts as they are. So far as President Eisenhower is concerned, on my part I am convinced that certainly he bears no ill-will to India; he wishes well of India, and that he would not take any step to injure India. It is not a question of motives, but rather of certain results which inevitably follow certain actions, and it has seemed to us in regard to this matter of military aid to Pakistan, that the results were bound to be unfortunate. It is stated that the aid is merely meant to strengthen Pakistan so that it can defend itself against aggression, and also to ensure security and peace. It is not clear to me what kind of aggression and from what quarter it is feared. I am unable to see any danger of aggression on Pakistan from any quarter; but perhaps to throw light on this question, the Pakistan delegate to the United Nations, Mr Ahmed Bokhari,<sup>6</sup> only a day or two ago spoke in New York,<sup>7</sup> and made it clear as to what his fears were. He said: "We want the guarantee that the two biggest countries in Asia will leave us alone." He referred to China and India. Now, it is not again clear to me how China is going to invade Pakistan, whether it is going to come over the Karakoram Pass into Pakistan, or how it is going to get there. As for India, it is not necessary for

6. Ahmed Shah Bokhari (1898-1958); Pakistani Civil Servant; Station Director, AIR, Delhi, March 1936; Controller of Broadcasting later; Director-General, AIR, April 1940—October 1946; Leader, Pakistan Delegation to India Office Partition Negotiations, London 1947; Under Secretary in charge of Public Information, UN Secretariat, 1955. Author of: *Misir Ki Raquasa*, *Patras-Ke-Mazamin*; both in Urdu.

7. At a meeting organised by the Citizens' Conference on International Economic Union in New York on 26 February, Bokhari said: "We have strong neighbours to the north and south. We have a right to protect our integrity and we don't have to go on apologizing for the military aid we are going to receive."

me to remind the House as to what our attitude has been. I may say a little about it later.

So far as ensuring security and peace are concerned, one need not go into any argument about it. It is a fact that since this aid has been announced there has been greater insecurity and greater tension. Whatever, as I said, the motives may be, the result, the fact, is there—that there has been in India, in Pakistan, an upsetting of things as they were and a sense of insecurity. In other countries in Asia, West and other, there has also been a sense of the situation becoming, if I may say so, “fluid”, and a certain apprehension as to what the consequences might be.

Now, so far as India is concerned, the House will remember that for the last three years we have repeatedly offered a No-War Declaration to Pakistan.<sup>8</sup> A No-War Declaration is, what is called in perhaps more precise language a Non-Aggression Pact. Now we have offered that repeatedly and Pakistan has been repeatedly rejecting that for whatever reason it may be. If there had been such a No-War Declaration or Non-Aggression Pact, obviously that would have eased tension between the two countries and in surrounding areas and produced a greater feeling of security in both countries, it would have helped us to solve the problems that face us. Now it is in the context of this rejection of our proposal for a No-War Declaration that we have to view this military aid from the United States to Pakistan. I venture to say that it is not easy to even imagine any aggression on Pakistan as things are, either from that great country China, or from India, regardless, I say, of motives about it. I am looking at the barest physical possibilities of the matter.

How then does this question of aggression arise and is made a pretext for this kind of military aid being given, from Pakistan's side? I am wholly unaware of any possible reason which I can understand. For my part, I would welcome the strengthening of Pakistan, economically, even militarily, in the normal sense, if they build themselves up I have no complaint. But this is not a normal procedure. This is a very abnormal procedure, upsetting normality, and in so far as it upsets normality it is a step away from peace.

Now, the President of the United States has stated that if the aid given to Pakistan is misused and directed against another in aggression he will undertake to thwart such aggression. I have no doubt that the President is opposed to aggression. But we know from past experience that aggression takes place and nothing is done to thwart it. Aggression took place in Kashmir six and a half years ago with dire consequences. Nevertheless, the United States have not thus far condemned it and we are asked not to press this point in the interests of peace! Aggression may take place again and be denied, as the previous aggression was denied till it could not be hidden. If conditions are created for

8. See *ante*, p. 323, fn. 4.



such an aggression to take place it may well follow, in spite of the desire of the United States to prevent it. Later long arguments will be carried on as to whether it was aggression or not. The military aid given by the United States to Pakistan is likely to create the conditions which facilitate and encourage aggression.

The President of the United States has been good enough to suggest that he would consider sympathetically any request from us for military aid. In making this suggestion the President has done less than justice to us or to himself. If we object to military aid being given to Pakistan, we would be hypocrites and unprincipled opportunists to accept such aid ourselves.

As I have said repeatedly, this grant of military aid by the United States to Pakistan creates a grave situation for us in India and for Asia. It adds to our tensions. It makes it much more difficult to solve the problems which have confronted India and Pakistan. It is vitally necessary for India and Pakistan to solve these problems and to develop friendly and cooperative relations which their geographical position as neighbours as well as their long common history demand. These problems can only be solved by the two countries themselves and not by the intervention of others. It is indeed, this intervention of other countries in the past that has come in the way of their solution. Recently a new and more friendly atmosphere had been created between India and Pakistan, and by direct consultations between the two Prime Ministers progress was being made towards the solution of these problems. That progress has now been checked and fresh difficulties have arisen.

The military aid being given by the United States to Pakistan is a form of intervention in these problems which is likely to have more far-reaching results than the previous types of intervention.

At the present moment there is a considerable number of American Observers attached to the United Nations' team on either side of the "ceasefire" line in the Jammu and Kashmir State. These American Observers can no longer be treated by us as neutrals in this dispute, and hence their presence there appears to us to be improper.

I have referred previously to the wider aspects of this aid, aspects which may affect that whole of Asia. Many countries in Asia have recovered their freedom after long years of colonial subjection. They prize their freedom, and any intervention which lessens their freedom is considered by us to be harmful and a step away from both freedom and peace.

Recently, on the 26th January the Assistant Secretary of State in the United States, Mr Walter S. Robertson,<sup>9</sup> made a statement to the House Appropriations Sub-Committee of the Congress of the United States of America. Now, I have

9. Walter Spencer Robertson (1893-1970); Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1953-59.

no official record of the statement. The statement was made on January 26th. It was released, I believe, on February 23rd or 24th. I have to rely on press reports of which I have two, which are not identical though the meaning perhaps is much the same. One press report states that he told the House Appropriations Sub-Committee of the Congress that the USA must dominate Asia for an indefinite period and pose a military threat against Communist China until it breaks up internally. Another report says that the US must hold a posture of strength in Asia for an indefinite period till those results follow. Whether it is a posture of strength or clear domination,—I do not know what the exact words were, the idea behind it appears to be much the same. This testimony, as I said, was made public about five days ago. It is known that India's policy in regard to the People's Government of China differs from that of the USA. We have recognised this Government in China and have friendly relations with it. Our two policies, therefore, in this respect are wholly opposed to each other. What is more important is that a responsible official of the US should say that it is their policy that the USA must dominate Asia for an indefinite period. Whatever the objective may be, the countries of Asia, and certainly India, do not accept this policy and do not propose to be dominated by any country for whatever purpose. It is in this wider context that we must view these recent developments and more especially the military aid to Pakistan.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan has stated<sup>10</sup> that by the receipt of this military aid, a momentous step forward has been taken towards the strengthening of the Muslim world and that Pakistan has now entered a glorious chapter in its history and is now cast for a significant role in world affairs. It is not for me to criticise what the Pakistan Prime Minister says, but I have endeavoured to understand how the Muslim world is going to be strengthened through arms supplied by a foreign power, and how any country is going to play a significant role in world affairs relying on military aid from another country.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan has also stated that this military aid will help to solve the Kashmir problem. That is an indication of the way his mind works and how he thinks this military aid might be utilized. Military aid is only utilised in war or in a threat of war.

There is another aspect which I should like to mention. These separate pacts between countries take place, some of them in the nature of military alliances. It is for us and others to consider how far they are in consonance with the spirit of the UN Charter, even with the letter, I might say. But, I am not for the moment speaking in legal or juristic terms. The United Nations was formed for a particular purpose. And the Charter lays down that purpose. I

10. On 25 February.



would like the House to consider—this is not the time to discuss this matter—how far those purposes are being furthered by all these developments that we see in regard to countries linking up militarily against other countries, both sides often being represented in the United Nations.

Also it is becoming rather significant how discussions on particular vital matters affecting world peace are avoided in the United Nations General Assembly, and when something is discussed, previous decisions have been taken which almost appear to be imposed upon the United Nations in the General Assembly. That, I submit, is not the way either to work the United Nations to fulfil the purposes of the Charter or to remove the tensions of the world.

The world suffers today from an enormous amount of suspicion and fear. And we have to judge every matter from this point of view as to whether it adds to suspicion and fear or lessens them. Can there be any doubt that the recent step taken in regard to military aid being given to Pakistan is a step which adds to suspicions and fears and therefore the tensions of the world, instead of bringing about any feeling of security?

There is another small matter—not a small but relevant matter relating to Kashmir. The House will remember its long history and how for the last two years among the questions being discussed has been the quantum of forces to be left in Kashmir with a view to having afterwards a plebiscite; that is, a reduction of forces—sometimes it is called demilitarization. There has thus far been no agreement on that issue. Now the whole issue has to be considered from an entirely different point of view when across the border, across the “ceasefire” line on the other side, large additional forces are being thrust from outside in Pakistan and put at the disposal of Pakistan. It does make a difference. I said some time back, that this military aid was changing the balance of things in India and Asia. I was not thinking so much of the relative military strength of Pakistan or India, although that of course is a relevant matter, but I was rather thinking of all these other aspects, to some of which I have drawn the attention of the House.

India has no intention of surrendering or bartering her freedom for any purpose or under any compulsion whatever.

In this grave situation that has arisen this House and the country will, I have no doubt, stand united. This is no party matter, but a national issue, on which there can be no two opinions.<sup>11</sup>

11. After this Nehru gave the details of the strength and disposition of the UN Military Observers in Jammu and Kashmir State on both sides of the ceasefire line as on 13 November 1953.

## II INDUS WATERS TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

### 1. World Bank's Proposals on Canal Waters<sup>1</sup>

I have read all these papers.

2. The President of the International Bank wrote to me a letter some time ago and sent me the International Bank's full proposal regarding the use of canal waters by India and Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> I passed on this letter to CS and the Ministry of Irrigation & Power. I am not quite sure if this letter has been acknowledged thus far. Obviously it has to be replied to by me. No reference is made in these papers as to what reply I should send. Presumably my reply would be similar to the reply that Mr Khosla<sup>3</sup> intends sending to General Wheeler.<sup>4</sup>

3. As for the proposed reply by Mr Khosla, I do not see why we should be asked to commit ourselves finally in regard to every particular, before Pakistan discloses its hand. Thus far they have said nothing. I should have thought it quite enough for us to say that we accept the general principles governing this proposal, but in drawing up any agreement on the basis of it, naturally careful drafting will be necessary and a number of relatively minor matters will have to be cleared up. If Pakistan also accepts the general principles of the proposal as we have done, then we can proceed to these details and to the drafting.

1. Note to the Commonwealth Secretary, New Delhi, 15 March 1954. Copies of the note were sent to the Ministry of Irrigation & Power and Vishnu Sahay. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. On 5 February 1954, Raymond A. Wheeler, the World Bank Representative in the Indus Basin Working Party sent the following proposals for the development and use of the Indus Basin Waters: (1) The entire flow of the Western rivers—Indus, Jhelum and Chenab would be available for exclusive use of Pakistan, except for a small volume from Jhelum for Kashmir. (2) The entire flow of the Eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, Sutlej would be available for the exclusive use of India except that for a specified period, transitional in nature, India would supply to Pakistan withdrawals from these rivers, which would be calculated on the basis of the time estimated to be required to complete the link canals needed in Pakistan to make transfers for the purpose of replacing supplies from India. (3) Each country would construct works located on its territories, but the cost of Pakistan's link canals mentioned above would be met by India.
3. A.N. Khosla was the Indian Designee to the Indus Basin Working Party.
4. Raymond Albert Wheeler (1885-1974); engineer; Assistant Engineer of maintenance of Panama Canal, 1927-30; Principal Administrative Officer of the Allied South East Asia Command, 1943; Chief of US Army Corps of Engineers, 1945-49; joined IBRD as consultant engineer, 1949; the World Bank representative in the Indus Basin Working Party at this time.



4. Some such reply should meet the situation without our rejecting it and without our accepting every small detail.

5. The reply can be sent, as suggested, round about the fourth week of March.<sup>5</sup>

6. It has always been Pakistan's practice not to commit itself to anything and to get our commitment. The result is that the next stage of the basis of discussion is our commitment and their lack of commitment. Why should we be in this position?

7. I agree generally that we should not appear to reject in any way the Bank's proposal. But why should it be necessary for us to swallow every little bit of it wholesale at this stage?...

5. The formal Indian reply sent by A.N. Khosla to R.A. Wheeler on 25 March pointed out that if India gave up, as proposed, her intention to withdraw waters from Chenab at Marhu, some part of Rajasthan would remain desert for ever. The financial burden imposed on India for paying the cost of link canals in Pakistan would cause serious blow to economic development of the country but in the interest of a speedy and constructive settlement, India would accept the Bank proposals as the basis of agreement, to be worked out in detail, which should also safeguard existing uses of water within Jammu and Kashmir. Indian acceptance of the proposals was given with the expectation that Pakistan would also accept the same at an early date. It was also mentioned that regarding new projects in both countries expected to be opened shortly an *ad hoc* agreement about them might be reached.

## 2. Cable to Eugene R. Black<sup>1</sup>

We have now examined the proposals of the International Bank for development and use of Indus basin waters forwarded with our letter of 8th February. We welcome the Bank's attempt to help in the solution of this problem and, as suggested in your letter, we are prepared to accept generally the principles governing the Bank proposals as the basis of agreement.

2. Our delegation in the Indus Basin Working Party<sup>2</sup> will formally indicate

1. New Delhi, 19 March 1954, JN Collection. Also available in *Indo-Pakistan Dispute Over the Distribution of Indus Waters*, Vol. IV, Part III, Union Ministry of Irrigation.
2. The Indus Basin Working Party consisted of Indian Designee A.N. Khosla assisted by D.D. Jaini, J.K. Malhotra, Barkat Ram and four others; Pakistan Designee M.A. Hamid assisted by Pir Mohammad Ibrahim, S.I. Mahbub, M.S. Quraishy, A. Hassan and Khan Sarwar Jan Khan, K. Rahman and A. Tariq. The World Bank Representative in the Working Party was R. A. Wheeler, assisted by Neil Bass and Harry Bashore.

our attitude to the Bank proposals. The actual agreement, which will be worked out with the assistance of the Bank authorities, will naturally deal with a number of details including the question of the small requirement of Jammu and Kashmir.<sup>3</sup>

3. If Pakistan also agrees to accept the general principles governing the Bank proposal as the basis of agreement, we can go on to the next stage of considering details with the assistance of the Bank which you have so kindly offered.

3. Regarding the Jhelum, the Bank proposal had provided for continued enjoyment by India of the uses already developed but no provision was made for any new irrigation development from this river in Indian territory. The proposal denied India the right to tap the Chenab in her territory as India was planning to withdraw waters of Chenab at Marhu and Merala.

### III. EVACUEE PROPERTIES

#### 1. To Mohammad Ali<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
6th March 1954

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of the 4th February dealing with various questions relating to evacuee property, outstanding between our two Governments.

2. I understand from our Ministry of Rehabilitation that they have, in the interest of expediting the ratification of the decisions reached between our two Advisers in July/August last<sup>2</sup>, agreed to exclude the decisions on shrines and holy places, and that your Government have ratified the rest of the decisions,

1. JN Collection.

2. Mehr Chand Khanna, and Ahmed E.B. Jaffer, Advisers to India and Pakistan Governments respectively discussed the evacuee property question in Karachi between 27 July—13 August 1953. Agreement was reached on: refund of cash securities and deposits of contractors; on Joint Committees to assess compensation where it had not been determined for immovable property allocated or acquired; release of postal articles; restoration of seized articles etc. It was decided that questions about bulk transfer of lockers, restoration of properties of joint-stock companies were to be discussed later. It was agreed that question of properties allotted to places of worship should be taken up apart from trust properties and a report on the trust properties, by Joint Committees was to be prepared within three months.



and also, given decisions on most of the outstanding matters which had been reserved for consideration. Though I cannot accept your Government's version of the causes of delay in the ratification of the Agreement,<sup>3</sup> I do not propose to enter into an argument about this question. I hope, however, that the decisions on shrines and holy places, which are the subject of a separate demi-official reference to your Ministry of the Interior, will soon be formally ratified by your Government, and that the new agreements will be implemented both in the spirit and the letter, and with all possible speed.

3. You say that the impression which you gave me during the course of our meeting in Delhi in August last<sup>4</sup>, that your Government had accepted our proposals in regard to lockers and safe deposits, properties of joint stock companies, shares, securities, debentures, etc., and evacuee bank accounts, is not correct and that your suggestions are now under the active consideration of your Government. As a considerable time has elapsed since we met in August last and as you had accepted the principles underlying our suggestions, I feel that there should be no difficulty in persuading your Cabinet to accept them. You will agree with me that a decision on these matters would afford relief to a large number of refugees on either side and I trust that you will convey early acceptance of these decisions.

4. I must confess I have been unable to appreciate your stand with regard to the disposal of old and dilapidated evacuee property by public auction.<sup>5</sup> We cannot afford to be helpless witnesses to the destruction of these properties, in many cases endangering human lives. Only recently two evacuee houses collapsed resulting in the death of seven or eight persons. These dilapidated properties cannot be saved except at a disproportionately heavy cost which is not warranted by the condition and nature of the buildings and for which funds are not available in the evacuees' accounts. It is, I reiterate, in the interest of evacuees and it will be conducive to proper administration of evacuee property if such properties are sold and sale-proceeds thereof credited to the evacuees' accounts. The last rainy season, as I had foreseen, has resulted in further deterioration and destruction of a number of such properties. The next rainy season is not far off and it will be necessary for us to take suitable action this time to prevent avoidable losses.

3. On 4 February Mohammad Ali had written that since the draft prepared by the Government of India containing conclusions reached during Karachi discussions did not adhere strictly to the decisions reached in Karachi, there was delay in ratification of the agreement by the Pakistan Government.
4. From 17 to 20 August 1953.
5. Mohammad Ali commented that such a course of action would tantamount to expropriation and would not be in the interest of the evacuees concerned. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, p. 329.

5. In para 7 of your letter, you say that my Rehabilitation Minister made an announcement to the effect that out of the rents received from evacuee property and the sale proceeds of movables, some 8 or 10 crores have been credited to the "Compensation Pool" for the benefit of Indian refugees. This is not a fact. All the money recovered as rents or sale-proceeds are lying to the credit of the Custodians in the name of evacuee owners. I wish you had first ascertained the correct facts from us before drawing inferences.

6. I now come to the most important question of immovable evacuee property. You are probably aware that prior to January 1949, i.e., in March 1948, the Joint Official Committee had recommended the settlement of agricultural evacuee property on Government to Government level, the difference between the value of such properties in the two countries being paid by one country to the other. The Inter-Dominion Conference of January 1949 had, however, deferred the consideration of this recommendation. Meanwhile, it was agreed that the two countries should exchange revenue records in respect of agricultural evacuee lands and that the six-monthly statements of rent collections of agricultural lands in the two countries should be exchanged and accounts adjusted through the Auditors-General of the two countries. In respect of urban immovable evacuee property, it was agreed that private sales and exchanges should be permitted and also adjustments should be made in respect of rent collections from the urban property as in the case of agricultural lands. Shortly after this Agreement, however, difficulties arose in the implementation of certain provisions of the Agreement. A Conference of the representatives of the two countries was, accordingly, held in June 1949, but it failed to come to any decision. Thereafter, on the 26th July 1949, the Government of Pakistan promulgated an Ordinance banning sales and exchanges of evacuee properties and on the 30th July, 1949, we were compelled to take similar steps.

7. Since then only revenue records have been exchanged, but no rental statements in respect of agricultural or urban properties have been exchanged nor have any adjustments of rents taken place. The January 1949 Agreement has thus become a dead letter since the middle of 1949.

8. After the exchange of some correspondence, my Ministry of Rehabilitation addressed a letter to your Government in respect of evacuee property on the 15th December 1949, but this remained unreplied for almost three years. Thereafter, with a view to resolve this deadlock, my Ministry of External Affairs sent comprehensive proposals to your Government in their letter No. CS(T)/8 dated the 13th October, 1952 for the settlement of these issues. We suggested that the two Governments should take over the evacuee immovable properties left behind in their respective countries and compensate the evacuee owners according to the principles which might be decided by negotiation between the two countries. We also intimated that, if direct negotiations proved unfruitful, we would be prepared to refer the question of the method of valuation



to arbitration or to an impartial tribunal agreed upon between the two countries or, if it was so desired, the matter might be referred to an international court or an *ad hoc* court consisting of the nominees of the two Governments. In reply, under your letter No. 3(II)8/8/52 dated the 5th March, 1953, you rejected our offer not only of Government to Government settlement but also of reference of the matter to an impartial body.

9. At this stage your predecessor, Khwaja Nazimuddin, suggested settlement of all outstanding issues between our two Governments by negotiation and personal discussion<sup>6</sup> and on your coming to office, you also supported this move.<sup>7</sup> As a result, you and I had a general discussion about this question in London<sup>8</sup> and in Karachi<sup>9</sup> and our officers discussed this question at Karachi in July/August last. In spite of these discussions, no progress has, however, been made with regard to a solution of this important issue.

10. It is against this background that you have to view our Interim Compensation Scheme<sup>10</sup>. Ever since Partition, all our efforts to come to a satisfactory solution in regard to immovable evacuee property have met with failure. In the meanwhile, discontent and a sense of frustration amongst displaced persons have been mounting. Even the pending negotiations did not hold out much hope of solution and, therefore, with a view to afford some relief to a section of displaced persons, we decided in November 1953 to sanction the Interim Compensation Scheme. As its name implies, it is of an interim nature and is, for the time being, limited to certain categories of displaced persons who are in great distress. In formulating the scheme, we took care to see that it did not affect the rights of evacuees in the properties left behind.

11. The quasi-permanent allotment of evacuee property provided for in the Interim Compensation Scheme is not new in principle. Your Government have settled evacuee agricultural lands in West Pakistan on a provisionally permanent basis and we have done likewise. A temporary occupant of a house has no

6. On 28 March 1953.

7. On 24 April 1953.

8. While attending the Coronation ceremony and Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London, the two Prime Ministers held informal talks on outstanding problems between India and Pakistan on 5, 6 and 12 June 1953.

9. From 25 to 28 July 1953.

10. Put through by the Government of India on 28 November 1953 to utilise the evacuee property in India to meet in part the claims for compensation filed by the displaced persons from Pakistan, this scheme envisaged compensation pool to be set up out of proceeds of the rents paid by occupiers of the urban evacuee property in India plus the value of such property expressed in terms of money. The sum thus arrived at (Rs. 100 crores) was to be augmented by providing for about Rs. 90 crores in the form of property constructed by the Central and State Governments for the use of displaced persons.

interest in its proper upkeep. We, therefore, felt that if a greater personal interest is created in the allottee, the properties would be better maintained and preserved. Under the Interim Compensation Scheme, the proprietary rights of the evacuee owner remains intact and I fail to understand how the scheme can be construed as having presented you with a *fait accompli*.<sup>11</sup>

12. You have referred to my Rehabilitation Minister's statement to the effect that a sum of Rs. 200 crores is to be distributed as compensation amongst 3,90,000 displaced persons, half of which represents the estimated value of Muslim evacuee property left in India and the balance the Government of India's contribution towards this compensation. This has nothing to do with the Interim Compensation Scheme but relates to the ultimate compensation scheme envisaged by us according to which the assets available for compensation will consist of the evacuee property in India, the Government of India's contribution and such sums as we may receive from your Government on account of the difference in values of evacuee properties in the two countries. A final decision on this has, however, been deferred pending negotiations with Pakistan. We had anticipated that, in view of my personal appeals to you, it would be possible to arrive at a settlement on the evacuee property issue before the end of the present Interim Compensation programme. Therefore, your statement that the Interim Compensation Scheme constitutes a "flagrant repudiation" of the 1949 Agreement is unwarranted. This Agreement has, in anycase, as I have already mentioned, remained a dead letter and the provisions regarding private sales and exchanges were rendered inoperative by the ban placed by the Pakistan Government in July 1949. The implementation of the Interim Compensation Scheme should, therefore, in my view, not come in the way of our efforts to find a solution of the evacuee property issue and I suggest that this question should also be discussed at the proposed talks in April next.

13. You have again repeated the suggestion that the urban evacuee properties might be privately sold or exchanged. We have the experience of private sales and exchanges during the few months that the Agreement of 1949 was operative. This is not encouraging. I have no doubt that the position would not be much different if the experiment is tried again. I regret to say that I do not share your faith in the effectiveness of the private agencies, but, even assuming that they function satisfactorily, in my view, this method can never constitute a complete or satisfactory solution of the whole problem.

14. We have, during the course of lengthy correspondence and negotiations,

11. Mohammad Ali in his letter had stated that the Interim Compensation Scheme, would mean that the Government of India had decided to take over all Muslim evacuee property in India and appropriate it for compensating the refugees and thus before he could carry further discussions to solve the evacuee property issue, he had been presented with a *fait accompli*.



detailed our manifold objections to private sales and exchanges and it is not necessary for me to reiterate all of them here. You will, however, agree that the sale value of property is determined largely by the rental income therefrom. You would be aware that soon after the January 1949 Agreement, your Government reduced the rents of evacuee urban properties payable by refugees by 80% and by other tenants by 33%. When Shri Mohanlal Saksena, the then Rehabilitation Minister, protested against this arbitrary reduction, your Government declined to consider the matter. Thus, by this action your Government have effectively depressed the value of evacuee property to the detriment of the evacuees here.

15. Apart from this, the properties are mostly occupied by refugees who cannot now be displaced and unless vacant possession of properties is given it will be difficult to find a buyer, specially in small towns. Further, if lakhs of properties are suddenly put on the market for sale, there is bound to be a fall in prices. On account of these factors, the evacuee owners will never get a fair and reasonable return by private sales.

16. According to our estimate, the value of the evacuee properties left by the Muslim migrants in India is about one-fifth of the value of the properties abandoned by the non-Muslim migrants in Pakistan. I do not expect you to accept this estimate. But I do not think that it can be seriously challenged that the value of the non-Muslim evacuee property in Pakistan is substantially higher than the value of the evacuee property in India. Private sales and exchanges, even if they were successful, could therefore, only touch a small fraction of the evacuee property in Pakistan, and it is obvious that in a scramble between private persons to sell or exchange their properties the small man will suffer the most. Your Government have not, during the course of lengthy negotiations and correspondence extending over years, even once suggested as to how the question of the large number of evacuee properties which will remain undisposed of by private sales and exchanges will be tackled.

17. Your letter does not give any indication as to how your Government wishes to solve the problem in respect of evacuee agricultural lands. I do not think it can be seriously suggested that these can be privately sold and exchanged at this stage after a lapse of about seven years during which lakhs of refugees on both sides have been settled thereon.

18. Under the circumstances, I would request you once again to consider our proposal that the problem of evacuee immovable property should be settled on a Government to Government basis. This suggestion is not without precedent in international affairs. In our own times when a large-scale movement of population from one country to the other has taken place,—though not on anything like what happened in this continent after Partition—settlement of their properties has been reached on Government to Government level. I would, therefore, repeat our earlier offer, namely:

- (i) the two Governments should take over evacuee immovable property in their respective countries and compensate the evacuee owners;
- (ii) the properties in the two countries may be valued according to agreed principles, debtor country paying to the creditor country the difference in the value of the properties left in the two countries. If direct negotiations fail, the question of the method of valuation may be referred for arbitration to an international tribunal agreed upon between the two Governments. If so desired, the matter may be referred to an international court or an *ad hoc* court consisting of the nominees of the two Governments.;
- (iii) on the question of the payment of difference in value of the properties on the two sides, we feel it should be possible to arrive at a workable agreement after taking into account the paying capacity of the debtor country; and
- (iv) concurrently with the decision to settle this question at governmental level, operation of the evacuee property law may be suspended in both the countries in respect of future cases.

19. Lastly, we agree to your suggestion that talks between the representatives of the two Governments should be resumed. As this is the first week of March, I would suggest a meeting in the beginning of April or earlier as you decide. We shall be glad to receive your delegation here. I hope it will be possible then to discuss not only the outstanding matters relating to movable property but also the major issue of the immovable evacuee property—both urban and rural—and to reach a final settlement thereon. At the same time, discussions may also be held in regard to the working of the Banking Agreement of 1949<sup>12</sup> which has been linked by your Government with the question of bulk transfer of lockers. Your Finance Ministry have, I understand, already agreed to the holding of discussions in respect of the Banking Agreement at the same time as the talks in respect of movable evacuee property.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. Agreement on Banking between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan was signed in Lahore on 23 April 1949.



## 2. To Mohammad Ali<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
7th May 1954

My dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to you about the evacuee property question, about which I have so often addressed you. It is almost a year since the officials of our two countries discussed this question. At various times during this year I have had talks with you on this subject and I have written to you a number of letters also; the last one dealing with evacuee property was on March 6, 1954.

2. A further meeting of our officers was to have been held in August 1953. It has not taken place yet, and I do not how long we shall have to wait for it and with what prospects. After I met you in Karachi in July last, I had great hopes that it would be possible for our two Governments to agree to a realistic and workable solution of the problem. Those hopes have not been fulfilled. Indeed, apart from no effective decisions having been taken, we have not even been able to agree to a definite date for the resumption of the talks.

3. This problem is more than six years old now and my colleagues and I have given it repeated and anxious consideration, as you and your colleagues must also have done. It is unfortunate that a question involving the well-being of millions of people, both in India and Pakistan, should have remained pending all this time and that our respective Governments could not have solved it by agreement. I do not give up hope that some time or other we shall be able to agree. But meanwhile, it is becoming increasingly difficult to allow matters to drift. That is harmful to all concerned both in India and Pakistan. Both our Governments have done something for the refugees. On our part, we have also had an Interim Compensation Scheme, but this benefits only a small section of the displaced persons and others are in urgent need of succour and help.

4. Then, there is the problem of the rapid deterioration of many of these evacuee properties. Both in the interests of the evacuee owners of these properties and from the point of view of preventing the gradual collapse of these houses etc., it has become an urgent matter to deal with them in some manner. You will remember my talking to you about this in London in June last year. At your request, we postponed action then and, since then, we have been continually postponing it. Now another rainy season is near and further postponement would mean considerable loss to all concerned and, more especially, to the owners of the properties. As I pointed out to you then and later, this does not mean our affecting the rights of owners in so far as the value of those properties that are disposed of, are concerned. That right remains, and whatever is realised from

1. JN Collection.

them will be held on their account till some settlement is arrived at between the two Governments.

5. Another question that has been troubling me for a long time has been the evacuee property laws which, both in India and Pakistan, are exceedingly unusual and abnormal and which have caused a great deal of harm to large numbers of people. It was my hope that we could put an end to these laws by agreement in both our countries. But as any agreement on this question of evacuee property seems to be a very long time in coming, we have decided to take action ourselves. We have come to the decision that in future these evacuee property laws should have no application. Naturally they will continue to apply to such evacuee properties as are already in control of the Custodian of Evacuee Properties or such as are being considered by him. But we shall not apply it in future. That is to say that there will be no restriction in future on anyone owning property here, whether he goes to Pakistan or anywhere else. This decision, I hope, will be appreciated by you, because it puts an end to this abnormal legislation which has affected so many people.

6. In regard to the evacuee immovable properties in India, especially the large number of petty houses etc., we have decided to take action to acquire the rights and title of the evacuee owners in these properties and to utilise these properties for giving part compensation to displaced persons. The final settlement of this problem, including that of compensation, must await the ultimate settlement between our two countries. As I have said above, this will be in the interests of the evacuee owners themselves, because it will prevent further deterioration. Evacuee owners will get credit for the values of these properties. We shall naturally proceed in this matter carefully so as to realise as high a value as possible. We intend to introduce legislation soon on both the subjects mentioned above. The legislation will necessarily take some time to pass, but it will be introduced in Parliament, we hope, fairly soon. In so far as the abrogation of the evacuee property law for the future is concerned, we shall take executive action to prevent any future application from now onwards without waiting for the passage of the legislation. In so far as the other matter is concerned, the proposed legislation will make a provision for the payment of compensation to evacuee owners in accordance with the terms of settlement that may be reached with Pakistan on a reciprocal basis. This decision on our part should not, therefore, prejudice any negotiations between our two countries in regard to the settlement of the evacuee property issue.

7. I would again suggest to you that it will be desirable for a meeting to take place of the officers of the two Governments in the near future to consider and settle the problems relating to evacuee immovable property as also the outstanding items relating to the movable property. At this conference the progress of implementation of the agreement already reached in respect of movable property may also be reviewed and the working of the Banking



Agreement of 1949 discussed. If you so prefer, we might only consider for the moment the question of movable property and the Banking Agreement of 1949. We can consider the question of immovable property later.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## IV. RECOVERY OF ABDUCTED WOMEN

### 1. Rehabilitation of Abducted Women<sup>1</sup>

S.S. More wanted to know the figures of recovery of abducted women from Pakistan and India. He also asked whether those women recovered from Pakistan were married again and had children and if so, what would happen to the children and to the new ties to which the women had been acclimatized even under duress.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The problem that the honourable Member has raised is a very important and basic problem, which has not much to do with numbers. They, of course, help us to understand the extent of the problem, but the real problem is—it is a very unusual and extraordinary problem—when certain new relationships have been created, whatever the conditions might have been, should they be sundered or broken up, or should they be allowed to continue? In general an answer to that problem would be exceedingly difficult to give because it really is a question of individual cases, the state of the relationship, how it is subsisting, whether it is stable or unstable, whether it is happy or unhappy. So many factors come in so that a general answer would really not cover the ground, but generally speaking, the approach has been, first of all, to find out where such cases have occurred. The process of finding out itself is not too easy. When such complaints are received, enquiry is made, and sometimes it leads to results and at other times it does not. Strictly speaking, the cases referred

1. Speech in Parliament during a debate on the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Amendment Bill, 25 February 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, 1954, Vol. I, Pt. II, cols. 717-721.

to, to begin with, contain—if you divide them into categories—probable cases where, of course, there should be some effort *prima facie* even to begin with, others doubtful cases, others unlikely cases and so on. You can divide them into half a dozen categories, and in the enquiry, the doubtful cases would become probable cases if you get more facts. In the course of these years, we received from Pakistan and we also gave to Pakistan, long lists of cases—we could not guarantee nor could even Pakistan guarantee to the truth of them. If any person comes to us and says, his relative or daughter, or whoever it is, was abducted in Pakistan, it will be taken as truth as for the moment we have no means of checking it. We send the name to Pakistan, and similarly they do. It is possible that there is no such abduction; it is possible that the person died long ago in the troubles, and because she was not there, it does not mean she was abducted; it is possible that she did not die, she was not abducted but went to some other area. These things have happened and they can only be traced after due enquiry. The original lists prepared were entirely based on any vague allegation that somebody was abducted either in India or in the other place. Sometimes, the same names appear several times in the lists and it is very confusing to take these names without due enquiry. As the honourable Member himself hinted, the problem is not a political problem, but it is essentially a human problem affecting the individual lives of a large number of persons, affecting it originally—that part is over—and subsequently, because of the relationship, affecting it in another way, and children are born. What is to be done with the children? If I may say so, perhaps one of the most important factors to be borne in mind in dealing with this matter is the future of the children—I do not minimise the other factors, the women concerned—and I think, on the whole, the future of the children is even more important, because they are to be the future citizens and should be given an opportunity to grow up in the normal surroundings. All these are very difficult factors. Therefore, right from the beginning, it has not been a question purely of governmental machinery working, although that machinery has to work, but an element, which normally is not supplied by Government, has also to be brought in, that is to say, an informal element of dealing with these unfortunate women in a friendly way and in an understanding way. Then again, the question arises: How is one to make an approach? The basic approach was that there should be agreement or consent of the woman concerned. How is that to be obtained? How are we to create conditions in which she really gives her opinion and does not give it under duress, or fear of consequences? This example, in an entirely different way of course, was referred to me in connection with the Korean prisoners of war. When we put to them the question: “Do you want to go back?”, they gave an answer which had really little meaning, because they had been told so much, probably that their heads would be cut off, or something like that. Their answer was not a fair answer until they were given some chances of explanation or



understanding that they would be properly treated. Ultimately the decision has to be theirs. First of all, the woman concerned should be traced. Then we know that it is a solid case. Secondly she should be given a period of calm and friendly surroundings where she can possibly see her relatives, etc., find out how she is likely to be treated and then decide. I have no doubt in mind—I had never had at any time about this matter—that no one should be sent across, if she is unwilling to be sent across. I am quite clear about that. But the difficulty comes about her being given full opportunities to make up her mind without any doubt about it. That has been the general approach. But in applying that approach so many other points have to be taken into consideration. It is easy enough to say that, but every case has to be judged on its merits. We had a tribunal<sup>2</sup> to decide it. Whether it went deeply into the matter in regard to each case, I have no personal knowledge. But that was the idea behind it. Lately we have been trying to understand this problem in its details, apart from its general nature, so as to lay greater stress on that major aspect which I have just mentioned. The future of the children should be very much taken into consideration and in regard to the woman in the final analysis nothing should be done which is in the nature of a compulsion. In the early stage you may take her away and put her in a home, but in the final analysis, I have no doubt that there can be and should be no compulsion.

Sometimes people compare the figures of recoveries from Pakistan and recoveries from India. The comparison can be made and should be made. But it has really no relevance in this matter. If there is, let us say, a single woman in Pakistan who wants to come to India and whose life may be happier by coming to India, to her own original home, we ought to do our best to get her and *vice versa*, regardless of other considerations, because each individual case, if properly handled and settled is that much of human gain. They are not chattel to be measured, as to how many women have been recovered that side and how many here. That I submit is not the right approach.

Then again there is this fact that all these matters can only be carried through by a measure of cooperation between the two Governments. It is obvious. One Government cannot do it, unless there is cooperation forthcoming from the other side. Therefore a cooperative machinery has developed. Occasionally an individual officer may not have functioned as he ought to have, but the machinery has been a cooperative one in this matter and it has functioned tolerably well.

2. In accordance with section 6. of the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act of 1949 a tribunal was constituted by the Central Government to decide whether a person detained was an abducted person or not.

Take this piece of legislation whose period is sought to be extended. Even apart from other considerations it is right and proper that we should extend it, so as to fit in with the general scheme. Any change that we make could be done only mutually and not unilaterally, because some types of legislation apply to both sides. That itself is an adequate reason for extending it. Obviously this way of dealing with the problem cannot be continued indefinitely. At some time or other it has to end, because passage of every year makes further difficulties.<sup>3</sup> But taking everything into consideration we do feel strongly that we should carry on for another year or so. Of course, we have asked for extension by another quarter, because extension by a year comes at an awkward time in the middle of the Budget session and the House would be inconvenienced. Practically, it is for a year and we shall, in this period, in a sense, revise our method of approach, where it is considered necessary, and try, if possible, to finalise the problem.

I do submit, Sir, that in the circumstances, the right thing for the House to do is to extend the life of this measure and not to go into details, and meanwhile for the Ministry and others responsible to consider all the aspects—many of the aspects have no doubt been mentioned by honourable Members here—and deal with the problem as humanely and as rapidly as possible.<sup>4</sup>

3. Recovery work began to slow down by 1952-53, as the abducted women seemed to be settling down and assimilating in the new families and society.
4. The Indo-Pakistan Conference on recovery of abducted women met on 6 and 7 May 1954 mainly to review the situation and lay down a system to expedite recovery activities for an early completion.



11  
KOREA





## 1. Steps Regarding Prisoners of War<sup>1</sup>

I am sending a reply to Krishna Menon's telegram No. 28.<sup>2</sup> dated January 31. I think that we should send a message today to the Secretary General, UN, through our Permanent Representative informing him of the steps we intend taking in regard to the seventeen courtmartialled POWs and regarding the 104 POWs who wish to go to other countries, we should tell him that we shall send full particulars about these soon. Meanwhile we shall bring such POWs as are not disposed of to India temporarily, as we cannot leave them in Korea. We should like UN to be responsible for them and for their future disposal. We are prepared to help UN by keeping such POWs in India pending such disposal. For the present we do not intend offering them permanent residence in India.

I do not see why it should be necessary to send any further authority for Krishna Menon to deal with this or any other matter in the UN. If, however, it is necessary, you can do so and inform the Secretary General, UN.

Probably, there will hardly be any POWs who will want to go to countries other than India, apart from those who are handed over to UN Command.

I think we have more or less settled the line we have got to take now and no further difficulty is likely to arise. When we receive full particulars from Thimayya<sup>3</sup> about 104 POWs we should communicate them directly to the Secretary General and also to Krishna Menon.

As for the handing over of the 17 courtmartialled prisoners, we can do this, after we have received the final reply from the UN Command in regard to them and after we have informed the Northern Command as well as the Peking Government fully about the course we intend to adopt. I do not think there is any hurry to do this. This can be done two or three days before the Custodial Force<sup>4</sup> leaves Korea.

1. Note to the Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, 1 February 1954. JN Collection.
2. Krishna Menon, a member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations, had informed that since India after 22 February would have no right to detain the 17 prisoners of war awaiting trial, she should after notifying the UN Secretary General and the UN Command, restore publicly the prisoners to the UN Command with formal request to continue trial. Regarding the 104 POWs Menon advised that (a) those electing to go to belligerents like USA should be returned to former detaining sides; (b) UN Secretary General should immediately be notified to arrange for placement of those POWs who elect to go to non-belligerents, mentioning that pending such placement India would on behalf of UN care for them but the costs should be borne by the UN.
3. K.S. Thimayya was the Chairman of Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.
4. Custodial Force, India (CFI), was entrusted under the Armistice Agreement with the task of taking charge of the POWs refusing repatriation. It arrived in Korea in September 1953 under the command of Major-General S.P.P. Thorat.

If I have left out any matter contained in Krishna Menon's telegram No. 28, you will please deal with it.

You will of course send immediately by fast air-mail Thimayya's communications<sup>5</sup> to the two Commands for the Secretary General.

5. Krishna Menon had informed that the UN Secretary General did not receive copies of any of the communications of K.S. Thimayya addressed to the UN and Northern Commands. These should be sent to the Secretary General with a request to print them as UN documents. For Thimayya's communications see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, p. 535.

## 2. Cable to K.S. Thimayya<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 7241 of February 1st.<sup>2</sup> We are referring this whole question of remaining POWs with you to the Secretary General, United Nations.<sup>3</sup> In case UN Command are not prepared to give any assurance about undertrial prisoners, we shall refer that also to him<sup>4</sup> and inform you of action to be taken.

2. The handing over to the UN Command of these undertrial prisoners will, of course, have to be done before CFI departs from Korea, probably a day or two before.

1. New Delhi, 2 February 1954. *The Korean War, Disposition of Prisoners of War*, Volume-5, (F. 12/62NGO-52. Vols. XII-XVI & F. 12/74/NGO-53), MEA.
2. K.S. Thimayya, had informed that on 1 February he had sent a letter to UN Command asking them to continue the trial of courtmartialled prisoners and not hand them over to South Korean or Formosa Government. He sought instructions in case UN Command failed to give any assurances.
3. Formal communication regarding POWs desiring to go to neutral countries was made to the UN Secretary General by Krishna Menon on 8 February who promised to sound the neutral countries in this matter. In regard to UN responsibility in this regard he said that this matter must be decided by the General Assembly but he did not anticipate difficulties on the financial side.
4. See the next page.



### 3. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

As we have informed you, Thimayya has asked UN Command<sup>2</sup> to continue trials of courtmartialled prisoners and in no event to hand them over to South Korean or Formosa Government. We have reason to believe that UN Command will not give any assurances to this effect. It seems to me highly improper for such undertrial prisoners accused of murder, etc., to be handed over to South Korean Command or Formosa Government. At the same time, we cannot keep them or bring them with us to India. Are we then just to leave them in the camp when the CFI departs? That also means allowing South Korean Command to take possession of them.

2. We shall let you know definitely what the UN Command's answer is.<sup>3</sup> Please explain this difficulty to Secretary General, UN.<sup>4</sup> We should like his advice and your own suggestions.

1. New Delhi, 2 February 1954. *The Korean War, Disposition of Prisoners of War*, Volume 5, (F. 12/62/NGO-52, Vols. XII-XVI & F. 12/74/NGO-53), MEA. Also available in V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. On 1 February 1954.
3. The UN Command on 3 February informed K.S. Thimayya "... we are prepared to receive the individuals being held by NNRC for trial for alleged crimes and to turn them over to the governments concerned, with such records and recommendations as you may desire."
4. Krishna Menon sent the formal communication in respect of undertrial prisoners to the Secretary General on 6 February who told Menon on 10 February that he was awaiting his legal experts' opinion, on which, he must base his reply.

### 4. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

You have been kept informed during my absence<sup>2</sup> of developments in Korea. It is quite clear to me that Commission must remain in existence while CFI is still there. We are informing Thimayya that undertrial prisoners may be handed back to UN custody four or five days before last CFI batch leaves on 21st. Commission must however continue to function until that date.

1. New Delhi, 11 February 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Nehru was on election campaign tour in Pepsu.

2. Draft letters for both Commands about handing back undertrials are being sent to Thimayya. Letter to UN Command points out that as witnesses etc. have not been sent by them Commission has not been able to proceed with trials. Prisoners are being handed back to UN custody and hope is expressed that steps will be taken by them to ensure that accused found guilty are punished according to law and that responsibility for this rests solely on UN Command and not on other authorities. Thimayya is being asked to send these letters a few days before actual handing over.

3. Brief particulars of 88 prisoners<sup>3</sup> coming to India have been sent to you. Presume Secretary General UN is sounding neutral countries.<sup>4</sup>

3. These prisoners consisted of 74 North Koreans, 12 Chinese and 2 South Koreans.

4. See *ante*, p. 362, fn. 3.

## 5. Cable to N. Raghavan<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 72 of February 9th.<sup>2</sup>

2. Krishna Menon is in touch with Secretary General, UN, and others about Panmunjom talks.<sup>3</sup> We do not think that President should be asked to intervene in this matter, more particularly as her suggestion for reconvening of General Assembly has not been accepted.<sup>4</sup> Resumption of Panmunjom talks and Far Eastern issues generally are tied up with discussions now taking place in Berlin. Further progress will depend on outcome of these discussions.<sup>5</sup>

1. New Delhi, 11 February 1954. *The Korean War, Disposition of Prisoners of War*, Volume 5. (F. 12/62/NGO-52, Vols. XII-XVI&F, 12/74/NGO-53), MEA. Also available in JN Collection.

2. N. Raghavan, Indian ambassador in Beijing, had reported that during informal conversations with Chang Han-fu, Vice-Foreign Minister of China on 8-9 February, Chang felt that India's plan to hand 17 POWs to UN Command would be violation of the Terms of Reference and that trial of the 17 undertrial POWs should continue.

3. The Panmunjom talks between the UN Command and Northern Command (26 October - 12 December 1953) on the composition of Political Conference on Korean question had reached a deadlock and Menon was trying for its resumption.

4. On India's request to reconvene the Assembly before the dissolution of the NNRC on 22 February, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, the President of the General Assembly suggested 9 February as the date of reconvening of the Assembly but India's request lapsed because only a few countries favoured reconvening of the Assembly.

5. The Foreign Ministers of USA, UK, USSR and France met in Berlin from 25 January to 18 February and decided to hold a conference in Geneva on 26 April 1954 in order to reach a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.



## 6. Cable to V. K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 40 of February, 12th.<sup>2</sup> I have just seen this on return from tour.

2. Your draft letter for UN Command came soon after we had sent our own drafts. We are now amending our drafts on lines suggested by you. Drafts will be shorter, but all important points will be brought out. Not necessary to refer to your letter to Secretary General and his reply in Thimayya's letter to UN Command .

3. Thimayya has informed us that last CFI batch will be leaving on 26th. Ship has apparently been delayed. Commission will be dissolved on 21st, but we are asking Thimayya to inform both Commands of delay in departure of last batch and also to stay in Korea until last batch leaves.

4. We have agreed to Thimayya's suggestion that letters to both Commands should be delivered on 16th<sup>3</sup> and undertrials should be restored to UN custody on 18th. Dates may be changed,<sup>4</sup> if necessary. He will be finalising report<sup>5</sup> on 21st.

5. Text of Secretary General's letter need not be telegraphed.

1. New Delhi, 14 February 1954. *The Korean War, Disposition of Prisoners of War*, Volume 5 (F. 12/62/NGO-52, Vols. XII-XVI & F. 12/74/NGO-52), MEA.
2. Krishna Menon had informed that the UN Secretary General had sent the legal opinion of the UN experts to the effect that "jurisdiction exercised by a detaining power over POWs' offences is confined to offences committed while they are in custody of the detaining power." Hence UN Command might find itself without jurisdiction over acts by prisoners while latter were in NNRC custody. Krishna Menon wanted to know whether Secretary General's letter to him should be telegraphed to Nehru.
3. K.S. Thimayya's letter to the UN Command on 16 February stated that as the term of the NNRC was about to expire and as it had not been enabled to carry out the trial of accused prisoners, the NNRC under protest acquiesce in the UN Command's position and would transfer the said prisoners to UN Command on 18 February hoping that the Command would not take any step enabling the guilty to escape unpunished. Thimayya also informed the Northern Command on the same lines on 16 February.
4. Dates were not changed.
5. The Final Report covered the activities of the NNRC between 24 December 1953 and 21 February 1954.

## 7. Developments in Korea<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru : Mr Speaker, with your permission, I should like to lay on the Table of the House a statement on Korea.

Parliament has been kept informed of developments in Korea and in the course of debates held in both Houses in December,<sup>2</sup> reference was made to the work of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Custodial Force of India.

2. According to the terms of reference, the NNRC had to carry out its work in three stages. The first was the explanation stage, which ended on the 23rd December, 1953. Thereafter, the NNRC was required to refer the cases of the remaining prisoners to the Political Conference and to await its decision until and 22nd January 1954. Finally, there was the third and the last stage during which prisoners released to civilian status were to be assisted to go to neutral countries. This process was to be completed within one month and the NNRC was to be dissolved on the 22nd February.

3. As is well known, difficulties arose and the NNRC was unable to give effect to the terms of the Agreement fully. Only about one-tenth of the prisoners had received explanations when this process came to an end. A few days later, on the 28th December 1953, the NNRC submitted a report<sup>3</sup> to the two Commands, giving reasons for the failure of the explanation process. The Majority Report was signed by the representatives of India, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and there was a separate Minority Report signed by the representatives of Sweden and Switzerland. The Majority Report pointed out that the prisoners who had been handed over by the UN Command were organized in groups and were not completely free from the influence of the former detaining side. The activities of the POW organization and its leadership were not conducive to the creation of conditions for the exercise of the right of repatriation in an unfettered manner. Furthermore, these activities derogated from NNRC's custody and control and made the task of establishing freedom of choice one of great difficulty. This was confirmed, to some extent, by the

1. Statement in the House of the People, 16 March 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, 1954, Vol. II, Pt. II, cols. 2323-2331. A similar statement, ( not printed) was also made in the Council of States on the same day.
2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 560-562.
3. The Interim Report of the NNRC covered its activities from 10 September to 23 September 1953.



minority report which admitted the fact that the organization exercised its firm control over prisoners desiring repatriation.

4. On the 23rd December, the Northern Command made a formal request to the NNRC to continue explanations. They pointed out that explanations had been given for only ten days out of the prescribed ninety, and that the responsibility for this rested with the POW organisation and the UN Command. This request had the support of the Czech and the Polish Members of NNRC but was opposed by the Swiss and the Swedes. The Indian representative took the view that an extension of the period of explanations was necessary in order to carry out the terms of the agreement, but such an extension was only possible if there was an agreement between the two Commands. In the absence of a fresh agreement, the NNRC had no power to allow access to explaining representatives after the 23rd December. On the 2nd January 1954, the Indian representative, who was also Chairman of the Commission, asked both the Commands if they would agree to an extension. The UN Command replied that they were not prepared to consider this request.

5. As there was no agreement for an extension of the period<sup>4</sup> and the explanations could not be continued, the NNRC had to decide about the dispositions to be made on the 22nd January when its custody was due to terminate. On this question also, there was a difference of opinion within the NNRC, Article 11 of the Terms of Reference of NNRC made it clear that the cases of the remaining prisoners should be submitted to the Political Conference. The Swiss and Swedish representatives agreed with the UN Command's interpretation that this reference was not obligatory. The Polish and Czech representatives supported the Northern Command interpretation which was to the effect that the prisoners must remain in custody until the Political Conference had met. The Indian representative's view was that the prisoners could not be released to civilian status until the Political Conference had considered their cases, but custody could not be continued after the 22nd January in the absence of a fresh agreement between the two Commands. In the absence of such agreement the only two courses open to the NNRC were either to restore custody of the prisoners to the two Commands on the 22nd January, or to terminate its custody on that date.

6. The Chairman made a reference<sup>5</sup> to both the Commands about this matter. He pointed out that the Political Conference had not met and there was no prospect of its meeting. He invited them to consider the situation and give fresh directions. The Northern Command replied<sup>6</sup> that custody should not be

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, p. 536.

5. On 2 January 1954.

6. On 7 January 1954.

terminated, while the UN Command<sup>7</sup> made it clear that on no account should custody continue beyond 22nd January.

7. It was clear that custody could not be continued in the absence of a fresh agreement. The NNRC was, in any case, dependent for logistical and other support on the two Commands. It could not release the prisoners to civilian status without referring their cases to the Political Conference, nor could it retain custody. Mere termination of custody might have led to anarchy and disorder, so the Chairman followed the only remaining course, namely, to call upon both the Commands<sup>8</sup> to accept restoration of custody with effect from the 22nd January.

8. The Northern Command<sup>9</sup> refused to accept restoration of custody. The UN Command<sup>10</sup> accepted restoration under protest, while making it clear that the prisoners will be treated as civilians with effect from the 22nd January. The Chairman again pointed out that this would be a breach of the Terms of Reference and requested the UN Command to keep the prisoners in their custody until the Political Conference had met. The POWs were restored to the UN Command on the 20th January and, in spite of the Chairman's request that they should be kept in custody, the UN Command released them on the 23rd January. The Chairman's request had the support of the majority of the Members of the Commission. In their view, the step taken by the UN Command amounted to a breach of the Terms of Reference.

9. As the Northern Command refused to accept the prisoners on their side, the NNRC's custody was withdrawn with effect from the 22nd January. About three hundred and forty prisoners remained in the Northern Camp under the protection of the Custodial Force of India. Some days later,<sup>11</sup> the Chinese and North Korean Red Cross took charge of these prisoners and they left the Northern Camp. Two prisoners who had expressed a desire to go to neutral countries remained under the protection of the CFI.<sup>12</sup>

10. When the prisoners in the Southern Camp were being returned to the custody of the UN Command, one hundred and sixteen of them elected repatriation. These latter were immediately validated and repatriated the same day.

11. One hundred and one prisoners who had previously escaped from their respective compounds and had expressed a desire to go to neutral countries

7. On 6 January 1954.

8. On 14 January 1954.

9. On 19 January 1954.

10. On 16 January 1954.

11. On 28 January 1954.

12. These two South Korean prisoners were sent to India on 8 February 1954 by the CFI.



remained under CFI protection. Thus, in all, one hundred and three prisoners from both Camps remained under CFI protection.

12. A large number of the one hundred and three prisoners remaining with the CFI had asked to be sent to countries which were among the sixteen belligerent countries. They were told that they could not do so, as they could only elect for a neutral country. If they were unwilling to change their choice they were told that they would have to return to their former detaining power. Most of them were willing to be so returned, provided the UN Command gave them assurance that they would not be handed over to the Governments of South Korea or Formosa. The UN Command were not prepared to give these assurances, and, in fact stated definitely that anyone returned to them would be handed over to either the Government of South Korea or Government of Formosa. Subsequently, fifteen prisoners out of these one hundred and three, agreed to be handed over to the UN Command's custody. They were restored to the UN Command and were immediately released by it.

13. The remaining eighty-eight prisoners continued under the protection of CFI. Some of them had expressed a desire to settle down in India, while others had named other neutral countries. The cases of all these eighty-eight prisoners were referred to the Secretary General of the United Nations and it was made clear that they would be kept under our protection, on behalf of the United Nation, pending a final settlement, about their future. They have been brought to India with the Custodial Force.

14. In addition to these POWs, there were seventeen prisoners under trial on charges of murder etc. in the Southern Camp. In all these cases investigation had been carried out and a *prima facie* case of murder had been established. The NNRC was anxious to complete the trials and the UN Command was repeatedly requested<sup>13</sup> to cooperate by sending defence witnesses and in other ways. The trial could not be completed in the absence of defence witnesses. The UN Command further expressed<sup>14</sup> its inability to produce the defence witnesses and called upon the NNRC to hand back these prisoners. As the NNRC was due to be dissolved on the 22nd February, it had no alternative but to hand back these prisoners under protest. These prisoners were handed back on the 18th February and the UN Command were requested to take steps to ensure that the guilty parties were suitably punished. We have no authentic information about the action taken by the UN Command in this matter.

15. The Custodial Force of India and other Indian personnel were withdrawn from Korea in stages. Five ships were used for the purpose of effecting the withdrawal of our men. The first group left on the 9th February and arrived in

13. On 19, 22, 27 January and 1 February 1954.

14. On 20, 30 January and 3 February 1954.

India on the 21st February. The eighty-eight prisoners are included in this party.<sup>15</sup> The fourth ship reached India on the 13th March. The Commander of the Custodial Force, Major-General Thorat, returned in this ship. The fifth and the last group is expected to reach India on the 18th March.<sup>16</sup> The Chairman of the NNRC, Lieut General Thimayya, has already arrived in India.<sup>17</sup>

16. The eighty-eight POWs who have been brought to India are at present living in the Delhi Cantonment. They consist of seventy-four North Koreans, two South Koreans and twelve Chinese. The majority of them are young men and the largest group consists of students. There are also some doctors, engineers, tradesmen, technicians and farm labourers among them. Further enquiries are being made about their qualifications and also about the neutral countries they wish to go to. After these enquiries have been completed, full information will be sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

17. The NNRC submitted its final report to the two Commands on the 21st February and was dissolved on the 22nd February. The two reports of the NNRC are at present being printed and will soon be placed on the Table of the House. Apart from disposal of the eighty-eight POWs who have been brought to India, the responsibilities assigned to India in Korea have come to end. India accepted these responsibilities at the request of both the Commands in order to help in settling the question of repatriation of prisoners of war. Because of a disagreement between the two Commands on this question, the signing of an Armistice was held up for more than a year.<sup>18</sup> Eventually, an agreement was reached<sup>19</sup> which was based on some proposals which had been put forward by India in the Seventh Session of the General Assembly.<sup>20</sup>

18. India's representatives in Korea had to deal with a complex problem and their difficulties were aggravated by the differences between the two Commands. In carrying out this difficult and delicate task, India's representatives both in the Commission and the Custodial Force, showed a high sense of duty. Their patience, tact and firmness, in many difficult situations, earned them the respect of those who came in contact with them.

15. The second and third groups arrived in India on 1st and 3rd March respectively.

16. This group arrived in India on 17th March.

17. On 4th March.

18. The Armistice Agreement was signed on 27 July 1953.

19. The agreement on the repatriation of the prisoners of war was signed by the UN Command and the Northern Command on 8 June 1953 calling for establishment of a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission composed of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and India to take custody of the prisoners of war alleged to be refusing repatriation. India was to be the Chairman of the Commission and alone should supply guards for the prisoners.

20. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 424-25.



The statement laid on the Table of the House is rather a long one, and I do not propose to take up the time of House by reading it through. It is a factual statement, and if I may say so, there is nothing new in it which honourable Members do not know and which has not appeared at various times in the press. It is really a kind of continuation of the account of what our Forces had to do in Korea since I made a statement in this House in Decemeber last. Now, that chapter is practically close so far as the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is concerned.

The only point remaining over for us is the fact that we have got 88 of those old prisoners of war here in Delhi with us, and we are holding them on behalf of the United Nations—that is, not the United Nations Command, but the United Nations Secretariat in New York. We have referred the matter to the Secretary General of the United Nations<sup>21</sup> as to what we are to do with them.

These 88 persons are those who refused to be repatriated and at the same time refused to be handed over to their old detaining sides. Out of the 88, two are from the Southern Camp and 86 are from the Northern Camp. These are the persons who first elected to go to various neutral countries, and among the neutral countries named was India. They could not be sent to neutral countires unless the neutral countries accepted them and there were arrangements for them to be sent.

Some of them said at that moment that they wanted to go to the United States of America, but the United States were not a neutral country;so, they could not be sent there. These difficulties could not be got over, and we pointed this out to them before our Custodial Force came back. We said again that either we could send them back to their own homes or hand them over to the UN Command. A number of them said that they were prepared to be handed over to the UN Command, provided they gave an assurance and a guarantee that they would not be handed over to the South Korean Government or the Government of Formosa. The UN Command were not prepared to give this guarantee to them, and in fact said, "As soon as you come to us, we will release you, and you can go anywhere you like."

The result was that we had the choice of leaving them in the Camp and coming away, or bringing them with us. When these people learnt that we were on the point of leaving, they, some of them, at any rate, were much agitated that they might be left behind, and some of them even threatened something in the nature of suicide. They said, "We won't be safe here if you go away; therefore, we might as well commit suicide." Maybe, it was an idle threat. Now, we could not very well leave them in the lurch, and so we brought them here with us, and here they are with us at the present moment.

21. See *ante*, p. 362, fn. 3.

We are in communication with the UN headquarters in New York as to what to do with them. That, more or less, closes the chapter of our work in Korea in connection with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Custodial Force. I am sure that, as previously, this House would like me to express on its behalf our high appreciation of the work of our representatives in Korea.

## 8. Treatment of Ex-Prisoners of War in India<sup>1</sup>

The 88 ex-prisoners of war who have come from Korea have been here with us for some time now. About 30 of them have opted for India. We have referred the case of all of them to the United Nations. Obviously however, we have to decide for ourselves about these 30. The uncertainty about their future is having an unsettling effect on them and they are constantly asking us about it. All these ex-POWs are living comfortably, but there is this element of uncertainty which upsets them.

2. It is possible that even the other ex-POWs might be with us for some considerable time. In any event, we have to decide about the 30. I think that we need not come to any final decision about them now and, in any event, we cannot make them our nationals. The best course appears to be to allow them to remain here temporarily and give them some special papers permitting them to do so. We may, to begin with, give these papers for six months. We have to keep them because there is no where else for them to go. At the same time, we need not make any long distance commitment.

3. I suggest, therefore, that we should give them these papers for six months and try to find work for such of them as have any particular training or can get any work. Keeping them without work is not good.

4. Even in regard to the other ex-POWs, I think that some work should be found for them. They should, of course, be treated somewhat differently from the 30. But if work is found for them, we shall have to give them some papers too which may be wholly temporary, that is for a month at a time till some decision is made by the UN. Keeping them in a big group in barracks does them no good, and having nothing to do they are apt to hatch mischief.

1. Note to the Minister of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 22 March 1954. JN Collection. A copy of the note was sent to the Cabinet Secretary.



5. I rather doubt if most of these ex-POWs are capable of being assimilated in India. A few might be. I understand that some of them are good technicians. But however that may be, we just have to hold on to them till some other opening is offered. If we have to keep them, we should think in terms of their working.

6. In any event, the sooner the 30 are separated from the other 58 the better.

7. I suggest that this matter might be mentioned at the next meeting of the Cabinet.





12

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS





## I. FOREIGN POLICY

### 1. Issues in Foreign Policy<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: ...There are a number of relatively secondary matters, but of great importance to us—secondary only in the world by sense, I mean. I find a number of cut motions relating to Chandernagore.<sup>2</sup> In this matter I should like to apologise to this House for a certain delay in placing the Report on Chandernagore<sup>3</sup> on the Table of the House. I understand from my colleague, the Deputy Minister, that he placed it on the Table this morning. We had hoped to place it sometime earlier. The delay occurred really in finalising certain decisions about Chandernagore. I am afraid they have not been quite finalised yet, though they are very near that. I may say that, broadly speaking, we intend to adopt the recommendations made in that Report of Dr Amaranath Jha, who was sent to Chandernagore to find out what the conditions were there, to meet people, various groups, various representatives, and then to make recommendations as to what should be done with that particular place. Broadly, what is recommended is that Chandernagore should be merged into West Bengal—and, indeed, there is no other way to deal with it—but that at the same time it should be made into some kind of a Corporation with considerable powers such as a Corporation might have. There are a number of other recommendations also.

The House may remember that whenever we have referred to these French possessions or Portuguese possessions in India, we have always made it clear that it is not our desire to interfere. We have made it clear, first of all, that it is quite essential that they should be merged into the Union of India. At the same time, we have given an assurance that we do not wish to interfere with the customs, language, laws and various other such like matters which appertain

1. Intervention during discussions on the Demands for Grants relating to the Ministry of External Affairs, 23 March 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People) Official Report*, 1954, Vol. II, Pt. II, cols. 2789-2798, 2801-2803. Extracts.
2. A French possession near Calcutta, Chandernagore had in a referendum on 19 June 1949 opted for joining the Union of India. The Government of India assumed responsibility of its administration on 2 May 1950. On 11 April 1952, the National Assembly of France ratified the referendum.
3. Amaranath Jha, a distinguished academician was appointed by the Government of India to enquire as to what should be done with Chandernagore and Jha submitted his report in December 1953.

thereto, without the consent of the people concerned. In fact, we were anxious in the case of some of the French possessions, especially Pondicherry which is the chief of them, that it would be a good thing if it should continue as a centre of French language and culture in India if the people there wanted to do so. So, in Chandernagore also we propose to give some assistance in the preservation of certain cultural developments that have taken place. Whenever a change is made like this, whether in Chandernagore or elsewhere, a number of people those who have grown up in the last 100 years or more in a different background, linguistic or other, are necessarily put in some difficulties. We do not want them to suffer. That is, so far as Chandernagore is concerned.

In regard to other foreign establishments in India, only yesterday in reply to a question, I referred to the present position that has arisen in Pondicherry and roundabout.<sup>4</sup> This as the House knows, is an entirely spontaneous movement in the French possessions and comprises in its fold practically all the Ministers,—in fact, all except one who happened to be absent, accidentally,—all the ministers and about 80 per cent, of the councillors of the municipal communes who have unanimously asked for merger with India to be brought about without any referendum, as rapidly as possible. They have naturally addressed the various high dignitaries of the French Government in Paris on the subject. They sent these resolutions to me also and we have acknowledged them. It seems to me that this move, this spontaneous development in Pondicherry, puts or ought to put an end to any argument that might have been raised by those who were opposed to merger and even get over the other technical, legal and constitutional difficulties which sometimes the French Government has pointed out to us in this matter. It is clear that there can be no clearer exhibition of popular will than we have seen, not only from the ministers and municipal councillors, but at the other end from the industrial workers who, the House may remember, a little while ago demonstrated in favour of merger and there was some conflict with the French authorities. I hope that this will lead to a friendly settlement of this problem between the French Government and our Government, and a *de facto* transfer of power there. I say *de facto*; *de jure*, of course, should follow and has to follow. It may take a little time for the legal formalities. Sometime back we sent a note to the French Government in which we suggested that the *de facto* change over might take place straightaway and the *de jure* can follow soon after, after the necessary formalities had been done. I am hopeful, therefore, about these French possessions. I am not very hopeful at the present moment

4. On 22 March in response to a question of M.S. Gurupadaswamy, Nehru said that there had been a spontaneous movement inside the French enclaves in India demanding their merger with India. He hoped that steps should be taken for peaceful transfer of power.



about the Portuguese possessions, though it is inevitable that the same results must follow there.

I find that there are a number of cut motions also relating to tribal affairs. The House will remember that sometime back there was a tragedy there, not very far from the Tibet border, when a platoon of ours, the Assam Rifles, was attacked and ambushed and a number of people were suddenly killed.<sup>5</sup> That was a kind of thing which sometimes occurred in pre-Independence days when the British ruled this country, and they had a way of dealing with them—a heavy way which involved much destruction of life and property. We were put in a difficulty as to how to deal with this matter, and the immediate reaction was that we must do something quickly to get back the persons who were held as hostages, and, well, to punish the guilty. The place was very difficult to get at. Even after sending troops by air, it was about three weeks' march to the exact spot. Anyhow, we decided on adopting not the old way, but avoiding destruction as far as possible and making a friendly—a firm and friendly approach. As a result of this, this matter was settled. I think, in a very happy way. Those who were dead, of course were dead, we could not get them back. We got back the hostages doing very little damage to anybody, and those simple folk who had, in a moment of excitement or whatever it was, misbehaved, realised that we meant well with them. They came, surrendered the arms they had taken and the whole thing was settled in a friendly way, and we are receiving a good deal of cooperation there from these people, and it has become one of our Partly Administered Areas now. I should like to congratulate those in charge of our North East Frontier Agency, who were responsible for this—for the very tactful and wise way in which they handled the situation there.

Sometime ago I made a statement about the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and our Custodial Force in Korea.<sup>6</sup> There is nothing more to be said about it. I promised then to place the reports—the original reports—of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission on the Table of the House. I have not done so, I am sorry, because they have not come out of the press yet. They are very big reports, running into hundreds and hundreds of pages, and they are taking some time, and I hope that within a week or ten days I shall place those original reports here for members to refer to them if they so wish.

This chapter of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and Custodial Force is over so far as we are concerned. That, of course, does not mean that the Korean problem is over. It is very much alive. But the only part of that Custodial Force business that is not over in a sense is that we have brought over here 88 prisoners of war, or ex-prisoners of war, who, for the present, are

5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 307-310.

6. See *ante*, pp. 366-372.

with us. Out of these 88, about 30 have expressed a desire to stay on in India, and there are others who want to go to other countries. For the moment we are holding all these people, in a sense on behalf of the United Nations, but, of course, it is for us to decide whether those 30 or any other who want to stay here should be given facilities to do so or not. Probably, we shall allow them to stay here temporarily. That is to say, we cannot—we do not propose and we cannot in law—make them citizens of India, but if they have nowhere else to go to, we can hardly throw them out either. So, we intend giving them some papers of residence here which can be renewed periodically,—that is, it is for the Government then to keep them or not to keep them in future, and to provide, where possible, some occupation for them.

Another matter in which the House is interested is the negotiations that are going on in Peking in regard to Tibet. They have lengthened out rather more than we thought, not because of any inherent difficulty in the problems we are facing, but simply because there are so many Chinese who are not in favour

of the Chinese Government's policy in regard to Tibet. The Chinese Government has been very anxious to get the Chinese Government to agree to the Chinese Government's policy in regard to Tibet. The Chinese Government has been very anxious to get the Chinese Government to agree to the Chinese Government's policy in regard to Tibet. The Chinese Government has been very anxious to get the Chinese Government to agree to the Chinese Government's policy in regard to Tibet.

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represents the Government of Formosa. But to say that this person represents this great country of China is so wide of the mark that any discussion based on that must fail. And that has been our misfortune in world affairs that realities, because they were not liked, have been ignored.

I do not know what is going to happen at Geneva. So far as we are concerned, we have no desire whatever to appear at the scene in Geneva, to participate in these conferences. It is only when we feel that we can really do some good, that we wish to undertake any burden, for the rest, we would rather avoid these burdens.

In this House, sometime ago, I mentioned Indo-China.<sup>9</sup> Indo-China has been, for the last six years nearly, a scene of warfare of a kind of civil war aided by other countries.

Now one fact we must remember when we think of Indo-China and that is that the Indo-Chinese War started five or six years ago, before the culmination of the Chinese Revolution. I say this because people are apt to tie up too much what is happening in Indo-China with China. Now, it is quite clear that for the first year or two or more what happened in Indo-China had nothing to do with China; it was something which arose in Indo-China. In fact, in China itself, there was conflict, a civil conflict—civil war—which resulted ultimately in the establishment of the People's Government, what is at present called the People's Government of China. Since then, this war has gone on in Indo-China and there have been varying fortunes; but, on the whole, one might say this is a kind of stalemate when neither party can defeat nor push out the other. More or less, the House will realise, that has been the result of the Korean war too. After all the bloodshed and the suffering and the terrible destruction of Korea and her people, it is a stalemate in Korea and neither side can say that it has won. That has a lesson for us. Wars nowadays tend to become stalemates, nobody wins. If that is so in a war like that in Korea or in Indo-China, when both of them were not so very small—the territory involved might be relatively small, but great powers were behind them and great forces were involved—if wars tend to end in a stalemate even in such cases as we have seen, then what is likely to happen if there is a great war involving many countries in the world, many big countries in a great war? From this analogy one might think that a great war might go on infinitely, with terrible destruction, no doubt, but with no ending and with nobody to end it.

However, in so far as Indo-China was concerned, I referred to the possibility of a ceasefire there. I made it clear that we were making no offer to take any step. We have no intention of doing so. But it seems to me that when this question of Indo-China is going to be discussed at Geneva a month hence,

9. See *post*, p. 437.

obviously it is desirable at least to put an end to the slaughter that is going on and discuss this question in calmer atmosphere, even though a ceasefire might not come now, because I recognise that there are difficulties, there is no firm line of battle and forces go backwards and forwards. I realise all those difficulties, but sometime or other, whether now or at Geneva, they will have to consider these difficulties. So, why not begin considering them beforehand—so that some part of this work of consideration might be done before the great powers meet at Geneva? That was my suggestion, and although nothing very much has come out of it. I believe it has done some good, in the sense that there has been a good deal of consideration given to these problems and the possibilities of a ceasefire by the countries concerned.

Now, a problem which interests honourable Members of this House and the country greatly, and to which reference has been made many times, is this question of the US military aid to Pakistan and its consequences. I do not think I need take up the time of the House over that because we have expressed ourselves quite clearly on that issue and it is very well recognised everywhere, all over the world, that in this matter, more even than in any other, there is almost a complete unanimity in the country, so that it is not necessary for me to place any argument before this House. We hold by the position we took up. We feel that from a variety of points of view, this was an unfortunate thing, not only because it creates, instead of security—which it seeks—insecurity, instability and uncertainty in all this area. But the mere fact that this question has been argued in this way not only in India but in many countries of Western Asia and South Eastern Asia shows that something happened which has brought about a new wave of uncertainty. The uncertainty is not of security but of insecurity. There are two approaches to this question of war and peace. One is the approach of feeling that war is almost inevitable and therefore one must be prepared for war. The other is that war must be avoided, if not at all costs, at almost all costs. The two approaches differ, as everybody will see. Of course, nobody wants war—or very few people. And yet many people may well say, “We do not want war, but how are you going to help? A war must come and therefore we must do this and do that.” That is a legitimate approach. And yet, if you lay stress on war coming, you lose the battle for peace and war is likely to come, because your minds have succumbed to the prospect of war coming in. That is the danger of the situation, not that people want war, but many people seem to succumb to the idea of the inevitability of war. It is from that point of view also that this military aid to Pakistan helps in spreading that mentality, that climate of war, and brings it to this area, this area of peace. But leave that out. I am referring to another aspect of that; the climate of war comes to this area and upsets many things. I need not say much about that....

I was reading only yesterday an article by a very eminent thinker, Bertrand Russell, in which he called upon India especially to point out to the world the



horrors of war. Why he said this is; because India being a neutral country, can do so. If either of the power blocs try to do so, their voices are suspect by the other. It will be thought that they are trying to demoralize their own people by saying so. If honourable Members would read some recent literature by the Atomic Energy Commissions of other countries, not ours, including the American Commission, they might perhaps get some idea of what war is likely to be.

Now, it is obvious that most countries cannot even participate in such a war. They have not got the atom bombs. The real power to decide today whether there is going to be war or peace ultimately rests, if you like, with two great countries, the United States of America and the Soviet Union; others also, no doubt but these two principally, because they are the most powerful and they possess these terrible weapons of destruction. War might not come—I do not mean to make the House feel that war is on the threshold. I think, On the whole, there are lesser chances of war now than there were perhaps a year or two ago. But again there can be no certainty about this, and there are so many uncertain factors that any mistake here or there might perhaps set off a chain of action and reaction resulting in war. We hope that at the Geneva Conference—it will be too much to say that a settlement will be arrived at,—some steps towards the easing of tensions might take place, both in the West, in Europe and in the Far East and South—in Indo-China.

Now, it is in this context that we carry on our foreign policy. To some extent we have an opportunity which other countries have not got, an opportunity in the sense that it is fairly well recognised by other countries that we have an independent opinion on these matters and that we are not coerced into this or that opinion by any great country. Therefore our opinion carries some weight—not much, I do not presume that we make too much of a difference in world affairs—but we have occasionally made some difference. In Korea, for instance, the whole armistice and truce was, to some extent, brought about by the efforts of India, and to that extent we can take some little credit. But it is not a question of taking credit. The affairs we deal with are much too serious for us to think in terms of showing off or taking credit. The burdens are too great for us to carry, but no country can seek to escape from discharging its duty if it is clear that it is its duty to do something. Therefore, in this wider context of world affairs, we strive to throw our weight, however light it may be, on the side of peace.

In connection with that, it is not only this wider problem of the conflict between these two great blocs of powers but also other things which we think come in the way of establishment of peace, that is to say, colonialism, racialism and the like. Both of them have existed in various cases, but more especially today in Africa both these things exist.

Again, we have avoided merely condemning countries even though in our opinion those countries may be at fault. Honourable Members know that

diplomacy today has arrived at a stage when the language used often by even eminent diplomats might well shame the market-place. The public language used in conferences and the like is one of gross abuse of the other party. Indeed, that itself shows the tension, the climate, in which these conferences do their work, and the tension that exists. When they distrust each other so much and dislike each other so much, good advice given by one to the other has the opposite effect. Everything is suspect, and condemnation has no effect at all except to bring forth from the other side more condemnation, and it becomes thus a competition in strong language used against each other. Therefore, it does not help at all in our abusing or condemning, even though we might think that we are right in doing so. Our voice does not carry weight; it does not convince the other party. However much we might feel strongly in our hearts and in our minds, it does not help. Therefore, in our international affairs we try to avoid merely running down countries, even those who might be opposed to us in any policy. Naturally, we have sometimes to criticise that policy or to express our own views as precisely and clearly as possible, but even so, we try to avoid using strong language because, unfortunately, there is no face left; there are no common standards left to vast numbers of people, and unless gradually we develop some climate of peace where questions can be considered, it will lead to greater conflict....

## 2. Principles of Foreign Policy<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Deputy Speaker,<sup>2</sup> we have been having a debate on our foreign policy since yesterday. I heard part of it and the rest of it was relayed to me. And I wondered whether we were looking at the complete picture or confining ourselves to bits and pieces.

In a way I am grateful that by bringing up the smaller issues you have drawn attention to the bigger picture. The fact is that ever since we became independent, we have become a player in this great drama in the world. Before that we were spectators who watched and expressed an opinion one way or the other. We express our opinions even now. But the difference is that as we now

1. Speech during debate on the Demands for Grants relating to the Ministry of External Affairs, 24 March 1954, *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, 1954, Vol. II, Pt. II, cols. 2948-2974. Original in Hindi.
2. M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar.



are ourselves on the stage, others watch us also as players. As you know, these are strange times when dangerous games are being played in the world. Nobody knows where it will all end. We are a great country and we are proud of it. But, as I have reminded you time and again we are not here to turn the whole world upside down or change its destiny. We may be able to tilt the balance a little one way or another. Whether it makes a difference or not, for our part we must try to keep to what we consider the right path.

It is sometimes said that our foreign policy is one of neutrality or impartiality. This is not correct. These words can be used only when two countries are at war and a third remains aloof from that war. Our policy is merely to do what we think is right and not give in to pressure from anyone. I shall merely call it an independent foreign policy. We may side with some policy or remain aloof or have our own views on the subject to which we hold on. But no nation can become a hermit kingdom. That would not be right either. We must have some relationship with world affairs and mould our policy according to the circumstances. Otherwise our policy will remain in the air.

The broad fact is that there are two extremely powerful countries in the world who are opposed to each other. There is mutual suspicion and constant preparedness against each other. I do not wish to go into who is right and who is wrong. What we have to understand clearly is that rightly or wrongly, the two superpowers are ranged against each other. They are mutually afraid and the strange thing is that each side says it is preparing to defend itself against a possible attack by the other. So it is a vicious circle. There is an atmosphere of fear and suspicion and rumour-mongering. Each one exaggerates the other's capability and expresses fear of encirclement by the other. Both of them feel that they are in danger of a nuclear attack from the other and so the preparations for war keep escalating. The result is that both the superpowers are armed to the teeth and the danger of war increases. Modern warfare is an extraordinary thing which cannot be compared to anything we have known earlier. You must have heard about the hydrogen bomb which was tested on the Bikini Island and which had an adverse effect on people living 500 miles away. Some people even went blind. There are weapons available which can annihilate thousands in the blinking of an eye.

Our friend Dr Khare<sup>3</sup> talks about defence matters and Shri Chatterji<sup>4</sup> says, "stop the Five Year Plans and worry about national defence." It is true that the defence of a nation is of foremost importance. If that is not taken care of, how can there be any Five Year Plans? But how do you defend the nation against the threat of a nuclear attack? We cannot defend ourselves even if we have nuclear weapons. But that does not mean that we should not protect ourselves.

3. N.B. Khare, MP.

4. N.C. Chatterji, MP.

It is the duty of the government to make arrangements for the security of the country. Basically the defence of the nation is possible in two ways. One, the nation should be politically strong and united. Two, the country must become economically stronger because that is the only way in which our military strength can increase. It cannot happen in a void. We may buy aeroplanes from other countries. But the real strength comes when we can make them ourselves. We must become economically stronger, produce weapons and aircraft, so that our basic strength can grow.

We can argue that we can add to our strength by getting arms from outside. But, any kind of dependence on others means that we are not really free. We would become vulnerable. Even buying weapons and military equipment, which we have to perforce do at present, diminishes our freedom to some extent. But we are helpless at the moment. However ultimately the only way to build a nation's strength is to become economically stronger and increase production of goods including weapons, set up factories etc. That is the only method. We can alter the Five Year Plan but, fundamentally, what I have just outlined is the only way to build a strong nation.

I should like to refer to something that our friend Dr Khare has just said. He does not even try to be responsible in what he says. But I was amazed at some of the things that he said. He alleged that we thought that our armed forces were useless and that we did not appreciate them enough. That is indeed strange. I have the opportunity of constantly meeting people from the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. I think our young men in the armed forces are strong, tough and can compare with the armed forces anywhere in the world. I am very proud of them. The fact of the matter is that India is backward not in human resources but in other things—industries, modern weaponry, etc. We cannot compete with the great nations in these areas. We have to forge ahead but that cannot be done all at once. The edifice can be built up only over a length of time. The question is, are we going to pay more attention to these matters or be satisfied with having an army with some guns and weapons? That will not take a nation very far.

Dr Khare has mentioned nonviolence. What can I say about that? It is my belief that if we had the strength to follow that path to the end, no one can defeat us. My reference is to the entire nation. After all, a government or parliament cannot change millions of minds and hearts by merely passing a law or a resolution. We are embarked on a journey with millions of human beings as fellow travellers and so we cannot reach our destination alone. The people of this country can traverse the path of nonviolence only to the extent that they are capable of. Otherwise we shall be talking in the air sitting on a Himalayan mountaintop.

We keep an army but we do not rely wholly on armed strength but believe in resolving problems through discussions. This is what the last twenty or thirty



years have taught us. We have now reached a stage in history where, as any intelligent human being can see, war means only total disaster. Once that is clear, we are forced to think of finding other solutions.

I was not here but I believe some members including Mr Anthony asserted that though we made a big show of being in the middle, the fact was that we bent too much towards the communist world.<sup>5</sup> I would submit that this is not a very responsible remark to make. My friend Dr Lanka Sundaram said something on the same lines. I want you to think about the kind of attitude of mind which leads to making such pronouncements. It is somewhat irrelevant to discuss ideologies and the principles they adhere to.

In essence, what is our policy? First of all, irrespective of what we may think, it is quite clear that we shall follow the path that this country wants, our Parliament wants, without bowing to any external pressures. This is number one. If we wish to follow the socialist path, we shall do so undeterred by threats or pressures from any quarter. We shall be the ones to decide. I am referring to the economic sphere. We do not view our economic policy as something of a gospel that cannot be criticized, something that in a rigid, doctrinaire path which cannot be changed. We shall do what is best for our country, keeping in mind conditions obtaining here on our resources and our ability to deal with these things. We shall change our policies whenever we want to.

Whether some members favour the American ideology or the Russian ideology, we should not lose sight of our own ideology. I shall not go into the details. The policy that we have adopted is outlined in the Constitution and it comes up before Parliament in our day-to-day activities. It can be changed by Parliament, if it feels the need to do so. This is at the political level. Now as far as the economic sphere is concerned, you may be of the view that we should be going more or less in one direction or the other, I shall not go into that debate because this is not the place for it. There will be other opportunities. But we must be clear as to which way we are going.

I should like to say one more thing. Ultimately the people will accept that economic policy which benefits them most, it is so not only in India but anywhere in the world. That is the test of a policy. You may indulge in long, esoteric debates but ultimately the test by which an economic policy is judged is how it benefits the people. If it does not prove beneficial, people will themselves abandon it and change their path. This is on the economic front.

However here it is a tussle between capitalism and communism and hence the debate is not merely economic, it takes on a political colour. There are two great superpowers in the world today. I do not wish to go into which of them

5. Frank Anthony in his speech in the House on 23 March had said that in seeking the ideal of complete impartiality, India often appeared to be partisan or pro-communist.

is good or bad. Since the two superpowers are extremely powerful, the terms communism and capitalism themselves have acquired new meanings. The two are ranged against each other in the world arena. When there are two giants ranged against each other, each one wants to get the other countries of the world into its own sphere of influence. I am not saying that this is wrong in itself. In the process of enlarging their spheres of influence, all kinds of pressures are exercised, all kinds of temptations are held out. Threats, pressures and allurements are all part of the game.

At the present juncture, no other country in the world, even the larger countries, compares in power to these two superpowers. They may have the potential but in terms of military might all of them are negligible. As a result, the smaller countries are being drawn willy-nilly into one camp or the other. This is not a matter so much of communism or capitalism but a tug-of-war between two superpowers who dominate the world arena today.

You must also take into account the weapons of warfare available today, including the atom bomb. If this process goes on, the conclusion is unavoidable that there will be attempts in future to obliterate one-half or one-third of the world. And the weapons are so powerful that they are bound to have an impact on the rest of the world. We may engage in an intellectual debate about the rival merits of the two ideologies but that would have no impact on the real goals. If one of the superpowers were to decide that the only way that is by annihilating the other, then we have only two alternatives - to accept or not to accept. Accepting means that we agree that there is no alternative to a world war. If we do not agree and if we feel that a war will not solve any problem and only bring ruin upon everyone then it means looking for a way to stop the conflict. In that case to side with one or the other or blame the other is dishonest. That is why we follow a policy of not criticizing or praising one or the other but raise our voice against all these things which we feel would lead the world towards armed conflict. We follow a policy of trying to reduce tensions. As far as possible we do not criticize other countries.

Many things happen which we do not like and yet we do not express a critical opinion because the world is divided into two armed camps and both are so hostile, that they are totally unprepared to listen to any kind of reason. Criticism does not get any result. It may cool our temper a little bit if we speak out our mind. But if, we want to get results or influence others, it is better that we do not express our opinion on many events that take place in the world. We normally hold our peace. We express our views on colonialism which we have always maintained is wrong. But we do not launch a great agitation over every issue. The public is free to do so if it wants to. Do we want to achieve results or just make a big noise? When something affects us directly, we do not keep quiet. If there is any development in Europe or Asia, we express our views as governments do, through our Ambassadors or in Parliament. But we express



our view as far as possible in mild tones, with the intention of not exacerbating but bringing about conciliation. But if something affects us directly, then it is obvious that it is our responsibility to do something. Therefore, when any such issue comes up, for instance, the United States military aid to Pakistan, which will affect us directly, and which has an impact on our policies and on the whole of Asia, then we express our views forcefully. In such matters we cannot be mere spectators.

Some members feel that we did not express our views forcibly enough on Indo-China. That is true. But our expressing our views loudly will not bring about a ceasefire, it will not bring the war to an end. We advised them that there should be a ceasefire. We are not looking for kudos nor do we wish to interfere. But in a climate when nations are arrayed against one another and nobody is prepared to listen to reason, then a third party's advice may be beneficial. So we gave a hint and will do so again if an opportunity arises. But to mount an agitation that there should be a ceasefire in Indo-China would be totally meaningless. It is not we who are fighting the war there. International affairs are very complicated and a time has now come when even if one country takes some steps in self-defence, the other side thinks it is aggression and *vice versa*. This is all very complex.

From this point of view, the move to give military aid to Pakistan by America seemed to be directed against us. It was said—ostensibly honestly, we do not wish to cast any aspersions—that they were doing it for their own security. But it had the contrary effect, as it was bound to, and it was perceived as an act of aggression, of an attempt to endanger the security of other nations. In short, whatever the intention might have been, its results were disastrous. You can see what is happening in India and in other countries of Asia. So it has not been a step towards peace. On the other hand, it has been a step towards escalating the danger of war. Therefore it is fundamentally wrong.

So I want you to keep this picture before you and bear in mind that national security depends on how strong we are as a nation. All sorts of meanings are read into it if we seek aid from elsewhere. We are often taunted that while we object to Pakistan getting military aid, we have bought tanks and aircraft and other military hardware from the United States. These taunts are not very relevant because we did not seek aid, we bought whatever we needed and paid for it just as we would buy from anyone. There was nothing roundabout in a simple act of buying and selling, Shri Mukerjee has mentioned the US Mutual Security Act.<sup>6</sup> It is true that it had slipped my mind. Whenever weapons are sold they

6. H.N. Mukerjee said in the House on 16 March that the US Mutual Security Act aimed at promotion and maintenance of the foreign policy of USA, since this Act barred US assistance unless the US President considered such assistance strengthened security of USA. India in these circumstances might be blackmailed by USA to become follower of her foreign policy because of accepting assistance from her.

have to take their Governments' permission. They have this Act in order to safeguard weapons passing into the hands of their enemies. Whatever the reason, the Government of the United States gave its permission for the sale of arms and on the basis of it, we bought them. It is true that they have this law. But that cannot be compared with the military aid that is being given to Pakistan. I have said this before and I repeat that if there are any strings or conditions attached to our buying arms from the United States which overtly or covertly jeopardize our sovereignty, we shall not accept it. We want the best equipment for our armed forces. We want to be self-reliant as far as possible. But if we cannot, then we shall have to buy what we need from others. But I feel that it is more important to build up our own strength. If we let ourselves become complacent and think that we are stronger than our neighbour, then we shall become weak, no matter how many arms we buy.

I now want to refer to some of the other things that have been mentioned, like Goa. There is an old Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. Now there is the NATO treaty. What are their possible effect on Goa? As far as I know, the big powers in the NATO have all along made it abundantly clear that it has nothing to do with Goa. Nor do I think that the old Anglo-Portuguese Treaty has anything to do with Goa. The question of Goa is completely separate. As far as we, that is India or the Government of India, are concerned, we neither wish the NATO to interfere in this matter nor do we accept that it has anything to do with any other treaty. Goa is a simple, straightforward problem. I do not have to tell you that. It would be beyond anybody's comprehension that a pocket of colonial rule should be allowed to flourish in India after one hundred and fifty years of British rule. I cannot understand under what law this can be permitted. It is absurd and inconceivable that India can tolerate this because, for one thing, it is not consistent with independent India's dignity and, secondly, to have a pocket of territory under foreign rule spells danger for the country. The apprehension is always there that some undue advantage may be taken of it at any time. Apart from that, we have our day-to-day problems. These foreign pockets create a number of problems for us, for instance smuggling.

As far as Goa is concerned, we have said right from the beginning that we wish to solve this problem peacefully and through non violent methods. Some people have been annoyed with us that we are showing weakness. But we stuck to our policy and shall continue to do so because if you look at the larger world picture, it is not an isolated issue but something on which major issues hinge. It would not be very wise of us if we were to take any step by which we get bogged down in a morass of difficulties. Goa and Pondicherry cannot go away from us. They are part of India and will continue to remain so. There is also no doubt about it that all these territories will become a part of the Republic of India. We have to determine when to take the appropriate step in a peaceful manner. Sometimes we are able to move fast and at other times



the pace becomes slow. Did you observe the strange spectacle that we witnessed in Pondicherry? Did you note what a great victory it is for our policy? Not that we engineered the victory in any way but it does mean that it spells victory for our policy of peace. If the referendum and plebiscite had been free and fair, the people would have expressed their views openly. But the manner in which the French Government had organised the referendum, there could be no fairplay because there was hooliganism and tremendous pressure. This is what the foreign observers said. Where was the question of referendum when everyone there including the common people said in one voice what they wanted? There is mention in today's newspapers about a note that has been sent to us by the French Government.<sup>7</sup> I want to tell you that the note has not yet come to us. We shall look at it when it does. But it is obvious that the time has now come for the French Government to realize that there is no point in dragging this matter any further, it is of no use to anyone, least of all to them. That is why we have been telling them to hand over *de facto* possession to the Government of India. Regarding *de jure* possession the deliberations can continue and amendments to the Constitution can be adopted leisurely.

Before I forget, I should like to tell you that all kinds of rumours and stories are spread these days. Recently there was an extraordinary news item, I think it was published in Colombo, that an anti-communist rally was to take place in Ceylon to which some elderly statesmen from different countries had been invited and among them was mentioned Shri Rajagopalachari's name. Anyone who read this would have understood how absurd and mischievous this item was. I made enquiries about the matter. Shri Rajagopalachari replied to me as follows:

I have absolutely no knowledge of it, nor have I received any such invitation. I entirely agree with you that it is an outrageously foolish conception which can only be traced to the genius of some journalist.<sup>8</sup>

Yesterday some of our friends here raised the subject of our borders, particularly on the Tibet side, what is known as the McMahon Line. I do not know why they had this sudden doubt because the McMahon Line is

My friend Sharmaji has raised an objection in connection with the border question,<sup>9</sup> that the new step taken by the North East Frontier Agency and the separate cadre created by the officers is not to his liking. I regret that he does not like it. But we have done this after much deliberation and I am convinced that we must follow this path and if necessary, extend it further. What is the basic question? Perhaps the greatest danger is that of the segregation of Assam. I do not want Assam to be segregated. I want that all parts of India should come closer together and coexist in harmony. But the most important thing is to see that the people of Assam progress willingly.

The parts which are on the borders have come into the Indian Union somewhat late and to some extent not through the right manner, I mean during British rule. Our freedom movement did not make much of an impact on areas which were remote and difficult of access. We have to coopt them into the mainstream now. The most important part of it is to make them feel that they

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At my colleague the Deputy Minister read out a few lines from an article I had written for an officer when I had visited the borders a year ago. It had been marked secret,<sup>10</sup> although there is nothing really secret about it. But since some part of it has been read out, I have advised that the article be placed on the Table of the House so that those who are interested can read it. It will be put in the Parliament Library or on the Table of the House so that our proposed plan for dealing with the North East becomes clear. This policy is not to keep Assam segregated. We want it to join the mainstream. At the same time we do not want the people in the North East to feel that anything is being thrust upon them. This is a very delicate problem. It is a problem that can be resolved quickly. It will take at least a decade or two to draw the tribes of this region towards us.

Often the question of language. There are many languages in the North East—every ten or twenty villages speak a different language. Yet we give them primary education in their own languages. They learn other languages so. But you must understand where their difficulty lies. A Khasi

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*Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 160-172. Anil K. Chanda, the Deputy

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10. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 160-172. Anil K. Chanda, the Deputy



came to me and said, "It is all very well that you have made arrangements for providing primary education in our own languages. We like it. But it is equally important for us to learn Assamese in its own script." At the moment the dialects in the North East are written in the Roman script, a practice started by the missionaries. He said it was equally important for them to learn Hindi in the Nagari script and to learn English too. So we have to teach four languages and three scripts, which cast quite a heavy burden on the poor students. They are tribals and I think their protest was legitimate. They wanted that they should be allowed to learn Assamese in the Nagari script which would reduce the load somewhat. It seemed quite reasonable to me. But as you know, we have to tread carefully in these matters because it could have an adverse effect on the people.

I have heard that one of our colleagues has objected to the fact that our ambassadors belong to the old ICS. There was a world conference in which there were twenty or twenty-two ICS men and only one or two others.<sup>11</sup> That is true. I am afraid they have not got rid of their colonial mentality yet. They continue to remain in the same atmosphere which we put an end to seven or eight years ago. Now we have set up an Indian Foreign Service into which we take the most outstanding youth. They are given training for a year and a half or two in India and abroad. They are taught foreign languages. Then they are apprenticed in one of our missions to learn the ropes. They familiarize themselves with foreign policy issues. They learn the history of other countries and try to understand their culture and civilization. In this way, they prepare themselves for a decade or two, because the more prepared they are, the better they can fill the positions of responsibility. We live in a very complex world and the tasks before them are extremely complex. They are experts in their areas. They do not belong to the ICS though there may be a few of that service left. We have recruited new blood into the Foreign Service, some from the ICS, some from the Armed Forces and other services, yet others from outside the government—professors, lawyers, etc. The Foreign Service has all these elements.

There are people from different walks of life in the Foreign Service. I do not say that all of them are of an equally high calibre. But I think by and large their standards are high, and we are constantly trying to improve them. Generally speaking, it takes decades to build up the Foreign Service of a nation. It is not

11. Joachim Alva during his speech in the House of the People on 24 March said that the Indian Ambassadors belonging to the ICS were dominating the Indian Foreign Service and that during the conference of Indian Ambassadors in Berne, the Prime Minister was surrounded by about twelve Ambassadors, out of whom ten were from the ICS. A bureaucrat, he added, could not change his colour and could not appreciate what China and Russia had done for the progress of their countries.

merely a question of selecting some persons. They have to gradually mature in the service and gain experience. As you know, we have tried to do all this in seven or eight years. Now we have criticism that there is a strong odour of the ICS in our Foreign Service, and a demand that more public men should be taken. We have done that too. But I want you to consider whether it is enough to be a public man. There are many capable man in public life and many who are not. So just by saying public man does not bestow a sign of competence. The posts which carry great responsibilities with them are being manned by public men in the government, in the cabinet, etc. That is as it should be because in that way, in the matter of policies etc. they remain in control. But how can you take only public men when expertise in a specialized field is needed? You will turn round and say that we should make public men as generals and not men from the armed forces. Public men may be very qualified but it is possible that they would not make very good generals because in that profession you need to be trained for fifteen or twenty years. Yes, it is all right to have public men in the Defence Ministry where policies have to be made and principles that we want to follow decided upon, but not in the actual armed forces.

So though we do take public men as ambassadors, etc., most of the Foreign Service is manned by career recruits. The public men who become ambassadors also become part of the Foreign Service and as their expertise grows, we can repose more confidence in them.

Now about Chandernagore. As I mentioned, I hope that a decision will be arrived at very soon and on the lines suggested by the Report of the Commission.<sup>12</sup>

Finally let me tell you that foreign policy is generally regarded as extremely complicated and in a sense it is so. An old English Ambassador had written 200-odd years ago, "an ambassador's job is to go to another country and lie on behalf of his own." Well, I do not know how far it is right. But it is generally felt that foreign policy matters involve deceit and stratagem. You may have heard of the famous Bismarck of Germany who is credited with great victories and is regarded as a great statesman. When asked by someone about the reason for his success, he is supposed to have said: "It is generally believed that everyone is telling lies in foreign policy matters and so nobody believes them. Therefore what I did was to always tell the truth about what I was going to do. Nobody believed me and so they became confused. They thought I was deceiving them."

I do not want to go into all that. But the fact is that our foreign policy is absolutely simple and straightforward. There is no complexity in it. Yes, it is true that we cannot discuss everything in the market place because other

12. See *ante*, pp. 377-378.



countries are involved. But there is no question of our practising deceit or trickery against any country. We have reiterated the principles which govern our policy a thousand times. Yet I am often amazed at the kinds of things that are written about India's foreign policy specially in foreign newspapers which are constantly trying to read between the lines. They do not believe that it is a straightforward policy because they think there is some deep ploy to hoodwink others. They are confused only because they do not look at the matter openly.

Many have spoken in this debate and though there has been some criticism, our policy has been by and large accepted. I am very grateful to the House for approving our policy. There may be some points open to debate. Please come to me separately and we can go into them. But we must be firm in following the broad principles of our foreign policy.

### 3. Changes in Asia<sup>1</sup>

I am glad to learn that a newsmagazine, named *Jana* is going to come out soon from Colombo. There are many newspapers and periodicals, and a mere addition of another to them is not a matter for rejoicing. But I have read with interest the reason for the starting of *Jana*. That is a significant reason which should make this new periodical particularly welcome.

After some hundreds of years, a great change is taking place in the countries of Asia. The period of European domination—political, economic and cultural—has ended, though it may survive here and there for a while longer. This long period has naturally left its impress on peoples of Asia, both good and bad. We are, on the one hand, powerfully influenced by the spirit of nationalism and freedom, and, on the other, by our conscious or unconscious attempts to follow European models. There is no reason why we should not follow foreign ways and customs, provided they are good and suitable. But a country and a people cannot be pale imitations of others. They have to stand on their own feet and on their own soil. Mahatma Gandhi once said that he welcomed the winds from the four corners of the earth to blow into his country, but he refused to be blown off his feet.

1. Message sent on the occasion of inauguration of *Jana*, a newsmagazine from Colombo, 7 April 1954. JN Collection.

Asia is thus engaged now in finding herself again. We pick up old threads and, at the same time, we naturally add to them what the modern age has brought. That modern age is essentially an age of science and technology, and probably the biggest world problem today is how to adapt human beings to this amazing growth of technology. The atomic and hydrogen bombs are the final culminations of this technological progress, if progress it can be called. They may destroy the world, or perhaps, as we hope, lead to a better life. This generation of ours will have to decide how to use these tremendous powers which have been placed at man's disposal for good or ill.

In the realm of politics, the spirit of Asia inevitably seeks an avoidance from a line-up with the two great power blocs. It does so partly because that lining-up itself necessarily means limiting our independence, which we prize so greatly. But it means something infinitely more, for it means also the giving up of the standards and cultural values that we claim to possess. There can be no progress for the countries of Asia if they become mere hangers-on of other countries, however great these might be in their own way. We have to find our salvation in our own way, in friendship and cooperation with others, but retaining our individualities and our broad human and cultural outlook. We shall learn from the West, and we have to learn a great deal, but that learning will be of little value if we are uprooted from our backgrounds and our soil.

Thus we have to build up anew the free countries of Asia and Africa, in cooperation with each other and without hatred or malice for any country in the world.

Mahatma Gandhi taught us many things, but perhaps his basic message was that, means govern ends. We cannot attain the right ends if we adopt wrong means. Today, in our world, there is much shouting about freedom, liberation, equality, democracy, etc., all good objectives, but people seek to attain these objectives through methods of hatred and violence. However good those objectives might be, and they are good, I am certain that they can never be attained through violence and hatred. The hydrogen bomb is the ultimate symbol of violence. If that symbol represents the spirit of the age, then there is little to hope for.

Man survived many dangers in the course of his perilous journey since the dawn of civilization. That gives us hope for the future also, and it may be that he will ultimately control not only the hydrogen bomb, but, what is more important, the spirit that lies in this engine of vast destruction.

We, in the countries of Asia, are weak in this atomic age, weak in military power, weak in financial strength. We are poor countries, struggling against this curse of poverty and trying our utmost to raise the level of our millions of human beings. However weak and poor we might be in these symbols of material power, there is no reason why we should succumb to them or lose that dignity and that cultural inheritance which has given us strength in the past.



#### 4. India and International Situation<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: I beg to move:

“That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration.”

About four months ago, in January last, this House had a debate on foreign affairs.<sup>2</sup> Since then, many developments have taken place and from time to time I have come to this House and made statements in regard to those developments, or sometimes in answer to questions, placed before the House our viewpoint and the facts as they were developing. The House is, therefore, well aware of these developments.

I shall deal this morning with some of the more important ones. To begin with, I would remind the House that at the present moment, since yesterday, our representatives are discussing with the French Government in Paris on the future of the French establishment in India.<sup>3</sup> Now, our viewpoint in regard to those French establishments is very well known. We have gladly accepted the invitation of the French Government to send our representatives to Paris with a view to negotiations about the future of these establishments, and I would not like to say very much more at this stage about them, except this, as is well known, that the recent developments in Pondicherry<sup>4</sup> and round about there are rather remarkable; they have been completely spontaneous, and quite extraordinarily unanimous. In fact, not only the Central Assembly there, but every commune in Pondicherry, Karaikal and Mahe decided for a merger with India without any referendum or the like. We have not in any sense intervened or participated. We had to take certain steps to avoid conflicts in Indian territory and, therefore, we decided—and we informed the French authorities in Pondicherry—that we could not allow armed police or any other armed French forces to pass through Indian territory from one part of those establishments to another, in case Indian territory intervened. As a result of this popular and spontaneous movement, roughly one-fifth of those French establishments are under some kind of popular control, and in the rest too, there are strong movements. We had no desire to interfere in this matter unilaterally as we

1. Statement in the Parliament, 15 May 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report 1954, Vol. V, Pt. II, cols. 7493-7514.
2. In December 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 558-579.
3. See *post*, pp. 526-527.
4. See *post*, p. 528, fn. 4.

thought that the best settlement would be the peaceful settlement after negotiation with the French Government. Therefore, we are now negotiating with them and I hope that these negotiations will lead to satisfactory results. I might add that with a view to creating as good an atmosphere as possible for these negotiations and to show our own goodwill, while firmly adhering to our position, we have decided that we may, in certain matters, relax certain steps that we had taken, that is to say, in regard to permits, we allowed the permits a little more, in regard to this scarcity of petrol, we allow a little more petrol and in regard to some parcels, etc., which have been held up, we may allow them to go. But we hope that the French Government, on their side, will also show by their attitude in those settlements that they are desirous of promoting a peaceful settlement.

The next thing, an event—and a very important event—that I would like to draw the attention of the House to, is the Agreement between India and China in regard to Tibet.<sup>5</sup> That Agreement deals with a large number of problems, each one of them perhaps not very important in itself but important from the point of view of our trade, our pilgrim traffic, our trade posts, our communications there, and the rest. It took a considerable time to arrive at this Agreement not because of any major conflict or difficulty, but because the number of small points were so many and had to be discussed in detail. The major thing about this Agreement to which I would like again to draw the attention of the House is the preamble to that Agreement. I shall read that preamble. It states:

The principles and considerations which govern our mutual relations and the approach of the two countries to each other are as follows:

- (i) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- (ii) mutual non-aggression;
- (iii) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- (iv) equality and mutual benefit; and
- (v) peaceful coexistence.

These principles not only indicate the policy that we pursue in regard to these matters not only with China but with any neighbour country, or for the matter of that, any other country, but it is also a statement of wholesome principles, and I imagine that if these principles were adopted in the relations of various countries with each other, a great deal of the trouble of the present day world would probably disappear. It is a matter of importance to us, of course, as well as, I am sure, to China that these two countries, which have

5. See *post*, p. 468, fn. 2.



now almost about 1800 miles of frontier, should live in terms of peace and friendliness and should respect each other's sovereignty and integrity, should agree not to interfere with each other in any way and, in fact, though now it is formally stated as such, but practically speaking, not committing aggression on each other. By this agreement, we ensure to a very large extent peace in a certain area of Asia. I would earnestly wish that this area of peace could be spread over the rest of Asia and indeed over the rest of the world.

There has been a great deal of talk of collective security, sometimes of preparations for collective war or collective war-preparedness. collective security, good as it is and essential to aim at, assumes the garb rather of preparation for collective war. I submit that it would be a healthy approach to this problem if it was that of collective peace. Therefore, when we have talked sometimes of an area of peace in Asia especially, it has been in this context of collective peace, with no element of aggression against any country and with an idea of not only helping in the preservation of the peace of the world but, in any event, preserving peace in that area. Therefore, I should like the House to consider these wider implications of this agreement between India and China.

So far as Tibet is concerned, it is a recognition of the existing situation there. In fact, that situation had been recognised by us two or three years ago. Some criticism has been made that this is a recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Apart from that fact, I am not aware of any time during the last few hundred years when Chinese sovereignty or if you like suzerainty was challenged by any outside country and all during this period whether China was weak or strong and whatever the Government of China was, China always maintained this claim to the sovereignty over Tibet. It is true that occasionally when China was weak, this sovereignty was not exercised in any large measure. When China was strong, it was exercised. Always there was a large measure of autonomy of Tibet, so that there was no great change in the theoretical approach to the Tibetan problem from the Chinese side. It has been throughout the last 200 or 300 years the same. The only country that had more intimate relations with Tibet was India, that is to say, British India in those days. Even then, when it was British policy to have some measure of influence over Tibet, even then they never denied the fact of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, although in practice it was hardly exercised and they laid stress on Tibetan autonomy. Recent events made some other changes, factual changes because a strong Chinese State was against the practical evidence of exercising that sovereignty. So that what we have done in this agreement is not to recognise any new thing, but merely to repeat what we have said previously, and what, in fact, inevitably follows from the circumstances, both historical and practical today. The real importance, I repeat, of this agreement is because of its wider implications in regard to non-aggression, recognition of each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference with each other, external, internal or any other like interference.

The House will remember that the Prime Minister of China, Mr Chou En-lai sent a message to me on the conclusion of this agreement, a friendly cordial message which I heartily reciprocated.<sup>6</sup>

At the present moment, there is going on in Geneva a very important conference, chiefly concerned with the Korean problem and with Indo-China. From day to day we see messages about various proposals made on either side and sometimes the two approaches seem to be diametrically opposite. And yet, the mere fact, first of all, of this conference meeting in Geneva is important. That is why on the last occasion when I spoke after the Berlin Conference I laid stress on the importance of the coming Geneva Conference. Also at that time, I made suggestion that there might be a ceasefire in Indo-China.<sup>7</sup> That suggestion was welcomed in many quarters, but nothing was done about it, at any rate, it produced no effect. Looking back over these few months, a feeling of regret comes that perhaps if a ceasefire had been thought of in more urgent terms at that time much suffering and killing would have been avoided and the position that is being faced today would have been infinitely easier and better, and the tragic and heroic episode of Dien Bien Phu<sup>8</sup> might have been very different.

Anyhow, the House will see that today what we said at that time and what others said too, that is, about ceasefire, has become one of the urgent matters of consideration for the Geneva Conference. Everybody agrees now that there must be a ceasefire, and the question is only how it is to be brought about. Right at the beginning there were some procedural difficulties in Geneva, but they were settled satisfactorily. That was a good and auspicious beginning, because we must remember that the countries meeting there are full of strong feelings against each other. They do not want to give in to the other party in the slightest, in argument or otherwise. And, therefore, this procedural beginning which was settled so satisfactorily was a good omen.

In Geneva today the question of war and peace,—world war and peace—hangs in the balance. I do not mean to say that war will suddenly descend upon us, not that, I do not think it will. Nevertheless, whether as a result of the Geneva Conference many steps forward are taken towards peace, or the present stalemate continues or worsens, is important. It is important for all the countries of the world and it is natural that the great powers are deeply interested in this matter. But let it be remembered that both these major questions that are being considered in Geneva, that is, Korea and Indo-China, are Asian questions. Both

6. Not printed.

7. See *post*, p. 437.

8. See *post*, p. 477, fn. 7.



the countries are in Asia, and whether we are small powers or great, whether we have great military or other potential or not, naturally as countries of Asia we are intimately concerned with what happens in Korea and Indo-China. Indeed, we are even more intimately concerned—if I may say so—because of our geographical proximity with Indo-China. It has been the misfortune of Asia during the past some hundreds of years, not only to have colonial regimes, but to be often the theatre of war for others and by others. Therefore, if we wish that this business of warfare in Asia should cease, and more especially the business of others carrying on warfare for their own purposes in Asia should cease, it is not an illegitimate desire on our part. As I said on a previous occasion, peace for us, countries of Asia, who have newly emerged into freedom is not merely a pious hope, but an emergent necessity. In a sense the fate of Asia depends a good deal on what happens in Indo-China or Korea.

Now, recently I attended a Conference of five South East Asian Prime Ministers at Colombo<sup>9</sup> and long reports have appeared about this Conference and a statement too which the five Prime Ministers agreed to then.<sup>10</sup> This Conference was not a formal conference, with a formal agenda and formal resolutions at the end of it. Such conferences are normally held on an informal basis, more so, this conference, which was the first of its kind. And I think, this fact has to be remembered, that of the uniqueness of this Conference. It was for the first time, in a sense, in history, that representatives, the Prime Ministers of these five countries met together to discuss common problems. Quite inevitably, there were somewhat different approaches to some of the problems and different suggestions were made in regard to them. Yet, the remarkable thing is that in spite of those different approaches, in spite of, sometimes, in the case of some countries certain entanglements, which kept them back, nevertheless, we had the statement, this unanimous statement issued by those five countries referring to a wide field of public affairs, more especially concerning Asia. It shows that sometimes, whatever differences there may be between us, the countries of Asia, there is a vast common ground in regard to which we think alike, and that is an important factor.

Now, in this Colombo Conference many questions were discussed. I should like to read out—if I may—a part of the joint statement issued after the Colombo Conference. It has, of course, been published in the press and honourable Members know it. Nevertheless, I should like to draw the attention of honourable Members again to this.

The Prime Ministers reviewed the situation in respect of Indo-China where a long and tragic war threatens the establishments of the freedom

9. See *post*, p. 423, fn. 2.

10. See *post*, p. 434, fn. 3.

and independence of the people of Indo-China as well as the security and peace of Asia and of the world as a whole. They welcome the earnest attempts being made at Geneva to find a solution to the problem of Indo-China by negotiations, and hope that the deliberations of the Geneva Conference would bring about a speedy termination of the conflict and restoration of peace in Indo-China. They consider that the solution of the problem of Indo-China required agreement and a ceasefire should be reached without delay. The Prime Ministers feel that the solution of the problem require direct negotiations between the parties principally concerned, namely, France, three associated States of Indo-China and Viet Minh as well as other parties invited by agreement. The success of such direct negotiations will be greatly helped by an agreement on the part of the countries concerned, particularly, China, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, on the steps necessary to prevent a recurrence and resumption of hostilities. The Prime Ministers contemplate that this negotiating group would report to the Geneva Conference the final decision. They propose that France should declare at the Geneva Conference that she is irrevocably committed to the complete independence of Indo-China. In order that the good offices and the machinery of the United Nations might be utilised for the furtherance of the proposals of the Geneva Conference and implementation of the decision on Indo-China, the Prime Ministers were of the opinion that the Conference should keep the United Nations informed of the progress of its deliberations on Indo-China.

This is more or less a summary of what we have decided. It said something—the House will remember—about colonialism and racialism, about non interference by other countries. It has expressed its opinion strongly about any interference—external or internal, communist or anti-communist, in fact any type of interference in other countries. That of course, has been the policy or the feeling of most countries; no country likes interference of any type. Therefore, it was as well that this fact was clearly stated. Without meaning any disrespect to the great countries of the world, I would like to point out the fact that is well known, that we have today not only two great groups hostile to each other, but what may be called, two crusading spirits trying to undermine each other. It is, if I may use the word, a kind of *Dharm Yudh* going on between the two....

Whatever the virtues of the *Dharm Yudh* might be, somehow other countries unfortunatley get entangled, and are bound to get entangled if matters go worse. It has been our desire, both for ourselves as well as for the sake of the world because of the wider aspect of the problem, to keep apart from this conflict.



Therefore, this declaration is of great importance. The House will see that this declaration fits in exactly with the preamble to the Sino-Indian Agreement that I read a little while ago. In that Agreement, therefore we had in mind more or less the same approach of noninterference as we have mentioned in this Ceylon statement.

In this statement also, the Colombo statement, there is reference to Tunisia and Morocco.<sup>11</sup> Why, it may be asked, were Tunisia and Morocco specially mentioned, when there are many other areas of colonial control. You can hardly make a list of them. But the fact of the matter is that Tunisia and Morocco are not colonies in the real sense of the word. They are both, or they are both supposed to be, sovereign countries in alliance. In effect, it is perfectly true that their sovereignty is non-existent and has been gradually pushed aside and colonial conditions have been produced there. But in law and in fact the position in Tunisia and Morocco is different from the normal colony. Actually the conditions are much the same. But this was one of the reasons why we wanted to mention Tunisia and Morocco separately, because colonies included all colonial territories, and these two places were not directly colonies in that sense.

One thing else we mentioned in the statement, about the possibility of having an Asian-African Conference.<sup>12</sup> This was a proposal made by the Prime Minister of Indonesia. We all of us welcomed that proposal. There are some obvious difficulties in organising such a conference. And the Prime Minister of Indonesia undertook to explore this matter and to consult with the other governments concerned about it later.

Another matter in which we were deeply interested was the economic problem of South Asia. We were hardly in a position there to discuss this with any detail, because one wanted experts and others. Also, we had exhausted the time at our disposal in discussing other matters. But certain proposals were made by several countries; and those proposals, it was suggested and agreed to, should be circulated to all the Governments concerned with a view to our corresponding about these and, if necessary, meeting to discuss these either at a technical level or any other level. Because, it was considered important that in economic matters as well as in cultural matters these countries of South East Asia should come closer together.

Just previous to going to the Colombo Conference I made six proposals in this House.<sup>13</sup> It was not my intention to push those proposals exactly as they were at this Conference at Colombo. I naturally wanted the general background and approach of those proposals to be appreciated and accepted by the Prime

11. See *post*, p. 434, fn. 3.

12. See *post*, p. 431-432.

13. See *post*, p. 439-444.

Ministers present there, but not everything, word for word, as I had stated here. And so I placed these proposals in their general outline. There was much discussion about them, and as a result I have already read out to you what we unanimously agreed to. Now, much has been said about this matter; about disagreement over these question. Of course, they were different approaches, but the fact is, I would like the House to read the Colombo decisions and read the six proposals in regard to Indo-China and see how much similarity there is in that approach. The basic approach that I made in those proposals was, ceasefire, direct negotiations and nonintervention. These were the three basic things. Now, in the Ceylon statement, ceasefire has been given prominence, direct negotiation has been given prominence, but the word 'nonintervention' does not appear. But, what appears in its place? It is said that the success of direct negotiation will be greatly helped by an agreement on the part of all countries concerned, particularly China, UK, USA, and USSR, on the steps necessary to prevent a recurrence and resumption of hostilities. Now, if they come to an agreement on the steps necessary to prevent a recurrence and resumption of hostilities, it inevitably means nonintervention or "nonaid". It has got that meaning. In fact, nonintervention as such was in a sense negative. This is a positive approach to the problem including that negative approach of non intervention, so that, if I may say so, the way the Colombo Conference has put it in a much better way than I had put it previously.

The real question whether you consider Korea or Indo-China is the question of how far we can get a negotiated settlement, or of how far these countries are going to try to impose a settlement. Imposition is hardly a settlement. But, now one thing is quite clear. It is this: that the various forces and powers are so matched that it is not possible for either group of powers to impose any settlement on the other wholly against the will of the other one. One can of course incline the settlement this way or that way. It depends on the desire for settlement. It depends on the strength behind one. But, in the final analysis there can be no imposition quite apart from the merits of the question. We have seen even in Korea the war dragging on for three years and ending in a stalemate, not in the victory of the one or the other and a desire for settlement naturally came after that three years of warfare on both sides. Now, if after that stalemate they speak—and I regret to say that both sides are in the habit of speaking that way—as if they have won a great victory; if either side wants to function as if it was victorious, well, the facts belie that position. It was a stalemate and if we are to have a settlement it will have to be based on that stalemate position. I do not mean to say that geographically it is on that, but I may say the mental approach has to be that, there is no victor in the struggle and we have to come to terms with that. That in effect is the position both in Korea and Indo-China. That is, if there is to be a settlement it has to be a negotiated settlement and not by imposition. Now, unfortunately our wishes



sometimes do not coincide with the facts of the situation. Our desire about the type of settlement or solution we want has no relation to facts. President Eisenhower used a very interesting phrase about the approaches that were made, the 'untenable and the unacceptable'. That is, when one wants something which one cannot attain, well, one wants it rather in the air and what the other party wants is unacceptable. So, one cannot bridge that gulf. Now, in Geneva, these matters are being discussed daily in a number of groups and conferences and privately. All kinds of proposals have been made which appear to be far removed from each other. Nevertheless, the feeling that I get is that there is a very earnest desire to find some way out for a ceasefire as well as for future steps towards a settlement. I have no doubt that the great statesmen who are engaged in this work in Geneva are actuated by a strong desire for peace. Also, behind all these big differences and sometimes strong criticism of each other, there appears to be a growing area of commonness in their approach. I do not know, of course, what the result will be of these deliberations in Geneva. I earnestly hope that some way out will be found towards settlement. I repeat that there can be no such approach towards a settlement except to a negotiated settlement, not to an imposition.

People at some times said that India is angling for some kind of invitation to go to Geneva. Speaking for myself, I can say quite frankly that not only have I no desire at all, but I would hesitate very much to assume further burdens of any type or kind. I have no desire; there is no question of angling about it. If and whenever we are invited to any of these difficult conferences, it is not with too great a pleasure that we go, but it is only under the compulsion of events that one cannot avoid going as we went to Korea. Our attitude all along has been not to push ourselves in; at the same time not to isolate ourselves and say, we can have nothing to do with it, because we are intimately concerned with it. Not only we; but other neighbouring countries in Asia are intimately concerned. We cannot say we wash our hands of this business. Therefore, being intimately concerned, we cannot get away from the fact that if a situation arises which might require some kind of association on our part in any particular decision, we cannot just run away and say, no, let us drift. Inevitably, we cannot shed the responsibilities that go with a great country.

I do not wish to discuss these various proposals in regard to Indo-China or Korea which have been put forward at Geneva. That would not help at all. We are anxious to help; not merely to show our cleverness by criticising this country or that proposal. Apart from that, these proposals change daily. It is not easy to keep pace with them. Anyhow, so far as we are concerned, we are earnestly following these developments and if and when necessity arises, we express our viewpoint privately. If an occasion arises when we can be perhaps of some assistance in the promotion of a settlement, we shall consider that with the greatest care.

Of one thing in the Colombo meeting, I should like to remind the House. That is, we have emphasised that all these matters in regard to Indo-China should be kept in the purview of the United Nations, that the United Nations should be brought into the picture. Now we attach importance to this. Sometimes I have ventured to criticise the United Nations—the functioning, rather, of the United Nations—but the fact remains that the United Nations is the only great international body which can deal with international questions. It is far better in these matters for that large forum of the United Nations to consider these questions of war and peace than for limited conferences. Of course, limited conferences are essential, but, on the whole, when the time comes, if the United Nations is there, the weight in favour of peace is likely to be much greater, because nearly all the countries there are interested in peace. Therefore, we have suggested about the United Nations being seized of the matter in a sense, that is, the Geneva Conference reporting to the United Nations, and, may be, the United Nations giving the weight of its support to that settlement and seeing that it is carried through. It is difficult enough for a settlement to be arrived at—I hope that difficulty will be surmounted—but having surmounted the difficulty of coming to some agreed settlement, the next step is equally difficult, the implementation of that settlement. And it is there even more than before that the United Nations comes in, and all of us who are members of the United Nations have to play our part in this matter.

There are one or two other matters I should like to refer to rather briefly. I refer to the French settlements. There is, of course, the old problem of Goa, and, quite frankly, we have not taken any special step in regard to Goa. Questions are put in this House from time to time, and I quite recognise the impatience of honourable Members and the country, and I give a reply which even I consider very unsatisfactory, but there it is. I hope that this problem will become easier of solution because of other developments, but the real difficulty, if I may venture to say so, dealing with Goa, is that the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries come up against the middle of the twentieth century. It is quite extraordinary for this three or four hundred years' gap suddenly to be bridged. We are told of alliances like the Anglo-Portuguese alliance which I believe in some form or other dates back six or seven hundred years and which was renewed in the sixteenth, seventeenth and early nineteenth century in various forms. We are told that His Holiness the Pope, three hundred years ago, issued a bull giving half the world to Portugal. We are told of the more recent NATO alliances and agreements,<sup>14</sup> and we are told that Goa has become an integral part of Portugal. Well, apart from that being somewhat of a violence in geography, now, in this matter, the Prime Minister of Portugal lays stress on

14. See *post*, pp. 520-521.



the Anglo-Portuguese alliance of some hundreds of years ago. Naturally, the world was rather different then. In fact, India was hardly in the picture. Even the British were not in India then, and partly, I think, India came into the picture in the sense that the island of Bombay was about that time given as dowry. Now, the ruling authorities of Portugal still live in the mental climate of the time when the island of Bombay was given as dowry, and it is naturally difficult for us to adapt ourselves to that climate. But this reference to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance has no relevance obviously to events in India or Goa, nor has NATO which was an alliance for the Atlantic communities. First of all, as I have stated, we are parties neither to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance nor to the NATO alliance, and, therefore, we are not bound by any treaty whatever, to which we are not parties. Secondly, we do not think that either of these, even from another point of view, has any relevance in this respect; and in fact, some of the countries associated with the NATO alliance have expressed this view themselves. Nevertheless, we have addressed some of the governments concerned, and drawn their attention to Prime Minister Salazar's statement and pointed out that we do not recognise this alliance, and hope that they also do not recognise that to be the correct position.

Then there is the unfortunate problem of people of Indian descent in Ceylon. I find a great deal of difficulty in dealing with this matter, because I am quite convinced that this is, more so than other questions, a question which can only be solved in a friendly and peaceful way, and I do not wish to say or do anything which ruffles the atmosphere or makes it a little more difficult. The House knows that some months back—in January, I think—there was what was called the Indo-Ceylonese Agreement.<sup>15</sup> That was rather a big word to describe it; it was not a solution, but it was an understanding as to how to proceed about this matter, in order to reach a solution. There were certain procedures, and among those procedures, one of the things that we have laid down specifically was that neither Government would take any step without consulting the other about this matter. That, of course, does not make less the sovereignty of either Government. It is a very common thing for countries to come to a decision that they will consult each other. That does not make them less sovereign or less independent. Since then, nothing very much has happened, and yet many small things have happened, which have made large numbers of people in Ceylon very apprehensive about the future. There is the problem, honourable Members will remember, of these persons, who, at the present moment, can only be described as stateless.<sup>16</sup> They are certainly not Indian nationals. They and their families have lived there for a long time; many of them have been born there.

15. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, p. 615.

16. See *post*, pp. 487-488.

Now, normally they would be Ceylon nationals, but, of course, Ceylon has the right and authority to decide about that matter, about its own nationals. So long as it does not accept them as nationals, they are nationals of no state—certainly not Indian nationals—and so they have become stateless people living in Ceylon and hoping for Ceylonese nationality. In fact, they have applied for it, nearly all of them or a very large number of them. I am not for the moment referring to the Indian nationals who are there. They are in large numbers too, may be 150,000, and the House should always distinguish between the two. We talk vaguely about Indians here and Indians there. That is confusing, because an Indian is normally an Indian national; it does not matter what the colour of his skin, is, or he may be, if I may use the word—let us say—a 'European naturalised Indian'. Well, he is an Indian from that point of view. Now, there are Indian nationals in Ceylon who claim only the normal rights of non-discrimination, of freedom to function there as any foreign national can claim. The others are people of Indian descent who have been there for a long time, some of them for generations. Nobody has been able to go to Ceylon from India as an immigrant legally for the last 15 years. I think since round-about the late thirties. There have, of course, been illegal immigrants—leave that out. Now, so far as the Indian nationals there are concerned, that is a separate problem. It is a bit of a problem too, because there is a certain process of squeezing them out. While I may regret the manner of doing it, I cannot challenge the right of the Ceylonese Government of dealing with any individual they choose to. But when it is not a question of an individual but large groups, then the situation becomes more difficult. Most of these Indian nationals there are professional people—merchants, domestic employees and the rest. The other problem, and the real problem is of that of the so-called stateless people; they have nearly all applied for Ceylon nationality and the matter is being considered by some committee etc. in Ceylon which accepts some applications and rejects the others. Lately there have been far more rejections than acceptances. Anyhow I do not wish to go more deeply into this question except to express my regret at the trend of events in Ceylon which has produced this strong apprehension. There are, after all, 600,000 or 700,000 of these persons in Ceylon. It is a fairly large number, and it is to the interest of Ceylon, as it is to the interest of these people, to settle this matter peacefully; otherwise, naturally an unfortunate feeling of conflict persists, which does no good to anybody.

There is one matter which came up the other day here and in answer to a question, I made a brief statement, that is, clemency for Japanese war criminals.<sup>17</sup> Now, this is a very important matter, not because of the exercise or not of clemency; we were strongly in favour of clemency for these people. But I

17. See *post*, pp. 506-509.



realise that our voice could not go far when others, who normally differ, are of one opinion about this matter; other countries who have normally differed, that is, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, are of like opinion that there should be no clemency. However, that is almost a matter affecting a few persons. But what is important is the procedure adopted in this—the way India is pushed out because she did not sign the San Francisco Treaty and Pakistan is brought in. We have no objection to Pakistan coming in the normal course anywhere. They are welcome. But the arguments advanced were really remarkable. I had paid much attention to this. We, of course, consulted our lawyers and others repeatedly, although I thought no great legal knowledge was necessary in this matter. But the way this has been dealt with casually, rather cavalierly, without any intimation to us, without anything—just we go out of the picture and we are informed later by the Japanese Government that they are told that India has no say in the matter and that Pakistan comes in—all this is a most extraordinary thing which one cannot think of in international affairs. But apart from its being arbitrary and all that, an attempt has been made there to undermine, if you like, the very basis of the agreement after the Partition, with the United Kingdom. All these are recorded facts. Here was this agreement in which India was a continuing entity, not only the name of the country but the country of India. We assumed all the liabilities, all the debt, all the international obligations, everything. It is all recorded, and now we are told calmly that Pakistan, as a successor State to British India, because she signed the San Francisco Treaty—what the San Francisco Treaty has to do with this, I do not understand—is brought in and India goes out. It is a matter of grave concern that great countries should function in this way and deal with the international obligations in this casual and cavalier way. In particular, I must express my great surprise that the Government of the United Kingdom, even more than the others, should have agreed to this, because that Government there has a special responsibility. It is with that Government that we came to an agreement on these matters. Then, casually to deal with this question in this way shows, if I may say so, with all respect, that in some matters the normal considerations of international law or, if I may say so, even international conventions and behaviour are not respected, and just any decision one wants is imposed. Yet all this does not make very much difference to us—whether our opinion towards clemency to the Japanese war criminals is accepted or not. Ours was a lone voice any way. But it does make a great deal of difference, this approach. This approach is applied repeatedly in other matters. No country least of all India, likes to be imposed upon, likes to be played with, in this way. I mention this not because of its own intrinsic importance, but as a sign and a symbol of the way highly respected and great countries function nowadays in such matters.

There are of course, in the course of these debates, many matters which

are often referred to but I have tried to concentrate upon relatively a few important ones, because, after all, they cover this wider situation. If it so happens that out of this Conference at Geneva some good emerges—and I earnestly hope it will—the whole aspect of affairs changes and other problems are affected by that change. I earnestly hope that the great and wise statesmen assembled at Geneva will find a way out of these problems. If they find a way out, I am sure, other countries who have no desire to push themselves there, but whatever they might be, would like to help in the settlements arrived at, provided, of course, they are settlements—no country can help in imposing anything. That is a basic difference between our approach and the approach sometimes taken by other countries.

I come back to what I said a minute ago; our approach is that of trying to work for collective peace and, in fact, that collective peace is the only collective security. The other collective security—that, all the time, by threats and fear of mounting armaments—is not even bringing in a climate of peace. It brings in a climate of fear. In fact, in the world today there are very few people who have any sense of security and hardly enough the people belonging to the most powerful countries of the world have the least feeling of security. It is curious; it shows that security necessarily does not come with power and armaments when the power and armaments are matched by somebody else with power and armaments. Security springs by bringing about a new climate, a new approach and recognising that in this world, we can only exist by a policy of 'live and let live', by tolerating others—tolerating no aggression, tolerating no interference—but tolerating others to exist as they want to exist. Here, we are in India—it may apply to other Asian countries—trying hard in our way to shape our own destiny, political, economic, social, cultural, whatever it may be. We have sometimes our own internal arguments or conflicts. That is natural, we settle them. We may accept and we do accept many things from other countries. We have to because we are backward in industry, in science, in technology, in hundred and one things. We do not wish to be isolated. We want to accept many new concepts and ideas, but it is we who accept them of our own free will. The moment anything is imposed upon us, even if it is a good thing, it becomes poison in our system. Therefore, this idea of imposing good—even some of us I am afraid, I include all of us not excluding myself in that number, try to be good to others and we get very annoyed if our good is not accepted and acted upon—is not good. We are unduly thrusting ourselves on others; may be this Parliament might occasionally thrust itself on the people of India today by trying to do too much good to them. However that may be, when it is a question of other countries trying to do good to you, it is a dangerous matter, and immediately there are bound to be conflicts. I mean that a thing you might accept in grace normally, you reject even a good thing because you are roused against that imposition, so that in this world today we must



accept this 'live and let live' business. Let there be no interference, external or internal, and let ideas freely flow and let each country evolve itself and that is the only basis on which you can have a gradual return of feeling of sanity and security. I have no doubt that if there is in the world a value or ideas—as there is, of course—the right ideas will prevail in the end. They would prevail far less by fear of armaments because that produces a new context of things. Now, of course, if you know about force and arms in the world of today, the arms are such that at the end of the conflict between these arms no ideas may be left at all finally to prevail. So, I earnestly hope that the efforts of the statesmen at Geneva will meet with success and, while we are perfectly entitled as individuals or as groups to express our opinion and criticise, I think, we should also send them our goodwill for that purpose.

## 5. India and International Situation<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Deputy Speaker, it was my intention—and to some extent is—with your permission, to speak in Hindi, but I may be permitted to reply to some points raised by honourable Members opposite in English because I wish them to understand those points and then I may be permitted to be bilingual in my speech....

We talk about the inner line and Christian missions<sup>2</sup> etc., and there is sometimes an argument. Questions are put here or elsewhere about the activities of Christian missionaries or about the activities of others against Christian missionaries or both. Now, so far as Government is concerned, we do not look upon this point from the religious point of view, but purely from the political point of view. Christianity, of course is a very old, established and respected religion of India. We respect it; millions of our people are Christians; many are represented here. There is no question of any religious bias at all. The difficulty arises when we consider it in two ways. One is, that these people are directly near the border, where we look upon any foreigner, if I may say so with all

1. Statement in Parliament, 18 May 1954, delivered in continuation of the statement of 15 May 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People), Official Report*, 1954, Vol. V, Pt. II, cols. 7647-7672. Extracts. Nehru also spoke on this in the Council of States on this day which is not included in this volume.
2. Lanka Sundaram had said that certain American missionaries were operating within the innerline in UP and urged that this line should be altered in the interests of "more adequate security."

respect, with suspicion. In other places we do not suspect anybody, unless there is reason for suspicion. In the border we suspect everybody, unless there is reason not to suspect. That is our approach. It is these political reasons which weigh there. Another aspect of these foreign Christian missionaries—it does not apply, of course, to our indigenous missionaries or others—is that sometimes difficult local problems and difficult social problems are created by an excess of foreign establishments and foreign missionaries. So, as I said, our approach to these problems is essentially a political approach and not to create problems for the future.

There are a large number of missionaries from abroad in this country running into many many thousands and many of them are doing excellent work. We welcome that work; medical work, educational work and the rest. But there is this fact to be remembered, that the creation of large foreign populations in the country undoubtedly creates problems of all kinds. Therefore, we are not in favour of additions to this; individuals apart, we do not wish this number to increase, because that will lead to fresh problems, as one can see in other countries of Asia they have given rise to problems of all kinds. I need not go into that, because it is not my subject today—I just wished to mention it....

Dr Lanka Sundaram referred—one or two other honourable Members also referred<sup>3</sup>—to the fact that I had not said anything in my opening address about Pakistan and about Kashmir. The criticism is certainly justified because our relations with Pakistan and our problems with Pakistan are highly important. Nevertheless, I did not say anything because I had nothing fresh to say about it. It is perfectly true that many developments have taken place in Pakistan recently both in Eastern Pakistan and Western Pakistan—and they continue to take place. We are greatly interested in them for the simple reason that we are interested in our relations with Pakistan. We want them to be friendly and co-operative and anything that occurs there which might have any effect on our relations is of interest to us. We are deeply interested. But because we are deeply interested, it does not mean or follow that we should in any way, directly or indirectly, interfere in them.

For instance, the honourable Member<sup>4</sup> said that I should invite Mr Fazlul Huq<sup>5</sup> for a quiet chat. Mr Fazlul Huq is my old friend and it is—I do not exactly know—30 or 40 years since I first met him and I will always be happy to meet him. But if we discuss any matter relating to Pakistan, it is with the

3. T.K. Chaudhuri also referred to the fact, that the Prime Minister in his own wisdom did not think it fit to mention the issue of Pakistan and Kashmir in his opening address.

4. Lanka Sundaram.

5. Chief Minister of East Pakistan.



Pakistan Government—the Central Pakistan Government—or their representatives and not with the Governments of the states or provinces of Pakistan.

In regard to Kashmir, a reference was made to the President's Order<sup>6</sup> which was issued about three or four days ago. Many comments have also appeared in regard to that Order.<sup>7</sup> That Order was important in so far as it went but one must remember how far it went and must not add or give greater importance to it than it actually possesses. We have discussed this question of Kashmir repeatedly here; nevertheless, because of the abundance of facts occurring one after another, one is apt to get a little confused. In October 1947, the first accession took place—the accession of Kashmir to India. That accession was in law, according to us, complete. It was as good an accession as of any state in India. Then of course came trouble. Now, later, in regard to the other states a year or two later, the accession on the three subjects of defence, foreign affairs and communications was extended in regard to the other states, and they became intimate parts of our new Constitution which we were drafting in 1949 and which was finalised at the end of 1949. That is to say, the position of Kashmir and the other states was identical to begin with in regard to accession. But the others, as a matter of constitutional development and because we wanted them to be full parties to our Constitution, came into this picture. Kashmir did not make that development, although the accession itself was complete like the other accessions. It could not come in then because for a year or two there were military operations going on. After that, and during that period too, the matter became much more complicated because it became an international matter, and we wanted to wait and we could not do anything, naturally, without the concurrence of the Kashmir Government and the Kashmir people. Three years afterwards the Kashmir Government decided to have elections for a Constituent Assembly.<sup>8</sup> There were elections. There was a Constituent Assembly.<sup>9</sup> When their Constituent Assembly came into existence, it became necessary for us to determine precisely what our relations were. It was easy enough till then to leave the matter rather fluid. The basic fact was not fluid, the basic fact of accession on three subject. These three subjects were in fact each a category of subjects. What does defence mean? You sit down and make a list. What does foreign affairs mean? What does communications mean? We attempted to do

6. See *ante*, p. 328, fn. 3.

7. Thakur Das Bhargava commented that the Order had ended the controversy on the future of Jammu and Kashmir which was now an integral part of India and there was no question of UN or any outside agency ever attempting to interfere in the matter.

8. The Order for holding elections for a Constituent Assembly was proclaimed on 20 April 1951.

9. The elections for the Assembly took place on 15 October 1951 and the Kashmir Constituent Assembly first met on 31 October 1951.

it. Some attempt was made at the time this Constitution was finalised at the end of 1949. Even then we could not finish that work. And in the Constitution there are certain articles—I forget their numbers—which specifically refer to this rather fluid state of Kashmir and give authority to the President to take steps.<sup>10</sup>

Now, this fluid state went on, and there was no immediate pressure on us for deciding it. But when the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir met, we had to decide this way or that way. Because, they were going to make their Constitution, they had to define, and we had to define how they fitted in. It was because of that pressure that a conference took place here in Delhi two years ago when representatives of the Kashmir Government came here and met us, and we discussed for many days and came to an agreement which has often been referred to as the Delhi Agreement.<sup>11</sup> That Agreement was specific enough, though some details were not worked out. The broad facts were decided. But only a small part of that Agreement was implemented, by them and by us. This House knows well how many times I have had to answer questions about the implementation of the Delhi Agreement and I had to, if I may say so with all respect, parry. Because, the fact was that except for that small part the rest had not been implemented. It is true the working out would take some time. Well, there was some considerable dissatisfaction and discontent about this non-implementation of the Agreement. Now, what has happened is that, three months back the Kashmir Government at present functioning there under the leadership of Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad raised the question of the implementation of the Delhi Agreement and for that purpose we wanted further talks in regard to detailed matters, chiefly financial and others like customs and other things. So, we welcomed their proposals; they came here and we discussed.<sup>12</sup> We had no such regular meetings as we had two years ago because all the principal points had been decided. It was only a question of working out various things with each individual Ministry, the Finance Ministry, Irrigation and Power Ministry, Planning Commission etc. We worked out that and then we were quite ready to implement the rest of the old Agreement as worked out in details now, and the President has issued an Order. Therefore, the President's Order really finalises something which was intended to be done two years ago. What I mean is this; it is not a new development; it is something which is to be done and which we

10. By January 1950, the Constitution of India was put into effect and Kashmir was treated as an integral part of Indian Union as defined in Article I of the Constitution. It was, however, expressly provided in Article 370 that the law making power of the Union Parliament in regard to Kashmir would be specified by the President of India in consultation with the State Government.

11. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 19, pp. 211-219.

12. See *ante*, p. 329, fn. 7.



had postponed for two years. It has no relation to any external commitment that we might have made. We cannot by a President's Order wash off an external commitment. I say this because some honourable Members seem to imagine that it washed off every such commitment or assurance. These commitments and assurances, therefore, stand and will stand effectively quite apart from the Presidential Order or any other development. Our position all along has been that we stand by the pledges or assurances that we have given, but they can only be given effect to under certain circumstances and in certain contexts. If the circumstances do not arise, if that context does not come into existence, then we cannot give effect to those assurances. That is a different matter. For instance, certain events have happened, as the House knows, in the last few months in Pakistan which has changed the whole context of the problem and our approach to it, with the result that certain preliminaries which had to be settled between Pakistan and us in regard to Kashmir have been completely deadlocked. That deadlock may or may not be removed. But, it is not correct to say that by the Presidential Order we have pushed aside or covered up all those pledges of ours. I wanted to make that point clear.

Now, there is another matter, rather delicate and rather embarrassing to me, to which I think, Dr Lanka Sundaram referred. That is, he referred to the continued detention of Shaikh Abdullah.<sup>13</sup> Now, a few things have happened, not only in the recent past, but in my political life which have distressed me and pained me more than certain aspects of the developments in Kashmir last year resulting in the arrest and detention of Shaikh Abdullah.<sup>14</sup> It always hurts one when one falls out with an old colleague and friend, and that hurt is a deeper one than coming into conflict with an opponent. Therefore, it hurt me very much. I am not going to that history and how one step led to another; but, I would say this that it is patent that no one—I am quite sure the Kashmir Government would to that extent agree with me—can think,—I cannot think—of indefinite detention of Shaikh Abdullah. That is true. At the same time, we are in a difficulty, because in the situation that has existed and still exists in Kashmir, and the House must remember—quite apart from the internal situation which, I am glad to say, is far better than it has been for a long time—that armies still face each other on the Kashmir border.

I referred to affairs in Pakistan just now. There are plenty of people in Pakistan who, specially in regard to Kashmir, talk rather wildly. One cannot forget the context of things in which one has to function. If one has to function in war, one functions in a particular way, which is somewhat different from

13. Lanka Sundaram had said that Shaikh Abdullah should not be kept in prison for ever without trial which was a question of moral principles, jurisprudence and legal procedure.

14. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 23, p. 310.

peacetime functioning. In peacetime, one takes greater risk and all that kind of thing. There are stages and sometimes, it may be said to be between war and peace. It is peace in the sense of no war. But, one never knows when war occurs. These difficulties have to be faced and responsibilities borne. It is not a question of some theoretical solution. Life is too complicated to permit of a theoretical solution. Anyhow, in this matter, I do not wish to say that no responsibility attaches to me or to the Government of India. That would be a wrong thing to say. Essentially, all these matters are the responsibilities of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State, and we deal with the Government. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir State, if I may say so, in the course of the last six months, has really brought about quite a remarkable change, chiefly economic, in the life of the people of Kashmir....

I agree<sup>15</sup> that our foreign policy should not be conducted on any one party's ideology. That is neither right nor proper. It should be a national policy, I agree. But what does national mean? It does not mean that before any step is taken, everyone in the country must agree to it. If that were so, nobody will be able to move an inch, we would just have to remain frozen, no fresh initiatives could ever be taken. Decisions have to be taken, initiatives have to be taken, in foreign policy and in other matters too. Acharya Kripalani has criticized some of the decisions we have taken.<sup>16</sup> But after all, what were we to do? Either we had to do nothing or Acharya Kripalani would have had to agree to what we proposed. This is the problem. If we want consensus every time. We want to take a new policy initiative, we would have to conduct a big debate. But there are various aspects to any issue which cannot always be discussed in huge open forums. National issues are those which are fundamental to its national roots.

In the last few years we have followed a basic policy of nonalignment. We have not agreed to side with one or the other power blocs. As a matter of fact, this phrase nonalignment or even 'neutral' as some people say, is not correct. Both are negative phrases, whereas ours is a positive approach. Not that we have deliberately set out to think of this policy. I will tell you quite clearly that there could have been no other outcome except this given our old mindset in foreign affairs. This was the only possible outcome once we became free and we could retrieve our ancient traditions. Let me tell you that whichever party had come to power, it would have done this.

Thereafter our policy became firmer and began to evolve according to the

15. This part of the speech was in Hindi.

16. Kripalani criticized the Agreement with China on Tibet as it recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. He also criticized the Government for trusting Shaikh Abdullah and thereafter Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad.



circumstances. We began to take new initiatives. But fundamentally our policy was the same. During the last six, seven years, events have occurred elsewhere in the world. For one thing, the power blocs began to grow more firmly entrenched against one another. Then there was the Korean War. Fortunately the fighting and killings have stopped and there is ceasefire. But the terrible war went on for three years and what was the result? Nothing. Nobody could claim to be victorious. If the fighting could have stopped two years earlier, the result would have been the same except that so many people would not have lost their lives and so much hardship would not have been caused, people would have been in a cooler frame of mind than they are today and perhaps it may not have been so difficult to arrive at an agreement as it is today.

Six years have passed since the war in Indo-China began. I do not have the time. Otherwise I would have told you of the ups and downs during these years. I cannot think of a war which has been so fruitless as the Indo-China War. It was absolutely futile. Now people are sitting and trying to find a way out of the problems created by the war.

Take Korea. As I said, no party was victorious, otherwise both parties would not have been sitting in Geneva. Though everyone is aware today that it is not possible to win an argument by military intervention and yet they resort to this path. Neither party is willing to accept that the other has won, and how can they when neither can claim to have won? Neither of the parties can force the other to accept defeat. Then what is the solution? Either both sides should accept that neither has won and then try to arrive at some agreement. Otherwise, the only other way is to continue fighting to the finish. However, to continue fighting is to bring ruin and it should not go on. As you can see, if no decisive victory could be won after three years of fighting, then it is not necessary that victory will be assured after three years or ten years of combat. A fight to the finish can only spell disaster, ruin. This is the state of the world. If by some misfortune if another war is fought anywhere in the world, it will only bring ruin and neither side can win or lose just as it has happened in Korea. Both parties would have to accept that neither can claim victory.

All of us want that South and North Korea should become united. So long as that happens, there will be bitterness and feud and could lead to war. But how is this to be achieved? They will not come together merely by our saying so. Both the parties to the war want Korean unification. But how is it to be achieved so that neither side dominates. Whichever proffers the hand of friendship stands to risk the other becoming dominant. And so neither side comes forward. So what is the solution? How can there be a marriage between two unwilling partners?

So a way has to be found. I do not wish to put forth any proposals regarding Korea or Indo-China, and to tell you the truth, I have no solution in mind. It would be a simple matter for us to come up with a plan which would look

beautiful on paper but it may be completely unworkable or unrelated to the circumstances on the ground.

The talks that are now taking place in Geneva will have far reaching effect whether an agreement is arrived at or not. Though both the parties are poles apart and keep criticizing each other, you will find that as a matter of fact tremendous efforts are being made to find a way out. Both sides are making an effort. Therefore, I do not wish to say anything which will hinder that effort. This is a delicate stage and it might do more harm than good by trying to offer suggestions sitting far away. That is absurd. We cannot offer any advice. We are getting information regularly about how the talks are proceeding but we do not know always how matters stand. Therefore, I do not wish to say anything. But honest, sincere attempts are being made to find a way. I would only create problems by offering my opinion at a critical juncture. The difficulties are mounting day by day. An effort such as this may have yielded quicker results two or three years ago. Three years of fighting in Korea has created tremendous difficulties in the way of solving the problem in Indo-China. If another year goes by without the matter being resolved, difficulties will multiply. That is why there is redoubled effort. We should respect their effort. I don't want to put forth any suggestions but there are some fundamental issues which we must bear in mind. As I mentioned just now, no party at the talks can behave as if he is the victor. That is not so. It will not be acceptable to the other side and there will be further hostilities. Therefore both sides will have to accept that nobody has won the war and hence there will be no efforts to show the other side down. That will not be acceptable. Take Korea for instance. We want that the two Koreas should be unified but at the same time neither sides should seek to have the upper hand. Anyhow, it is possible that some way will be found so that even if the ultimate goal is reached, we may inch towards it step by step.

Similarly, look at the circumstances in Indonesia.<sup>17</sup> What is the military situation there? Any solution will depend on that. I agree that in the case of Indonesia both sides have made statements which makes it clear that they are in search of a way out. Let me tell you something which may be patent to you.

17. The dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the western half of the island of New Guinea arose from the Round Table Conference held at The Hague in 1949. The Dutch agreed to transfer the sovereignty over the Netherland Indies to a new Federal Republic of Indonesia, only if Western New Guinea were excluded, which the Indonesians refused. Ultimately both sides decided that while sovereignty over the whole of Indies was to be transferred to Indonesia, Western New Guinea was to be governed for a year by the Dutch, during which period its political future would be decided through talks. The discussions held in 1950 ended in failure and incorporation of Western New Guinea became Indonesia's main aim.



You will be amazed at the facts presented by the Viet Minh.<sup>18</sup> I do not wish to go into all that. But underlying all that was the possibility that they would be willing to consider staying with the French. "They are prepared to consider the possibility of staying in the French Union even after six years of fighting and their eventual victory. It is obvious from this that they want to end the conflict. I do not wish to go into their other conditionalities. I merely wish to show you that on both sides there is a similar desire. Now for any responsible government or parliament to criticize from afar in a holier-than-thou attitude is not proper. That would not be a responsible act. Such irresponsible statements are only indulged in by college students in debates.

So, I want you to appreciate how complex the world has become today. We have to unravel these knots. If we isolate ourselves or merely criticize others, it will benefit no one. To look for culprits or someone to blame is futile. What we must strive for is how to unravel these knots. There is no doubt about it that they will be unravelled. Sometimes things become stagnant and the situation becomes knotty. Then it becomes necessary to unravel that knot, either by peaceful means or through violence, by fire and storm and people are carried away in the turbulence. Therefore, we are faced with the problem of unravelling these knotty problems. We cannot help anyone by isolating ourselves. Therefore our effort should be to bring some sense of calm and normalcy, not arrogantly but softly, and gently, into an atmosphere which is surcharged with fear and anger. All this complicates matters further and calm thinking becomes difficult. I have tried to outline what we need to do in the case of Korea and Indo-China.

Recently we have reached an agreement with China which has not been approved by several of our members. They feel that we have shown weakness and we have made a mistake in accepting China's suzerainty over Tibet.<sup>19</sup> I would like to go into the whole history of this issue step by step whenever an opportunity arises. In my opinion since Independence, we have not taken a step which has been more appropriate and sensible than this. I have no doubts on this score. We have to weigh things in the balance, before we reach a decision. Sometimes we have to compromise on the minuses because the pluses outweigh the minuses. This often happens in foreign affairs. But I have no

18. Participating in the Indo-China discussions in Geneva, Pham Van Dong, the Vice-President of the Viet Minh regime said on 10 May 1954 that the Viet Minh Government was ready to reach a "satisfactory settlement" with France on the basis of "recognition of the national rights of the people of Indo-China." He also expressed readiness of the Viet Minh to examine question of entry into the French Union alongwith Khmer and Pathet Lao Governments in Cambodia and Laos.

19. Kripalani and Satya Narayan Sinha expressed this opinion.

doubts over the steps we have taken over the Chinese issue. I do not agree that we have made any mistake. That does not mean that I am in agreement with everything that China has done. But the relationship that we have established is right from every point of view. I believe that we have been right no matter how you view it. I feel that it has been the right step for India, for Asia and for the world as well. I do not think that something should be criticized without understanding all the nuances of the issue. There has been a revolution which has had a fall out, whether we like it or not. You may not wish to see what is plain as your nose, you may want to blindfold yourselves. But that will not make it go away. People feel that we have had a long standing relationship with Tibet going back thousands of years. Nobody denies that. There is no doubt about it. As you know, our forces were stationed in Tibet, either as an independent country or under China's suzerainty. Now is it proper that the forces of another country be stationed in another independent country? What did the three hundred odd strong force symbolize? What right did India have to keep its forces stationed on alien territory, whether it was independent or a part of China? That was a symbol of British rule. Fifty years ago, the British empire in the time of Lord Curzon had become expansionist and entered into all kinds of arrangements. Now it is impossible for us to continue the arrangements entered into by the British. We do not need to continue to station our forces in Yangtze or Gangtok. Neither militarily nor intellectually does this make any sense. When the forces had been stationed there, initially, the agreement had stipulated that they will continue to be there until the indigenous government could make its own arrangements. The agreement also says that we shall continue until we are able to make arrangements for the defence of their roads. In short we were to stay there until they asked us to go and said they could take care of their own defence. They will now look after the installations that we had made. All these things were done as a dominant power claiming hegemony over another country would do. We could not continue such arrangements. If we had not withdrawn voluntarily, we would have been forced to do so. There is no doubt about that.

I will not go into the history of Tibet's relations with China. It goes back into a hoary past. The treaties and maps that Dr Satya Narayan Sinha has referred to all belong to the British imperialist period.<sup>20</sup> How can we continue to accept them at a time when a great revolution has taken place in China? Whether we like it or not, it has had an impact on our minds. It has been the greatest event in history since World War II. This great upheaval in a country

20. Satya Narayan Sinha had referred to traditional traffic routes between India and Tibet and complained that certain passes had been closed to such traffic under the current agreement.



like China where for the first time in a few hundred years of its history it has a strong central Government is a momentous occurrence for Asia and the world.

There is Korea, Indo-China—let us leave aside Indo-China. That war began before the Chinese revolution. Let me tell you that the problems in Korea and Indo-China may not have started if a great mistake had not been made initially of some great powers not accepting the People's Republic of China and the revolution that had taken place there, closing their eyes to reality. They refused to let China into the United Nations. It was indeed strange as though their refusal to accept China would have made it disappear. All the ills of this region, of Asia, during the last six years have arisen because of the refusal of the great powers to accept China.

I referred to the Colombo Conference three days ago and the decision which was taken, but forgot to draw your attention to the fact that it was unanimously decided to bring China into the United Nations. Even that is not quite correct. China is not a new country to be brought into the United Nations. China has always been there, the question now is which is the real China. This is what was discussed in Colombo. I will let you into a secret—I hope nobody will mind if I say that the suggestion that People's Republic of China be accepted was made by me, not merely because I wanted the issue of Indo-China be taken up or that there may be no obstacles in the path of resolving the issue. I even said that we need not take a decision immediately though there could be no two opinions about it. But it is often seen that when too many issues are brought in together then the issue that we wish to settle does not get resolved. Some of our comrades there said the matter was obvious. There could be no two opinions about this. It was clear what had to be done in Indo-China. I realized during the debate that I had been slightly wrong. I had proposed that this issue should be separated but it was felt that the issues were inextricably linked and could not be separated.

As you can see, in Geneva, a heated debate is on over China, that it will not be accepted as a great power, as though saying or not saying so makes a difference. I urge you to look at our agreement over Tibet with China. Dr Satya Narayan Sinha said in his speech that a door had closed. I would like to point out that it is always a two-way street, nobody can close doors unilaterally. When a new picture emerges, we shall also think of new ways to follow. When both sides are agreed, it is difficult to say that we shall do one thing but they must not do so. This is like what Lord Curzon would have done. Therefore, we have decided upon trade routes with Tibet. If Dr Satya Narayan Sinha wants to follow a new route, there will be no obstacle from our side, what happens on the other side is not our responsibility.

Now, what is the significance of the agreements we had entered into with Tibet about trades, etc. The agreement has been read out. The preamble is of great significance not only for India and China but for the whole of Asia, if it

is accepted, because the pall of fear which hangs over Asia will gradually lift. We have to realize that in today's world, our likes and dislikes do not count. We have to accept certain realities about the shape of the world. One of them is that the great powers are ranged against one another in different blocs and if they try to destroy the other side, they too will be destroyed.

Therefore, we have to learn to accept the principle of live and let live, not attack one another, threaten one another. The fact is that both sides are mortally afraid that the other side will swallow them. It is a strange situation. Each country must be allowed to follow its own ideology, the Soviet Union and the United States, without getting into a conflict with the other. An armed conflict will bring ruin and disaster upon everyone, there can be no victor in modern warfare. I want you to take note of our agreement with China which talks of "Recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, non-interference."

Then comes mutuality, territorial integrity and sovereignty means non-aggression, noninterference in the internal affairs of another country. If these principles are accepted by every country, if every nation is free to progress in the manner they wish, whether it is in the matter of economic or other national policy, then gradually an atmosphere of peace will emerge in the world. This is our policy which we try to follow.

There has been a great deal of debate about South East Asia. But we have not talked about the European countries or the Middle East. As you know, our relations with them date back thousands of years. I think we have had contacts with them for longer than any other region. There too, some of the countries are under the dominance of one or the other bloc. But all those nations love their freedom too and it does not seem quite proper that they should be tied down by these power blocs against their wishes, willy-nilly, helplessly in their weakened position. Our relations with them have been good and are progressively getting better. Sometimes we have chosen to go our different paths, but that has not made any difference.

I have not been able to reply to all the questions that have been raised about our relations with other countries. But let me say one thing. There is a great deal of talk about what is known as collective security. It is believed that you need to have a collective force for collective security. I would like to submit very humbly that a collective force is likely to contribute to collective insecurity instead of collective security, as the picture of the last six, seven years shows. If there had been only one great power dominating the world, then the world would have been under one umbrella, and there would be peace. But when there are two power blocs, and neither is prepared to bend its will, then it leads to an arms race. Collective force cannot lead to collective security in such circumstances. It leads to greater insecurity and gradually it will increase and swallow up everyone. Therefore, it is not collective security but collective



peace which will lead to collective security. That is why, even if a few countries of the world could work towards peace and stay away from the idea of collective force, then it will go a long way towards ensuring world peace in the long run.

I apologize for taking up so much of your time.

## II. COLOMBO CONFERENCE

### 1. Six-Point Proposal on Indo-China<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, welcomed the convening of the Conference<sup>2</sup> and expressed the hope that it marked the beginning of closer cooperation between the countries of the region. The five countries represented at the Conference, he said, had common backgrounds and common problems. They had all achieved their independence recently and were now faced with the problems which the newly acquired independence brought with it. The Conference represented the new resurgent Asia whose dominant passions were, first, to retain the freedom they had recently won, and, second, to extend that freedom and consolidate it by bettering the living conditions of their people and by preventing any incursions into their freedom by any external agency. These aims required, above all, peace in the neighbouring countries, and peace in the rest of the world. The countries, of this region, therefore, had a strong interest in the maintenance of peace. These countries although they were not powerful from a financial and military point of view, represented a vast population and a great area, and they could, therefore, exert considerable influence in the cause of peace.

The major problem in the world, Mr Nehru said, was the continuing problem of the "cold war" between two blocs of big and powerful countries. Most of

1. Minutes of the first and second meetings of the South East Asian Prime Ministers' Conference, Colombo, 28 April 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Colombo Conference of the Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia took place at the initiative of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka from 28 April to 2 May 1954 to discuss the general international situation with particular reference to the security and stability of the region.

the countries represented at the Conference had attempted to follow a policy of nonalignment with these great power blocs, and to live their own lives according to their own notions without dictation or compulsion from abroad.

Shri Nehru next referred to the two problems which had come to the fore since the Conference had been originally proposed, viz. the conflict in Indo-China and the development of the hydrogen bomb. He referred to the proposals which had been made by him on behalf of the Government of India with regard to these two problems<sup>3</sup> and suggested that these proposals might be considered at the Conference....

Shri Nehru stated that in his opinion, the topics which should be discussed at the Conference fell into two broad categories. The first were items of world significance as, for example, the conflict in Indo-China. The world expected the Conference to discuss these topics, and the view of the Conference on them were eagerly awaited. The second category of subjects for discussion would be internal matters affecting the participating countries themselves, for example, the development of procedures for closer collaboration and consultation between the countries of the region in the future...

Shri Nehru pointed out that, in this matter, we should follow the precedent set by conferences of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. At these conferences, disputes between members of the Commonwealth were never discussed. India's dispute with South Africa, for instance, would not be placed on the agenda for a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. The same convention, he felt, should be adopted at this and future conferences of Asian Prime Ministers. In his view, there were certain matters of international importance on which the countries of the region had a common outlook. It should be the aim of the Conference to further develop this common outlook rather than to emphasise on conflicts and disagreements between the participating countries...

Shri Nehru opened the discussion on Indo-China at the request of the Conference.<sup>4</sup> He explained that the conflict, which had gone on for several years, had now become a very important issue in the present context of world affairs. The Asian countries were interested in seeing that the situation did not worsen and become a focal point for a clash on a larger scale. It was impossible to find a complete solution for the problem at once and it was therefore necessary to approach it step by step and with the greatest of care and caution.

He referred to the six-point proposal he had recently made on the subject of Indo-China and said that his appeal for a ceasefire, which was made before the Geneva Conference,<sup>5</sup> was intended to put an end to the killings in Indo-

3. See *post*, pp. 439-444 and 445-449.

4. During the second meeting, which started at 2.30 pm.

5. See *post*, p. 437.



China and prepare the atmosphere for the Geneva Conference. He realised the difficulty of having a ceasefire because of the difficult conditions in Indo-China, where there was no clear line between the two armies in conflict, but he thought that the ceasefire was necessary sooner or later, and the sooner the better. The military situation in Indo-China had now worsened, but there were indications that the belligerents had begun to give serious thought to a cessation of fighting.

He then went on to clarify the various points in his proposal and said that the obvious first step was an immediate ceasefire. This had been welcomed by Burma, Indonesia, Canada and even France, as well as several other nations. He did not contemplate going into details and prescribing methods, but only wanted to make a general proposal. He considered that the ceasefire should have priority in the agenda of the Geneva Conference and that the ceasefire group, who would settle details, should be confined to France and the other actual belligerents alone, viz. the three associated states and the Viet Minh.

On the third point of his proposal—it was now an admitted proposition both by France and the United States that there should be a complete transfer of sovereignty in Indo-China—he did not venture to say to whom sovereignty should be transferred to or in what form; that was a matter for decision and agreement between the parties concerned. Nor did he suggest that the French should withdraw their forces immediately and leave behind a vacuum in Indo-China for some other power to fill in. All these were matters which would have to be discussed and settled by the principal parties to the conflict, which was the substance of his fourth point. He did not suggest either that the settlement of this issue should be completely divorced from the Geneva Conference, but he visualised that the machinery for direct negotiation between France and the Indo-Chinese might proceed, as it were, through the Geneva Conference—as a sort of sub-committee of the Geneva Conference.

His fifth point called for nonintervention in Indo-China in any form by the great powers, UK, USA, USSR and China. There was no doubt that both USA and China were intervening in Indo-China, and they have in fact not denied this. He felt that if the problem could be localized by removing all possibilities of intervention by outside powers, the onus of finding a settlement could be thrown on the parties in conflict themselves.

Finally, his sixth point was intended to bring the United Nations into the picture as there might be the need for broad supervision by the United Nations of the implementation of any settlement...

Shri Nehru, referring to the admission of China to the United Nations, said that in his view China's admission would go a long way towards relieving existing tensions, and the history of Korea might have been quite different had China been given her seat in the United Nations much earlier. On the other hand, he doubted the advisability of suggesting that China should be admitted

to the United Nations as a condition precedent to the securing of a ceasefire in Indo-China. Besides bringing into the issue the prestige of the great powers, such a course would further complicate the present international tangle. He therefore suggested, as a matter of tactics, that the two issues should be kept separate.

He went on to deplore the tendency of non-Asian powers to intervene in the problems of Asia without any reference to Asia, in the same way as they did in other parts of the world. While Asia might not be in a position to claim to be consulted, it was quite open to Asian countries to make helpful suggestions.

Shri Nehru went on to say that the representation of China by Formosa was factually absurd and was, besides, embarrassing to China as well as to the rest of Asia. China regarded it as symbolic of the attempt to put an end to the new regime...

Shri Nehru said that he conceded the right of France to be present at ceasefire talks—though he opposed it from the point of view of colonialism—but the presence of powers other than the belligerents would not be conducive to a settlement...

Shri Nehru pointed out that both America and China had admitted the fact of their intervention in Indo-China. He thought therefore, that any proposal the Conference put up should make clear, in principle, its attitude towards intervention...

## 2. Hydrogen Bomb, Colonialism and Racialism<sup>1</sup>

...At the commencement of the meeting<sup>2</sup> Shri Nehru expressed alarm at the publicity given in the press to the proceedings of the first and second meetings. In particular, he said he did not expect to find any of the opening speeches reported verbatim. Had he known that his speech would be reported in the press word for word, his approach might have been quite different. It was not the practice at any international conference for proceedings to be reported so fully in the press. The statements made by each Prime Minister at the Conference

1. Minutes of the third and fourth meetings of the South East Asian Prime Ministers' Conference, Colombo, 29 April 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Third meeting.



were intended only for the hearing of the others, and were not meant for the public...

Shri Nehru pointed out that once the Conference had agreed on the principles which were to be included in its proposal, the question of drafting should present no difficulty...

To his enquiry whether the direct negotiations contemplated were to be before or after the ceasefire,<sup>3</sup> Shri Nehru replied that it would have to be both, before and after. He (Shri Nehru), also explained that to leave negotiations open to the "parties concerned" would by implication include both China and America, which was exactly what the Conference did not want...

Shri Nehru said it was very necessary that the Conference should have clear ideas on these issues. He personally supported the admission of Communist China into the United Nations, not because he was in favour of the ideologies of communism, but because he thought that for a large country like China not to have its own representative in the United Nations, but to be represented by Formosa, was absurd. He emphasized that the present conflict was not a conflict of ideologies but was based on power politics. He pointed to the case of Yugoslavia which, though a communist country in all senses of the word, was now accepted as a member of the western bloc and even received aid from it. As far as he knew, all four countries, viz. Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and his own, had supported the admission of Communist China to the United Nations and he was convinced that the settlement of this issue was vital to peace in the Far East. He, therefore, agreed with the point proposed by the Indonesian Prime Minister,<sup>4</sup> but he did not like making it a condition precedent to a settlement in Indo-China...

Shri Nehru, explaining the proposals he had made regarding the hydrogen bomb, said that these proposals were in four parts. The first part called for a "Stand-Still Agreement", in respect of the actual explosion of hydrogen bombs. The second part requested that full publicity should be given by the countries principally concerned in the production of these weapons and by the United Nations on the extent of their destructive power. The third part of the proposals called for immediate private meetings of Sub-Committees of the Disarmament Commission to consider the "Stand-Still" proposal. As regards this suggestion, Shri Nehru explained that the Disarmament Commission had since commenced meetings to consider this matter. The fourth proposal was that those countries, which, though not directly concerned with the production of these weapons but

3. Mohammad Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan asked the questions.

4. Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Indonesian Prime Minister desired that a reference should be made to the importance of China taking her place in the UN and its relation to the whole problem of stability in Asia.

were much concerned by their possible use, should use their influence to arrest the further development of these weapons of mass destruction. Shri Nehru said that if the Conference was in general agreement with the proposals he had made, then a resolution on the lines of these proposals could be drafted and adopted by the Conference...

Shri Nehru explained that, if the hydrogen bomb was exploded in any part of the world today, atomic laboratories in other parts of the world would immediately become aware of it and be able to estimate the location and strength of the explosion. Moreover, it was well known that the United States and the Soviet Union were the only two countries in a position to explode the hydrogen bomb today. A breach of the "Stand-Still Agreement" could therefore be immediately detected, and it was a matter for later consideration what the consequences of such a breach would be. Shri Nehru emphasised that his proposals were only intended as an interim measure and as a prelude to some more lasting agreement on the control of atomic weapons...<sup>5</sup>

Shri Nehru suggested that the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia should adopt a resolution at this Conference urging the admission of Ceylon to the United Nations...<sup>6</sup>

Shri Nehru pointed out that these were entirely distinct topics<sup>7</sup> and that they should be discussed separately. Colonialism and racialism might be discussed together, but communism should be considered independently. He had no objection, however, to the discussion of the two topics in the order suggested by the Prime Minister of Ceylon.

Shri Nehru, opening the discussion<sup>8</sup> on this subject,<sup>9</sup> said that all the participating countries were united in their opposition to colonialism and racialism. They were agreed on the general principles and it was only necessary to devise a form of words to express their views on this subject.

Colonialism, Shri Nehru continued, had not only brought suffering to the conquered peoples, but had also caused serious conflicts between the great colonial powers. Colonialism was now mainly confined to Asia and Africa. In

5. The Conference expressed general agreement with Nehru's proposals and directed the Drafting Committee to prepare a draft of a Resolution on the subject for consideration by the Conference.

6. In view of Sri Lanka Prime Minister's objection it was decided not to pursue this matter.

7. John Kotelawala suggested that the next topic of discussion should be Regional Cooperation in Asia with special reference to the attitude of the participating countries to (a) colonialism and racialism and (b) international communism.

8. In the fourth meeting at 3 pm.

9. (a) Colonialism and racialism; (b) international communism.



Africa, he said, colonialism was of two types. In North Africa, which was inhabited principally by Arab peoples, there existed colonialism of the classical type with a foreign nation ruling over a subject people. In certain other territories of Africa, however attempts were being made to set up semi-independent states in which a small minority of European settlers dominated the vast coloured majority of the population. This was happening in Central and East Africa, for instance. Both forms of colonialism should be opposed, Shri Nehru said. As for racialism, there was no doubt that the participating countries were completely opposed to it. Apart from any other considerations, Shri Nehru said, racialism was opposed to the letter and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>10</sup>

Shri Nehru felt that it would be better to avoid reference to particular examples of colonialism, as the conference should either include a comprehensive list or no list at all. It would be difficult, he said, to draw up an exhaustive list of all instances of colonialism...

Shri Nehru opposed the adoption of a resolution on the lines proposed by the Prime Minister of Ceylon.<sup>11</sup> In the first place, he said, we should know exactly what we meant when we referred to international communism. Every one understood what was meant by colonialism, it involved the physical conquest and occupation of one country by another. In the case of international communism, on the other hand, we were dealing with an ideology and we must be clear what exactly we were condemning before we adopted a resolution of the type proposed by Sir John.

Shri Nehru said that in India, as in the other countries of the region, they were experiencing difficulties as a result of the activities of local communists, but, in spite of all his efforts, he had failed to detect any direct contacts between local communists and Russian agents or to prove any wrongful action in India on the part of diplomats or agents of the Soviet Union. The countries of the region, he continued, were aware of the danger of communism and they must decide what was the best way of dealing with these dangers. He contrasted the United Kingdom's way of dealing with communism with that of the United States' and felt that US approach to communism was an aggressive one and he felt that the United Kingdom's approach was the one to be preferred.

10. John Kotelawala at this point stated that in the proposed resolution condemning colonialism, a reference should be made to particular instances of colonialism like French settlements in India.

11. Kotelawala placed before the Conference a draft resolution condemning the activities of international communism and deploring the attempts made by international communism to infiltrate into non-communist territories.

Shri Nehru pointed out that, if India adopted the Ceylon resolution, it would amount to aligning itself with one of the two great powers in the cold war. India's policy had always been to carefully avoid any such alignment. He could not, therefore, accept the Ceylon resolution...

Shri Nehru said that it was important to take a practical view of this problem. In his long experience of dealing with issues involving large numbers of human beings, he always felt that the better approach was to try to win the confidence of the people and wean them away from something which was evil rather than attempt to suppress it. While he would not hesitate to oppose violence, in any form, or any threat of violence, or to punish and deal suitably with individuals who committed breaches of accepted standards of conduct, he was always reluctant to attempt to suppress anything by force. Such a course often had the effect of encouraging and strengthening the very thing it was desired to suppress. He was certainly in favour of each country taking all possible steps, either by law or more efficient administrative methods, to stop communist intervention or infiltration into its territory, but he thought that in dealing with communism little could be achieved by merely denouncing it. A different approach was necessary; an approach to people's minds and an attempt to influence them against the attractions of communism would, he thought, be more effective. He said that, after all, if one attempted an analysis of the situation, one would find intellectuals in every country who were strongly attracted towards communist ideologies changed their minds. The challenge of Russian communism today was really the challenge of her economic system. The real test was which economy, communist or capitalist, would pay better dividends to the people. The United States was convinced that her economy was the better of the two and so was the USSR as regards her economy. It therefore boiled down to a conflict of ideas. The idea that would prevail in the end would be that which would be more acceptable to humanity, and it was for this reason that the approach should be by reason and persuasion, rather than by compulsion...

As regards the point that communists paid no attention to normal codes of behaviour, Shri Nehru referred to the appalling feature of McCarthyism in the United States, and asked whether that movement had any regard for the rules of the game. He was quite prepared to support something precise against foreign intervention, or external influence, but he did not think that the Conference should line up with either side in the cold war. He saw colonialism and communism as two entirely different things. The former was related to a state of fact and the latter was concerned with an idea. In any case, he was, of course, strongly against power-hungry countries seeking to expand their influence and increase their power in the process of which they lost all concern for ethical and moral values.



### 3. Communism and Afro-Asian Conference<sup>1</sup>

...Shri Nehru said that he did not think that that statement<sup>2</sup> represented the position correctly, and he doubted whether even non-communist countries, like the United Kingdom, would go so far as to make such an outright accusation. He, for one, could not agree with it, because he felt that by accepting what amounted to the American version of what communism was, the Conference would be aligning itself with one of the parties in the cold war; and such a step would upset the policies of nonalignment which these countries, particularly India, had hitherto adopted. He went on to explain the philosophical issues involved in the theory of communism and said that to his personal knowledge the attitudes of communists had changed considerably since the time of Marx and Lenin. He had very good reason to believe that the Cominform would cease to exist in the near future, and that the whole approach of the communists towards the rest of the world was undergoing a change. He mentioned that India was about to enter into a treaty of great significance to his country with Communist China and that it would very seriously embarrass him in India's relations with Communist China to associate himself with the charge implied in the statement made by Sir John. He considered that any reference to "International" communism would amount to the adoption of the American thesis and would automatically align the countries represented at the Conference with the American side...

Shri Nehru maintained that the basis of the whole settlement in Indo-China was dependent on nonintervention by outside powers, because the receiving of aid from outside by both belligerents created a vicious circle, which made the ceasefire more difficult to achieve...

The Prime Minister of India, while agreeing that there was a great deal of force in what Dr Sastroamidjojo<sup>3</sup> had said,<sup>4</sup> foresaw several difficulties in

1. Minutes of the fifth and sixth meetings of the South East Asian Prime Ministers' Conference, Colombo, 30 April 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Pakistan tried to commit all the Prime Ministers to accept the "sinister character and dangers of international communism" and to pledge themselves collectively to organise steps against it.
3. Ali Sastroamidjojo (1903-1975); Indonesia's Ambassador to USA, Canada, and Mexico, 1950-53; Prime Minister, 1953-55 and 1956-57; Chairman, Nationalist Party, 1955-66; Permanent Representative to UN, 1957-60; Permanent Deputy Chairman, Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, 1960-66.
4. In the sixth meeting at 3 pm.

implementing the Indonesian proposal.<sup>5</sup> There was, for instance, the danger that in a large conference of the type envisaged, there would be many differences of opinion between the participating countries and consequent difficulty in reaching any agreement on the subjects discussed. Again, there was the question of the countries to be invited to such a conference. Among African countries, for instance, would they invite the governments of colonial territories or not? Or again, in a country like Indo-China, which government would they invite Vietnam or Viet Minh? In spite of these difficulties, Shri Nehru said he welcomed the proposal made by Indonesia.

Shri Nehru referred to the earlier attempts that had been made to organise an Afro-Asian conference and said that all these attempts had proved abortive. If they accepted Indonesia's proposal, it was essential to ensure that this proposal did not fizzle out too.

Finally, Shri Nehru emphasised that a great deal of preparation at an official level would be necessary before any conference of the type envisaged could be held...

Shri Nehru reiterated his views, that in spite of the difficulties, he was attracted to the Indonesian proposal. He had himself been thinking on similar lines for several years. He felt that they should give Indonesia full moral support in sponsoring an Afro-Asian conference, and that they should refer to this decision in their final communique...

Shri Nehru suggested that Morocco should also be referred to in the same resolution.<sup>6</sup> In Morocco, he said, there had been a semi-independent Sultan functioning under French protection. This Sultan had been deposed by the French authorities and replaced by a French protege. It was necessary that Morocco too should recover her independence and sovereignty. The Conference agreed with Shri Nehru's suggestion and requested the Drafting Committee to prepare a resolution on the lines of the Pakistan draft, referring to both Tunisia and Morocco...

Shri Nehru said that while he felt great sympathy at the plight of Arab refugees and other victims of oppression in Palestine, it would be difficult for India (which had recognised Israel) to be a party to a resolution which stated that the creation of the State of Israel was a violation of international law.<sup>7</sup> The United Nations, Shri Nehru continued, was taking steps to settle this very difficult and delicate question, and he felt that the attempts which were being made to arrive at an amicable settlement would be prejudiced by the

5. The proposal advocated holding of an Afro-Asian conference.

6. The resolution on Morocco demanding recognition of the right of self determination of the Moroccan people was proposed by Pakistan.

7. Pakistan wanted the Conference to adopt a resolution condemning Israel's aggressions in Palestine and even to repudiate the existence of Israel.



adoption of a strongly-worded condemnatory resolution of the type proposed by Pakistan...

Shri Nehru said that, in his view, the Pakistan's interpretation of the Indonesian resolution<sup>8</sup> was unjustified. This resolution did not condemn Western policies; it did not state that these policies were objectionable; it merely stated that the existing international economic organizations served not only Asian aims but western aims and policies as well. It was his view that the existing schemes of economic and technical assistance sponsored by Western countries were intended to serve Western policies, but this was not in itself objectionable. It was natural that any country giving assistance to another would expect to gain some benefits from such assistance, even if it was only the goodwill of the country to which the assistance was given. But many American Senators had gone much further and stated that no American assistance should be given to countries which did not toe the American line.

One of the advantages which countries like America derived from the schemes of economic assistance was that it enabled them to get rid of their surplus production. A country like America with a highly developed economy, would collapse unless this excess production was syphoned off. Formerly, poorer countries were given loans with which to purchase this excess production, but as it had been found that these loans were rarely repaid, America now preferred to get rid of this excess production in the form of gifts, and thereby earn the goodwill of the receiving countries. In one way or another, therefore, these economic assistance schemes served the purposes and policies of the countries which sponsored them, and he saw no objection to expressing this view emphatically, as had been done in the Indonesian resolution....

8. Mohammad Ali said that even if the Indonesian resolution did not specifically condemn Western purposes and policies, such condemnation was implied in the wording of the resolution, which was capable of being interpreted as a condemnation of West sponsored economic schemes.

#### 4. Drafting the Communiqué<sup>1</sup>

...Shri Nehru expressed the view that the sentence referred to by the Pakistan Premier was a *fundamental part* of their proposals on Indo-China and that its

1. Minutes of the seventh meeting of the South East Asian Prime Ministers' Conference, Kandy, 1 May 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

deletion would greatly weaken the force of these proposals.<sup>2</sup> The Geneva Conference, he said, was eagerly awaiting their recommendations on Indo-China. The United Kingdom and French delegations at Geneva, in particular, were very anxious to arrive at an early settlement of the Indo-China problem. It was their duty to make some concrete proposals for the solution of the problem rather than to pass vague and indefinite resolutions which would be of no help at all in its solution...

Shri Nehru said he felt that interference from anti-communist agencies had equally to be guarded against and he was, therefore, opposed to pointed mention being made of communism alone. He considered that a general reference, such as "any external agencies" would be a sufficient safeguard against both, and suggested as a modification the addition of the words "communist, anti-communist or other" to meet the point of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He was also opposed to the description of communism as "international communism" as he felt that that term was not sufficiently precise and merely echoed the American thesis...

Shri Nehru, on, behalf of the Indian delegation, thanked Sir John Kotelawala for his sponsorship of the Conference and expressed great pleasure at its successful outcome. This Conference, he said, had laid the foundation for many similar meetings in the future, and for close and constant collaboration between their respective countries in dealing with problems of mutual interest. He, too looked forward to the Afro-Asian conference envisaged by Indonesia, and he was sure that such a conference would open up vistas of fruitful cooperation between the countries of Asia and Africa which had many problems and difficulties in common. The countries of Asia, Shri Nehru continued, had now to face greatly increased responsibilities in world affairs. Conferences of this type, he said, would help them to discharge these responsibilities more effectively. He shared Mohammad Ali's views that the heated arguments which had sometimes taken place during the Conference had absolutely no personal relevance, and he was extremely pleased that the Conference had ended on a very happy note.<sup>3</sup>

2. Mohammad Ali objected to the inclusion in the final communique of the sentence stating that an essential requirement for a ceasefire in Indo-China was an agreement on the part of the countries concerned "not to add to the war potential of the combatants." He argued that if the necessity for an immediate ceasefire was stressed, it was not necessary to lay down the conditions which must be fulfilled before ceasefire could be made effective.
3. The communique issued at the end of the Conference on 2 May, urged speedy ceasefire in Indo-China, the suspension of the hydrogen bomb tests, representation of People's Republic of China in the UNO, self-determination for Morocco and Tunisia and rehabilitation of Palestinian Arab refugees in their original homes. Affirming their faith in democratic institutions, the Prime Ministers expressed their determination to resist outside interference in their countries' affairs.



## 5. Message to Anthony Eden<sup>1</sup>

Your message of the 28th April reached me in Colombo through your High Commissioner there.<sup>2</sup> I am sorry for the delay in sending you an answer. I felt that I should reply after the Colombo Conference had finished its work.

2. Your message was of assistance to me, and I think to others, in our deliberations in Colombo in realising that our work at Colombo and yours at Geneva were of complementary character. I am happy to see in your message a note of hope and cautious optimism and to learn that you are giving careful thought to the suggestions that I ventured to make in regard to the Indo-China problem.

3. The question of Indo-China held our minds more than anything else in Colombo. The initial agreement reached at Geneva in regard to procedure had, to some extent, created a climate of peace to which I had referred in my proposals. It also helped the Colombo Conference to consider the remaining suggestions with a sense and feeling of purpose. There was complete agreement on ceasefire, direct negotiations, complete independence for Indo-China and on bringing the United Nations into the picture. There was also agreement on the principle of nonintervention, but not on the proposal for a nonintervention agreement as contained in my statement.

4. Burma, Indonesia and ourselves considered an agreement on non-intervention by all the major external parties as fundamental to any purposeful negotiations and effective settlement. To Burma, it was a matter of profound and proximate concern. The Indonesian Prime Minister also maintained that it was a basic issue without which no proposal for settlement would have any real value. Ceylon regarded nonintervention as inherent in the other suggestions, but did not attach the same importance to its inclusion in any statement that the Conference issued.

5. Pakistan was opposed to any reference to nonintervention. This was at first stated to be for the reason that it might "embarrass" the Geneva Conference. Later, it was stated that this was not related to the Indo-China problem, but to Pakistan's apprehension that this might have some effect on Pakistan's internal problems, more especially US military aid to Pakistan.

6. The present phraseology in the final communique of the Colombo Conference avoids the use of the term, nonintervention or aid, to meet Pakistan's objections. Agreement on "steps necessary to prevent recurrence or resumption of hostilities" by the four main States and others must necessarily include agreement

1. New Delhi, 4 May 1954. JN Collection. Anthony Eden was the Foreign Secretary of the UK.
2. Cecil George Lewis Syers.

on the question of intervention or aid. It would be a basic factor for any agreement on a ceasefire or settlement. By making China and the US among the primary parties, the Colombo phraseology seeks to allay apprehensions about aid from either of them. The suggested agreement is also wider than nonintervention and would have a stabilising effect when reached. This proposal is also related to the question of guarantees which you have raised in your message.

7. The interest India has taken in this matter arises out of our deep concern about both the Asian and world aspects of it. Because of this, we made definite suggestions for immediate consideration at Geneva, and by all concerned. At Colombo the Indian proposals were the basis of the discussions and are now embodied in the conclusions reached there to which we are parties. These will indicate to you that the Government of India have taken into consideration the fact that a major responsibility now rests on them in assisting in a solution of the problem.

8. On the specific question you have posed, our present position is that within the limits of our policy of nonalignment and our own resources, we would assist in promoting and maintaining a settlement in Indo-China. We can make no commitments beyond this until we see the pattern that emerges and until it is known to what extent and to whom the guarantees extend and who are parties to such guarantees. We do not envisage any guarantee that is intended to bring and ensure peace in Indo-China as one in which a group of states seeks to protect a settlement against anyone or some of them excluded. We do not also think that a guarantee by one side in the cold war alone will bring about peace or ensure it against a recurrence of hostilities.

9. There are, however, other contexts in which guarantees by, or the assistance of others, including ourselves, would both help to effect a settlement and ensure its continuance. This is contemplated in and covered by the phraseology of the Colombo declaration which names the four Powers to an agreement and refers to all others concerned.

10. I hope that what I have said will enable you to feel that we are willing to assist and do so in a practical form within the limits of our general policy and our resources.

11. Our delegation kept in touch with your High Commissioner in Colombo and gave him a background of our work there.

12. I have just received, from your High Commissioner here your personal message of 3rd May.<sup>3</sup> I am grateful to you for the message.

3. Eden, who was participating in the Geneva Conference, had said that regarding Korea, the view of two sides was clearly defined in a confidential meeting of the seven powers and that negotiation stage had not yet been reached. Expressing gratitude for moderate and objective character of the comments made in Colombo on Indo-China, he wrote that they could now agree on the composition of Conference on Indo-China on the basis of UK, USA, France, USSR and Viet Minh and that discussions on chairmanship would begin soon.



## III. INDO-CHINA

1. Appeal for Ceasefire<sup>1</sup>

Now, I just mentioned that in Korea, whatever difficulties there might remain, the fact is that war has stopped. It is a very big thing. Unfortunately, in Indo-China war has not stopped and is being continued in a very terrible way. It is six years now since this Indo-China war began and for the present I do not propose to say anything more about it, because of this that anyhow all of us here—and many others, I have no doubt—would obviously welcome some kind of ending of this actual war, but more especially when it has been proposed to discuss this matter two months hence by the great powers concerned. It seems a tremendous pity that this war should continue when a serious attempt is going to be made to find a way out. Now, it is not for me to suggest anything, and certainly it is with no desire to intervene in any way or intrude or involve ourselves or anything like that, but I do venture to suggest to all the parties and the powers concerned that in view of the fact that this matter of Indo-China is going to be discussed at the Geneva Conference<sup>2</sup> two months later, it might be desirable—it is desirable, I think—to have some kind of ceasefire without any party giving up its own position, whatever they might consider their right etc., because, once one starts arguing about rights, then there will be no end to that argument. So, I would make this very earnest appeal in all humility—and I am sure this House will join with me—to the powers to strive to have a ceasefire there. Then they can discuss it in their own way. I repeat that so far as we are concerned, we have no desire to interfere or to shoulder any burden or responsibility in this connection.

1. Reply to debate on President's Address in the House of the People, 22 February 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, 1954, Vol.1, Part II, cols.415-416.
2. In conformity with the resolutions adopted by the British, French, American and the Soviet Foreign Ministers at the Berlin Four-Power Conference, the Geneva Conference on Far-Eastern problems was to open on 26 April 1954 with the twin objectives of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and to discuss the problem of restoring peace in the Indo-China.

## 2. Cable to N. Raghavan<sup>1</sup>

You will have seen my reference in Parliament to immediate ceasefire in Indo-China without prejudice to any issue<sup>2</sup> there. Situation there is very complex. Nevertheless, it appears worthwhile to explore possibilities before Geneva Conference meets.

We have no means of finding out reactions of Viet Minh. We enquired from Chinese Ambassador here what his Government thought about it and what in their opinion, Viet Minh might say. His answer was friendly but noncommittal.

Please find out from Chinese Government at highest level what their reaction is to proposal. We do not wish to be entangled in this matter at all and propose taking no active step at this stage.

1. New Delhi, 25 February 1954. JN Collection. A similar cable was sent to K.P.S. Menon in Moscow.
2. See *ante*, p. 437.

## 3. Statements of Dulles<sup>1</sup>

I think that the recent statements of Mr Dulles, the US Secretary of State may not be helpful for a successful outcome of the forthcoming Geneva Conference.

Statements like "mass retaliation" and "united action" in South East Asia<sup>2</sup> are not conducive for a proper atmosphere. The reference made by Mr Dulles to Chinese intervention in Indo-China war and to the alleged presence of a Chinese

1. Statement at a Congress Parliamentary Party meeting, New Delhi, 9 April 1954. *The Hindustan Times*, *National Herald*, *The Hindu*, 10 April 1954. Extracts.
2. On 30 March Dulles said in Washington that the possibility of imposing communist political system in South East Asia should not be passively accepted and should be met by united action. On 5 April he said that free world's capacity for instant retaliation had neutralised the communist threat.



General on the Viet Minh side<sup>3</sup> seem to indicate that certain conditions for action by the USA are very near materialization....

3. In a statement on 5 April to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representative, Dulles stated that: (i) a Chinese Communist, General Li Chen-hou, was stationed at the headquarters of the Communist C-in-C in Indo-China, (ii) nearly 20 Chinese Communist technical advisers were also attached to the headquarters of General Giap, the Communist C-in-C in Indo-China, (iii) there were numerous Chinese advisers, anti-aircraft gunners, truck drivers, (iv) Viet Minh's artillery, ammunition and equipment were from Communist China.

#### 4. Proposals on Indo-China<sup>1</sup>

The House is aware that in February last France, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United Kingdom agreed to convene a conference of themselves and the People's Republic of China, to which other interested States are also to be invited, to consider, respectively, the problem of Korea and Indo-China. This conference begins its sessions at Geneva next week.

We are not participants either in this conference or in the hostilities that rage in Indo-China. We are, however, interested in and deeply concerned about the problem of Indo-China and, more particularly, about the recent developments in respect of it. We are also concerned that the conference at Geneva should seek to resolve this question by negotiation and succeed in doing so, so that the shadow of war which has for long darkened our proximate regions and threatens to spread and grow darker still, be dispelled.

An appreciation of the basic realities of this problem, of the national and political sentiments involved, and of the background and the present situation there, both political and military, is essential to that kind of approach which alone might prove constructive and fruitful.

The conflict in Indo-China is, in its origin and essential character, a movement of resistance to colonialism and the attempts to deal with such resistance by the traditional methods of suppression and divide-and-rule.

Foreign intervention have made the issue more complex, but it nevertheless remains basically anticolonial and nationalist in character. The recognition of this and the reconciliation of national sentiments for freedom and independence

1. Statement in Parliament, 24 April 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, 1954, Vol. IV, Part II, cols.5576-5583.

and safeguarding them against external pressures can alone form the basis of a settlement and of peace. The conflict itself, in spite of heavy weapons employed and the large scale operations, remains even today a guerilla war in character with no fixed or stable fronts. The country is divided between the rival forces, but no well held frontiers demarcate their respective zones. Large pockets and slices of territory and populations, change allegiance to one side or the other from day to day or overnight. Battles are won and lost, places taken and retaken, but the war rages year after year with increasing ferocity. Millions of Indo-Chinese, combatants and others as well, irrespective of which side they are on, are killed and wounded or otherwise suffer and their country rendered desolate.

In Indo-China, the challenge to imperialism, as a large scale movement, began in 1940 against the Japanese occupation. During the war against Japan, the United States and allied troops were assisted by the Viet Minh (founded in 1941) and by other nationalist and other groups, at the head of which was Ho Chi Minh. The Viet Minh proclamation of the time referred to the 'defence of democratic principles by the United States, the USSR, Britain and China' and asked the great powers to "proclaim that after Japanese forces had been overthrown, the Indo-Chinese people will receive full autonomy."

After World War II, a provisional Government, of which five out of the fifteen members were communists and which was supported by moderate nationalists, Catholics and others, was established. Ho Chi Minh was elected the President of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam", which was proclaimed in September 1945 and was recognised by the then Government of China. On March 6th, 1946, France, which had now returned to Indo-China after the War, signed an agreement with Ho Chi Minh, recognising the Democratic Republic of Vietnam "as a free State with its own Government, Parliament, Army and Finance and forming part of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union." This arrangement, however, did not last long. Conflict between Ho Chi Minh's Republic and the French Empire began in 1947 and has continued ever since. In June 1948, the French signed an agreement with Bao Dai, the former Emperor of Annam, and made him the head of Vietnam which they recognised as an Associate State within the French Union. Similar agreements were made by the French with the two other States of Indo-China, the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia.

At this stage, the conflict in Indo-China began to assume its present and most ominous aspect of being a reflection of the conflicts between the two power blocs. Material aid and equipment given to France by the United States became available to the French for the war in Indo-China. The Viet Minh, on the other hand, although still maintaining that the war was only against French colonialism, it is reported, received supplies from the People's Republic of China, whose Government continued the recognition accorded to the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (Viet Minh) by its predecessor.



Intervention followed intervention and the ferocity of war increased. Negotiations became increasingly difficult and abortive. It is in this background that the developments of recent months have taken place.

The first of these developments is the decision of the Berlin Powers to have this problem considered by the Geneva Conference. We welcomed this conference and expressed our hope that it would lead to peace in Indo-China. We saw in it the decision to pursue the path of negotiation for a settlement. I ventured to make an appeal at the time for a ceasefire in Indo-China in a statement made in this House, which was unanimously welcomed by the House.

While the decision about the Geneva Conference was a welcome development, it was soon followed by others which caused us concern and forebodings. Among these were:

1) The repeated references to instant and massive retaliation, to possible attacks on the Chinese mainland and statements about extending the scope and intensity of hostilities in Indo-China;<sup>2</sup>

2) an invitation to the Western countries, to the ANZUS powers, and to some Asian States to join in united and collective action in South East Asia.<sup>3</sup> This has been preceded by statements, which came near to assuming protection, or declaring a kind of Monroe Doctrine, unilaterally, over the countries of South East Asia.<sup>4</sup>

There were thus indications of impending direct intervention in Indo-China and the internationalisation of the war and its extension and intensification.

The Government of India deeply regret and are much concerned that a conference of such momentous character, obviously called together because negotiation was considered both feasible and necessary, should be preceded by

2. President Eisenhower at a press conference, on 13 January 1954, said that the Administration's new policy of swift and instant retaliation against any new aggression was based on proven value of surprise element in warfare. On 5 April 1954 Dulles gave a warning that the Chinese communists by their continued help to the Viet Minh forces were approaching a form of undisguised aggression in Indo-China which might in certain circumstances call for retaliation.
3. After discussions in London on 12 and 13 April 1954 on South East Asia, Dulles and Anthony Eden, in a joint statement declared that the communist forces in Indo-China were increasingly developing their activities into large-scale war, endangering the peace and security of the entire South East Asia and hence USA and UK "are ready to take part with other concerned countries in an examination of possibility of establishing a collective defence to secure peace and security of South East Asia and the Western Pacific." On 14 April, Dulles and the French Foreign Minister issued a similar statement. Between 9 and 14 April Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand declared their willingness to take part in such a collective security system.
4. See *ante*, p. 438, fn-2.

a proclamation of what amounts to lack of faith in it, and of alternatives involving threats of sanctions. Negotiations are handicapped, if any at all, with duress, threats, slights and proclamations of lack of faith preceding them.

Another element which must again increase our misgivings, is the stepping up of the tempo of war and the accentuation of supplies in Indo-China. Accentuated supplies have obviously come to the aid of the Viet Minh<sup>5</sup> which, it is alleged, enables them to mount great offensives calculated to secure military victories to condition the forthcoming conference to their advantage. To the French Vietnam side, United States aid has been stepped up and assurances of further aid have been made.<sup>6</sup>

To us in India, these developments are of grave concern and of grievous significance. Their implications impinge on the newly won and cherished independence of Asian countries.

The maintenance of independence and sovereignty of Asian countries as well as the end of colonial and foreign rule is essential to the prosperity of Asian peoples as well as for the peace of the world.

We do not seek any special role in Asia nor do we champion any narrow and sectional Asian regionalism. We only seek to keep for ourselves and the adherence of others, particularly our neighbours, to a peace area and to a policy of nonalignment and noncommitment to world tensions and wars. This, we believe, is essential to us for our own sake and can alone enable us to make our contribution to lowering world tensions, to furthering disarmament and to world peace.

The present developments, however, cast a deep shadow on our hopes; they impinge on our basic policies and they seek to contain us in alignments.

Peace to us is not just a fervent hope; it is an emergent necessity.

Indo-China is an Asian country and a proximate area. Despite her heavy sacrifices, the conflict finds her enmeshed in intervention and the prospect of her freedom jeopardised. The crisis in respect of Indo-China therefore moves us deeply and calls from us our best thoughts and efforts to avert the trends of this conflict towards its extension and intensification, and to promote the trends that might lead to a settlement.

5. See *ante*, p. 439, fn-3.

6. From 20 to 26 March General Paul Ely, the French Chief of Staff, met Eisenhower, Dulles and others to discuss Indo-China situation when it was decided to send 25 US B-26 bombers, ammunition and other items to Indo-China. On 21 April US decided to fly a battalion of French paratroopers from France to Indo-China. In the US aid programme for 1954-55 placed before Congress on 6 April, \$1, 133,000,000 (about one-third of total aid) was earmarked for Indo-China, out of which \$800,000,000 was for direct support of the French Union forces there.



The Government of India feel convinced that despite all their differences of outlook, their deepseated suspicions and their antagonistic claims, the great statesmen assembling at Geneva and their peoples have a common objective, the averting of the tide of war. In their earnest desire to assist to resolve some of the difficulties and deadlocks and to bring about a peaceful settlement, they venture to make the following suggestions:

1) A climate of peace and negotiation has to be promoted and the suspicion and the atmosphere of threats that prevail, ought to be dissipated. To this end, the Government of India appeal to all concerned, to desist from threats, and to the combatants to refrain from stepping up the tempo of war.

2) A ceasefire. To bring this about, the Government of India propose:

- a) that the item of a "ceasefire" be given priority on the Indo-China Conference agenda;
- b) a ceasefire group consisting of the actual belligerents, viz. France and her three Associated States and Viet Minh should be formed;

3) Independence. The Conference should decide and proclaim that it is essential to the solution of the conflict that the complete independence of Indo-China, that is, the termination of French sovereignty, should be placed beyond all doubt by an unequivocal commitment by the Government of France.

4) Direct negotiations between the parties immediately and principally concerned should be initiated by the Conference. Instead of seeking to hammer out settlements themselves, the Conference should request the parties principally concerned to enter into direct negotiations and give them all assistance to this end. Such direct negotiations would assist in keeping the Indo-China question limited to the issues which concern and involve Indo-China directly. These parties would be the same as would constitute the ceasefire group.

5) Non-intervention. A solemn agreement on non intervention, denying aid, direct or indirect, with troops or war material to the combatants or for the purposes of war, to which the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and China shall be primary parties, should be brought about by the Conference. The United Nations, to which the decision of the Conference shall be reported, shall be requested to formulate a convention of non-intervention in Indo-China embodying the aforesaid agreement and including the provisions for its enforcement under United Nations' auspices. Other States should be invited by the United Nations to adhere to this convention of non intervention.

6) The United Nations should be informed of the progress of the Conference. Its good offices for purposes of conciliation under the appropriate Articles of the Charter, and not for invoking sanctions, should be sought.

The Government of India make these proposals in all humility and with the earnest desire and hope that these will engage the attention of the Conference as

a whole and each of the parties concerned. They consider the steps they have proposed to be both practicable and capable of immediate implementation.

The alternative is grim. Is it not time for all of us, particularly those who today are at the helm of world affairs, on one side or the other, in the words of His Holiness the Pope, which I feel cannot be improved upon, to "perceive that peace cannot consist in an exasperating and costly relationship of mutual terror"?

## 5. Cable to Anthony Eden<sup>1</sup>

I am very grateful to you for your personal messages and for keeping me fully informed, through your High commissioner in Delhi,<sup>2</sup> of the progress of the talks in Geneva. I need hardly tell you that I have followed the course of these difficult negotiations with the greatest interest. We have appreciated very greatly the earnest attempts you have made to bring about a ceasefire and a peaceful settlement. I earnestly hope that your efforts will be successful.<sup>3</sup>

2. I have noted with satisfaction from the reports received from you that M. Molotov<sup>4</sup> is also anxious for a settlement and is trying his best to find some way to it. In a situation which is full of difficulty, these are hopeful signs.

3. When I suggested a ceasefire in Indo-China,<sup>5</sup> I had no clear ideas as to how this could be brought about. Indeed, I could not attempt to form an opinion on the very limited data available to me. Ever since, I have deliberately avoided saying anything in regard to this matter or connected matters, which, instead of helping, might perhaps add to your difficulties....

1. New Delhi, 23 May 1954. JN Collection. Also available in V.K. Krishna Menon Papers. NMML. Extracts.

2. P.A. Clutterbuck.

3. The British proposals for bringing about a ceasefire in Indo-China presented by Anthony Eden were: (1) the representatives of the High Commands of both sides should meet in Geneva immediately and contacts should be established on the spot in Indo-China; (2) the military representatives should study disposition of forces to be made upon cessation of hostilities with the question of regrouping of areas in Vietnam; (3) they should report their findings and recommendations to the Conference as soon as possible. The Conference communique of 30 May announced acceptance of this plan unanimously.

4. Vyacheslav Molotov, Foreign Minister of USSR, participated in the Geneva Conference.

5. See *ante*, p. 437.



## IV. HYDROGEN BOMB

### 1. Steps Against Hydrogen Bomb Tests<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: ... I welcome this opportunity to state the position of the Government in regard to the hydrogen bomb and, I feel sure, of the country, on the latest of all the dreaded weapons of war, the hydrogen bomb and to its known and unknown consequences and horrors.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, we are told, possess this weapon and each of these countries has during the last two years effected test explosions unleashing impacts, which in every respect were far beyond that of any weapons of destruction known to man.

A further and more powerful explosion than the one on the 1st of March has been effected by the United States, and more are reported to have been scheduled to take place.<sup>2</sup>

We know little about the hydrogen bomb and its disastrous and horrible consequences that have appeared in the press or are otherwise matters of general knowledge or speculation. But even what we do know, and the very fact that the full facts of the effects of these explosions do not appear to be known or are not ascertainable with any certainty even by scientists, point to certain conclusions. A new weapon of unprecedented power both in volume and intensity, with unascertained, and probably unascertainable range of destructive potential in respect to time and space, that is both as regards duration and extent, of consequences, is being tested, unleashing its massive power, for use as a weapon of war. We know that its use threatens the existence of man and civilisation as we know it. We are told that there is no effective protection against the hydrogen bomb and that millions of people may be exterminated by a single explosion and that many more injured, and perhaps still many more condemned to slow death, or to live under the shadow of the fear of disease and death.

These are horrible prospects, and it affects us, nations and people everywhere, whether we are involved in wars or power blocs or not.

From diverse sides and parts of the world have come pronouncements which point to the dreaded features and ominous prospects of the hydrogen bomb era. I shall refer but to a few of them.

1. Statement in Parliament, 2 April 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, 1954, Vol. III, Part II, cols. 3913-3920. Extracts.
2. In a series of new tests of thermonuclear weapons, the US carried out explosions on 1 March, 26 March and 6 April 1954 in the Pacific Ocean.

Some time ago, when the hydrogen bomb was first mentioned in public, Professor Albert Einstein said: "The hydrogen bomb appears on the public horizon as a probable attainable goal .... If successful, radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere, and hence annihilation of any life on earth, has been brought within the range of technical possibilities...."

A US Professor, Dr Greenhead of the Cincinatti University said: "We are proceeding blindly in our atomic tests and sometimes we cannot predict the results of such blind moves." He said that "the US was able to make these bombs out of relatively plentiful substances. If those are used to create an explosive chain reaction, we are nearing the point where we suddenly have enough materials to destroy ourselves."

Mr Martin,<sup>3</sup> the Defence and Scientific Adviser to the Government of Australia, is reported to have said after the explosion of the 1st of March: "For the first time I am getting worried about the hydrogen bomb.... I can say as an individual that the hydrogen bomb has brought things to a stage where a conference between the four world powers in mankind's own interests can no longer be postponed."

He is reported to have added that the fission was greater than expected by the scientists and that the scientists were more worried than anyone else.

Mr Lester Pearson, the External Affairs Minister of Canada, referred to the use of such weapons in war when he said recently that "a third World War accompanied by the possible devastation by new atomic and chemical weapons would destroy civilization".

The House will no doubt recall the recent statement of Mr Malenkov, the Soviet Prime Minister,<sup>4</sup> on this subject, the exact words of which I have not before me, but which said in effect that modern war with such weapons in use would mean total destruction.

There can be little doubt about the deep and widespread concern in the world, particularly among peoples, about these weapons and their dreadful consequences. But concern is not enough. Fear and dread do not lead to

3. Leslie Harold Martin (1900-83); Associate Professor of Natural Philosophy, University of Melbourne, 1937-45, Professor of Physics, 1945-59; Defence Scientific Adviser to Australian Government and Chairman, Defence Research and Development Policy, 1948-67; Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission of Australia, 1958-68; Dean of Military Studies, and Professor of Physics, Royal Military College, Canberra, 1967-1970.
4. George Maximilianovich Malenkov (1902-1988); Member, Organisation Bureau and Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party, USSR. 1939; Member, Committee for State Defence, 1941; Member, Committee for Economic Rehabilitation of Liberal Districts, 1943; Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers, 1946; Chairman, 1953-55; Minister of Electric Power Stations, 1955-57; Manager of Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydro-Electric Station, 1957-63.



constructive thought or effective courses of action. Panic is no remedy against disaster of any kind, present or potential.

Mankind has to awaken itself to the reality and face the situation with determination and assert itself to avert calamity.

The general position of this country in this matter has been repeatedly stated and placed beyond all doubt. It is up to us to pursue as best as we can the objective we seek.

We have maintained that nuclear (including thermonuclear), chemical and biological (bacterial) knowledge and power should not be used to forge these weapons of mass destruction. We have advocated the prohibition of such weapons, by common consent, and immediately by agreement amongst those concerned, which is at present the only effective way to bring about their abandonment.

The House will no doubt recall the successive attempts made by us at the United Nations to secure the adoption of this view and approach.

At the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1953, as a result of amendments moved by our delegation to the Resolution on Disarmament, these were incorporated in the Resolution that was adopted:<sup>5</sup>

- (1) An "affirmation" by the General Assembly of its earnest desire for the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, bacterial, chemical and other weapons of war and mass destruction and for the attainment of these ends through effective means.
- (2) A provision for setting up of a sub-committee, consisting of the powers principally involved, to sit in private, and at places of its choosing to implement the purposes of the Disarmament Commission.

The House is aware that this latter suggestion has lately engaged the attention of the powers principally concerned, at Berlin and elsewhere, and talks have taken place and, so far as we know, are continuing.

Time, however, appears to challenge us. Destruction threatens to catch us up, if not to overtake us, on its march to its sinister goal. We must seek to arrest it and avert the dire end it threatens.

Government propose to continue to give the closest and continuous consideration to such steps as it can take in appropriate places and context in pursuit of our approach and the common objective.

I have stated publicly as our view that these experiments, which may have served their one and only useful purpose namely, expose the nature of the horror and tragedy, even though but partly, should cease. I repeat that to be our considered position, and it is our hope that this view and the great concern it reflects, and which is worldwide, will evoke adequate and timely responses.

5. The resolution was adopted by 54 votes to none on 28 November 1953.

Pending progress towards some solution, full or partial, in respect of the prohibition and elimination of these weapons of mass destruction, which the General Assembly has affirmed as its nearest desire, the Government would consider, among steps to be taken now and forthwith, the following:

1) Some sort of, what may be called, "Standstill Agreement" in respect, at least, of these actual explosions, even if arrangements about the discontinuance of production and stockpiling, must await more substantial agreements amongst those principally concerned.

2) Full publicity by those principally concerned in the production of these weapons and by the United Nations, of the extent of the destructive power and the known effects of these weapons and also adequate indication of the extent of the unknown but probable effects. Informed world public opinion is in our view the most effective factor in bringing about the results we desire.

3) Immediate (and continuing) private meetings of the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission to consider the "Standstill" proposal, which I have just mentioned, pending decisions on prohibitions and controls, etc., to which the Disarmament Commission is asked by the General Assembly to address itself.

4) Active steps by states and peoples of the world, who though not directly concerned with the production of these weapons, are very much concerned by the possible use of them at present, by these experiments and their effects. They would, I venture to hope, express their concern and add their voices and influence, in as effective a manner as possible, to arrest the progress of this destructive potential which menaces all alike.

The Government of India will use its best efforts in pursuit of these objectives.

I would conclude with an expression of the sympathy which this House and this country feels towards the victims of the recent explosions, Japanese fishermen and others, and to the people of Japan to whom it has brought much dread and concern by way of direct effects and by the fear of food contamination.<sup>6</sup>

The open ocean appears no longer open, except in that those who sail on it for fishing or other legitimate purposes take the greater and unknown risks caused by these explosions. It is of great concern to us that Asia and her peoples appear to be always nearer these occurrences and experiments, and their fearsome consequences, actual and potential.

6. As a result of the first test on 1 March in Marshall Islands 236 islanders had been exposed to some radiation. 23 Japanese fishermen, the entire crew of a Japanese fishing vessel, *Fukuryu Maru*, had been affected and displayed symptoms of radiation sickness. Japan Government banned sale of all fish landed by the *Fukuryu Maru* and warned people against danger of buying contaminated fish. On 1 April, Japanese Foreign Minister demanded an apology and compensation from the USA for damages caused to *Fukuryu Maru* and the injuries to her crew.



We do not yet know fully whether the continuing effects of these explosions are carried only by the medium of air and water or whether they subsist in other strata of nature and how long their effects persist, or whether they set up some sort of chain reactions at which some have already hinted.

We must endeavour with faith and hope to promote all efforts that seek to bring to a halt this drift to what appears to be the menace of total destruction.

## 2. Cable to Winston Churchill<sup>1</sup>

Thank you for your personal message<sup>2</sup> which your High commissioner delivered to me this morning.

2. I share your anxiety and concern and the sense of the very grave responsibility to which you refer in respect of the hydrogen bomb and all its implications, present and future.

3. My statement before Parliament on the 2nd of this month, which you may have seen, expresses the deep concern and anxiety of the Government and people of India and their earnest desire to seek remedies or at least reliefs, both immediate and long-range.

4. I would particularly draw your attention to, and request your study and consideration of, the four proposals in my statement, (which I am arranging to be telegraphed to you for your ready reference). I would consider that the "Standstill Agreement" in regard to test explosions is feasible of immediate achievement and without prejudice to matters of acute difference between the parties principally concerned. I believe that if we get some agreement with both parties immediately to stop these explosions, irrespective of future negotiations and agreements on stoppage of production or ultimate prohibition, we would have made a beginning in stopping the dangerous drift to disaster. I would say that a Standstill Agreement is much like a ceasefire in an armed conflict.

1. New Delhi, 4 April 1954. JN Collection. Also available in HC's File (1954), MEA.
2. The UK Prime Minister had mentioned about a debate to be held in the British Parliament on hydrogen bomb and said: "We are indeed at a turning point in the world's history.... I wish that at this moment it had been possible for us all to take counsel together—as we did at the time of the Coronation."

5. I very much hope that you will lend your weighty and valuable support to this proposal, which compromises no principle and does not prejudice any issue of method or substance. I venture to think that the mere arrest of this dreadful process at some stage, even though not final, will help us in making other decisions and lead us in the right direction at the "turning point" to which you refer.

6. I agree with you about Commonwealth (and I would add, other) consultation at high levels. I would welcome an opportunity for all of us to take counsel together in view of the grave emergency.

7. Conscious as we are of what is involved for the future of mankind, our seeking each other's counsel appears to me a supreme duty.

## V. NEPAL

### 1. To B.K. Gokhale<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
18th February 1954

My dear Gokhale,<sup>2</sup>

As I think I wrote to you, I met M.P. Koirala<sup>3</sup> at Kalyani during the Congress session.<sup>4</sup> I met separately B.P. Koirala.<sup>5</sup> I told M.P. Koirala that I was astonished

1. JN Collection.

2. B.K. Gokhale was the Ambassador of India in Nepal.

3. M.P. Koirala was the President of the Rastriya Praja Party, which he had formed in April 1953 after his expulsion in 1952 from the Nepali Congress headed by B.P. Koirala. He at this time headed a Rashtriya Party Government in Nepal which assumed office on 15 June 1953.

4. Nehru, the Congress President, arrived at Kalyani, West Bengal, on 19 January 1954 in order to attend the 59th session of Indian National Congress and returned to New Delhi on 25 January.

5. B.P. Koirala was the President of the Nepali Congress.

6. The Royal Proclamation of 20 September 1953 authorized M.P. Koirala to broaden his Cabinet by incorporating members of other political parties like Nepali Congress and others. As M.P. Koirala could not reach any decision in this regard, effectiveness of the Rashtriya Praja Party Government was adversely affected creating the impression that this Government was a temporary arrangement.



and distressed at the great delay in his coming to any decision.<sup>6</sup> Whatever the decision was he must arrive at it. He said that fault was not his and indeed if B.P. Koirala had been in Kathmandu he would fix matters up. I suggested him to meet B.P. Koirala at Kalyani, which he promised to do. I believe they met. M.P. Koirala told me that soon after his return to Kathmandu he would finalise matters.

2. Now nothing is being done and I have lost all patience. Not that this helps in finding a way out but I merely want you to know how utterly disgusted I feel.

3. I have received a letter from B.P. Koirala, copy of which I enclose<sup>7</sup>. B.P. Koirala has behaved badly on many occasions in the past but the entire responsibility for delay in everything lies with M.P. Koirala now.<sup>8</sup>

4. I saw Bhatia<sup>9</sup> this morning. He will be going to Kathmandu within a week or so. He told me about various schemes etc., but he felt that nothing could be done unless the Government of Nepal set about it in the right way. As far as I can see, the Government of Nepal is going to do no such thing. A number of times they have disappointed me and broken their assurances. I cannot imagine a more incompetent set of people.

5. I see no reason why we should throw about money which is going to be wasted. All that the Government of Nepal is interested in is to get money from us.

6. I gather now that they are not anxious to have Police Officers from us or any other officer.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. On 13 February B.P. Koirala wrote that he met M.P. Koirala and the King to finalise the question of expansion of the cabinet but, M.P. Koirala had still not taken any decision in this regard and seemed to be dealing with this most important matter in a spirit of levity.
8. The Rashtriya Praja Party Government was replaced by a four-party coalition Government headed by M.P. Koirala on 18 February 1954. It contained two representatives of M.P. Koirala's own party, one each from Praja Parishad, the National Congress (Regmi faction) and All-Nepal Jana Congress plus two independents. No member of the Nepali Congress participated in this Government.
9. K.B. Bhatia (b. 1907); joined Indian Civil Service, 1929; served U.P. Government as Asstt. Collector and Magistrate, Joint Magistrate, April 1933; officiating Magistrate and Collector, January 1936; Secretary, Tariff Board, April 1937-April 1938; Secretary, Agriculture, UP, September 1942; Commissioner, Gorakhpur and Faizabad Divisions, headquarter, Lucknow, 31 October 1953; On deputation to MEA, from January 1956 as Director of Aid Programme, Kathmandu, Nepal.

## 2. Disturbing Conditions in Nepal<sup>1</sup>

A talk I had with Major-General Yadunath Singh<sup>2</sup> about conditions in Nepal has disturbed me. There are two aspects of this. One is the total incompetence and corruption of the administrative apparatus. Nothing seems to improve there. Are we to leave this as it is and offer gentle advice from time to time or is it possible for us to do something?

2. Secondly, American activities there have increased greatly<sup>3</sup> and are definitely aimed at creating anti-India feeling and encouraging reactionary elements there. Money flows and the administration is still further corrupted. The recent visit of the US Ambassador in Colombo<sup>4</sup> to Nepal was not a casual affair. He is apparently an important man with close contacts with the Intelligence Services and he appears to have taken up a positive and aggressive line.

3. I think we shall have to take a strong line with the American Ambassador here<sup>5</sup> in regard to all these matters and follow that up.

4. However, we might wait till our Ambassador Gokhale comes here.

5. I feel that we should give serious thought to sending a new Ambassador to Kathmandu. The person sent must be absolutely first class and capable of handling difficult situations.

6. It appears that Ambassador Crowe<sup>6</sup> (US Ambassador to Ceylon) was to some extent responsible in preventing B.P. Koirala and company to join the new cabinet.

1. Note to the Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 5 March 1954. JN Collection.
2. He was the head of the Indian Military Mission in Nepal at this time. The Mission went to Nepal in February 1952 on invitation of the Nepalese Government to train the army of Nepal.
3. After conducting exploratory surveys in the fields of agriculture, health and mineral resources, specific programmes and projects were undertaken by the US Government in Nepal by an agreement on technical assistance on 23 January 1953 under Point Four Programme (1949). During 1950-55 out of a total US economic assistance of \$ 841,000, 000 for the Colombo Plan countries, Nepal was allotted \$ 4,000,000.
4. Philip Kingsland Crowe.
5. George V. Allen.
6. (1908-1976); American journalist and diplomatist; reporter, and Assistant Financial Editor, the *New York Evening Post*, 1930-34; on advertising staff of *Life* and *Fortune*, 1937-41, 1945-48; Lieut Colonel, US Army, 1941-45; Ambassador to Ceylon, 1953-57; Special Assistant to Secretary of State, 1957-58; Ambassador to South Africa, 1959-61, Norway, 1969-73, and Denmark, 1973-76. Author of *Diversions of a Diplomat* (1958), *The Empty Ark* (1967), *Out of the Mainstream* (1970).





WITH LOUIS STEPHEN ST. LAURENT AND ESCOTT REID, NEW DELHI, 22 FEBRUARY 1954





A PERSPECTIVE OF THE COLOMBO CONFERENCE,  
SHANKAR'S WEEKLY, 25 APRIL 1954



7. I was under the impression that there was some kind of check here on foreigners going to Nepal. Apparently there is none. I should like this matter looked into.

8. I enclose a note given to me by Major-General Yadunath Singh.<sup>7</sup>

7. Yadunath Singh had written on 5 March 1954: (1) Nepal's economy was bankrupt and her currency vis-a-vis India's had depreciated heavily; (2) there was no real political party there capable of ruling and those who were ruling the country in their individual capacity were corrupt; (3) the administration was inefficient, selfish and corrupt, the police were corrupt and untrained; (4) more roads and airways were needed; (5) the King of Nepal was loyal to India; (6) the US technical aid personnel were bribing the important people with cash and other items and encouraging them to indulge in anti-India propaganda, and that Crowe had come to Nepal to judge and influence popular reactions to US military aid to Pakistan; (7) the Nepalese troops were ill-equipped and support and use of Indian Army on the northern frontiers of Nepal were necessary.

### 3. To King of Nepal<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
23rd March 1954

My dear friend,

Thank you very much for your letter of March 9 which was handed to me by our Ambassador on his arrival here. I was waiting for his return to Kathmandu to send my reply. Now that he is returning, this letter will be taken by him.

2. I have been glad to learn that Your Majesty's stay in Switzerland has done you much good.<sup>2</sup> But it seems clear to me that care should be taken about your health. I earnestly hope that you will take this care in regard to regular hours, food and adequate rest. Your Majesty has to bear a heavy burden and much depends upon your health.

3. I am glad that the Cabinet was at last enlarged.<sup>3</sup> It was unfortunate that this was delayed for such a long time and that, in enlarging it, it was not possible to include representatives of the Nepali Congress.<sup>4</sup> However, now that the Cabinet

1. JN Collection.

2. King Tribhuvan left for Europe for medical treatment on 21 September 1953 and returned on 16 January 1954.

3. On 18 February 1954. See *ante*, p. 451, fn- 8.

4. The main objection of the Nepali Congress in joining the Cabinet was that the "Government was a product of palace intrigue" and hence undemocratic. The Working Committee of the Nepali Congress in a resolution on 2 March commented that the new Government was formed as a "private affair", like a managing committee of a private estate.

has been formed, I trust that it will deal with the many problems of Nepal with speed and efficiency, unfortunately, owing to internal difficulties, not much progress has been made during the past year or two. It will be for the new Cabinet to make more rapid progress. The resources of Nepal are great, but they have not been tapped. Any marked development can only take place by utilising these essential resources. I think that it should not be difficult to follow a policy of reform which will not only satisfy the people generally, but will also add greatly to the available resources. As I have often told Your Majesty, we shall gladly give all the help we can. But, ultimately it is for the Government and the people of Nepal to shoulder this burden effectively.

4. The very first consideration always is an efficient administration. Without such an administration, nothing much can be done because even decisions are not implemented. I trust that the new Cabinet will lay stress on improving the administration and the judiciary, I am glad that our Military Mission<sup>5</sup> has helped in training and improving the tone of the Nepalese Army. If a similar improvement takes place in the police as well as in the administration, the basis of progress will be laid down.

5. On this basis must be built reforms dealing with the land problem, suitable taxation, the weight of which must necessarily fall on those who can bear it, and schemes of development. All this can be done without much delay if the Cabinet will apply itself to this urgent and important task. The main thing is that decisions should be taken with speed and implemented.

6. I realise that one of the major difficulties before Nepal is the lack of trained personnel. In so far as we can, we shall gladly help in supplying such trained personnel as may be needed. We have already sent a competent officer Shri Bhatia, who is particularly qualified to look after the development side of the country. He can help in many other ways also. I understand that Your Majesty's Government wants a team of other officers also. We shall endeavour to supply such as you need. Our main purpose would be to train up suitable Nepali personnel and help in establishing an efficient administration. That efficiency must necessarily be accompanied by a high standard of public integrity.

7. Nepal is aiming at a democratic constitution. That would necessitate a democratic approach to this problem, and the leaders of Nepal will have to set a standard of simple democratic ways to the people. The old days of a small group living in extravagance hardly fit in with a democratic set up when most people are poor.

8. I understand that Your Majesty has permitted Shri Govind Narain<sup>6</sup> to leave your service in the middle of April. He has been in Nepal now for

5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 17, p. 474.

6. Govind Narain was Adviser and Secretary to the King of Nepal between 1951 and 1954.



considerable time and it is right that he should revert to his normal activities in India. I trust that his stay in Nepal has been of some use to Your Majesty and your Government. Should you in future require any person to help in secretarial or like duties, we shall try to find a suitable person.

9. As Your Majesty is no doubt aware, grave developments have taken place in the international sphere. Among other things, the United States have decided to give military aid to Pakistan. This has created a new situation. The Government and people of India have disapproved strongly of this military aid to Pakistan because of its far-reaching consequences. We have made our views clear to the United States Government as well as to other governments. We do not approve of any foreign power bringing in its military apparatus into a neighbouring country and thus bringing it into the region of potential war. Apart from the possible threat to Pakistan's neighbouring countries, this has a larger significance in regard to Asia. I am afraid, American policy has not been wise and has created in this respect a great deal of resentment in many countries, even apart from India. Instead of bringing a sense of peace and security, it has led to feelings of insecurity and tension,

10. Because of this and other reasons, I view the extension of American activities in Nepal with some apprehension.

11. Your Majesty knows that there have been frequent discussions between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal about foreign affairs and defence. Even at the time of our last Treaty,<sup>7</sup> it was stated in some letters exchanged at the time that there should be coordination between the policies of our respective countries in these matters.<sup>8</sup> Further discussions led to the same result. In the new grave situation that has arisen, this becomes all the more necessary. The international situation is a very complicated one, and small countries are apt to become entangled in the conflicts of great powers. I mention this matter as it appears that special attempts are being made on the part of the United States Government to develop various activities in Nepal. Some of these activities may appear to be beneficial, but in the main they may well lead to entanglements in Nepal which will not be good for either Nepal or for India. I

7. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14, Pt. II, p. 468.

8. Under the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on 31 July 1950, between India and Nepal, it was agreed upon that both would consult with each other and devise effective counter measures to deal with any threat to security of either and Nepal might import all arms ammunitions necessary for her security through Indian territory with the assistance and agreement of the Government of India. It was also agreed that Nepal should give first preference to the Government or nationals of India for seeking foreign assistance in regard to the development of the natural resources or of any industrial project in Nepal and both Governments agreed not to employ any foreigners whose activity might be prejudicial to the security of the other.

should like this position to be made perfectly clear to the representatives of the United States Government in India and Nepal.

12. I have had long talks with our Ambassador Shri B.K. Gokhale, and he has informed me of the situation in Nepal and of the progress being made in some directions. I am happy to learn that there is, generally speaking, peace and order in Nepal. This is the time to take advantage of the situation and lay the foundations of progress. That will bring stability to the Government and the country and will lead to the betterment of the people, which is no doubt the aim of Your Majesty and your Government.

13. I send Your Majesty all my good wishes and my assurance that we shall be always happy to help to the best of our ability in the progress of Nepal.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 4. To M.P. Koirala<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
23rd March 1954

My dear Maitrika Prasadji,

Our Ambassador, Shri B.K. Gokhale, gave me your letter of the 10th March.<sup>2</sup> During his stay here we have had many discussions and he has explained to me the situation there and the possibilities of future work. We have been able to settle a number of pending matters. I need not assure you that we are anxious to help you and your Government to the best of our ability.

2. With the new Government that you have formed,<sup>3</sup> the time has come for some rapid and striking advances to be made. Unfortunately the last two years or so have been spent in some internal difficulties, which have prevented

1. JN Collection.

2. M.P. Koirala had written that the Nepali Congress chose to stay out as they wanted larger representation in the Cabinet. Regarding Gurkha Parishad and Nepali Congress receiving assistance from the Americans, he wrote that he was keeping a sharp vigil and would take action on finding tangible evidence. He hoped to get Nehru's advice and guidance on personal basis through Indian Ambassador. He also wrote that law and order situation was much better in Nepal now and suggested Mahendra Vikram Shah, a non-Rana, a Cabinet Minister in his first Cabinet and Vice-President of his party, as the ambassador to India.

3. See *ante* p. 451, fn. 8.



progress.<sup>4</sup> A chance has now come to your Government to lay the foundations of the progress you aim at. That progress depends on an efficient administration. I know that you cannot suddenly change the administration, but it should be possible to go some way towards this. Fortunately the Army has improved greatly under the training given to it by our Military Mission. That is a gain for Nepal and gives stability to the country. If the police could also be tackled in the same way and the senior administrative officers chosen for their ability and integrity, a long step forward will be taken.

3. There is, quite rightly, a good deal of talk about development schemes. But any development can only be based on an effective administration, which can implement the decisions of Government. Those decisions of Government have also to be taken with some speed. I know that you will have to face many difficulties and that the trained personnel at your disposal is limited. We can help where possible and we are perfectly prepared to do so, but inevitably the principal burden must fall on your Government and your people. Those people have been waiting for some steps forward for the last two years. If these steps are not taken fairly soon, there is likely to be frustration.

4. Unfortunately, the standards of administration, and even more so of integrity in the services, are not high in Nepal. This not only creates a bad impression among the people but prevents any real progress. I hope that your Government will pay particular attention to these matters.

5. The potential resources of Nepal are very great and the problem is how to utilise them. Even a small reform in the land laws and the system of taxation would add to the resources available to your Government greatly. Everyone knows that the difference between the rich and the poor is very great. In the old days there used to be extreme extravagance and luxury among a few and poverty among the many. I do not know how far this has changed. But I imagine that no marked change has taken place. This state of affairs can only lead to discontent and is opposed to any democratic set up. A proper system of taxation on land would help somewhat in reducing this difference and in bringing in considerable resources to the Government.

6. We have sent you a competent officer, Bhatia.<sup>5</sup> He is good and, given the opportunity, will be able to serve your Government well. We can add a few

4. Progress in Nepal was stunted mainly due to frequent changes in Government during 1952-54. The full-fledged Nepali Congress Government headed by M.P. Koirala, formed on 16 November 1951, was replaced by the King on 14 August 1952 with the Royal Counsellors' regime. On 15 June 1953 the King replaced the Counsellors' Government by a Cabinet of Rashtriya Praja Party, headed by M.P. Koirala, which was again replaced on 18 February 1954 with a national coalition again headed by M.P. Koirala.

5. K.B. Bhatia.

more officers, who can work as a team and help the Nepalese administration, more especially in training others.

7. I see that you suggest Shri Mahendra Vikram Shah as your next Ambassador to India. I agree with you that I would have preferred a non-Rana as an Ambassador to represent the new order in Nepal. The position of your Ambassador in Delhi is an important one. It is in effect far more important, if I may say so, than your Ambassador in London or Washington. Therefore, a man of ability and integrity should be sent here. It is not for me to judge of the person you choose for this post. I can only lay stress on these aspects. I hope you will keep them in mind and then select a person for this high and responsible post. We shall accept your final choice.

8. You mention that D.R. Regmi<sup>6</sup> is in charge of the portfolio of External Affairs. I shall be glad to have direct contacts with him whenever any question relating to foreign affairs arises. But my principal contacts will necessarily be with you, whether the question relates to foreign affairs or any other subject. As Prime Minister, you are in overall charge of the Government and I presume that there is joint responsibility in your Cabinet. It is necessary that this system of joint responsibility should be built up and each Minister should not carry on an isolated and independent existence in his department. In particular, foreign affairs have to be tackled with great care in this changing and rather dangerous world.

9. In the previous talks I have had with you, as well as with the other representatives of the Nepal Government, we have discussed foreign affairs and we have agreed that there should be full coordination between the foreign policy and the defence policy of the two Governments. Indeed that was even laid down in the collateral letters exchanged at the time of the last Treaty between the two countries.<sup>7</sup> That Treaty was made before the changeover in Nepal and is, therefore, rather out of date, but the basic points laid down in it still hold.

10. You know of the new developments that have taken place because of the United States giving military aid to Pakistan. You know also that we have been having long talks with the Chinese Government in Peking in regard to Tibetan matters.<sup>8</sup> It is important, therefore, that there should be the closest coordination between India and Nepal so as to avoid any differing approach, which may lead to complications.

11. You refer in your letter to certain activities of Americans in Nepal. I am myself not happy about this at all. I think that it should be made perfectly clear to the Americans both by your Government and our Government that they must not interfere in the affairs of Nepal. Apart from other aspects, it is dangerous

6. Dilli Raman Regmi.

7. See *ante*, p. 455.

8. The talks on a new agreement on trade and intercourse in Tibet commenced in Beijing on 31 December 1953 and concluded on 29 April 1954.



for large sums of money to be thrown about corrupting people. We do not encourage in India our officials or military officers to mix with foreign representatives,

12. I am particularly anxious that there should be a clear understanding between us in regard to various aspects of foreign affairs as well as defence.

13. I have recently had reports of some trouble on the Bhutan border.<sup>9</sup> A number of Nepali organisations are organising satyagraha in Bhutan. They have made their base in Indian territory. I have just received news that there was a conflict between them and presumably Bhutan troops.<sup>10</sup> This is exceedingly embarrassing to us as it must be to your Government. Bhutan is your neighbour country and you would no doubt like to have friendly relations with Bhutan.

14. I am aware that there are difficulties in Bhutan for the Nepali residents there and that the policy of the Bhutan Government has not been very favourable to the Nepalese.<sup>11</sup> I would welcome progress in Bhutan in various ways. But we cannot encourage Indian territory to be made the base of operations. I am sure that your Government also cannot approve of this method. Governments do not function in this way. I hope, therefore, that you will discourage, in so far as you can, these aggressive activities. I know that many people who are indulging in them are probably not amenable to your influence and represent your opposition groups. Nevertheless, it seems important to me that your Government should take up a clear attitude in this matter. Any difficulties in Bhutan should be dealt with in a different and governmental way.

15. I learn that Govind Narain will be leaving the King's service next month. That is right, as he has been there long enough. I hope the King will have a competent Secretary provided for him because he must require secretarial assistance of a high quality. The King occupies a very special position in Nepal and your Government will no doubt want to help him in every way.

16. There is one matter which you will not mind if I mention to you. I have in fact hinted at it earlier in this letter. In view of the changes that have come in

9. The Bhutan State Congress, a Nepali Bhutanese political party, formed at Patgaon, Assam, in November 1952, with the primary goal to pressurise Bhutan Government to change the discriminatory policies against the Nepali Bhutanese community in Bhutan, was organising satyagraha inside Bhutan at this time with its headquarters at Siliguri, West Bengal.
10. On 22 March 1954, about 100 Bhutan State Congress volunteers marched from India across the border to launch satyagraha at Sarbhang, the centre of the largest concentration of Nepali Bhutanese in southern Bhutan. The Bhutan National Militia took repressive action against them when they refused to disperse and return to India.
11. Right to own and cultivate land by the Nepali Bhutanese was strictly regulated, not only in the Bhutan highlands which were closed to them, but in Southern Bhutan as well. Even their residence in Bhutan was on a tenuous basis, making them easy objects of exploitation by Bhutanese officials.

but their foreign policy is coordinated with that of India and therefore, in any such discussions, India will have to be represented also. Nepal should not agree to discussions taking place in Peking. They should take place either in Kathmandu or Delhi and it should be made perfectly clear that India will be represented at them also. The general line to be followed in these discussions would be more or less the line taken in India's agreement with China.

10. It is to be clearly understood that the foreign policy of Nepal and India is to be coordinated. This means that in any matter which affects Nepal, directly or indirectly, India will consult the Nepalese Government, and in any foreign policy matter which comes up before the Nepalese Government, they will consult the Government of India and coordinate their policy with that of India.

11. Wherever Nepal is not directly represented in foreign countries, the Government of India will gladly agree to represent Nepalese interests. This should not apply to every place, but to selected places where Nepal has particular interests and which are chosen by the Nepalese Government. The Government of India, should, therefore, ask the Nepalese Government in what countries abroad they would like India to take charge of their representation. Having agreed to these places, necessary steps will be taken to that end and the foreign Governments concerned informed. It must be clearly understood, however that such places will be agreed to previously between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal.

12. In regard to other places abroad, we should inform our Heads of Missions that they should give every help and assistance to Nepalese nationals. No intimation need be given there to foreign government.

13. The question which I have not discussed with Mr Regmi, but which might well be considered, is our representing Nepal's interests in Peking. I think that on the whole, this would be desirable and would lead the Chinese Government to deal with us in regard to the Nepalese.

14. Apparently, our External Affairs Ministry said sometime ago to the Nepalese Embassy in Delhi that we should check visas given to foreigners going to Nepal. This is not a correct way of putting it. The position is that the Nepalese Government had no way of checking the people who ask for visas and we offer them our help in this kind of checking. It is of course open to them to give visas to anyone they like, but they are already troubled by too many visitors coming from abroad, notably Americans. Therefore, it will be to their advantage to consult us in such matters. We have much greater experience and knowledge of the persons concerned and we could advise them.

15. I have seen a PTI telegram today which states that a draft treaty of friendship between France and Nepal is pending. I know nothing about this. This might be enquired into. I am informed that the French Ambassador has called on Mr Regmi here in Delhi.

16. As a consequence of our foreign policy being coordinated, it follows



that any treaty of Nepal with a foreign country should be considered in cooperation with us and after reference to us.

17. I mentioned to Mr Regmi that should the Nepalese Government so desire, we might be agreeable to accept one or two or more of their bright youngmen for training in some of our foreign missions abroad. Sometime or other they will require trained personnel and this might help.

18. While in conversation, the subjects are discussed and agreed to; in practice such agreements are not remembered or are not acted upon. It would be desirable to suggest some procedure for frequent consultation. Our Ambassador should keep in touch with the Foreign Office in Kathmandu and External Affairs keep in touch with the Nepalese Ambassador here.

19. This is a preliminary note as there are going to be further conversations. A copy of this note might be sent to our Ambassador in Kathmandu.

## VI. BHUTAN

### 1. To Bisnuram Medhi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

21st March 1954

My dear Medhi,

I have just received a telegram from your Government reporting that a batch of Nepalese have opened an office (apparently at a place called Patgaon on the Assam-Bhutan frontier) which is called the Bhutan State Congress,<sup>2</sup> that they fly the tricolour flag, though this flag is somewhat different from our National Flag and that these people are collecting subscriptions and enrolling volunteers with the object of offering peaceful satyagraha against the Bhutan Government. The object of this being the introduction of democratic Government in Bhutan.<sup>3</sup>

1. File No. 57/28/54-Poll., MHA. Also available in JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to K.N. Katju.
2. The Bhutan State Congress was formed in India in 1952 under the leadership of D.B. Gurung, D.B. Chhetry and others with the main objective to pressurize the Bhutan Government to change its discriminatory policies against the ethnic Nepalese in Bhutan.
3. The telegram intimated that the Bhutan State Congress volunteers were planning to enter Bhutan territory through Sarbhang, just across Assam border. Distance between camp site at Patgaon and Sarbhang in Bhutan was 23 miles along forest road. Police report indicated possibilities of clash between satyagrahis and Bhutan State Army at Sarbhang.

The local Bhutanese Officer at Sarbhang has apparently requested the Deputy Commissioner of Dhubri to intervene and prevent volunteers from entering Sarbhang.

Your Government has asked for instructions as to what to do in this matter.

We are sending a telegram to you but I should like to explain the position more fully in this letter. Our relations with the Bhutanese Government are friendly. Bhutan is a semi-independent State whose foreign policy has to be conducted in consultation with us. The State receives a subsidy from us also. They are very anxious to preserve their independence but realise that they have to rely on India. We have no desire to interfere internally in Bhutan but we have made it clear that, so far as any external matters are concerned or any defence matters, India is intensely interested and must have a say. This is the position.

Obviously we cannot encourage India being made a base for an organised agitation in Bhutan. There will be no difficulty about our interfering and putting a stop to this if there was any violence involved. Normally we do not interfere with peaceful activities. However, in the present case, even peaceful activities, apparently deliberately aiming at breaches of the law on the other side are undesirable. These so-called satyagrahis will be arrested or perhaps even shot at and then questions will arise about Indian nationals getting into trouble in Bhutan, apart from the Bhutanese Government accusing us of encouraging these activities.

Therefore I think that your DC should be told that he must make it clear to the so-called Bhutan State Congress which has opened an office at Patgaon that we cannot permit India being made a base for any kind of satyagraha or breach of the law in Bhutan. If organised bands of volunteers endeavour to go from India to Bhutan with the professed object of offering such satyagraha, they will be stopped. If this has to be done, it should be done quietly and without fuss.

There is a difference between organised bands going with this professed object and individuals going through peacefully without declaring their object of satyagraha. Such individuals normally go through and we cannot stop them unless we suspect trouble.

Our object should be to prevent this organised movement taking place from India and to make it clear to the Bhutanese Government that we are not encouraging it in any way. The Deputy Commissioner of Dhubri should inform the local Bhutanese officer at Sarbhang that we do not propose to encourage this satyagraha and we have informed the so called satyagrahis accordingly but that, if any individuals manage to go through quietly, peacefully, it is difficult for us to stop them.

The Deputy Commissioner of Dhubri should be told that he must exercise a great deal of tact in this matter so as not to produce an incident. He should, in fact, send for the Bhutan State Congress people and tell them that they are not helping the cause which they apparently have at heart by this kind of satyagraha



organised from India, in fact they are injuring it and doing harm to the relations of India and Bhutan. Therefore they should desist from this, it is for the Bhutanese people in Bhutan to press constitutionally for any reform. If this is organised from India, that will be pressure from outside which the Bhutanese People, even apart from their Government, will resent. Therefore this is a very unwise policy from every point of view.

This will further give rise to conflict between the Nepalese and the Bhutanese in Nepal which must be avoided. The real Bhutanese consider the Nepalese even in Bhutan as, to some extent, outsiders.

I have tried to explain the position to you fairly fully so that you might deal with it on the lines indicated above.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To Maharaja of Bhutan<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9th May 1954

My dear Maharaja Saheb,

Thank you for your letter of the 28th March.<sup>2</sup> I am sorry for the delay in answering it. As a matter of fact it took some time to reach me and then I had to go away from Delhi. Also I wanted to make further enquiries about the matter referred to in your letter.

As a matter of fact, information had reached us at an early stage about these troubles on your border territory. The moment we heard about this, we immediately got in touch with the Governments of Assam<sup>3</sup> and West Bengal and

1. JN Collection.
2. Druk Gyalpo, the Maharaja of Bhutan, reported about Nepali people gathering in Indian territory for incursions into Bhutan to create disturbances and added that since Indian territory was being used, it was the responsibility of the Government of India to control the situation.
3. On 21 March 1954. See *ante*, pp. 463-465. Medhi on 3 April informed Nehru that the Bhutan State Congress leaders on being contacted informed that they were sending a delegation to Nehru and that no satyagraha would take place before their return. He also stated that Bhutan State Congress office at Senalpara near the border had been closed and the Nepali Congress leaders had left the area.

also our Political Officer in Sikkim.<sup>4</sup> We told them that Indian territory should not be allowed to be used for any aggressive movement, even though peaceful, against Bhutan. Our officers carried out our instructions in this matter. Your Government must know this fully and in fact we have received letters from officials of your Government thanking the Government of India for the action we took. The agitation subsided then, chiefly, because of the action we had taken.

You will appreciate however that we have to function in terms of our Constitution and the Fundamental Rights guaranteed therein. We allow a large liberty even for agitations against our own Government. Opposition parties can function and are represented in Parliament. They can arrange demonstrations against Government. They write in condemnation of our Government in newspapers and deliver strong speeches. It is only when there is violence or threat to violence that we wish to interfere. That is the policy of our Government in consonance of our Constitution. Apart from this, our Supreme Court is anxious to protect the freedom of action of our people and judges governmental action strictly.

I am pointing this out to you to indicate the limits within which we can function. Normally, any peaceful action is permitted, although it may be very much against our Government. We are, therefore, put in some difficulty in dealing with agitations if they continue to be peaceful. We had to keep this factor in mind when dealing with the agitation on the Bhutan border to which you refer.

In a letter which we received through our Political Officer in Sikkim, Shri Jigme Dorji<sup>5</sup> had suggested that "security proceedings" might be instituted by us against some of the office bearers of the Bhutan State Congress. I very much doubt if this would be in consonance with our Constitution, because our Government's legal powers in such matters are strictly limited and if we go beyond them, they will be challenged in our courts. As I have said above, it is only in case of violence and threat to violence that we can take such security proceedings. Apart from this, it is doubtful if any such proceedings will be wise at this stage. Any penal action that we might take against some persons of the Bhutan State Congress would be criticised by many people in India and might serve as an irritant. The agitation has now subsided and it is best to leave matters there.

Such agitations, if they exceed constitutional limits, have necessarily to be dealt with by the Government. But we know from long experience in India that the way to deal with such agitation merely by law and order methods is not enough. We have to find out the causes of discontent as well as legitimate grievances and seek to remove them so that all sections of the

4. B.K. Kapur.

5. The Prime Minister of Bhutan.



population might feel that they are being treated equally and with justice by the authorities.

You are no doubt fully aware of the trend of world affairs and how major changes have taken place in various parts of the world as well as in Asia. No one can put a stop to these ideas and the desire of people everywhere to have a larger measure of freedom as well as an advance on the path to democracy. These ideas will no doubt reach Bhutan and it is a wise policy not to wait for pressure from outside in order to remove any legitimate grievance.

So far as we are concerned, we shall do everything in our power, within the limits of our Constitution and policy, to prevent any trouble to Bhutan from Indian territory. You can rest assured about that. But the real remedy rests with Your Highness' Government and not with the Government of India.

I am glad you wrote to me on this subject. I hope that you will not hesitate to write to me whenever you feel like it.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## VII. CHINA AND TIBET

### 1. Cable to N. Raghavan<sup>1</sup>

1. As you know, very grave situation has arisen because of new policy enunciated by Dulles.<sup>2</sup> We are much concerned about this and after few days I intend making a full statement.

1. New Delhi, 16 April 1954. *Agreement between India and China on Trade and Intercourse between India and Tibet Region of China*, 1954, Government of India, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Dulles, said in Washington on 10 April 1954 that he was going to Europe to seek British and French cooperation in forming a united front that could end the communist threat to South East Asia and he would try to persuade Britain and France to join the front before the Far East Conference in Geneva on 26 April. He also said that communist threat in Indo-China was not a limited one but extended to vital interest of nations in South East Asia including the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

2. If Indo-Chinese agreement on Tibet<sup>3</sup> is signed and announced soon, it will have salutary effect. If however this is postponed indefinitely, this will have contrary effect. Unless this agreement is finalised and signed before Chinese Delegation goes to Geneva these talks will inevitably have to be postponed indefinitely. We cannot have our men sitting in Peking hoping for something to happen. They have stayed there much too long already. We shall then have to fix some distant date, probably in Delhi, for future resumption of talks. This will create impression of failure which will not be good.

3. I suggest you point all this out to Chinese Government and say definitely that our men who have gone from Delhi will have to return here before Geneva Conference begins.

4. Personal. Please inform Kaul<sup>4</sup> that I appreciate his message to me. In view of early ending of Tibet talks either way, he can stay till then and return here immediately afterwards to report.

3. Negotiations between India and the People's Republic of China on the relations between India and Tibet opened in Beijing on 31 December 1953.
4. T.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary and the Controller General of Emigration, MEA, was in Beijing as a member of the Indian delegation negotiating with the Chinese officials on relations between India and Tibet.

## 2. Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet<sup>1</sup>


The Agreement between India and China on Tibet<sup>2</sup> should be communicated formally to the Commonwealth countries. With that Agreement there should be a note mentioning our old connection with Tibet and the necessity that arose to make fresh adjustments in view of the recent changes in Tibet. Petty difficulties

1. Note to the Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, Colombo, 2 May 1954. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. The preamble to the Agreement, concluded in Beijing on 29 April 1954, stated that it was based on the principles of "mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence" and that it was intended to promote trade and cultural intercourse between "the Tibet region of China" and India. The Agreement provided for establishment of trade agencies by China in India and by India in Tibet and visits by traders and pilgrims of both countries. It also provided for the lapse of certain rights and privileges previously exercised in Tibet by the Government of India.





WITH JOHN KOTELAWALA AT COLOMBO AIRPORT. 27 APRIL 1954



WITH U NU, JOHN KOTELAWALA, ALI SASTROAMIDIOJO AND MOHAMMAD ALI, KANDY, 2 MAY 1954



were cropping up in regard to trade, pilgrimage and other matters. These talks between the two Governments were, therefore, suggested by the Government of India and accepted by the Government of China after prolonged discussions in Peking between the representatives of the two Governments. The Agreement was signed. This Agreement not only settles these various points in regard to Tibet which have been troubling us during the last two years or so, but also, we hope will have a stabilising effect over this region, as well as, we think, to some extent, in Asian affairs....

### 3. Future Negotiations with China<sup>1</sup>

There are certain points in this preliminary report of Shri T.N. Kaul, which deserve notice:

- (1) Undoubtedly we should have any future negotiations with the Peking Government in Delhi and not in Peking. I take it, however, that this does not apply to the negotiations regarding handing over the P&T, rest houses, and withdrawal of escorts, etc., which, it has been agreed, will be held between our Embassy in Peking and the Chinese Foreign Office.<sup>2</sup>
- (2) So far as the withdrawal of escorts is concerned, I do not know what negotiations are necessary. The sooner they are withdrawn, the better. We should remind Defence about it so that they can make arrangements accordingly.

1. Note to the Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, 12 May 1954. *India-China Relations 1947-1954*, Historical Division, MEA, File Nos. 12/86/NGO/54 and 12/88/NGO/54. Also available in *Agreement between India and China on Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet region of China 1954*, Government of India, MEA and JN Collection.
2. In the text of notes exchanged between the Delegations of India and China and published with the Agreement, it was agreed that the Government of India would withdraw within six months the military escort stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet and it would hand over to China at reasonable price the post and telegraph and public telephone services operated in Tibet by India and the twelve rest houses of India in Tibet; concrete measures in this regard would be decided upon through further negotiations between Indian Embassy in China and Foreign Ministry of China.

- (3) I agree that adequate publicity has not been given in India to the fact of our having signed this international Agreement in Hindi as a principal and equal language with the other two. Our Public Relations Officer might put out some note about this specially.
- (4) I agree also that we should establish checkposts at all disputed points, wherever they might be, and our administration should be right up to these borders. This matter has been delayed and we should try to expedite it. Thus, the UP Government has written to us frequently about their problems in the Tibet border and, more especially, about the development of communications to that frontier. We should find out how matters stand and try to do something to expedite decisions and action.
- (5) As regards a trade agreement with China, I think that we should wait for the initiative of China. Further, that talks, when they take place, should be in Delhi.
- (6) As regards a regular non-aggression pact with China,<sup>3</sup> I do not think we should take any step in this direction. The present Agreement goes half way at least towards a non-aggression pact and that is quite enough.
- (7) I see no immediate possibility of my going to China.<sup>4</sup> That will have to wait for sometime. When I feel that it is the right time, I shall certainly go there. We need not take the initiative in this matter.
- (8) I rather like the idea of Mr Chou En-lai being invited to go *via* India from Geneva to China.<sup>5</sup> We need not formally invite him. but it might be worthwhile to make this suggestion to him. Perhaps Krishna Menon could do this informally, when he sees him in Geneva.

In the event of there being any possibility of Chou En-lai passing through India, we should certainly inform the Burmese Prime Minister of this. I am not sure about the desirability of having tripartite talks. That would give the visit a formal shape.

3. Kaul had mentioned that informal feelers were thrown by the Chinese during negotiations regarding desirability of a non-aggression pact.
4. Kaul had written that the Chinese Government were keen on a visit by Nehru to China.
5. Kaul had suggested to informally sound Chou En-lai whether he would like to visit India on his way back from Geneva Conference.



## VIII. MYANMAR

1. To U Nu<sup>1</sup>

Camp: Allahabad  
2nd February 1954

My dear U Nu,

U Win<sup>2</sup> handed to me your letter of the 24th January three or four days ago in Delhi.<sup>3</sup> I am now in Allahabad and shall be going to Travancore-Cochin in the South day after tomorrow.

U Win and Raschid<sup>4</sup> have had long talks with me, our Finance Minister as well as our Food Minister. As a result of this, they have, I believe, sent you some suggestions which have been made on our behalf by our Finance Minister. Your reply had not come when I left Delhi. I earnestly hope that you will agree to this approach. It may be possible to make some minor variations.

It has been a matter of very great distress to me that you should have been put to some difficulty because of this rice deal with India. We all know that you have often gone out of your way to show your friendship for India and it has been and is our firm policy to consider Burma not only as our close neighbour but as our close friend. Indeed, Burma has occupied a very special place in our minds, nearer than that of any other country. So far as you are concerned, it has been my privilege to have your friendship and confidence and I have valued these highly.

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to K.K. Chettur, Ambassador of India in Myanmar.
2. U Win (b. 1916), Myanmarese politician, joined Army in 1940 and during World War II participated in resistance movement of Anti-Fascist Organisation; Minister for Industry and Labour in 1947 and of Transport and Communications in 1949 and later for Port, Marine, Civil Aviation and Coastal Shipping; President of the Union of Burma, 1957-62; detained after military coup, 1962-67.
3. U Nu had written that his proposal for both the questions of debt and rice would be explained by U Win and Raschid to Nehru. Regarding the proposed conference of South East Asian Prime Ministers, U Nu had said that such a conference would attract much attention in Asia, Europe and America.
4. M.A., Raschid, (b. 1912), Myanmarese politician; active in trade union movement in pre-Second World War period, Minister in Myanmar Government, 1952-58 and 1960-62; detained after military coup, 1962-68. At this time he was Minister for Trade Development and Labour.

By some untoward occurrences, some impression appears to have been created in Burma that we want to overreach your Government and to create conditions which may prove harmful to Burma. We all know how vital is the question of the rice trade to Burma and how her prosperity depends upon it. For us to think of doing anything which might affect adversely this trade of Burma, or any other interest of Burma, is unthinkable.

We have put up a brave show before the world during the last few years, but this has been a very hard time for us and we have struggled to face the numerous difficulties which might well have overwhelmed us. The greatest of these difficulties was the lack of enough foodstuff. Because of this, we diverted all our energies to the production of more foodgrains. Fortunately for us, our efforts began to bear fruit early in 1953. We were also helped by a favourable monsoon. In particular our rice production increased beyond expectation, chiefly because of the new method of Japanese cultivation that we introduced. The situation thus was continuously improving for us throughout 1953.

In addition to practical difficulties, we had to face a psychology of scarcity, resulting in a tendency to hoard. We had to meet this by a psychological approach, in addition to our practical steps. We wanted to prevent hoarding and to make hoarders feel that it would not pay them to hoard. Hence statements were often made by our Food Minister about our rice position improving, as indeed it was. The price of foodgrains, including rice was continuously going down. The situation today, therefore, is that we have more than enough rice to meet our ration requirements and the price has gone down considerably. We would like to store rice for the future and we could also, to some extent, replace wheat by rice. These are not immediate needs but a provision for the future.

As you know, we are trying to implement our Five Year Plan. This has been a great burden on us because of our resources being limited. In spite of this and because of the vast unemployment in the country, we decided to increase our investment in public works etc. This was a risky move but we decided to take it even though this is going to lead to very big deficit in our budget this year. This deficit might well run into some hundreds of crores, I do not know exactly what it is going to be. In the balance, however, we preferred this deficit financing to a more cautious approach. We shall have to put on additional taxes this year.

This has been our background.

I should like to make clear one or two other matters. Apparently a person named Mubarak Mazdur<sup>5</sup> has been indulging in tall talk in Burma as if he

5. He was an importer of rice from Myanmar.



represented me or our Food Minister. This man is completely irresponsible and unreliable and we have no dealings with him at all. Because he went to prison with us some twenty years ago he exploits this fact. It is quite possible that he might have created wrong impressions in Burma. We are in no way responsible for what he might say.

Then there is the firm of P.C. Ray.<sup>6</sup> I know nothing about them, but I am told they have got a big concern in Calcutta. These people came to our Food Minister and offered to supply Burma rice. They were told that we dealt with the Burma Government directly, but, if the Burma Government gave them permission to function as their agents, we would consider this matter. It was for the Burma Government to decide. We informed our Ambassador accordingly and I think I mentioned this to you also in a previous message. As I have said above, I know nothing about P.C. Ray. and so far as we were concerned, we left it to the Burma Government to decide.

There is another small matter. The Government of Travancore-Cochin asked us to replace 30,000 tons of rice, which we were sending them, with par boiled rice from Burma, which they said they would prefer, Travancore-Cochin is just next to Ceylon and our Food Ministry asked Ceylon to exchange our rice with 30,000 tons of Burma rice to oblige the State of Travancore-Cochin. This was a matter of pure exchange and no payment was to be made.

I am mentioning all this relatively small matters to clear up any misunderstanding that might have arisen.

The position now is, if I may state it quite frankly and concisely to you, that we have no desire at all to continue any part of the debt Burma owes us.<sup>7</sup> We would gladly write it off completely. But we have to consider two matters. One is that we should be able to put forward some logical case before the people and Parliament, and, secondly, and this is more important, we want to avoid any unfavourable reaction on our talks with Pakistan about their debt<sup>8</sup> to us. This amounts to about Rs.300 crores. It is a recent debt due to the Partition. We have taken the burden of paying Pakistan's liabilities and hence this debt.

6. A company engaged in importing rice from Myanmar.

7. The financial settlement of 1939 fixed the debt of Myanmar to India, which arose out of her separation in 1937, at Rs. 49.73 crores, repayable in 45 annual instalments of Rs. 2.25 crores each. The Government of Myanmar by 1942 had paid only a part of it and by December 1952 the debt due was Rs. 72,00,00,000.

8. The exact amount of Pakistan's Partition debt to India had not yet been settled at this time due to difference of estimates of the two countries. Although the debt was repayable in 50 annual equated instalments of principal and interest, commencing on 15 August 1952, Pakistan had not made any payment till this time.

Our position vis-a-vis Pakistan in regard to this matter, would weaken very greatly if we wrote off the Burma debt completely. Our position in regard to Afghanistan and Nepal would also be affected as both those countries owe us money.

The second point which is important for us is that we should take no step which might lead to our having to put on more taxation, that is, in addition to what we are going to put on. It would be exceedingly difficult to get our Parliament and people to agree to such additional taxation, unless we could justify it absolutely. If we suffered a loss of considerable sum of money in hard cash over a rice deal, that would be translated into taxation. Keeping in mind all these factors, we would be prepared to go to any length to meet Burma's difficulties and special position. Our proposals are as a result of this.

I have no figures with me at present and write from memory. In effect our proposals were that we should buy 600,000 tons of rice from Burma at £ 50 per ton but that the actual cash payment should be at the rate of £ 35 per ton or there about and the rest should go towards liquidation of the debt. That debt would be reduced by half by our writing it off etc. It would then stand round about Rs. 32 crores. If this excess from the rice purchase was transferred to the debt account, that would reduce it to round about Rs. 16 crores.

We do not want you to pay us anything even in regard to this 16 crores but, in order to find a suitable way of placing this before our Parliament, we suggested that the annual payments for the next five years might be treated as our contribution to Burma's development under the Colombo Plan. That would have left about Rs. 11 crore. It is possible that the sum might even be lesser if you could give us some indication of the damage suffered by you on capital assets on accounts of the war.

Anyhow, we do not want any further payment of this. Only it is a little difficult to say now that the Colombo Plan would go on till ten or fifteen years. Hence for the present, we limit it to five.

All this really means that, after the rice transaction, as I have mentioned above, the debt ceases to have any relevance. This is, I believe, more or less what you suggested, though there is some slight difference. That difference is not factual but rather in the way we put it so as to meet our Parliament as well as Pakistan. I do hope that you will appreciate that we are anxious to do our utmost to meet your viewpoint.

I am glad you have agreed to go to Colombo for the Prime Ministers' Conference which Sir John Kotelawala has suggested. I believe he wants us to meet on the 28th April. I understand that the journey from Rangoon to Colombo by air is rather complicated. I would suggest to you that you might come to Delhi and then we could go together in a special plane to Colombo. Probably this will save your time, and anyway it would be much convenient.



Should you have an extra day to spare, we could stop *en route* to see the Ajanta and Ellora caves.

With all good wishes,

Yours very sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
5th March 1954

My dear Ananthasayanam,<sup>2</sup>

I have received the letter sent by you and a number of other MPs about the Land Nationalisation Bill in Burma.<sup>3</sup> I am afraid I just cannot find the time tomorrow to meet you on this subject because I am absolutely full up tomorrow. The day after I am going away to Madhya Bharat for two and a half days.

But I need not tell you that we are doing everything we can about this matter. We are naturally interested in this Bill and realise its consequences. We have spoken here to the Burmese Ministers fully. This question has been studied very carefully and some time ago a delegation went to Burma.<sup>4</sup> We shall continue our efforts. But it must be remembered that we are dealing with an independent Government and we cannot force it to do anything against its will....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts. A copy of this letter was sent to the Commonwealth Secretary.
2. He was Deputy Speaker of the House of the People.
3. M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, R. Venkataraman, K. Raghuramaiah, C. Narasimhan and B. Ramachandra Reddy submitted a memorandum to Nehru urging the Government of India to make a strong representation to the Myanmar Government to pay the Indian landowners in Myanmar affected by the Land Nationalisation Bill reasonable compensation. The Bill, which was before a select committee at this time, proposed compensation beginning with twelve times the land revenue of the first one hundred acres and progressively reducing to an amount equivalent to the land revenue in the case of holdings of 1,100 acres. As most of the landowners possessing above 1,100 acres were Indians, the Bill would affect them most.
4. In December 1953 one unofficial delegation led by K.K. Chettur. Indian Ambassador in Myanmar, pleaded before the Myanmar Government for more compensation to the Indian landowners.

### 3. To N. Raghavan<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9th May 1954

My dear Raghavan,

I have sent you a telegram last night<sup>2</sup> about the Burmese reactions to Chinese policies and have suggested that you might informally explain this position to the Chinese Government. Chou En-lai is not in Peking and not likely to return for some time.<sup>3</sup> The matter is urgent and, therefore, it is desirable that you should speak to other responsible authorities there. No doubt you would have done this by the time this letter reaches you. Nevertheless I am writing this. In dealing with the authorities there in this matter, you should of course be informal and as tactful as possible and explain to them that we are bringing this matter to their notice because of our friendly relations and because of its great importance in the context of South East Asia.

2. It is clear that any marked change in Burma's policy will have a powerful effect on the politics of South East Asia. It would practically lead to Burma ceasing to be a part of the nonalignment area. Burma may not definitely join any bloc. I do not think she will. But her weight might well be cast in favour of a bloc and that would have a powerful effect on other countries round about. Hence the importance of this both from India's point of view and China's, and most of all, from the point of view of peace in South East Asia.

3. Burma has stoutly maintained her position as a country which refused to be aligned to any bloc. In fact, Burma went much further in the past and actually gave active help to Ho Chi Minh. This was, I think, in 1948.<sup>4</sup> As you know, we have kept apart from this Indo-China conflict. Burma further refused technical aid from the US a year or so ago.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, no one can say that Burma has acted weakly in these matters.

4. Why then should Burma feel disgruntled at Chinese policies and begin to look away? This is largely conditioned by national policies and internal problems. They have still a petty communist revolt going on, which is

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to the Secretary General and the Foreign Secretary.
2. Not printed.
3. Chou En-lai was attending the Geneva Conference at this time.
4. U Nu in his autobiography had written "Burma could not remain unmoved when in a neighbouring country nationalism found itself pitted against imperialism... and had given what it could for the relief of the Vietnamese."
5. On 30 June 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, p. 331.



troublesome. For anyone in China, even though they are so-called non-governmental organisations, like the trade unions etc., to give any encouragement to this communist revolt in Burma, is naturally a matter which must irritate the Burmese very much. The Burmese Government says that the Chinese attitude has been strictly correct as a Government. But in China the Government and other agencies are intimately connected and if other agencies send messages of encouragement to the rebels in Burma, it is clear that the Burmese Government and people will think that the Chinese Government is in favour of this action. If the Chinese Government or any organisation in China sends such messages to any rebel in India, we would take the strongest exception and our relations would be grievously affected.

5. Then, within Burma itself, there are a large number of Chinese and many of them are communists. If those communist Chinese there go on encouraging the Burmese communist rebels and generally embarrassing the Government, the result would again be an estrangement of relations between Burma and China. The Burmese feel that even the recent trade treaty with China<sup>6</sup> has been utilised by the Chinese to encourage Burmese communists in Rangoon and elsewhere.

6. The general feeling in Burma is that the Peking Government treats them in a very casual and cavalier way. The Burmese are a proud people and easily react to such treatment.

7. The recent development in Indo-China<sup>7</sup> and more especially, the invasion of Laos and Cambodia<sup>8</sup> by Ho Chi Minh, supported no doubt by the Chinese, has also affected the Burmese powerfully and brought the war much nearer to them. Their own security is threatened.

8. These are some of the reasons which are influencing Burmese political opinion. U Nu is, on the whole, trying to resist this trend, but U Nu's party, the AFPFL, is beginning to go in this new direction. Hence the urgency and importance of this matter.

9. I hope that you will explain this situation to the Chinese Government as fully as possible, but at the same time, in a friendly and tactful way. I am sure they will realise that even an indifference on their part to this new development is likely to have far-reaching results. It is really for the Chinese Government to

6. A three year trade agreement between Myanmar and the People's Republic of China was signed in Rangoon on 22 April 1954.

7. The French Union Forces of Dien Bien Phu fort, in northwest Tongking, fell to Viet Minh forces on 7 May after a siege lasting eight weeks.

8. In April 1954.

do something which creates a feeling of assurance and security and friendliness among the Burmese. Burma has no desire to align herself with any power bloc. But it would be a great pity if circumstances compelled her to do so.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 4. To K.K. Chettur<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9th May 1954

My dear Chettur,

I have seen your letter of the 27th April addressed to N.R. Pillai. I wrote to you briefly on the 2nd May from Colombo. In my letter, I indicated that U Nu wanted me to write directly to Chou En-lai.<sup>2</sup> I had asked U Nu to send me some facts to enable me to write to Chou En-lai.

I have not received anything from U Nu, but, in view of those developments, I have, in fact, sent a message to Raghavan<sup>3</sup> in Peking to be conveyed immediately to the Chinese Government. Chou En-lai, of course, is not in Peking and is not likely to return for some considerable time.

I can well understand a certain irritation in Burma at various aspects of the Chinese policy. But the analysis of a senior official of the Government of Burma, which you quote in your letter, seems to me rather overdone and unbalanced. I am convinced that if they shift over in their policy in this way, they will land themselves in greater difficulties.

That would mean, of course, the abandonment by Burma of the policy of nonalignment, while Burma and India and some other countries like Indonesia have consistently followed this path. That is a serious matter affecting all of us but, most of all, Burma itself.

The recent Agreement between India and China in regard to Tibet<sup>4</sup> and,

1. JN Collection. Copies of the letter were sent to the Secretary General and the Foreign Secretary.
2. U Nu wanted Nehru to write to Chou En-lai about certain anti-Myanmar activities perpetrated by China.
3. See the preceding item.
4. See *ante*, p. 468, fn-2.



more especially, the Preamble to it, has laid down certain principles which, I think, are excellent. These are recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty, non aggression, non interference, internal or other, in the other country, etc. If these principles are applied in our relations with various countries, then some of the fears and apprehensions that exist today would disappear. I was hoping for the application of these principles as between Burma and China especially. If they were so applied and sincerely acted up to, many of the points that the senior Burmese official raised in his talk with you will cease to have any significance.

In the final analysis, no country has any deep faith in the policies of another country, more especially in regard to a country which tends to expand. Obviously we cannot be dead sure of what China may do in the future. But whatever its urges might be, we can, by our policy, strengthen our own position and even curb to some extent undesirable urges in the other country. At present the conflict of the two great power blocs exhibits these urges for expansion or of fear of each other. China and the Soviet Union hang together, and yet, in some ways, they pull in different directions. There is, for obvious reasons, a strong desire for peace both in the Soviet Union and China. These reasons may be wholly opportunist, but the fact of their avoidance of a major war is universally admitted. If that is so, that gives us plenty of room for action in favour of peace and protecting our respective countries. Unfortunately, in regard to the USA, one cannot say that there is this urge for avoidance of war, whatever the reasons may be. Hence the grave danger.

You will have seen that we were very near to a wide extension of the Indo-China war only two weeks or so ago when Eden had to rush up to London to consult Churchill.<sup>5</sup> It was Britain's attitude which held back the US. The UK, in fact, has been trying to play a mediatory role to some extent because the consequences of a big scale war are terrible for all countries. The point is whether we, i.e., the countries of Asia, like India, Burma and Indonesia especially, are going to play a mediatory role or not. If not, then the chances of a big scale war become inevitable and Burma is likely to be one of the chief sufferers in this region.

5. On 24 April 1954 Anthony Eden, while conferring with J.F. Dulles and the French Foreign Minister, G. Bidault in Paris was confronted with a proposal from Dulles that USA was prepared, if France and the other allies so desired, to move armed forces into Indo-China and thus internationalize the struggle and protect South Asia. In order to take a decision on the proposal Eden rushed to London on the same night to consult the British Prime Minister.

I think, therefore, that any vital change in Burma's foreign policy, as hinted at by you, is of the gravest consequence to Asia as well as to the possibility of extension of war. I believe that Burma is in a position not only to protect herself, but to influence the cause of peace, provided she keeps apart from any alignment and has an independent policy in favour of peace and her own protection. In this matter, it is possible that we can be of some help and certainly the recent Agreement between India and China over Tibet is an obvious indication of the way we can go. This might well apply to Burma also. It is because of this that I have sent a message through Raghavan to the Chinese Government.

I have indicated broadly our viewpoint in these matters. You can discuss this informally with the Burma Government. In particular, if you have the chance, you should speak to U Nu on the subject and tell him that while I am waiting for the note he promised me, I have already taken steps according to his wishes and addressed the Chinese Government.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. To U Nu<sup>1</sup>

The Retreat  
Mashobra, Simla  
29th May 1954

My dear U Nu,

Our Ambassador in Rangoon has written to me about a conversation he had with you, when he told you about our message to Chou En-lai. You said then that it was difficult to rely upon any assurance that might be given by the Chinese Government. I agree that there is some force in that, both because governments may change their minds and because a communist government especially functions often in a peculiar way.

It is not really a question of placing implicit reliance on the word of a government, but rather of judging circumstances and taking action accordingly. If we function correctly, then even a lapse on the part of the other party,

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to K.K. Chettur.



regrettable as it would be, cannot injure us very much. In the present circumstances, I think that it is to the advantage of the Chinese Government to be friendly to India, Burma and Indonesia. It is to our advantage to be friendly with them, subject always to protecting our interests. This being the position, it would undoubtedly be helpful for the Chinese Government to be made to realise that some activities of the Chinese are objected to by us and that they should stop them. Also, generally that we object to any interference, direct or indirect, in our internal affairs, as stated by the Colombo Conference.

This approach can be made in a friendly way or in a hostile way. It seems to me that it is obviously better to make it in a friendly way. That again does not mean that in case of the Chinese Government giving us assurances, we can rely upon them absolutely to keep them, but it will be a check on them and helpful to us as circumstances develop.

Our policy, that is, the policy of Burma and India as well as of Indonesia, is what is called the neutral policy as between the two power blocs. I do not like the word, "neutral", because it is rather passive. Our policy is dynamic, in a way in favour of peace and peaceful settlements. It is becoming increasingly clear that, even though we have no military power or financial strength, we can make a difference, provided we maintain our nonalignment and independent policy.

The proceedings of the Geneva Conference have brought out, rather vividly, the different viewpoints of the great powers concerned. In the final analysis, the UK is anxious for peace. The Soviet Union would also like peace. China would, I think, like peace, but is more rigid. The USA appears to be almost anxious not to have a settlement in Indo-China. In fact, there has been much difference of opinion in approach as between the UK and the USA. I have no doubt that finally the two will pull together. But there are limits beyond which the UK will not go and public opinion in England is strong on it. That is natural because a war would be absolutely disastrous for the UK, whatever the result might be for the other countries.

In this conflict of ideas and approaches, we would naturally like to give our moral support to the efforts being made by the UK at Geneva in favour of a settlement. I do not mean that we need agree to any particular plan or details, but that we should adopt a helpful attitude to any country working for a real settlement, and the UK appears to us to be aiming at that, more especially when the UK is somewhat isolated from its allies, viz. USA and France, and has to play a different game.

The USA apparently can only think in terms of war or threat of war and massive retaliation. It is clear that there can be no settlement on that basis because both the political and military situation does not fit in with that.

I am sending you some of my ideas on the present situation as, naturally,

I am much concerned. The next week or two may see serious developments in Geneva and we have to be wide awake.

I am writing to you from the mountains where I have come for five days. I am returning to Delhi tomorrow.

Yours very sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## IX. SRI LANKA

### 1. To C.C. Desai<sup>1</sup>

Camp: Quilon  
8th February 1954

My dear C.C.,<sup>2</sup>

I had over an hour's talk with the Ceylon Indian Congress people at about midnight yesterday.<sup>3</sup> I was terribly tired and, in fact, this last night's effort upset me today as it shortened my hours of rest.<sup>4</sup>

Briefly I told them that we would, of course, stick to our Agreement<sup>5</sup> and that I did not think it right that we should, take the initiative in demanding explanations etc. Of course, informally we could ask them. If the Ceylon Government put forward some interpretation which was obviously unacceptable to us, we tell them so. It mattered little whether we tell them before the so-called ratification or after. If there was a major difference on an important issue, that would naturally affect the whole Agreement. The Ceylon people appeared to be most anxious about one thing and that is, facilities to visit India for those who, for the present, might be considered stateless. I told them that

1. JN Collection.

2. C.C. Desai was India's High Commissioner in Sri Lanka.

3. A delegation of the Ceylon Indian Congress consisting of S. Thondaman, A Aziz, K. Rajalingam, K.G. Nair and S. Somasundaram met Nehru at Thiruvananthapuram to seek clarifications of the terms of the Indo-Ceylon Agreement on citizenship.

4. Nehru was on an election tour of Travancore-Cochin from 4 to 9 February covering about 700 miles.

5. Signed on 18 January 1954. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, p. 615, fn. 5.



they could discuss the matter and press for it from the other side. For the rest, they should not reject the Agreement.

I find that they have said something to the press.<sup>6</sup> I wish they had not done so. If you see them, you might tell them that this dragging my name into the press does not help at all.

I saw the two Ceylon newspapermen this morning for a few minutes.

I see that you have been suggesting to hold a party to celebrate the occasion. I think this is not called for in view of all the circumstances.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. The Ceylon Indian Congress delegation told *The Hindu* that the matters discussed by them with Nehru were: (1) the Resolution of the Ceylon Indian Congress seeking clarification of the Nehru-Kotelawala Agreement; (2) apprehension that legitimate residents might be excluded from the "Adult Register"; (3) separate electorate emphasizing segregation and restricting the right of the registered citizen; (4) large numbers of the stateless persons and discrimination against them; (5) large-scale rejection of applications for citizenship particularly in the recent months; (6) the possibility of the terms of Agreement being so interpreted as to defeat the spirit of it, and finally (7) the fear that disguised compulsory repatriation might be resorted to.

## 2. To Lanka Sundaram<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21st February 1954

Dear Dr Lanka Sundaram,<sup>2</sup>

...Your letter referred to the Indo-Ceylon Agreement. This Agreement is quite simple and so far as we are concerned, there is no question of interpreting it in any special way. It is true that the Ceylon Prime Minister, at one time, made some statements which led to this misunderstanding.<sup>3</sup> So far as we are concerned,

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Satya Narayan Sinha, Minister of Parliamentary Affairs. Extracts.
2. He was a member of the House of the People at this time.
3. Kotelawala soon after his return from Delhi to Colombo on 21 January and subsequently during a debate in the Sri Lanka Parliament stated that in future the persons of Indian origin whose nationality was in doubt on account of their application for citizenship being pending would not be allowed to go to India unless they were in possession of Indian or Sri Lankan passports, meaning thereby, that if a stateless person wanted to go to India, he would have to renounce his claim to Sri Lankan citizenship, seek Indian nationality and obtain an Indian passport.

we do not accept any interpretation which does not flow naturally from the Agreement.

References have been made to this Agreement in the discussion on the President's Address. I do not myself see what good purpose will be served by a full discussion in the House on this subject. It can of course be dealt with at a private meeting, at which some leading members of Parliament are present.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. On Citizenship Issue<sup>1</sup>

S.N. Mazumdar wanted to know whether the Government of India received any representations from the Indian organisations of Ceylon and if so what were the opinions expressed therein on Indo-Ceylon Agreement and whether any suggestions had been made for consideration of the Government.

Jawaharlal Nehru: A copy of a resolution passed by the Ceylon Indian Congress<sup>2</sup> was received by Government. A deputation from that organisation also met the Prime Minister recently at Trivandrum, and asked for elucidation of the recent Agreement arrived at between the Governments of Ceylon and India. The Prime Minister explained to them the limited nature of the Agreement which dealt with certain immediate aspects of the problem only and left the rest for further consultations between the two Prime Ministers.

S.N. Mazumdar asked whether the Ceylon Indian Congress had requested the Government of India not to ratify the Agreement.

JN: No Sir, that is not a fact.

1. Reply to questions in Parliament, 23 February 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, *Official Report*, 1954, Vol. VI, col. 713.
2. The Resolution passed on 24 January expressed disappointment over some of the terms of the Agreement which it was stated denied fundamental rights to the inhabitants of Indian origin and others were so vague and nebulous that they might be interpreted to create greater disabilities for the inhabitants of Indian origin.



S.N. Mazumdar asked whether the Government of India had received any representation from the Ceylon Indian labourers.

JN: I am not aware of it. I cannot say definitely whether such a thing has been received or not; but I am not personally aware of it.

S.N. Mazumdar wanted to know whether in this Agreement, the majority of these labourers would be deprived of all their democratic and civic rights for a period of ten years and left completely at the mercy of the British planters.

JN: No, Sir, this Agreement does not deprive any person of any right that he possesses. This Agreement does not decide the major question of those who are considered as stateless, those who have ceased to be citizens of India and about whose nationality in Ceylon there has been no decision by the Ceylon Government. That question as such has not been entered into or decided, but the area of those stateless persons is likely to be reduced by the process mentioned in this and their question will have to be dealt with separately.

S.N. Mazumdar wanted to know whether a labourer on loosing or changing his job was liable to compulsory repatriation.

JN: Offhand, I do not think he is. In regard to the matters mentioned in the Agreement, it is clearly laid down what is to be done. In regard to matters not mentioned, the existing practices continue. There is no going back or any disqualification added on.

S.N. Mazumdar wanted to know whether Nehru was aware of the recent statement of the Prime Minister of Ceylon that if a labourer lost his job or changed his job then he was likely to press this condition.

JN: It is rather difficult for me to deal with statements out of their context. So far as we are concerned, we are concerned with the Agreement that we have signed, not with some reference to that which may not be precise.

N. G. Ranga wanted to know whether the Government had taken into consideration the need for seeing to it that Indian workers employed in the estates were not thrown into unemployment or were not dismissed without any ostensible or satisfactory reason as otherwise they might come within the mischief of the terms of this Agreement.

JN: Whatever mischief there might be, it does not arise from this Agreement and it cannot arise. It is something apart from that which may be considered.

The honourable Member must remember that either these persons are nationals of Ceylon or nationals of India. If they are not nationals of India, then they may be either nationals of Ceylon or stateless persons. They or we, cannot have it both ways—ask for privileges for persons who are nationals of India and then claim that they are nationals of Ceylon. It has got to be decided one way or the other. If they are nationals of India, then we can claim such privileges as come to nationals of India; if they are not nationals of India then our right to interfere becomes very limited because they are not our nationals. But because this case has a long history behind it and in some cases opinions differ, that is to say, the Government of India holds one opinion and the Ceylon Government another, we are approaching it step by step and this is the first step. The major question is still to be considered.

H.P. Saksena wanted to know whether these stateless persons would get the citizenship of Ceylon if they apply to Ceylon Government for the same.

JN: If the honourable Member would read the Agreement and perhaps study the question, he would get to know the long history of it. A large number of people; hundreds and thousands, have applied; those applications are being considered, some are accepted and some are rejected and this process is to be expedited and finished within the next two years, so that we may know precisely how many have been accepted and how many have not been accepted.

P. Sundarayya wanted to know why for the people of Indian origin who had chosen to become Ceylon nationals and which fact was recognised by the Ceylon Government, the Government of India had agreed to the proposal of the Ceylon Government to keep these Ceylon nationals of Indian origin on a separate electoral register.

JN: Well, for the simple reason that, in the balance of things, taking everything into consideration, we thought that even this somewhat undesirable thing might be agreed to. It is not good; we have to agree to something which one does not like for a short period, and we agreed to it. As a matter of fact, even the Ceylon Indian Congress which is intimately concerned and which was naturally opposed to this, agreed to it in the balance of things.

P. Sundarayya asked if it was a question of the Ceylon nationals being entirely the concern of the Ceylon Government, why India should be a party to an agreement which Indians did not like. He also pointed out that Ceylon was not likely to accept any suggestion on matters of their own concern and hence India could have kept quite without signing the Agreement.



JN: The honourable Member's argument is valid to a considerable extent but, if one carries it to an extreme, it simply means. "Why should we say anything at all about the people of Indian origin settled there? They are none of our concern". It means that, carried to an extreme every country has a right to choose its nationals. If we as a people of the Government decide not to have one as our nationals, then no other country can force us. So, from that, it would flow that this question should be decided entirely by the Government of Ceylon. But we are concerned because of certain past history; all kinds of things have arisen and, therefore, we come into the picture in order to help settle the problem.

N. G. Ranga wanted to know whether the Government had given instructions to Indian High Commissioner to render any assistance by way of advice or anything like that to people of Indian origin when their applications for registration came for decision by the concerned authorities in Ceylon.

JN: The Ceylon Indian Congress is a well-organised body with a very large membership and they are fully competent to give advice to its Members. Normally speaking, our High Commissioner does not go about giving advice to a people who are not Indian nationals. But then in this particular case, as the Government of India is concerned, the High Commissioner comes into the picture from time to time. Now, as honourable Members will remember, it has been suggested in this Agreement that a register of all people of Indian descent should be made—this includes all those stateless people and others—in order to find out if any illegal immigrant has come, which will be decided by the courts later. Now, in such a case, it has been mentioned in the Agreement that although it is the business entirely of the Ceylon Courts and the Ceylon Government, the Indian High Commissioner would be consulted to see that no injustice is done.

#### 4. To John Kotelawala<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

15th April 1954

My dear Prime Minister,

Reports have appeared in the press about certain decisions taken by the Government of Ceylon on the discontinuance of renewal of temporary residence

1. File No. C/53/1741/5, Vol. II, MEA.

permits and the stoppage of identity certificates issued to persons who have applied for Ceylon citizenship and whose applications are still pending.<sup>2</sup> I have heard from C.C. Desai that he has been in touch with your Government on these matters.<sup>3</sup>

I will be meeting you within ten days but I am writing to convey my anxiety, which I am sure you share, that we should do all we can to maintain and strengthen the atmosphere of goodwill and understanding created by our Agreement in January. Recent international developments have unfortunately heightened the tensions already in existence between various governments or groups of governments and I am sure you will agree that we should not, in the comparatively smaller problems we have to tackle in our limited fields, do anything to create suspicions or fears however ill-founded they may be.

In all matters connected with the implementation of our Agreement, you have always our High Commissioner at your service for any assistance or information your Government might desire, and I hope your officials will use this method of informal consultations instead of worrying whether consultation between the two Governments or Prime Ministers is or is not necessary under clause 8 of our Agreement.<sup>4</sup> This is apart from the question whether in a particular measure Ceylon Government contemplates it is of a type requiring such consultation under clause 8 of our Agreement.

I look forward to seeing you in Colombo on 27th.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. *The Hindu* had reported on 27 March that the Sri Lanka Government on 26 March had ordered the Controller of Immigration to suspend the renewal of residence permits to Indians immediately until the Cabinet Sub-committee completed deliberation on the Delhi Pact of 18 January 1954. On 28 March it was reported that the Sri Lanka Government on 26 March also suspended issue of identity certificates to persons of Indian origin whose citizenship applications were pending.
3. On 3 March Desai met Sri Lanka Prime Minister and emphasized that Sri Lanka's action could come under the purview of the Delhi Agreement of January 1954 and the Government of India normally had expected to be consulted prior to any unilateral action by Sri Lanka.
4. Clause 8 of the India-Ceylon Agreement of 18 January 1954 stated: "Both Prime Ministers are desirous of continuing the present practice of close consultation between the two Governments in matters affecting their mutual interests."



## X. USA

1. Increasing American Activities<sup>1</sup>

For some time past I have been receiving reports from various parts of the country about increasing activities of Americans. They function in various capacities. Apart from those officially connected with the Embassy and the Consulates, there is the large staff of the USIS. Then there are Technical Aid people, Community Centres, Leadership Programme, Fellowship Exchanges, professors, students, missionaries and the like.<sup>2</sup> I do not mean to say that all of them are functioning in India in an undesirable way. But it is clear that there is a widespread network of activity which is either directly or indirectly aimed at doing intelligence or propaganda work. Large sums of money are spent in various ways.<sup>3</sup> The press is affected. Some of our smaller political parties are helped.

2. In particular, many function in our border areas such as Nepal. Also in our universities, libraries are started.<sup>4</sup> So-called Research Centres are also organised. In one state an institute of public administration is being started under the auspices of the US Technical Aid Programme.<sup>5</sup> Questionnaires are issued for

1. Note to the Secretary General, New Delhi, 4 March 1954. Copies of this note were sent to the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary. JN Collection.
2. 26 American experts under UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, 89 American experts, under American Aid Programme (Point Four) 7 American experts under Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation programmes and 10 American farm boys under International Farm Youth Exchange Programme run by National 4-H Club Foundation of USA came to India and 40 American students were given grants for coming to India under US Educational Foundation (Fulbright Agreement).
3. Out of the total estimated expenditure of 164.8 million dollars for US programmes in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, India, Nepal and Pakistan for 1954, 50.0 million dollars were earmarked for India, out of which 1.5 was to be spent for economic assistance, 45.7 for technical assistance, 1.7 for information activities, 0.7 for exchange activities and 0.5 (all in million dollars) was for grants and exchanges to rehabilitate the educational system of India.
4. The USIA (United States Information Agency) was opening new reading rooms in four university cities at this time and decided to open these in six additional cities by 1 January 1955.
5. On 21 February 1954 it was announced in the press that the Lucknow University would open a Public Administration Centre with assistance of the Technical Cooperation Administration of the USA.

the collection of so-called economic, social and sometimes anthropological data.

3. In Nepal, American agents are particularly active<sup>6</sup> creating anti-Indian sentiments and pouring in money which is eagerly accepted by many people there. Groups in Nepal which are actively anti-Indian are encouraged and financed by them.

4. This was bad enough at any time, but in view of the new developments connected with the US military aid to Pakistan, this kind of widespread activity in India is particularly objectionable and, to some extent, dangerous. The activity of any foreign mission or any foreign element of this kind must be considered objectionable. If any communists from abroad indulge in it, we should try to stop it or at least to check it. So far as numbers are concerned, probably the number of Americans at present working in various fields is greatly in excess of any other foreigners, even people from the United Kingdom.

5. These Americans in India are lavish with their money and with entertainment. They invite large numbers of our officers and other citizens, entertain them and, more especially, offer them alcoholic drinks in large quantities. Many of our people who go there talk freely and even loosely.

6. Then there is the question of further Americans coming here and Indians going to America for various courses of study or as visitors.

7. I think that we should take stock of all this and then formulate our general policy to check these abuses. In order to collect all the available data, it would be desirable to appoint a special officer, a fairly senior one, and to put him in charge of this for the time being. He will work in cooperation with External Affairs and Home Ministries. He should collect data about all foreigners here. The more or less permanent residents might be kept a little apart. This will probably mean some British merchants, etc. We should have not only the numbers of all such people, but when they came, for how long, what their normal and professed activities are and what their abnormal and undesirable activities are?

8. Meanwhile, we should consider specially the various schemes under which Americans come here and Indians go to America.

9. All further visas for Americans coming here (apart from casual tourists) should be examined more strictly than before.

10. Secretary General, Cabinet Secretary and Home Secretary might consider this note and then suggest to me what steps should be taken.

6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 479-482.



## 2. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12th March 1954

My dear Krishna,

...Your note on US-Pakistan military aid<sup>2</sup> came after we had made a clear declaration on this subject which, as you would have noticed, was in line with what you have said.<sup>3</sup> The question now is about the UN Observers in Kashmir. We do not wish to hustle the UN Secretary General, but it is clear that after what has happened, we cannot accept the continuation of the US officers in Kashmir. This can be put as politely as possible to the Secretary General, but the situation must be made clear.

It has been clear for some time past that the new development in US-Pakistan relations is the culmination of a long-term effort and is a basic change of policy.

About economic aid from the US, I think we should proceed a little cautiously. There is the existing aid that is coming and there is the aid that might be offered in the future.<sup>4</sup> I think we should try to do without this and, more particularly, to avoid American personnel coming here. But we shall have to proceed with some caution in this matter as it will have many consequences.

So far as the military aspects are concerned, what you have suggested<sup>5</sup> appears to me to be completely beyond our capacity. For instance, to have a radar screen. This is not merely a question of money, although that is important. Money will have to be diverted from something else or from some other item of

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

2. Krishna Menon in his note of 27 February on US military aid to Pakistan had written that the act had destroyed any title to a neutral role for the US as between India and Pakistan. Hence the Secretary General of the UNO should be requested to withdraw all US personnel working in Kashmir under UNCIP and the Government should consider how American citizens working in technical and assistance programmes, capable of penetrating political, military or social lifelines of India could be removed.

3. See *ante*, pp. 335-343.

4. With a US contribution of \$54, 500, 000 for the fiscal year 1951-52, the appropriation of \$45, 400, 000 for 1952-53, brought the total amount allocated by the USA for the economic development of India to \$99, 900, 000. In the Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill passed in the US Senate and the House of Representatives on 19 August 1954, \$60, 500, 000 was allocated to India as economic aid for 1954-55.

5. Krishna Menon suggested a radar screen to protect whole of the frontier from northern Kashmir to Kutch and a frontier command for interception. He also suggested qualitative changes in the Army and Air Force, and an increase in the size of the Navy.

defence or civil expenditure. No radar network even in the United States is supposed to be really good enough for the purpose aimed at. An ineffective network is worse than useless. It produces a sense of false security. Then again, all these things depend on a certain industrial background which we do not possess. The whole defence apparatus goes wrong if some little thing is lacking which we cannot get. It is, therefore, far wiser to depend on other factors for defence.

These are brief reactions...

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

### 3. Exchange Schemes Between India and USA<sup>1</sup>

The attached papers give information about the various schemes under which people come from the United States to India and people are sent from India to the United States for some kind of training.<sup>2</sup> I think that we must revise these schemes considerably and consider how far we can limit them. We need not suddenly end them but we should certainly progressively limit them. It is quite possible that we might have to stop these schemes altogether in future. I should like, therefore, for the process to start soon so that the changeover might not be too big and too sudden.

2. I should like you, therefore, to examine these papers and suggest what steps we should take immediately or progressively. There are three considerations to be borne in mind:-

1. Note to the Secretary General, 14 April 1954. File No. 3(1)/54-PMS (F.A.), MEA. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Indian nationals went for training to the USA and American nationals came to India under a number of schemes of Technical Cooperation and Scholarships such as:- UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance; American aid programme (Point Four); Ford Foundation; Rockefeller Foundation; US Educational Foundation (Fulbright Agreement); Leader Specialists programme; Proceeds of interest paid by India to USA on wheat loan; Modified Overseas Scholarships Scheme; Central States Scholarships Scheme; International Farm Youth Exchange Programme; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund;



(1) Political developments which make it undesirable for us to send people to America or to receive their so-called experts.

(2) The fact that we have tended to attach too much importance to this training. I can understand that in some branches of technical training, we can derive profit. But, I am becoming more and more convinced that, generally speaking, the type of training that is given in America is not always suitable for India because the environment is so completely different. Wherever possible, it would be better to send our students or others to Europe for specialised training.

It seems to me quite absurd for Indians to go to the United States for social welfare training. Social conditions in America are so different from India that a person trained there becomes almost unfit for any solid work in India.

(3) In particular, we should aim at limiting American experts in India and we should not encourage them to come here except in very special cases like a high class engineer. An American who came here, I think, under the Leadership Programme,<sup>3</sup> told me quite frankly that he was surprised at the crowd of Americans he found here who posed as experts. They were very second-rate people and he often found better people in India even in those branches of knowledge. Anyone who came from abroad in this way immediately considered himself as an expert.

3. There are far too many Americans all over India and, in existing circumstances, this is not desirable. I think that, as suggested in the note attached, a confidential directive might immediately be issued to the ministries concerned to desist as far as possible from inviting American experts to India, except in very special cases.

4. The Fulbright Scheme<sup>4</sup> and the Leader Specialists Programme should, I think, be given up completely.

5. After you have considered this matter, we can discuss it and then perhaps we may put it up before the Cabinet.

3. The provisions of the USA Public Law enabled leaders of public opinion, both American and foreign, in fields like public welfare, labour, social services, arts, journalism and radio to visit each other's country for a period of 90 days.

4. The Fulbright (US Educational Foundation) scheme worked under the terms of agreement between the Governments of India and USA aiming at a wider exchange of knowledge and professional talents through educational contacts. The Foundation was governed by a board of Directors consisting of 5 nominees of the Government of India and 5 nominees of the USA Government with the US Ambassador in India as Chairman.

#### 4. Problems of Accepting American Economic Aid<sup>1</sup>

Mr Allen,<sup>2</sup> the U.S. Ambassador saw me this morning and was with me for about 45 minutes. He referred to the angry statements made by some US Senators expressing their strong resentment at India's refusal to allow US troops carriers to fly over India to Indo-China.<sup>3</sup> He said that this was the kind of thing he will have to meet on his return to the United States. He hoped, however, that he would be able to convince them that this was not the right attitude to adopt in regard to India, and that this opposition would fade away. He was convinced that the US should continue to give substantial aid to India's development without being influenced by India's external policy. This was necessary earlier, and it was even more necessary since the US had agreed to give military aid to Pakistan.

2. Mr Allen referred to some speeches made in Pakistan, notably to someone saying that if US military aid could not be used for a war against India, then Pakistan should refuse to accept it.<sup>4</sup> He said that, if this kind of thing was said in Pakistan, then it was quite possible that there would be no military aid from the United States.

3. He referred to the United States giving both military and economic aid to Yugoslavia,<sup>5</sup> where he himself had served, although Yugoslavia's internal policy was poles apart from that of the US, and her external policy was more or less in line with that of the US.

1. Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and the Commonwealth Secretary, 24 April 1954, JN Collection.

2. George V. Allen.

3. Nehru on 22 April 1954 referred in the Council of States to the policy of Government of India not to allow any foreign troops to pass through or fly across India. On the same day US Senator Homer Ferguson, Chairman of the Senate Republican Party Policy Committee, said that Nehru's action in banning foreign troops from passing through India "to say the least, gave aid and comfort to the communist world." Senator Styles Bridges, the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, had said on 22 April that H. Stassen, the US Foreign Aid Chief, should consider the question of India's ban on US planes flying over India with French troops for Indo-China.

4. Sirdar Shaikat Hyat, a Muslim League member of the Pakistan Parliament said on 19 April 1954, "I would throw that aid (US military aid) into the gutter if it did not help us solve" the Kashmir issue.

5. Out of total US allotments for foreign aid to Europe between 3 April 1948—31 March 1955 amounting to \$14, 516, 049, 000, Yugoslavia was allotted \$316, 688, 000.



4. In India the position was reversed. India's internal policy was democratic with freedom of expression etc. and was, therefore, in line with American policy, while India's external policy was not in line. There was no reason why the US should not give substantial aid for development to India. He referred to Mr Dulles's statement that democracy accepted a variety of opinion.<sup>6</sup> He asked me what my feelings were about this aid.

5. I told him that the question was a difficult one for me to answer. In the past, we had gladly accepted this aid though we have made it clear that it has nothing to do with our policy. Naturally, we wanted aid to speed up our developmental programmes. But even from the economic point of view, apart from the political, I did not want that aid to upset our economic balance in India. Substantial aid might well create certain upsets in our internal economy. What was more serious, to my mind, was that our people should not develop the habit of dependence on external aid. They could only ultimately advance by their own efforts. Subject to these considerations, we had welcomed aid.

6. But now other developments have taken place which have created a problem for us, a kind of a moral problem apart from the economic or political aspects. There had been criticisms in America at our objecting to the military aid to Pakistan, and at the same time, accepting economic aid ourselves.<sup>7</sup> It was true that there was a basic difference between the two and I had pointed that out. Nevertheless, there was a germ of truth in those criticisms, and I was not sure in my mind whether it was desirable for us, in those circumstances, to accept any substantial aid. There was this moral problem before us.

7. On the other hand, I added, for us to refuse that aid now would itself naturally be interpreted as a hostile gesture to the US, and I was anxious not to add to the friction and lack of understanding between the two countries. Therefore, I was reluctant to take this step.

8. The result was that I was pulled in two different directions and, as a consequence, I preferred to remain silent for the time being and to await

6. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State speaking before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives in Washington on 5 April 1954 said that it was important to set aside \$85 million for aid to India even though she followed a foreign policy different from that of the USA, because she was "carrying on a notable experiment in free government."

7. On 6 April 1954 some members of the House of Representatives asked Harold Stassen, the US Foreign Aid Chief about the degree of India's friendliness towards USA after hearing about the US global aid programme recommending \$85 million in economic and technical aid to India.

developments. Any decision we might take later would depend on those developments.

9. I then spoke generally about our policy and American policy. It was obvious that we did not feel in the same way as the American Government about communism and the way to combat it. We did not like the communist way and we had every intention of following our own path. But we felt that American reaction to the communist countries was not only exaggerated and dangerous but actually was likely to produce the very opposite results than those aimed at, more especially in Asia. In Asia, one must always remember that our primary urges were different. We did not want communism, we wanted national freedom and an elimination of colonial control and, above all, we wanted economic advance. American policy had led the United States to side with colonial and reactionary elements in Asia, and, as a result of that, had almost presented to the communist countries an ideal opportunity to pose as liberating agencies. Mere force and threats of war might frighten people for a while, but would never succeed in convincing people. As Napoleon said: "One can do everything with bayonets except to sit on them." There were powerful urges at work in Asia and they have to be tackled in ways other than that of force.

10. This was the basis of my argument.

## 5. To Dorothy S. Norman<sup>1</sup>

Camp: The Retreat  
Mashobra, Simla  
26th May 1954

Dear Dorothy,

Thank you for your letter of the 10th May.<sup>2</sup> I have also received your

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Dorothy Norman, an American journalist had written that she had formed a Citizens' Committee to support US aid to India for 1955 and to fight against the propaganda of a few US Congressmen who are against it. She proposed to hold a press conference on 17 May at her house for George V. Allen, the US Ambassador to India.



memorandum<sup>3</sup> on the subject of US aid to India. As usual, you have taken up this good work with all energy and enthusiasm and formed a Citizens' Committee for the purpose. I need not tell you how grateful we all are for your deep interest and work for India.

We have welcomed US aid in the past, but, to be quite frank, I had sometimes wondered how far it was a good thing for us to have these controversies on this subject. Just before Ambassador Allen went to the US, he came to see me and he asked me what I thought about it. I told him that naturally we stood in need of help and any help that came would push our development programme. But I added that I was not at all happy at this controversy in the US, which naturally found its reactions in India. As you know, some of your Senators taunted us for accepting this aid when we had criticised American military aid to Pakistan. This comparison I pointed out to Allen, was not justified because there was a great deal of difference between military aid and normal aid for civil purposes and especially development programmes. Nevertheless, there was an atom of truth in the criticism and we were hurt by it and felt some doubts in our minds about accepting such aid in present circumstances. Also, while aid was welcome, it may well be that large scale aid might produce a sensation of dependence on others and not self reliance. This is, I considered, bad, because I am convinced that a nation progresses ultimately not by money but by the spirit of the people.

Both these reasons, therefore, made me rather reluctant to accept aid. On the other hand, unfortunately our relations with the US at present were none too happy and I was exceedingly reluctant to say or do anything which might worsen them. For us to indicate that we did not want this aid would undoubtedly hurt people in the US and estrange our two countries still further. It was because of this consideration that I preferred to remain silent.

This is what I told Ambassador Allen and, in saying this, I did not merely express my opinion but the opinion of many people in India. I know that it would be grossly unfair for me or for any of us to judge the United States by the speeches of some Senators. I do not think that we make that mistake. But inevitably there are reactions in India to speeches and writings in the press, just as there are reactions in the US to speeches and writings in India. I do not think that there is any basic antagonism to the US in India, but it is true that in regard to certain policies which the US has followed, there is a strong difference of opinion here. I refer more particularly to policies pursued in Asia...

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. She had circulated two memoranda to prominent members of US Congressional Committees arguing why the US aid should be economic rather than military.

## XI. OTHER COUNTRIES

### 1. Recall of Indian Commissioner from Nairobi<sup>1</sup>

Sardar Singh wanted to know whether the Government of the United Kingdom had sent representations to the Government of India about the activities of the Indian Mission in Nairobi;<sup>2</sup> and the reasons for the recall of A.B. Pant, Indian Commissioner in Nairobi.

Jawaharlal Nehru: (a) No official representations were made by, or on behalf of the UK Government.

(b) Shri Pant had served for over 5 years as our Commissioner in Nairobi and his transfer was due in the normal course.<sup>3</sup>

Sardar Singh asked whether the Government was aware of the allegations made in the *Daily Telegraph*, *Daily Express* and other papers in England of the anti-British activities of Apa Pant.

JN: Yes, we have seen such reports in the British Press. As a matter of fact, I should like to express Government's appreciation of the services Shri Pant has rendered. It was naturally his function and was also our desire that he should develop friendly relations between the Indians and the Africans, there, in fact between all the communities there, and he succeeded in doing that in a very large measure. I cannot answer for the opinions or views of the newspapers in England.

1. Reply to questions in Parliament, 23 February 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, Official Report, 1954, Vol. VI, col. 693.
2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 640-641.
3. Apa B Pant, India's Commissioner for British East and Central Africa and Consul General for Belgian Congo was transferred to MEA, New Delhi, in January 1954.



## 2. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

25th February 1954

My dear Rajaji,

...Canada has become increasingly important during the last few years. This importance is due to the rapid industrial progress she has made and the increasing part she has played in the UN and international affairs. Even now her industrial output is expanding rapidly and standards of living there are high. An average technical man can easily earn thirty dollars a day, which means nearly rupees one hundred and fifty a day. Canadians are a peculiar mixture of the British outlook and Americans. They are tied up with British institutions and have an emotional bond with Britain. On the other hand, the United States presses in upon them and has a powerful influence. They cannot resist that influence and at the same time they do not wish to submit to it wholly.

Even now the difference between the US and Canada is marked. As soon as one passes the border from US to Canada, the atmosphere changes. It is a quiet atmosphere with less of shouting and bustle—a more civilised atmosphere, if I may say so. Canada, of course, has its racial problems as between the French Canadians and the others. It is both racial and religious as the French Canadians are devout Catholics and others are more or less Protestants. St. Laurent<sup>2</sup> is a strong bond between the two.

The attitude of Canada towards India has been consistently friendly. Very often in the Prime Ministers' Conference in London, Canada has taken a receptive attitude to what we have said. Their point of view is that we know best about Asia in the East. In the UN to some extent publically and much more privately, Canada has exercised a restrained influence on the US. Of course, in the final analysis they side with the US. Canada has given support to the US because of the dollar returns. Generally speaking, Canada's attitude in world affairs is peaceful and reasonable, though they are tied up intimately to the US and have to give in to them.

This is St. Laurent's first acquaintance of the East. Previously he has never been east of Rome. He attaches much importance to India and to the Commonwealth connection.

I have had some talks with him about international questions and referred to Korea, the UN, US military aid to Pakistan and briefly to Kashmir. I have also referred to the very bad situation in Kenya and East Africa, as well as in

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Louis Stephen St. Laurent, the Prime Minister of Canada, was in India from 21 to 28 February 1954.

general to the situation in Asia and Africa. He has listened attentively and receptively, though of course he did not necessarily agree to what I said.

About the US aid to Pakistan, I pointed out to him that apart from international issues, it has no doubt increased and will increase tension between India and Pakistan, and give rise to fears and apprehensions, which will be exploited by extremist groups. Instead of bringing about a sense of greater security, it will have the reverse effect.

I referred also to the general feeling that the US has made the UN as something just carrying out its wishes, chiefly through the Latin American votes. This is a bad thing for the future of the UN. I casually mentioned about the foreign pockets in India and said how absurd it was for their continuing in our territories.

I am giving you this very brief summary of our talks as that may provide you some background.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. India and Defence of Iraq<sup>1</sup>

I have had two fairly long talks with Nuri Pasha<sup>2</sup> apart from two dinners.<sup>3</sup> His main argument was that Iraq's position is a very difficult one because of the Soviet Union in the north and the pressure of the Western countries, and then there is the danger from Israel, which is much stronger than any of the Arab countries. He said that they had no desire to line up with the Western countries, but they would have no choice in this unless some other help was given to them. The other help would be for India to guarantee Iraq from aggression and indeed to give three or four Divisions of troops for the defence of Iraq against aggression from the north. He referred to Indian troops functioning there under British rule in India. Since we had withdrawn our troops, there was a power vacuum and somebody had to fill it. So, the best course would be for

1. Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, 28 March 1954. A copy of this note was sent to K.M. Panikkar. JN Collection.
2. Nuri el-Said (1888-1958); Prime Minister of Iraq five times between 1930 and 1957. In 1958, he became Prime Minister of Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan.
3. He met Nehru on 22 March and again on 24 March 1954.



India to fill it, and they would avoid any formal lining up with any of the big blocs.

2. This whole approach seemed to me to be extraordinarily naive. It struck me that this was merely an excuse so that he could say that, since India was not prepared to help Iraq, inevitably Iraq had to seek help from the Western powers.

3. I explained to him our policy. I realised that Iraq was more dangerously placed than India, but even so, the safest policy for Iraq would be to keep out of these power entanglements. If Iraq lined up with the Western powers, that would be entering the potential war zone and an invitation for an attack from the north. Otherwise, there was some chance at least of Iraq not being involved, though there was that risk. In any event, in terms of modern warfare, there could be no effective defence of Iraq by some small Indian expeditionary force. Our policy was entirely against sending such forces abroad which would drag us into these blocs and into war. If unfortunately there was war, we would want all the strength we possess to defend ourselves from any intrusion.

4. Such influence as we possessed would vanish if we were tied up in this way. Keeping apart, we might play some small part in preventing a war. After all, our main objective should be the prevention of war which, when came, would be terrible. Some troops here and there would make no difference to the war. Any step taken which brought war nearer, or which lessened our power to work for peace, would therefore be wrong.

5. This is in brief what we said to each other. Of course, we talked for a long time. He acknowledged in the end that this seemed to be a reasonable policy for India. Nevertheless, Iraq was in a dangerous position.

6. He referred also to the question of Israel and was very eager for a settlement. He said that a settlement was possible if Israel was prepared to accept as the basis of that settlement what the UN had decided, I think, four years ago or more, that is, before the war between Israel and the Arab countries. That was, in fact, Israel's position then, and the Arab countries would be prepared to accept that position now although they had rejected it then.<sup>4</sup> Even that need not be a hard and fast position but it could be made the basis of talks and other adjustments could follow.

4. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine had recommended partition of Palestine into an Arab state, Jewish state, and an international trusteeship for the city of Jerusalem, with some degree of economic and other union between the successor states and Jerusalem which was approved by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947. Although the Jewish community accepted this plan, the Arab countries rejected it denying UNO the authority to partition Palestine. On the night of 14-15 May 1948, the Jewish Agency proclaimed the independent State of Israel and the Arab States invaded Palestine.

7. I told him that we would be very happy indeed if such settlement is arrived at between Israel and the Arab countries, and, if we could help in that, we would do so. But it was not quite clear to me how we could bring any pressure to bear upon Israel in this matter. It should be easier for the US to do so. Nuri Pasha said that the US Government was afraid of their Jewish votes and, therefore, dare not take any such step.

8. Mr Panikkar<sup>5</sup> was present at our last talk about Israel and mentioned that it would probably be difficult for the Israel Government to agree to that old basis for the talks because they had settled a large number of Jews on the new territory they had acquired in the course of the war. But Israel was in a very difficult position economically, many Jews had gone back from Israel and they were certainly anxious for some settlement. If the parties met without any previous commitments, there was a good possibility of a settlement emerging.

9. Mr Panikkar is seeing Nuri Pasha tomorrow.

5. K.M. Panikkar was Indian Ambassador to Egypt till December 1953. He was, at this time, a Member of the States Reorganisation Commission.

#### 4. Indonesian Proposal for an Afro-Asian Conference<sup>1</sup>

I had a fairly long talk with Dr Palar<sup>2</sup> this afternoon on this subject. I told him that, ever since the Asian Conference held in March 1947,<sup>3</sup> we had been hoping to build up some kind of a formal or informal meeting place for Asian (and African) countries. The Asian Conference itself tried to form a permanent organisation. This did not function although we have still got the relics of a branch in Delhi. Then I met representatives of Asian and African nations in Paris at the time of the United Nations General Assembly. We discussed this question again. There was general agreement that some such thing was desirable, but each representative said that he would have to refer to his government. Ultimately result nil.

2. Again early in 1949, we had the Indonesian Conference here,<sup>4</sup> which

1. Note to the Commonwealth Secretary, 6 April 1954. JN Collection.

2. L.N. Palar was the Ambassador of Indonesia in India at this time.

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 2, pp. 501-523.

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 9, pp. 9, 77, 157-159, 161-181, 291, 292, 297-298, 448-449.



was a success chiefly because of certain circumstances and because it was confined to one subject. At that time, we discussed the question of meeting frequently and having some kind of organisational set up. The matter was to be referred to governments. Result again nil.

3. Previously, I had discussed this matter both with President Soekarno and U Nu. We were all more or less of one mind, but the difficulties in the way seemed insuperable and we decided not to take any step just then.<sup>5</sup>

4. At the present moment, as CS points out, conditions in the greater part of Asia and in Africa are exceedingly fluid. I do not quite know who to deal with. There is no unity of outlook, and any large scale conference is likely to bring about more an exhibition of difference of opinion than unanimity. The first question that will arise is as to who we should invite. Should this conference be entirely on the official level? If so, countries like Morocco, Tunisia, East Africa would be omitted. Perhaps, though I am not quite clear, the Gold Coast and Nigeria might be included. In Eastern Asia, who are we to invite from Indo-China—Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Viet Minh?

5. Even for the Indonesian Conference, Turkey and Siam refused to come. They told us privately that they did not wish to incur the displeasure of the US Government.

6. If the representatives of some countries gather together, what exactly are they going to discuss? Some of these countries are intimately tied up with the US or the Western bloc. Some others are relatively free of these bonds, but are much influenced by them. I am not referring to the communist countries which, of course, would have a definite view of their own and which perhaps might not be invited. Not inviting some of them itself has a certain implication.

7. Then again, the new developments in Indo-China, which are very dangerous, hardly indicate that this is the time for such a conference.

8. Nevertheless, I told Dr Palar that I liked the idea but I would not like any step to be taken without full thought. I said that this was a subject that we might well discuss at Colombo.<sup>6</sup> If the Indonesian Government held such a conference, we would certainly like to send representatives.

5. The *Daily News*, Colombo on 11 March 1954, however quoted Dr Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Prime Minister of Indonesia as saying that he would take the initiative in calling a conference of Afro-Asian nations with the exception of South Africa to strengthen economic cooperation in the region.

6. The Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia met in Colombo from 28-30 April and on 1-2 May 1954 at Kandy adopted the following resolution: "The Prime Ministers discussed the desirability of holding a conference of African-Asian nations, and favoured a proposal that the Prime Minister of Indonesia might explore the possibility of such a conference."

9. Dr Palar told me that the Indonesian Government had itself begun to doubt the feasibility of such a conference at the present stage, in view of the obvious difficulties.

10. You might write to our Ambassador in Djakarta<sup>7</sup> on these lines.

7. B.F.H.B. Tyabji.

## 5. Declaration of East German Independence<sup>1</sup>

Some days ago, the German Ambassador<sup>2</sup> came to see me and had a fairly long talk with me. He came to convey a special message from his Government. This was occasioned by the declaration that East Germany had become independent.<sup>3</sup> The West German Government was anxious that we should not recognise the East German Government. They said that this independence was obviously not real as there were Soviet troops still in East Germany.

2. I asked the German Ambassador what would happen when the Soviet troops were removed from East Germany. This placed him in a slight difficulty because he was then not prepared to admit that East Germany would be completely independent.

3. I told him that our representation in Germany was a continuation of the old Military Mission and that no occasion has thus far arisen for us to recognise East Germany. Being of opinion that Germany should be united, we were anxious that we should take no step which might confirm the division. The German Ambassador said that given free elections, 95 per cent of the people in East Germany would vote against the present Government there and for reunion.

1. Note to the Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, 20 April 1954. JN Collection.
2. Dr Ernst Wilhelm Meyer was the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to India.
3. On 25 March 1954, the Soviet Government announced the end of occupation regime in East Germany and declared East Germany a sovereign state conducting its own internal and external affairs. The announcement however pointed out that the Soviet troops would continue to be "temporarily stationed in East Germany."



4. I said that we were not likely to act in a hurry in this matter, but it is quite possible that some difficult situation might arise when we would have to deal with the *de facto* Government of East Germany. There might be the question of trade and the possibility of appointing a Consul. Anyhow, we would give careful thought to the matter before taking any step.

## 6. Raid of Consular Office in Nairobi<sup>1</sup>

Please refer to telegram No. 420 dated April 24 from Comind, Nairobi.<sup>2</sup> This is a very serious matter. It is true that the acting Governor<sup>3</sup> has apologised and the Commander-in-Chief<sup>4</sup> is calling also to apologise. Also that they have promised to enquire into the matter and punish the culprits. Nevertheless, we must take other action. The attention of the UK High Commissioner must be drawn immediately to this and we should say that we take the gravest view of this. It is not possible for us to keep our representative or indeed any office in Kenya if there is even the possibility of this kind of treatment. If this kind of treatment can be given, even by mistake, to our Consular Office, it is patent to us that the treatment given to others there must be far worse. Apart, therefore, from the question of our Office being raided and members of our staff insulted and manhandled, this raises for us the whole question of the situation in East Africa.

2. I think that our High Commissioner in London<sup>5</sup> should also be immediately informed of this and asked to protest more or less in the same language to the UK Government.

1. Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and to the Commonwealth Secretary, 25 April 1954. JN Collection.
2. R.K. Tandon, the acting Commissioner in Nairobi had written that on 24 April during a Government screening operation to find out Mau Mau suspects in Nairobi, the British troops raided his office and all African staff were arrested in spite of protest that prior permission was necessary for taking such action in a Foreign Mission. The acting Governor of East Africa subsequently apologised and ordered an immediate enquiry.
3. Frederick Crawford.
4. George Erskine.
5. M.J. Desai was the acting High Commissioner of India in the UK at this time.

## 7. Selling Ordinary Arms to Iraq<sup>1</sup>

I do not think there is any objection to our selling ordinary arms or tentage etc. to Iraq. The fact that Iraq is aligning herself with any set of powers<sup>2</sup> is not a reason why we should not sell something which is easily obtainable elsewhere. This should be looked at as a purely business transaction which is profitable to us. Of course, we should not sell anything which we require or might require ourselves. But normally our problem is to dispose of goods that our Ordnance factories are producing and we have adequate stocks of many of these articles. Such therefore as we can spare we should be prepared to sell.

2. Our Ambassador<sup>3</sup> need not go out of his way to press for this sale. But since an enquiry has been made, the information should be supplied to them. They need not be told what stocks we have got and what we can spare. We should quote the prices and enquire from them what items they require and in what quantity.

1. Note to the Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, 26 April 1954. JN Collection.
2. On 25 April 1954 it was announced in Baghdad that USA had agreed to supply military aid to Iraq as a result of a request made by the Iraqi Government in March 1953. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 645-646.
3. Khub Chand was the Ambassador of India in Iraq.

## 8. India and Clemency of Japanese War Criminals<sup>1</sup>

A.S. Saigal requested the Minister of External Affairs to make a statement on India's rejection of the illegal inclusion of Pakistan as the legal successor of undivided India in the clemency arrangements relating to Japanese war criminals.

Jawaharlal Nehru: If you would permit me, Sir, instead of trying to answer the question seriatim, I shall make a brief statement on the facts. This is somewhat overlapping the paper I have already laid on the Table of the House.

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was set up by a

1. Statement in Parliament, 13 May 1954. *Parliamentary Debates, (House of the People) Official Report*, 1954, Vol. V, Part II, cols. 7270-7274. Similar statement was made by Nehru in the Council of States on 14 May 1954.



Proclamation issued in January 1946 by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the Pacific for the trial of Japanese war criminals. The Governments of the following eleven countries were members of the Tribunal:

- (1) Australia
- (2) Canada
- (3) China
- (4) France
- (5) India
- (6) The Netherlands
- (7) New Zealand
- (8) Philippines
- (9) The United Kingdom
- (10) The USA
- (11) The USSR

The trial began in June 1946 and judgment was delivered in November 1948. India's representative on the Tribunal was Dr R.B. Pal, who delivered a learned dissenting judgment.<sup>2</sup>

In November 1952, the Japanese Government approached India, along with the other Governments represented on the Tribunal, with a request for clemency to twelve Japanese war criminals who were undergoing imprisonment for life. The Government of India supported this request.

In March 1953, the Japanese Government informed our Embassy at Tokyo that they had been advised by the USA that only those Governments had jurisdiction in this matter which had signed and ratified the San Francisco Peace Treaty,<sup>3</sup> which was signed in September 1951 and took effect from April 1952. According to this interpretation, China, India and the U.S.S.R., which did not sign<sup>4</sup> the San Francisco Treaty, and the Philippines, which did not ratify it, had

2. Justice Pal in, his dissenting judgment, took the view that all the accused should have been acquitted since "the world is really in need of generous magnanimity, understanding and charity." see also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 8, pp. 233-234 and 415.
3. The San Francisco Peace Treaty signed by Japan and 48 Allied and associated nations on 8 September 1951 formally ended the state of war between Japan and the Allies which commenced on 8 December 1941.
4. Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak delegates in the San Francisco Conference were not present at the signing ceremony. A. Gromyko, representing USSR, denounced the Treaty as an "aggressive" pact aimed at China and Russia. The Government of India refused to participate in the Conference on the grounds that the draft treaty agreed on in July 1951 by UK and USA was not acceptable to her and urged: (1) Japan should be allowed to retain Ryukyu and Bonin islands; (2) Formosa should be returned to China and (3) the clause in the Treaty referring to possibility of retaining foreign troops in Japan should be deleted.

no jurisdiction in the matter of clemency. On the other hand, Pakistan which had signed and ratified the San Francisco Treaty, was held to have jurisdiction, even though she was not represented on the Tribunal.

Article 11 of the San Francisco Treaty provides that the powers of clemency etc., will be exercised by a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal and on the recommendation of Japan. Article 25 states that no rights or benefits under the Treaty shall be conferred on any state which has not signed and ratified it.

The view of the Government of India has been that Article 25 of the San Francisco Treaty, negotiated and signed by third parties, cannot take away any right belonging to India as a member of the Tribunal. Further, the Tribunal's judgment was delivered long after the Partition of India, and Dr Pal was obviously acting only for the Government of India and not for the Government of Pakistan. Moreover, by the agreement annexed to the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order 1947, membership of international organisations devolve solely on India.

Notes containing our views were delivered to all the Governments represented on the Tribunal and to the Japanese Government in April and May 1953. We received replies between July and December 1953. The Governments of Australia, Canada, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and the USA, reaffirmed their stand that India had no jurisdiction in the matter of clemency since she was not a party to the San Francisco Treaty. They said further that there was no question of India's vote being transferred to Pakistan. According to them, Pakistan had equal jurisdiction in this matter as one of the successor States to British India, and if India had been a party to the San Francisco Treaty, both she and Pakistan would have had equal jurisdiction in the matter of clemency.

In a further series of notes handed in April 1954 to the seven Governments named above, the Government of India have reaffirmed their stand. A press note was issued by the Government of India on the 10th May, a copy of which I have just laid on the Table of the House. This note states briefly India's case in this matter.

The Government of India are wholly unable to accept the view of the Governments named above and consider it a negation of the principles of international law and practice. In their opinion, the exclusion of India whose representative had all along functioned as a member of the Tribunal even after the Partition of India, is completely arbitrary and has no justification whatever. Equally arbitrary is the inclusion of Pakistan. The fact that India did not sign the San Francisco Treaty and Pakistan signed that treaty, has no relevance to this question. A treaty signed by some of the countries, and not signed by India, cannot bind India in any way and cannot affect India's rights.



As already stated, it was clearly laid down at the time of the Partition of India that all international commitments and membership of international organisations previous to the Partition devolve solely on India. The interpretation, therefore, put by the other countries has no justification whatever and the Government of India take a grave view of this arbitrary use of authority regardless of the principles of international law and practice and the circumstances governing this particular case.

## 9. African Students in India<sup>1</sup>

A few days ago, Shrimati Lakshmi Menon<sup>2</sup> came to see me and she spoke to me about the African students studying in India. She gave me an account which distressed me greatly. These students are apparently living an isolated life here with practically no contacts with Indian students or others. In fact, it is worse than this because some Indian students behave in an objectionable manner and show contempt for them.

2. The whole object of our giving scholarships to African students to come to India is frustrated by this attitude of Indian students and we must take some positive measures to meet the situation. In fact, we should not mind spending some money. I am told, however, that it is not money that is required, but rather the human approach.

3. Lakshmi Menon gave me a note on this subject which I enclose. She has dealt with this problem in this note and has made some suggestions. I should like those suggestions to be considered and such as are found practicable, to be given effect to.

4. The first thing to do about it is to make someone responsible for it. There is Shri G.D. Sondhi,<sup>3</sup> Youth Welfare Officer of the Education Ministry, but apparently he has nothing to do with the Africans. I think he should pay some particular attention to the Africans. But, apart from this, I think we might well appoint a Special Officer for this purpose to go round and see them and help in making arrangements for the Africans to meet people and to have a

1. Note to the Secretary General, 23 May 1954. A copy of the note was sent to the Ministry of Education. JN Collection.
2. Member, Council of States and Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister at this time.
3. G.D. Sondhi was the Hony. Adviser on youth welfare in the Ministry of Education.

better time generally. They must be made to feel at home in India. We cannot easily change the mentality of many of our students, though we should try to do so. But we can at least find others who will agree to take special interest in these African students.

5. In her note, Lakshmi Menon says that the real difficulty is that no one is responsible, and even the Education Ministry and the ICCR has not paid much attention to this problem. She suggests having a touring officer. She also suggests MPs taking more interest in these students. That is desirable, but that will have to be done at the Parliamentary level.

6. There is also the question of these African students not having enough money for holiday touring etc. I suppose it should be easy, under our present schemes, for the Railways to give them special rates. We may arrange also tours for them and we should certainly try to get them invited to Indian homes.

7. I am sending a copy of this note to the Education Ministry. But I suggest that SG might interest himself specially in this matter.

## 10. To A. G. Fraser<sup>1</sup>

Camp, The Retreat  
Mashobra, Simla  
29th May 1954

My dear Mr Fraser,<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of the 11th November<sup>3</sup> has reached me only today. As you say in your letter, it remained with you for many months before you finished it and posted it. I received it here in the mountains, where I have come up for a brief five days rest. I am returning to Delhi tomorrow.

Need I tell you how happy I am to get your letter. I have read it with the greatest interest and admiration for all that you have done for Africa and the Africans. I knew of course of your great fight for the Africans in the Gold Coast and of what you did in the Achimota College.

1. JN Collection.

2. Rev. Alexander Gordon Fraser (1873-1962); ordained in 1914; Principal of, Trinity College, Kandy, 1904-24, Prince of Wales College, Achimota, Gold Coast, 1924-35, Friends College, Jamaica, 1940-43; author of *The Future of Negro* (1929), pamphlets on *Educational questions in the East*; *Reports on Education Commissions*.

3. Fraser had stated how he fought for the rights of Africans in Gold Coast and other places in Africa and how he succeeded in doing away with segregation in Gold Coast. He also wrote that the Africans were not inferior people and were advancing speedily to win freedom.



I have no doubt whatever that one of the big things of today is the awakening of the Africans. My only anxiety is that this should not be connected with too much shedding of blood and violence.

I have watched with deep interest events and developments in West Africa.<sup>4</sup> Recently we appointed a Commissioner there<sup>5</sup> who sends us full reports. I wish that the rest of Africa was in line with the west coast.

In my last letter to you, I mentioned my grave apprehension at what was happening in East Africa. I am convinced that the methods employed in suppressing Mau Mau will not bring peace there.<sup>6</sup> The people are embittered and it is never safe to embitter a whole nation, whatever its faults might be.

It is men like you who give us hope during these difficult times and I am very grateful to you for having written to me at such length.

With all good wishes,

Ever yours,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. On 28 April 1954, Britain announced that drafts of the new constitutional arrangement for Gold Coast had been prepared after successful exchanges between British and the Gold Coast Governments and general elections under the new constitution would be held in June 1954.
5. Rameshwar Rao was the Commissioner of India in Gold Coast.
6. See *post*, pp. 560-561.

## 11. Establishment of Legation of Israel<sup>1</sup>

I agree that this is no time for us to raise the question of establishing an Israeli Embassy or Legation in Delhi.<sup>2</sup> I do not think this should be in the larger interests of peace. You may indicate this to our Ambassador in Rangoon.<sup>3</sup> It is not necessary for him to raise this question again with Prime Minister of Burma. But if he is asked, he should say that in the confused situation of the world, we think this matter should be postponed.

1. Note to the Secretary General, 29 May 1954. File No. T/52/1728/22. MEA
2. The State of Israel was recognised by the Government of India on 17 September 1950 but there was no exchange of Ambassadors.
3. K.K. Chettur.

## XII. FOREIGN POSSESSIONS IN INDIA

### 1. Policy towards Goa<sup>1</sup>

Joachim Alva wanted to know the attitude of the Government of India towards the Legation of Portugal in Delhi, whilst Indian Mission in Portugal had been withdrawn.

Jawaharlal Nehru: For the moment, we do not propose to take any action in that respect. The honourable Member will remember that we have got our Consul General in Goa.<sup>2</sup>

H.N. Mukerjee asked that when Portugal was obviously determined to retain Goa as one of her possessions, and when under the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, Britain had given a guarantee to defend Portuguese territories overseas, whether India would make it plain to Portugal that she could not indefinitely desist from answering the cry of agony which came from the people in that area.

JN: The honourable Member has compressed many points in his question. India has made it perfectly plain what her intentions are in regard to Goa. It is totally inconceivable that any foreign pocket like Goa or any other should continue in India. It is true that we believe that the best way to solve these questions is peacefully, even though it may take a little time. But I must confess that the way things are continuing to happen in Goa strains our patience to the utmost.

As for the honourable Member's reference to the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty,<sup>3</sup> I cannot, for the moment, say what the consequences of that Treaty may be in regard to this matter, legally speaking, nor am I prepared to take Dr Salazar's

1. Reply to questions in Parliament, 16 March 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People) Official Report*, 1954, Vol. I, Part I, cols. 1134-1135.
2. V.H. Coelho.
3. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1642 stated: "Great Britain promises to defend and protect all conquests and colonies to the Crown of Portugal against all enemies, future as well as present."



interpretation<sup>4</sup> of those consequences; but it has been clearly stated by various countries very recently that these external treaties have no application to Goa and India.<sup>5</sup>

4. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Prime Minister of Portugal had stated on many occasions, that by virtue of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1642 and her membership of NATO, Portugal was entitled to get help from Britain and other NATO members for protection of her colonies in India.
5. Louis Stephen St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, said in New Delhi on 24 February that NATO could be involved only in defence of metropolitan territories of the signatories and not their colonies and they did not regard the French and Portuguese colonies in India as metropolitan territories.

## 2. To Balvantray Mehta<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21st March 1954

My dear Balvantray,

In view of the developments in Pondicherry,<sup>2</sup> I think that we should send some instructions to the Pradesh Congress Committee at Madras. These instructions should be that we should not offer any provocation from outside and allow these developments to take place spontaneously. But one thing the Congress Committees round about Pondicherry should do and that is to meet and pass resolutions congratulating and welcoming the attitude taken up by the Pondicherry ministers and mayors and municipal councillors of the communes of the French Settlements. Some such expression of opinion will be helpful.<sup>3</sup>

1. JN Collection.
2. On 19 March 1954 Edouard Goubert and four ministers of the French India Government belonging to the ruling French India Socialist Party reiterated the resolutions passed on 18 March by municipal councils of eight communes of the French Settlements demanding that these be merged with the Indian Union without any referendum. Copies of the resolutions were sent to the President of the Republic of France, Presidents of the three Houses of the French Parliament and the Prime Minister of India.
3. In a meeting of the District Congress workers of Madras on 28 March, a resolution, appreciating the launching of the movement by the people of French India for merger with the Indian Union, was passed.

For the rest, we have to watch the situation closely. Our Consul General in Pondicherry<sup>4</sup> is coming to Delhi tomorrow for consultation.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Kewal Singh Chaudhry.

### 3. Telegram to C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

You will have followed recent developments in French Settlements where elected councillors of municipal communes have unanimously declared in favour of merger with India. We understand that French authorities there are intimidating people supporting merger movement and some arrests have been made.<sup>2</sup> We are lodging protest with French Ambassador here as well as the Pondicherry authorities.<sup>3</sup>

We understand that French Police party is being sent to some of these communes to suppress this movement for merger. We should not permit armed police to cross Indian territory for this purpose.<sup>4</sup> I hope your Government will issue necessary instructions.

1. New Delhi, 21 March 1954. JN Collection.
2. French India policemen and other Government officials visited various communes on the evening of 20 March and told people not to hold demonstrations. Since the evening of 20 March reports came of assault on prominent leaders of French India Socialist Party by goondas. The PTI coresspondent was beaten up severely in front of E. Goubert's house on the night of 20 March.
3. In a protest note delivered on 22 March the Government of India pointed out that the resolutions passed by the Representative Assembly of Pondicherry and mayors of the communes, demanding immediate merger of the Settlements without referendum, were an expression of the wishes of the people of the Settlements; and proposed that a *de facto* transfer of authority to India should take place immediately, pending a *de jure* transfer; and protested against attempts by the police to intimidate the people of Pondicherry, including the arrests of supporters of the merger movement.
4. Out of the eight communes of the French Settlements, three were separated from Pondicherry by Indian territory.



#### 4. Cable to H.S. Malik<sup>1</sup>

We have sent you text of note about Pondicherry developments.<sup>2</sup> Copies of this note have been handed to Commissioner in Pondicherry<sup>3</sup> and French Ambassador here.<sup>4</sup>

2. There have been isolated cases of intimidation in Pondicherry. Reports have also reached us that French authorities may be sending armed police to the enclaves. We have lodged protest about this and are taking steps to prevent passage of armed police.

3. Developments in Pondicherry show that demand for immediate merger is completely spontaneous. Resolutions about this have been passed by all the councillors and elected mayors of eight communes and their colleagues. A few days ago, there were demonstrations in Pondicherry which showed that industrial workers are also supporting this demand.<sup>5</sup> It is clear that large majority of the people, representing various interests, are behind this popular movement.

4. We would like you to take up this matter immediately with French Government. You should remind them that a settlement of this question has been held up for many years by doubts which existed in their mind about wishes of the people. Wishes have now been expressed in most effective manner possible under existing circumstances. We feel, therefore, that this is a suitable opportunity for reaching a friendly and peaceful settlement of this question.

5. In our last note to French Government, we suggested that they should agree to direct transfer of their possessions, leaving constitutional and other matters to be settled by negotiation. There was no reply to our suggestion, but we would like them to consider this now.<sup>6</sup> Constitutional changes will take time

1. New Delhi, 23 March 1954. JN Collection. H.S. Malik was India's Ambassador in France.

2. See *ante*, p. 514, fn. 3.

3. Andre Menard.

4. Count Stanislas Ostrarog.

5. On 2 March, some textile mill workers in Pondicherry took out a peaceful procession shouting slogans for merger of the French Settlements with the Indian Union. They were beaten up and arrested by the Police. The Government of India lodged a strong protest with the French Embassy in New Delhi against this incident on 9 March.

6. In response to the Indian note of 22 March, the French Government, on 26 March, proposed immediate discussions on the conditions under which a referendum could be held, preferably under international control; it rejected the Indian allegations that conditions in the Settlements did not permit pro-Indian elements to express their opinions freely and declared that recent measures by the Indian Government to "deprive the inhabitants of a normal economic life" were an attempt to bring pressure on them.

and both Governments will have to take some action in this respect. This should not, however, come in the way of a *de facto* transfer of administration which could be given effect to immediately.

6. We have given assurances that laws, customs, language and cultural associations of the people will be respected in any constitutional arrangements that may be made. We wish to bring about these changes, which are in any case inevitable, in a peaceful way and by consent of the people. If we can reach settlement in this matter, an important cause of friction will be removed and relations between India and France will be greatly strengthened. We would strongly urge them, therefore, to consider suggestions we have made about *de facto* transfer and also to take steps to prevent intimidation of the people who have made this spontaneous demand. As we have pointed out in yesterday's note, any attempt to intimidate the people is bound to have serious repercussions in India.

## 5. Telegram to C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

We are receiving information about French Government's coercion of merger movement in Pondicherry etc. People are being intimidated by goondas set up by authorities.<sup>2</sup>

2. This morning's newspapers contain information that French Police came to Indian territory and arrested not only a mayor from Pondicherry, but two Indian Nationals.<sup>3</sup> We are asking for confirmation of this news which is serious, and will have to take some action if confirmation received.<sup>4</sup>

1. New Delhi, 25 March 1954. JN Collection.
2. Muthu Pillai, the leader of the French India Socialist Party and Mayor of Pondicherry, in a letter to Commissioner Menard on 22 March, drew attention to the acts of violence indulged in by goondas who were moving about the town shouting anti-Socialist slogans and bullying citizens. These goondas targetted the houses having Indian Flags hoisted on them.
3. On 24 March armed French India Policemen trespassed into Indian territory of Kattupalayam and took into custody Nandagopal, the Mayor of Mudaliarpet Commune and two other Indian citizens from the house of an Indian citizen.
4. The Government of India on 25 March sent a protest note to the French Embassy in New Delhi demanding immediate release of the arrested persons and punishment of the police officials responsible. The Government of India in an *aide memoire* on 26 March demanded release of the three arrested persons, as the Indian Consul General in Pondicherry was satisfied after inquiries that the arrests took place on Indian territory.



3. I had requested you to have Madras Armed Police posted on routes connecting Pondicherry with western communes to stop passage of police, arms, etc. Please have this done immediately.<sup>5</sup> If necessary, we are prepared to help you with military for this purpose.

5. The Madras Government posted armed police along frontiers of the Settlements on 25 March.

## 6. Situation in French Indian Settlements<sup>1</sup>

Mr Deputy Sepaker, Sir, I am glad of this opportunity to inform the House of the position as it is, in so far as we have received information. This Government is greatly concerned with the situation in the French Settlements and on the borders. The House knows that a few days back, practically all the Ministers of the Government there in the French Settlements and all the communes of Pondicherry—I think they are 8—the councillors and the mayors separately in each commune passed a unanimous resolution in favour of immediate merger with India without any referendum, and they sent this on to the French Government, the President of the French Republic, and various other dignitaries in France. A copy of that was also sent to me. Yesterday, all the communes, I think they are six, in Karaikal have also passed a similar resolution...

They want to inform them, the French authorities, of the wishes of the population for an immediate merger with the Indian Union without referendum. They request the French Government to take necessary steps to this effect.

Now, every commune in these French Settlements, excepting a small village, and Mahe and Yanam, have passed this. I think the population of these French Settlements is roughly about 3,20,000, of which Pondicherry has 2,20,000 and Karaikal 70,000. We have a good majority in Karaikal and Pondicherry and at those places all the mayors and councillors have unanimously passed this resolution. There can be no more clear, emphatic, and widespread expression of opinion of these Settlements than this. When we heard of this, we thought that there should be no further difficulty for at least the *de facto* transfer of authority

1. Statement in Parliament, 25 March 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, 1954, Vol. II, Pt. II, cols. 2979-2983. Extracts.

of these to the Indian Union. Some time back, a year or more perhaps we suggested to the French Government that there should be this *de facto* transfer, though the *de jure* formalities can be undertaken later.<sup>2</sup> They did not agree with it then. After we heard of these resolutions, we again drew the attention of the French Government to our previous suggestion and said that the time has now come for this *de facto* transfer.<sup>3</sup> As a matter of fact, in the case of small enclaves, the question of our taking a referendum in three or four villages in the middle as to whether they should be in the Indian Union or not is rather odd, as if three or four villages in the heart of India, or as if any village in the heart of a country, can decide an international question as to whether there should be a merger. On the face of it, these enclaves had to come to India and have to come to India.<sup>4</sup> Apart from that obvious argument, the fact that all their representatives had declared emphatically in favour of merger has put an end to any possibility of argument about that. So we drew the attention of the French Government to this; we have not had their reply, although in the newspapers there are some references to it. But let me say this. As soon as these resolutions were passed by the communes, it appears that the authorities in these French Settlements adopted an attitude, which I can only describe briefly. They tried various methods of intimidation to frighten those people, the mayors and councillors, and other leaders of the merger movement, and to make them retract and to generally make out that the people of the French Settlements were not in favour of integration with India. The local French administration went about asking all their officials and pensioners to send telegrams to Paris requesting continuation of the French rule, and officers were sent to other communes in Pondicherry to get further declarations from pensioners in favour of France. Actually, violence was used and a number of people, who, we are informed, were paid persons of the goonda type, were sent to some of the leaders of these parties, the chief party concerned being the French India Socialist Party, and some of them were

2. The Government of India in October 1952 had asked the French Government that negotiations between the two Governments should take place on the basis of a direct transfer of the areas to India. See *Selected Works (second series)*, Vol. 19, pp. 679-680. The French Government did not agree to the proposal saying that "inhabitants of the establishments whatever the origin, must take a direct part in political life" and there could not be a direct transfer of power without the consent of the interested populations.
3. See *ante*, p. 514, fn. 3.
4. In a letter to Rajagopalachari the same day, Nehru wrote, "I quite agree with you that there can be no question of a plebiscite. Plebiscite or no plebiscite, they have to come to us.... The point is to make it clear that we are earnest about this and will not tolerate any nonsense."



arrested and, we are told, subjected to shameful treatment. Others went to the houses of the mayors and councillors and tried to frighten them by shouting abusive slogans. The police, as such took part in this, going about all these communes and telling people that if they demonstrate in favour of merger or if they express any pro-Indian sentiment, they will meet with a dire fate. The police behave in a curious way, apparently, at Pondicherry it appears that the police took out effigies of some of the leaders of the movement and of some of the mayors also in the streets of Pondicherry just to frighten people. All this occurred within the French Settlements.

But yesterday another incident occurred which is of an even more serious character: One of the mayors had apparently taken refuge in Indian territory. The House may perhaps not know that there are all kinds of enclaves there, that is to say, there is a French enclave in Indian territory and an Indian enclave in the French territory. So, I think in one of these Indian enclaves in French territory the mayor took shelter with some Indian citizens. The French police, that is to say the police from the French Settlements, entered into Indian territory, arrested the mayor, and possibly the three Indian citizens also who apparently had given him hospitality, and carried them off to their own territory.<sup>5</sup>

Now this is a very serious matter. We have previously for the last two or three days, protested both to the French Government in Paris, to their Ambassador here and locally in Pondicherry against various activities they were indulging in against people in favour of merger. This news has come today and we have immediately taken action and communicated with the French Ambassador here and with the authorities in Pondicherry. We shall communicate with the French Government also. We have demanded also the immediate return not only of the Indian citizens but the mayor who was taken away, and punishment of the policemen who had perpetrated this outrage on Indian territory. We have also taken measures, that is, through the Madras Government, the armed police of the Madras State, to prevent any armed people, policemen or any persons with arms, entering Indian territory from those French Settlements. That is all that I have to state before the House.

The situation is obviously a changing and developing one and if anything important occurs I shall come before the House and place the information before it.

5. See *ante*, p. 516, fn. 3.

## 7. Stoppage of Supplies to the French Settlements<sup>1</sup>

You have already intimated to the Madras Government to post armed police on all the routes leading from the French Settlements to the Indian territory. Please verify by telephone if this has been done.

In another telegram from our Consul General, he suggests that supplies of petrol and other petroleum products should be cut off completely. I think that the time has come when we should do this. For what period need not be stated. Please, therefore, arrange that these supplies are stopped and instructions are sent to those concerned.<sup>2</sup> The Consul General should be informed that you are doing this.

It is worthwhile examining immediately what other supplies might be stopped if need arises.

You might keep in touch with Kewal Singh by telephone. He is apt to get a little excited. Tell him to keep cool and that we shall do everything necessary in good time.

Since writing the above, I have seen a note from the Defence Secretary,<sup>3</sup> in which he tells me that he spoke to the Chief Secretary of Madras<sup>4</sup> and that Armed Police have been posted at 12 important points on the Pondicherry-Madras boundary and mobile parties are also moving about.

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 25 March 1954. JN Collection.
2. Export of petrol and petroleum items from Indian territory to French India Settlements was stopped towards the end of March.
3. M.K. Vellodi.
4. K. Rammuni Menon.

## 8. Applicability of North Atlantic Treaty to Goa<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: The Government have seen references in the press to a statement reported to have been made by the Prime Minister of Portugal purporting to state his view that the North Atlantic Treaty extends to, and covers,

1. Statement in Parliament, 15 April 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, *Official Report*, 1954, Vol. III, Part II, cols. 4808-4810.



the Portuguese possessions in India.<sup>2</sup> In this statement reference has also been made to treaties of remote date between Portugal and England. The Government affirms that they are not parties to any of these treaties under reference, new or old, and are in no way bound by them directly or indirectly, and that as a sovereign State, India cannot be bound by any international or regional agreement to which she is not a party. The Government have also seen reports and references to aerodromes about to be constructed in Goa, and allied matters.<sup>3</sup> They have no direct information of this. The Government of India reaffirm their view in the most categorical terms that they regard the foreign colonial enclaves in India as anachronisms which should come to an end and that their existence is inconsistent with the historic developments that resulted in the termination of imperial rule in India itself. The use of these enclaves as bases by foreign powers will meet with opposition from us. The Government further denies the right of a foreign power to establish such bases in these enclaves on the ground that they are the territories of a colonial power with which it is in alliance, as the Government do not recognize the right of the colonial power itself to continue there and to impose its rule on our people.

The Government of India have further noted that the views alleged to have been expressed by the Prime Minister of Portugal have not been endorsed or supported by any of the leading participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Government are glad to note that the Government of Canada have expressed their views to the contrary. Statements have been made on behalf of other Governments also to this effect.

The Prime Minister of Portugal has referred to his country's religious and cultural mission in the East.<sup>4</sup> I have stated repeatedly, on behalf of the Government of India, that we propose to maintain the special cultural and religious position of Goa and it is not India's intention to affect in any way the cultural traditions of Goa. Christianity is one of the major and respected religions in India which has full freedom to function. Its association with a foreign power does not add to its prestige in India.

It is the continuance of the present colonial rule with its suppression of all civil liberties and the continuance of conflict that endangers those cultural traditions which we seek to discontinue in Goa. A peaceful settlement will ensure

2. The Prime Minister of Portugal made this statement in a broadcast on 12 April 1954.
3. In a note of 8 March 1954, R.K. Nehru reported that there was evidence that the Portuguese Administration was developing closer contacts with Pakistan and was organising the small Muslim minority in Goa. There were also reports of building an aerodrome in Goa to link it directly with Karachi.
4. Salazar said "... in order to win the favour of the Goans, it is promised them, that all the religious activities and distinct cultural elements of that small community shall be respected. The truth however lies in recognition of the differences and not in the resemblances. The small Portuguese State of India is effectively a province of Portugal."

the continuance in an atmosphere of freedom of the cultural and religious traditions of Goa. Such a settlement can only be brought about by Goa becoming a part of the Indian Union which will enable it to develop economically and otherwise. We have, therefore, suggested that there should be a *de facto* transfer of authority in Goa to the Government of India to be followed later by *de jure* changes.

The Prime Minister of Portugal has stated that he is prepared to give guarantees that the Portuguese territories shall not be used as bases against India.<sup>5</sup> I would suggest to him that an immediate step to this end would be the withdrawal of Portuguese troops from Goa.<sup>6</sup> This itself will ease the tension and prepare the way for peaceful negotiations.

5. Salazar had said that Portugal had nothing in its external obligations that went against the possibility of giving India guarantee on security in relation to Goa.
6. R.K. Nehru had informed that there was definite information of strengthening of Portuguese armed forces in Goa and about import of some heavy military equipment for this purpose.

## 9. Friendly Settlement of Pondicherry Question<sup>1</sup>

The French Ambassador has just seen me. Mr Christian Belle<sup>2</sup> came with him and he handed to me a letter from the Prime Minister of France, which I enclose in original.<sup>3</sup>

2. I read this and then said to Mr Belle, who had brought the letter from France, that I should like some further elucidation of the letter and what the Prime Minister had in mind.

3. Mr Belle told me that the French Government had to face certain difficulties and obstacles in regard to the Pondicherry situation. The chief difficulty was their Parliament. Neither the people generally, nor Parliament understood the situation fully. It was not possible for the Government to take any step without convincing Parliament. It was conceivable that this question of Pondicherry might be settled by India unilaterally. But this would be unfortunate and affect the relations of the two countries. Hence it was desirable to deal with this matter by negotiations.

1. Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and the Commonwealth Secretary, 20 April 1954. JN Collection.
2. Christian Belle was an emissary of the French Government.
3. See the following item.



4. I said that throughout these few years we had taken special care to avoid taking any step which might affect the prestige of France. We had also been anxious to settle this question in a way which would leave no trail of bitterness behind between the two countries. This pointed to the way of negotiations.

5. The French Ambassador then spoke. He said he had not discussed this matter with me during the last two and a half years of his stay in India, because he felt the time was not ripe for it. Now he felt that the time was ripe for such a discussion. This could only be done by negotiations and not by way of ultimatum. In negotiations there was some give and take and the countries concerned dealt with each other in a friendly way and no country's prestige was affected. In such negotiations it was obviously desirable not to lay down conditions in advance because that would mean that the decision had already been taken and would be in the nature of an ultimatum.

6. The Ambassador went on to say that the position in France was difficult. The Government was not very strong<sup>4</sup> and there were especially internal difficulties in the French Parliament. No French Government could come to a decision on this matter without informing their Parliament and getting their support. If Parliament refused support to the Government on an important matter, then the Government would fall and the next Government was likely to be worse in so far as that particular question was concerned.

7. The Ambassador also suggested that some kind of a token of goodwill, however small, on the part of the Indian Government, would have a very good effect in France. He felt sure that the result of negotiations was likely to be very close to the viewpoint of the Indian Government. Mr Christian Belle was remaining here in case we wanted any further explanations or wished to utilise his presence in some way.

8. I repeated again that we attached value to a friendly settlement and to friendly relations with France and, therefore, we did not wish to do anything which might affect France's prestige in any way. I agreed that the way was by the method of negotiations, but it was not quite clear to me what kind of negotiations and where and how these should take place.

9. The Ambassador replied that once the principle was agreed to, the other details should not offer much difficulty. He again said that there was much goodwill on the part of the French Government and, especially, their Minister of Foreign Affairs,<sup>5</sup> but there were material obstacles, such as the French Parliament. However, if properly approached, they might be able to get over these obstacles.

4. Joseph Laniel, the French Prime Minister, belonged to Independent Republican Party having a voting strength of 55 in the French National Assembly of 627 members.

5. Georges Bidault.

10. I pointed out that at any time it was desirable to have peaceful Settlements. That was our policy and at the present juncture, when grave world issues were pending, this was all the more necessary.

11. I then said that I would give further consideration to this matter and consult my colleagues.

12. I should like to mention this matter briefly to the Cabinet, which is meeting at 5 p.m. today. Fuller consideration should take place in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet, probably tomorrow. Meanwhile, I should like copies made of the letter of the French Prime Minister (in English). I suggest that SG and FS might see me for a few minutes at about 4.15 p.m. today.

## 10. To Joseph Laniel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

23rd April 1954

Dear Mr Prime Minister,

I am grateful to you for your communication of the 16th April,<sup>2</sup> which was handed to me on the 20th April by M. Christian Belle.

2. I fully share with you the sense of responsibility to continue to maintain relations of confidence and friendship between our two countries. I welcome your initiative in writing to me about the Establishments that France still possesses in India and gladly respond to it. As I stated in our Parliament,<sup>3</sup> I am anxious that this problem should be settled between our two countries in a friendly way without leaving any ill will or bitterness between the two nations. Certain recent developments in these Establishments have been a matter of deep regret to us and have naturally produced strong reactions in the whole of India. The deterioration in the situation doubtless adds to our difficulties. But, at the same time, it points to the necessity of both our countries meeting this situation with

1. JN Collection.

2. Laniel hoped that a free exchange of views would help in arriving at an equitable solution of the problem. But he felt that, "the very regrettable measures which have recently complicated the relations on a local plane", would make it difficult to work out an agreed formula, acceptable to both the Governments. He wanted reduction of measures affecting economic and social interests of the population in the French territories, and requested India to facilitate maintenance of law and order by French authorities in their territory.

3. See *ante*, pp. 517-519.



wisdom and speed. This new situation in the French Establishments in India has arisen because of a spontaneous movement of the people there. Although we have inevitably sympathised with this movement, we have kept ourselves aloof and adhered strictly to international practice, because, as I stated in our Parliament, we do not desire to reach unilateral decisions in this matter.

3. This popular movement has demonstrated beyond all doubt that the people of the French Establishments in India desire to unite with the rest of their countrymen in India. What remains now, and is urgently called for, is to bring about this result peacefully and speedily. I entirely agree with you that we shall have to deal with our Parliaments in this matter in accordance with our respective constitutional requirements. Your Government is, of course, aware of the approach we have made to this question and of the suggestions which we have put forward for a friendly settlement. This approach appears to us to be practicable and offers a peaceful and equitable solution satisfactory to both countries.

4. You have referred to international action and mentioned that it is not your intention to seek that course. I should like to make our position clear on this issue. The Government of India have taken no steps which violate any principle of international law or recognised international behaviour. They have endeavoured to adhere strictly to international law and proprieties. As you are well aware, the people of India have passed through certain historic processes, which ultimately led to their independence and the establishment of the Republic of India. It is natural, therefore, that the Government and people of India should have sympathy and a sense of solidarity with people who are themselves Indians and are engaged in the same historic processes, which have led to the independence of India.

5. The Government of India, having regard to their history, the sentiments of the people of this country and modern internationally recognised concepts of the rights of peoples to their freedom, could not permit their territory to be used for the suppression of a popular movement. They have been constrained to take some measures in order to protect their territory and interest. It has not been, and is not, the intention of the Government of India that any of their actions should inflict hardship on the people of the French Establishments in India and, so far as they are aware, no such result has occurred.

6. The Government of India, as always, welcome a peaceful approach and settlement, however difficult the problem may appear. They have already stated that the cultural and other factors that are part of the recent history of these areas would be respected by them. This is also in full accord with the desires and sentiments of the Indian people and with the Constitution of India.

7. In the considered view of the Government of India, the next step is that our two Governments should enter into active negotiations forthwith for the solution of this problem and thus to implement as early as possible the desires of the people concerned.

8. It is naturally our wish, as it must be yours, that during these negotiations nothing should be done which might worsen the situation, and that efforts should be made to create an atmosphere which will be helpful to those negotiations. Should the two Governments decide to enter into negotiations for a peaceful and friendly settlement, we would naturally be disposed as we feel sure you too would be to take such practical steps as are possible to help in creating this atmosphere.

9. Mr Prime Minister, I sincerely welcome your communication to me as an initiative in the direction I have indicated and shall be glad to assist in giving it practical shape. The Government of India, therefore, suggest that the Government of France appoint representatives to discuss these matters with them at New Delhi without delay. The Government of India are not moved by any sense of prestige in this matter and will gladly send a representative to Paris for the same purpose, but they feel that negotiations in India will have a reassuring and calming effect on those concerned and assist to promote our common purpose.

With assurances of my highest esteem and consideration,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 11. Merger Through Negotiations<sup>1</sup>

The recent developments in the French Establishments in India have brought matters to an immediate crisis. As a result of this, the French Government, in spite of their numerous difficulties in Indo-China and elsewhere, have been compelled to take some action and approach us for negotiations on this subject.<sup>2</sup> They have not committed themselves about the future, but there can be no doubt that they are seized now of the reality of the problem and realise that there is no

1. Note to the Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, 7 May 1954. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. On 22 April during discussions in New Delhi between R.K. Nehru and Christian Belle, it was agreed to open negotiations in Paris regarding the French Settlements on 14 May.



way out except by handing over these Establishments to India. They want to do this in a way to save their prestige as far as possible. We should naturally help them in this. Our object is to get these French possessions merged in India and not to create difficulties for the French.

2. Therefore, the coming negotiations in Paris are a welcome development. Any other course would lead to a prolongation of the conflict and later, possibly, to international complications.

3. This fact should be fully appreciated by the pro-merger people in the French Establishments. That is to say, that this new development about negotiations is really a victory of their movement. They must not be apprehensive about these negotiations in any sense, but consider it a logical development which is likely to lead to their gaining the objective they have proclaimed.

4. Probably, these negotiations in Paris would not last very long at this stage.<sup>3</sup> They may not be completed and there may be a second stage, possibly in Delhi. The real difficulty which might cause delay is the uncertain future of the French Government and the Geneva Conference, and, above all, the position in Indo-China which absorbs French attention for the moment. However, I have little doubt that something substantial will be achieved during these talks in Paris.

5. Our position is going to be a firm one as we have stated previously. That is, there must be full merger. For the present, there should be a physical transfer of the territory to India; the *de jure* question can be considered a little later at leisure. We shall adhere to this position and in no way give it up. Of course, innumerable other questions arise about the maintenance of existing cultural and other rights there. We have given guarantees about these and we shall, of course, adhere to them. But that will be a matter for fuller consideration later.

6. If this position is fully realised by the pro-merger elements, then they must adapt themselves to it. This does not mean that they should weaken in their movement. They can certainly continue it as they have been doing. But they should avoid all aggressive incidents involving, in any way, violence. If such an incident occurs, they might well queer the pitch and weaken our position at a critical moment. Therefore, the movement should be peacefully carried on without any attempt to create incidents.

7. We have given a vague assurance to the French Government that if negotiations are started we may relax some of the measures that we have taken recently. It was thought that this might create a favourable impression on the

3. The Paris negotiations broke down on 4 June 1954 after it was found impossible to reconcile the opposing viewpoints on the conditions under which transfer of sovereignty should take place.

French Parliament. Obviously, we cannot relax any vital thing. Thus, it is quite clear that we will not permit French police or armed force to cross our territory into the enclaves which have been liberated from French rule.<sup>4</sup> This is the principal point to be remembered.

8. What else can we do?:

- (1) We might relax somewhat the issuing of permits, i.e., permits may be multi-journey<sup>5</sup> permits etc. or some other such relaxation;
- (2) we might allow a little more petrol to go there, provided always that this is distributed without discrimination;<sup>6</sup>
- (3) there are large numbers of parcels, about a thousand, lying in Madras, addressed to Pondicherry. We have to deal with them in some way. Probably, the best course would be to return them to the senders. This must be considered.<sup>7</sup>

9. Any of these courses adopted by us does not directly affect the movement or strengthen French authority. On the other hand, they are signs of our own strength. At any moment we can make these measures stricter or even introduce new measures. But a gesture of this kind, without injuring the movement, by us may be very helpful in the negotiations.

10. I want this to be fully appreciated both by the Madras Government and the pro-merger people in the French Establishments. There should be no apprehension on this score in their minds and no thought that we are weakening on the major issues involved. We are proceeding as a Government and with a view to ending this matter favourably to us without leaving a trail of conflict

4. By 30 April 1954, one-fourth of the French Indian Possessions had been liberated by the pro merger elements. Only the bigger Settlements like Pondicherry, Mahé, Karaikal and Yanam remained under French control.
5. On 19 April Government of India introduced a permit system for regulating travel between the French Settlements and India when the Consul General of India at Pondicherry was authorized to issue single journey visas on identity certificates issued by the French authorities to the residents of the Settlements. On 18 May, the Government of India instructed the Consul General to issue multi-journey visas at his discretion.
6. The Government of India on 18 May decided to resume supply of petrol and petroleum products on the basis of monthly quotas. Toward the end of March, export of these items to French Settlements were banned.
7. Some postal articles, intended for delivery through Indian post offices to the French Settlements were held up for completion of customs formalities. The Government of India on 18 May as a gesture of goodwill decided to release the parcels for onward transmission to the addressees.



behind. It would be easy enough for us to take possession of these Establishments, but that would be a running sore between India and France and the change-over in these French Establishments would have this legacy to face. There might be international complications also. Therefore, it is obvious that we should adopt the wise course of peaceful negotiations, while at the same time we maintain our strength. This way we achieve our end honourably and without loss of prestige of either party. This is the way of satyagraha which Gandhiji taught us, and the pro-merger people who are carrying on a peaceful movement for merger will, no doubt, appreciate this.

11. We could have left these negotiations to our Ambassador in Paris. But we were anxious that someone should go from here who was in intimate touch with recent developments in the French Establishments and had in fact personally come in contact with the pro-merger leaders so that he could know their viewpoint fully. That is why we are sending special representatives from here.

12. We shall keep in touch with our Consul General, of course, and whenever possible we shall ascertain the views of the pro-merger leaders, as well as Madras Government.

13. I am sending this note so as to make the position clear both to the Madras Government and our Consul General who can explain this situation fully, in an informal manner, to the pro-merger leaders. It must be remembered that we as a Government are not responsible for the movement and therefore nothing should be said or done to embarrass us in this way....

## 12. Reactions to the French Proposals<sup>1</sup>

I have seen Foreign Secretary's telegram<sup>2</sup> No. 9 of May 26 to you and your provisional reply.<sup>3</sup> It is desirable for Kewal Singh to be informed and asked to sound local leaders and report their reaction.

1. Note to the Secretary General, 27 May 1954. JN Collection.
2. R.K. Nehru, the head of Indian delegation to Paris, wrote that during plenary discussions he noticed that the French Government was not in a position to accept the principle of total transfer of administration in the Settlements and insisted that some departments there had to remain with them till transfer of sovereignty.
3. N.R. Pillai, the Secretary General, in his cable promised to send reply on receipt of the Prime Minister's instructions and advised R.K. Nehru to deal with matters like serious situation at Yanam etc. in the next meeting.

2. In view of present French proposals,<sup>4</sup> our attitude should not be of rejection but of proposing amendments to them. It should be made clear that French accept transfer of sovereignty in principle and some time limit should be laid down for subsequent steps and ultimate transfer. Referendum should not be agreed to, but we may agree to final proposal being legalised in accordance with constitutional requirements of both countries.

3. Transitory arrangements should end at conclusion of period specified above. In these arrangements any diarchy of authority should be avoided. We might accept two delegates representing France and India respectively to take the place of French Commissioner in Pondicherry. Indian delegate must have Police and Judiciary in his charge.

4. There may be Advisers as suggested.

5. In Mahe, Karaikal and Yanam, new Administrators must be approved by India if not appointed by India.

6. Enclaves under popular control to be taken over by India completely.

7. There seems no reason why present Council of 84 and Municipal Council should be replaced by new Council. Their continuance appears both desirable and proper during this transitory period which should not be lost.

8. It is not quite clear what will happen in Pondicherry itself except that two delegates will be in control.

9. Generally I agree with paragraph 6 of Foreign Secretary's telegram.<sup>5</sup> He should continue negotiation insisting on transfer of Police and Judiciary to Indian portfolio.

10. Important points are: French agreement to transfer of sovereignty in principle and actual transfer of important departments immediately. These

4. Main points of the French proposals were: (i) France was prepared to accept transfer of sovereignty in principle. But after transitory arrangements dealing with immediate situation had been made, negotiations should start for transfer of sovereignty which should be ratified by people in accordance with constitutional requirements; (ii) under transitory arrangements the French Commissioner in Pondicherry would be replaced by two delegates representing France and India. Departments of Economic Affairs, Customs and Public Works would be under the Indian delegate and the French delegate would have the departments of Police and Judiciary. Each delegate would have right to advise the other; (iii) existing Commissioner would be replaced by a new one and the Council of 84 and Municipal Councils would be replaced by new members jointly by France and India; (iv) new Administrators in Mahe, Karaikal and Yanam would be appointed with the approval of India. Enclaves under popular control would be taken over completely by India.
5. It suggested that if negotiations had to be discontinued, it would be better to break off on the question of inclusion of Police and Judiciary in Indian portfolio.



departments must include Police and Judiciary. Otherwise we cannot control situation. Also some limit for transitional period.

11. We cannot make ourselves responsible for divided administration in which we are directly or indirectly responsible for continuation of French colonial rule. Hence importance of Police and Judiciary and limitation of period.

12. These are my present reactions. You will no doubt give full thought to this matter and get reactions from Pondicherry.

### 13. Suggestions for Negotiations with France<sup>1</sup>

I have seen Foreign Secretary's telegram<sup>2</sup> No. 10 dated 27th May and your note dated 28th May.<sup>3</sup>

It seem to me that everything depends on the transfer of Police and Judiciary. of these two, Police is more important. Unless the law and order aspect is transferred to us, we cannot possibly undertake any responsibility. I would not mind, during this temporary period, for any other less important subject not to be transferred. But the whole position depends upon police activities and we must control them fully.

As for consultation of the people, I have indicated in my last message that we are prepared to consider this matter, even though we are not agreeable to a

1. Note to the Secretary General, 29 May 1954. JN Collection.
2. R.K. Nehru had written that the French had clarified that some immediate transfer of authority would take place as part of transitory regime. Complete transfer of sovereignty would be subject to further negotiations which would be part of arrangement to be ratified by the people. R.K. Nehru suggested that he would tell the French that India was agreeable to sharing of authority as transitory measure as against her previous demand for complete *de facto* transfer provided Police and Judiciary were transferred to India.
3. N.R. Pillai had written that the French proposals were being discussed with Madras Chief Minister, Kewal Singh and the pro-merger leaders. He enclosed with his note a draft telegram to be sent to R.K. Nehru seeking clarifications from the French on certain points such as:- (i) principle of transfer of sovereignty; (ii) envisaged period of transition; (iii) nature and purpose of the technical and other common issues relating to full transfer; (iv) precise nature of proposed popular consultation in place of formal referendum; (v) exact nature of financial union suggested by the French as condition for transfer of certain departments to the Indian delegate.

formal referendum. But this can only be considered after a substantial transfer of authority, including Police, is made now and for the transition period.

You might make this clear to the Foreign Secretary repeating that the transfer of Police and Judiciary is the crux of the matter and without that we are unable to proceed further. Other matters can be discussed.

For the rest, you should ask for full clarification as in you draft telegram.



LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS





New Delhi  
1st February 1954

My dear Chief Minister,

Since I wrote to you last on the 18th January, much has happened. In India, the chief events have been the Congress session at Kalyani<sup>2</sup> and the Republic Day celebrations in Delhi and the rest of the country. In Korea, many developments have taken place and the great bulk of the prisoners of war have been restored to the detaining sides.

2. The Congress session at Kalyani had a peculiar importance. It was held in Bengal after a full quarter of a century. During this period, Bengal had ceased to be what it was and a large part of it had become incorporated in another country. West Bengal remained, facing its tremendous problems with fortitude and courage. It is well to remember that Bengal was the cradle of our nationalist movement and many of the giants of old came from Bengal. It was also in Calcutta twenty-five years ago that the Congress passed a resolution<sup>3</sup> which inevitably led to the Independence resolution of the Lahore Congress<sup>4</sup> which followed. Thus, we met in Bengal again after fulfilling that pledge which was taken a quarter of a century ago in Calcutta.

3. Another reason for the importance of this session of the Congress was a feeling of something approaching a crisis in our international relations. Crisis is perhaps too big a word for us to use in this connection but, undoubtedly, a major change had taken place, which might well lead to critical days ahead. That change relates not only to our neighbour country, Pakistan, but even more so, to the United States of America. Our people, all over the country, had reacted to these new developments and were very conscious that something important was occurring. Even before the Congress met, there had been unanimous expressions of public opinion in all its forms all over the country, supporting

1. File No. 25(6)/53-PMS. These letters have been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964*, Vol. 3, (New Delhi, 1987), pp. 487-509, 513-521 and 524-548.
2. Annual session of the Indian National Congress at Kalyani, West Bengal, from 19 to 24 January 1954.
3. Moved by Gandhiji on 26 December 1928 the AICC passed the resolution on 29 December in Calcutta, stating that if the British Government did not accept the All Parties Committee's demand for a dominion status by 31 December 1929, the Congress would resort to "non-violent non-cooperation" and work for complete independence of India.
4. On 31 December 1929 the Lahore Congress declared complete independence of India as its goal.

the policy that the Government of India was following.<sup>5</sup> Seldom have we seen such a widespread, conscious and unanimous reaction, and foreign observers, not always friendly to India, realized that here was a proud country refusing to submit to pressure.

4. The people gathered at Kalyani sensed this public feeling, and it was natural that the Congress should deal with it in its own way. That way was a realistic analysis of the situation and a call to the people to meet it in the way we have met perils and dangers in the past.<sup>6</sup> Stress was laid on our desire for friendly relations with Pakistan and the USA, so that, in the excitement of the moment, our people should not be diverted into wrong paths. We are not anti-Pakistan or anti-America or indeed anti any other people or country. Indeed, it is inevitable, having regard to geography, past history and culture and the requirements of the present, that India and Pakistan should live in friendly co-operation. No present controversy or problem between the two countries should be allowed to overshadow this basic fact. So also, we desire friendly relations with the United States of America, that great country, which is playing such an important role in world affairs and on whom a tremendous responsibility is cast. It is not, therefore, through any ill will to Pakistan or the USA, much less to their peoples, that we have reacted in the way we have done to the proposals of military aid from the US to Pakistan. We have reacted in this way for basic reasons, which are stated briefly in the Congress resolution. Even the quantum of military aid is not so important. It is the policy underlying it and the inevitable consequences of it that are dangerous from the point of view of peace and war as well as the freedom of Asia.

5. We have kept ourselves away from any military entanglements and alignments with the two power blocs. We have, however, avoided criticisms of other countries, policies as far as we could. Sometimes, we have had to express an opinion in the UN or in our Parliament. Even so, we spoke moderately, but this intrusion of a new and dangerous elements in the politics of Asia, right across our border, was not a matter which could be viewed by us lightly. Some people in foreign countries have criticized us for making much of this and, more especially, for encouraging the public to express itself about it.<sup>7</sup> It was

5. For example, the Praja Socialist Party, the Communist Party of India, the All India Peace Council and the Provincial Congress Committees condemned the proposed US-Pakistan military pact.

6. The resolution passed by the Congress on 24 January 1954 described the situation created by the US offer of military aid to Pakistan as grave and reminded the United States of her "long record as champion of freedom and democracy," and urged her to refrain from taking any step which would reverse the process of history in Asia.

7. For example, the *Daily Express*, London, on 14 January and the *Dawn*, Karachi, on 21 January 1954.



said that this was a new form of diplomacy, trying to support, by public demonstrations, a policy that our Foreign Office and our diplomats were pursuing.<sup>8</sup> To some extent, this is true. But our critics forget that we are the children of a revolutionary period in India's history. We have derived our strength from our people and we go to those people whenever any important development takes place which is likely to affect them. Our view of diplomacy is not limited to the secret functioning of Foreign Office or even the working of Parliament. We have both to tell our people what is happening and to draw strength from them. If a crisis comes, it is those people who count. How then are we to ignore them?

6. There is another aspect of this question. If we do not give a proper lead to our people in such matters, others are likely to give an improper lead. If we are a wide awake Government and a living organization, we have to function accordingly in concert with our people.

7. The Congress passed a number of resolutions dealing with international matters.<sup>9</sup> As a matter of fact, all these resolutions are parts of an organic and integrated view of the situation. They hang together. Indeed, even the resolutions dealing with the domestic situation are parts of this integrated outlook. Therefore, all these resolutions should be considered in their entirety. I am sending you with this letter a copy of these resolutions for your reference and I would beg of you to read them very carefully and to see that they are fully understood, in all their implications, by others. All the resolutions ultimately lead to the final one which is entitled 'A Call to the Nation'.<sup>10</sup> There is nothing dramatic or flamboyant about this resolution. It is simple and brief; yet there is, I believe, strength and faith in this, as in other resolutions. It is not a cry of fear or of weakness. As a foreign correspondent said: "Here was a proud nation reacting to a certain situation."

8. The call has come and we have to answer the call. We have made it clear

8. On 4 January 1954, the Pakistan Government protested against "a planned campaign" in India to organize protests. The Government of India rejected the protest on the next day.

9. Three resolutions—on Korea, colonial domination and racial discrimination, and India's foreign policy—expressed appreciation of the policy pursued by the Government in this regard, hoped that a decision would be taken soon by the political conference to end the stalemate in Korea and that nationalism would ultimately triumph in Africa and Asia despite the support given to "the feudal and reactionary regimes" by some western powers. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 452-453, 547-548 and 585.

10. The resolution said that in view of the fast deteriorating international situation, the country's unity and spirit of self-reliance should be sustained by improving economic and social conditions. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 98-103.

that our way is not a way of war but of peace and our idea of strengthening a nation is to rely on ourselves and develop the country as rapidly as possible.

9. Some people in Pakistan and elsewhere say that we are jealous of the possibility of Pakistan becoming strong with foreign aid.<sup>11</sup> That is a complete misunderstanding. We are convinced that foreign aid of this kind does not strengthen a nation but rather weakens it in the long run. In the short run, it means, whatever may be said to the contrary, a limitation of the independence of action of a country. We know very well that a gesture from us would bring very considerable military aid to us from the United States. But that gesture is not going to be made, because we value our freedom and we know that freedom cannot be preserved by others for us. Even though we may get some temporary increase in our armed strength, we shall lose the essence of freedom and that spirit of self-reliance without which no free country can subsist for long.

10. I dislike joining in the game of praising my own country at the expense of others. Every country has that feeling. I do not wish to say that India has a particular mission for others and all that, but, at the same time, I see no reason why we should accept other people's missions to improve us or, as is said, to protect us. I believe that India has a certain individuality, a certain genius of her own, as many other countries also have. Each can give something to others as well as receive from them. Difficulties arise when so-called gifts are imposed upon one and policies thrust down by one country upon another. If such gifts are accepted, then the individuality of the nation accepting it suffers and such particular contribution that it can make to the world suffers equally. We have no desire to impose ourselves on others in any way and we have no intentions of being imposed upon. If a policy of live and let live was followed by the nations of the world, there would be no war and no major conflict. Today, however, we are faced with attempts by powerful nations to impose themselves upon others and to expect these others to follow their particular line of action or even their way of living, and they are even prepared to go to war for this purpose. In this conflict of desires and urges, fears and passions, we have, in our own small way, attempted to keep an area of peace, where the cold war, with its hatred and violence, does not receive encouragement. That policy is not only ideally sound but practically the only safe policy to pursue.

11. We had hoped that other countries, more especially in Asia, would pursue a like policy, so that this area of peace might cover a good part of Asia. I have no doubt that many Asian countries feel this way, but some of them are subjected to heavy pressure and sometimes fear assails them.

11. For instance, Ian Stephens, former editor of *The Statesman*, stated on 26 January at Karachi that the underlying reason for India's strong reaction had been her desire to keep Pakistan "weak".



12. An eminent Egyptian recently coined a new word—Afrasia. We have heard of Eurasia and Amerasia. The idea of Africa and Asia having common interests and trying to cooperate in some measure is a relatively new development. But it represents a significant trend, which should be encouraged. Uptil now, it has almost been taken for granted that Europe or America must play a dominant role in the rest of the world. That idea no longer holds good, in our minds at least. Europe or rather Western Europe, still clings to that idea to some extent, but is, on the whole, in retreat. The United States of America, however, are a young, powerful and dynamic country, believing in their own destiny to shape the world after their own image. So also, in a different way, is the Soviet Union. I think that the time has come when we should state politely but firmly that the countries of Asia and Africa also happen to have a mind and will of their own. It is extraordinary that questions relating to the future of Asia should be settled in Europe or America without even a proper reference to the people concerned.

13. All of you have celebrated the Republic Day in your respective states. I can speak only from personal knowledge of Delhi, though I have had reports of elaborate and successful functions all over the country. There can be little doubt that Republic Day has established itself as a great popular festival and is not merely an official function. In Delhi, the Republic Day parade and pageant were an improvement on the past year and were tremendously impressive. There were many eminent foreign representatives present, apart from the diplomats, and I think that each one of them realized that something remarkable was happening in India. Here was a great nation, determined to make good, marching forward to its goal and progressively making good. The military part of the parade was, as usual, good, and the smart and efficient bearing of our soldiers, sailors and airmen warmed our hearts. There were also representatives of the Territorial Army and the National Cadet Corps, both boys and girls. There were the school children of Delhi in large numbers and of all ages and there was the great cultural pageant, in the making of which many States had contributed. The tableaux were very fine and artistic. As a part of this great cultural display came many hundreds of folk dancers in their varied and many coloured attire, bringing a touch of gaiety and dance and song to this pageant of India. They also brought out the infinite variety of India, all unified in our great Republic under our beautiful flag.

14. I do not know how others felt on this occasion. I know that I felt proud and greatly moved at this entire spectacle of India on the march. There were the people of our defence forces, our youth, our children, our fellow-citizens from far off outposts of the Indian Union, our dancers and singers, all combining to bring about a noble pageant of India today. There was a sense of balance about it and a dynamism, a feeling of pride. I have no doubt that the vast numbers of people who saw this parade and pageant had a feeling of pride

in India and, more especially, in the way we were progressing and making good.

15. Last year we invited a large number of representatives from our tribal areas and, more especially, folk dancers from them. This was a happy thought and this year it was improved upon. There were about 700 of them in Delhi from all parts of India, each fascinating in its own way, each a small pattern in the rich garment of India. Above all, this was important because it showed not only to us but to the world that was looking on how much importance we attach to these fellow-citizens of ours and to the development of the basic culture of our people. In our political life, we tend to forget that life consists of other things than politics, and indeed, that the other things are more important than politics, even though politics often overshadows the rest.

16. Many people in India talk a great deal of culture, usually in connection with language. Their idea of culture appears to be to exclude this and that, to introduce some dead conformity and to produce something artificial and unrelated to life and the living and varied traditions of our people. There was far more culture in this assembly of dancers from various parts of India than in the small rooms or halls where the learned discourse about it.

17. We have to encourage this cultural tradition of India, which is so strong and so deep and, if we are to impress our people, we have to speak to them in terms of that tradition. In our developmental programmes, this aspect of culture must be given a prominent place. That will give those programmes more life than the speeches we deliver. Some of our people go to distant countries abroad to learn the art of publicity and social service. They come back full of very good ideas, which are totally inapplicable to India and which have no relation to conditions here. These experts speak to our people in ways which are foreign to them and, therefore, do not convey much understanding. It has always surprised me that anyone should seek to learn the art of approaching our people in foreign countries. The only real way of conveying any message to the people is to be in tune with them, to live with them, to speak their language and to understand their ways. The art of publicity in India can be learnt much more by mixing with our own people on friendly terms and, more particularly, in understanding their songs and dances. The art of social service in India can be learnt much more by going to Sevagram or many other like places in India than by going to the social service centres or publicity experts of America. I do not know how many of you have heard of Tukdoji Maharaj,<sup>12</sup> who functions specially in Madhya

12. (1909-1968); social activist; took part in the national movement and devoted himself to national reconstruction with emphasis on khadi, village industries, prohibition, illiteracy eradication and Harijan uplift; founded Sri Gurudeo Sevashram at Nagpur, 1947 and Guru-Kunj Ashram at Mozari in Amravati district, 1954.



Pradesh. He is a man of religion, in the widest sense of the word, not sectarian, but he has undertaken to develop the countryside and by fitting himself into the life of the people, he is bringing about a silent revolution in hundreds of villages. Without the slightest external help, he is doing something which the people running our community projects might well envy.

18. A part of the Republic Day celebrations was a rally of the National Cadet Corps in Delhi. This consisted of both boys and girls and there were the new Auxiliaries. I was glad to see them. The time has, however, come for us to extend this NCC rapidly all over the country. In particular, the auxiliary NCC should include in its scope all the colleges and schools in India. We give them this training not to produce regular soldiers, but to improve them in many ways, both physically and mentally. You know that the NCC cadets have done very good work in the social service sphere. But the main thing is to discipline this younger generation. I hope, therefore, that your Government will encourage in every way both the senior and junior wings of the NCC as well as the Auxiliaries. Any money spent on them is well spent. We are continually talking about student indiscipline and other troubles that we are having in our colleges and universities. Let us improve our educational systems and methods by all means, but let us lay stress on this obvious way of improving our younger generation. The Territorial Army and its auxiliary should also be expanded rapidly.

19. In Korea, the chapter of the functioning of our custodial force is gradually coming to an end. The great bulk of the prisoners of war have been handed back to the detaining sides.<sup>13</sup> Both of them protested and objected to some of our decisions, but we stuck to them and the POWs. were handed over. It is true that the UN Command immediately released them, contrary to our wishes in the matter. What is worse is that these POWs were handed over to the South Korean Government and the Formosa Government.

20. At present only 121 POWs remain with the custodial force. Of these 17 are persons who were being tried by court martial for grave offences. In some cases, the trial was almost over and *prima facie* cases had been established against these POWs. The trial could not be concluded because the UN Command refused to give facilities for it towards the end. The defence witnesses could not come. Obviously the right course would be for these trials to be concluded, while our forces are there. If that does not happen, and it is unlikely to happen in view of UN Command's views in this matters, then the only course open to us is to hand them over to the UN Command expressly asking them to continue the trial.

21. Then there are 104 POWs who refused to be repatriated and, at the same time, did not want to be handed over to their old detaining sides. Some of

13. On 20 January 1954.

them wanted to go to neutral countries. These people are offering a problem to us. If we can settle their future by reference to other countries, we shall send them there. Those, whose future cannot be settled before we leave, will have to be brought over by us to India. We cannot leave them there. Indeed some of them threaten to commit suicide if we leave them there in this way. It is likely that we may have to bring about 30 or 40 such POWs to India for a temporary stay here till their fate is decided.

22. The Kashmir Prime Minister, Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad, has been in Delhi with some of his colleagues, discussing the constitutional set up as between Kashmir and India. These talks have had a satisfactory result.<sup>14</sup> The Kashmir Government will soon put up certain proposals before their Constituent Assembly for implementing the Delhi Pact of 1952 and deciding various other matters also, including that of financial integration.

23. In my last letter to you, I referred to the urgent necessity of our revising our administrative rules and regulations. In this connection, I should like to remind you that the Planning Commission gave a good deal of thought and have discussed these at some length in the Five Year Plan. The conclusions in those chapters of the Five Year Plan were arrived at after long discussion between Ministers and the Planning Commission. Unfortunately, little has been done to give effect to them. I think that both the Central Government and the state governments should refer to these chapters of the Planning Commission's report and immediately give effect to the recommendations made. Later I hope to write to you about certain other proposals that are being considered in this connection.

24. I am leaving tomorrow for Allahabad where I shall spend two days at the time of the Kumbh Mela. From there I am going to Travancore-Cochin for five days' stay in connection with the coming elections. I hope to return to Delhi on the 10th February. On the 12th and 13th and again on the 16th February, I shall go to Pepsu, also on an election tour. Parliament, as you know, will open on the 15th February. I hope to remain in Delhi more or less continuously after the 16th.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

14. See *ante*, p. 329, fn. 7.



## II

New Delhi

15th March 1954

My dear Chief Minister,

It seems an age since I wrote to you last. It is in fact six weeks. I have thus missed two of my fortnightlies, and yet, this period of six weeks has been full of notable events on which I would have written to you. These events have crowded in upon us, one after the other, and left us little time to consider the full significance of each. As it is, the first quarter of every year is probably the busiest season for us in India. It is full of important conferences. The year begins with the Science Congress, somewhere in India,<sup>1</sup> and we have the annual session of the National Congress. Both of these, and of course especially the latter, take up a great deal of time and energy of some of us. Many of these conferences attract eminent visitors from abroad and they take up a lot of time. Then we have the Republic Day celebrations, which are becoming fuller and more significant year after year. This year there was the Kumbh Mela, culminating in tragedy.<sup>2</sup> There were also general elections in two States, Travancore-Cochin and Pepsu. There were the developments in Korea, with which we were intimately concerned, as the burden of decision fell on us, because of the conflict of views between the two Commands. The US military aid to Pakistan was an issue which naturally created a powerful impression all over India, not to mention other countries, and compelled us to consider various aspects of our policy afresh. There was the Governors' Conference.<sup>3</sup> Two of our most important visitors were the Prime Minister of Ceylon<sup>4</sup> and the Prime Minister of Canada.<sup>5</sup> Then there has been the budget session in Parliament.<sup>6</sup>

2. This is a very brief summary of some of our activities and the problems that we have had to face. In the outside world strange and unexpected things

1. Nehru inaugurated the Indian Science Congress at Hyderabad on 2 January 1954.
2. On 3 February about 400 pilgrims were killed in a stampede at Prayag.
3. The conference of Governors and Rajpramukhs was held on 1 and 2 March 1954.
4. See *Selected Works* (second series), vol. 24, pp. 613-615.
5. Louis Stephen St Laurent visited India from 21 to 28 February 1954.
6. On 19 and 27 February the railway and general budgets were presented respectively in the House of the People.

have happened, more particularly in Egypt<sup>7</sup> and Syria,<sup>8</sup> and the Berlin Four Power Conference has been held,<sup>9</sup> yielding little result, but at least taking one small step forward in deciding upon a conference to be held at Geneva in April next at which the People's Government of China is also to be represented.

3. I could have written much to you about these and other matter because they deserve our consideration. But the very abundance of these activities has absorbed all my time and prevented me from writing. I am very sorry for this because I attach importance to my keeping in touch with you in this and other ways. Perhaps I tend sometimes to undertake to do more than my capacity would justify. I have had a warning of this only recently on returning from a brief but intensive tour in Madhya Bharat.<sup>10</sup> I have spent the last five days more or less in bed recovering from a slight infection. It was nothing serious, but it did indicate that I was overdoing things. Indeed I am dictating this letter from bed. My doctors and friends insist on my going slower in future. There is absolutely nothing to worry about, but I suppose I shall have to agree not to rush about quite so much as I have done in the past. I hope you will bear with me if I cannot undertake quite so many engagements in future as I have thus far done.

4. I do not quite know what subjects I should write to you about now out of the multitude that I have in my mind. Both the internal and external situations deserve our closest attention. We have to be wide awake all the time and be responsive to new trends, new forces, new ideas, new developments. Nothing is more unwise than complacency. The US military aid to Pakistan<sup>11</sup> is a very vital development with far-reaching consequences. There is no need for us to take up an alarmist view of the situation, but this does require rethinking in many ways. I shall refer to this matter a little later.

5. The general elections that took place in Pepsu and Travancore-Cochin also deserve careful analysis. Broadly speaking, we have won handsomely in Pepsu and have been gravely disappointed at the result of the Travancore-Cochin elections, where we expected a much greater success. And yet, we must always remember that the actual result in Travancore-Cochin was not so bad as people imagined. Actually the Congress Party bettered its position somewhat. In numbers

7. On 25 February, Gamal Abdel Nasser took over from Mohammad Neguib as Premier. On 8 March, Neguib was reappointed as Premier and Nasser became Military Governor and Vice-Premier.

8. Serious riots broke out in Damascus following a coup overthrowing President Shishakli's Government on 25 February. On 1 March, M. Harhem Atassi, took over as the new President and announced that the Constitution adopted in 1950 had been restored and a future Parliament would draw up a new Constitution.

9. See *ante*, p. 364, fn. 5.

10. From 7 to 10 March 1954.

11. See *ante*, p. 333, fn. 2.



it was slightly better and in voting strength it was much better than two years ago. Nevertheless, it is true that the majority of the electorate voted for the various parties of the Opposition. The position in Travancore-Cochin is still rather a fluid one and much depends upon the final decision of the Praja Socialist Party, which, though relatively small in numbers, occupies a position of vantage. Normally the Congress Party, which is the biggest single party, would have attempted to form a ministry with the cooperation of others, if such cooperation was available. Indeed, in the circumstances in Travancore-Cochin, no single party can form a government without the active or passive cooperation of some other group. The Congress Party deliberately, and I think rightly, has not put itself forward as a claimant for the ministry, in spite of its dominant position.

6. The election in Travancore-Cochin has shown us that it is quite likely that in future clear single party majorities might not be available in states. The result would be some form of coalitions between like minded groups or a fluid and unstable state of affairs. We must think of such situations from the broadest national point of view and not merely from a narrow party viewpoint. We must accept this type of development and adapt ourselves to it. Another important line of thought flowing from the Travancore-Cochin elections is that there is a vague feeling of dissatisfaction among the electorate with the present governments. I do not think this goes far and to some extent it is natural in a democratic set-up. Every existing government has to face that desire for a change in the electorate. I am, however, referring to something deeper than that. It is a feeling that the Congress is not progressive enough and is becoming a little too static and conservative. It is easy of course for all opposition parties to talk in a big way and people in responsible positions have necessarily to be more careful both in their talk and in their policies. Personally I have a fairly high opinion of the intelligence of the Indian electorate. They may make many mistakes and they are quite capable of being swept away by some momentary urge but, by and large, they are as good an electorate as anywhere else. Travelling about a good deal and meeting large numbers of people in various parts of the country, I make myself receptive to their feelings and reactions. The impression I get is, and this is derived not only from the general public but even from the Congress rank and file, that we are not moving fast enough and are much too cautious and conservative. That, I think, correctly represents the viewpoint of even the Congress as a whole and more so of some other groups. It is true that the people generally have, I think, a great deal of faith in the present leadership and our achievements have not been inconsiderable. I am pointing this out to you because we have to keep wide awake and always in touch with the minds of our people. It is only then that we can give it a proper direction. Before doing so, of course, we have to direct our own minds consciously in that particular direction. We are passing through a special stage when the period of the first Five Year Plan is gradually coming to an end and thoughts are being directed to the drawing

up of the second Five Year Plan. That is just the time when we have to think anew about our approaches and not be afraid of self-criticism.

7. You know that latest developments in regard to the US military aid to Pakistan and you must have seen my statement in Parliament.<sup>12</sup> This matter has been before us for the last three or four months, and we had repeatedly given a clear expression of our opinion. The United States took their final decision and, inevitably, our decision followed. It must be remembered that this is no sudden or new development, as for the last two or three years there has been this tendency visible in the United States. Practically all the policies of the US have been increasingly based on military considerations and the prospect of a third world war. It is called a policy of containment of the communist world. Attaching importance to military factors alone, they have tended to ignore other major factors. A military base becomes more important than the goodwill of people. There are, I believe, over 200 American military bases all over the world, outside the United States. The result of this policy had led the United States to support reactionary as well as colonial regimes in various parts of the world. Some of the symbols of the "free world", for which America stands, are Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-shek and Bao Dai. It is not surprising that these symbolic figures do not bring visions of freedom in people's minds. In North Africa, French colonialism is directly or indirectly supported by the United States. In Spain, the fascist regime has entered into an alliance with the US.<sup>13</sup> This process is now continuing in Western Asia, often at the expense of the United Kingdom. Logically, from a purely military point of view this addition to bases and points of vantage might perhaps be justified, though there is no such thing as a purely military point of view when larger questions of strategy are considered. People count and the urges of large numbers of them cannot be ignored. In the United States, what is called McCarthyism<sup>14</sup> has become a very important force which almost openly challenges even the President and the Administration. US policy has thus both in the domestic and the international field, tended to become more conservative and rather tied up with reactionary elements in various parts of the world. America, instead of appearing as a liberating force, takes on the guise of something the reverse of it in the minds of many people in Asia and Africa. There is an obvious tendency to dictate the policies of other countries and a resentment where the other country does not fall in line. Even great

12. See *ante*, pp. 335-343.

13. On 26 September 1953, the USA and Spain signed a 20-year defence agreement which provided for the development and use of naval and air bases on Spanish soil by the United States in return for the supply of military equipment to Spain.

14. A political plan for getting rid of any publicly known person who might be connected with communism. Father of this policy was the US Senator J.R. McCarthy of the Republican Party.



countries like the United Kingdom are told openly what they should do and what they should not do. A recent statement by the American Assistant Secretary of State clearly indicated that the United States wish to have a dominating position in Asia.<sup>15</sup>

8. All this is justified on the plea of stopping communist aggression. It is not clear how far this affects the communist countries, except in so far as that the cold war continues and a shooting war is kept in view. But immediately this policy does affect the policies and freedom of other countries, notably in Asia. I have dealt with this aspect frequently in my public statements<sup>16</sup> and I need not emphasize it. What I would like you to bear in mind is that during the last two or three years American policy has been concerned with Kashmir for two reasons. One is its geographical position from the military point of view and the possibility of having a base in the heart of Asia. The other is the possibility of rich mineral wealth in Kashmir. An important element in American policy appears to be to control the sources of mineral wealth in various parts of the world. The US is rich in its mineral resources, but it is exhausting them rather fast. Hence its desire to control other sources, more especially those which have what are called strategic minerals.

9. In the Kashmir conflict, the US naturally inclines towards Pakistan because Pakistan was a more pliable country. Indeed, Pakistan has been working for some kind of a close arrangement with the US for the last two or three years. Pakistan's objective had little to do with the communist countries and had almost everything to do with India. The US also gradually began to woo Muslim countries. More and more conscious of their destiny of world leadership, they have tried to push out the UK from the Middle East and take their position as the leading power there. This has been no sudden development and has been a long-term policy. Step by step they have come to this agreement with Pakistan. This agreement is not, in strict terms, a military alliance, and yet, in effect, it is something more than that, and Pakistan passes under US political and military influence. We do not know the volume of military aid that might be given. This is indeterminate and can be increased at will. It is unreasonable to imagine that the United States has deliberately adopted this basic policy even at the expense of injuring its relations with India, merely to give some little aid to Pakistan. That aid is bound to be substantial. A military mission has already gone to Pakistan.<sup>17</sup> There will no doubt be surveys of mineral resources, particularly of

15. See *ante*, pp. 341-342.

16. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 449-450 and *ante*, pp. 335-343.

17. The US military mission arrived in Karachi on 22 March 1954 to make recommendations on military aid to Pakistan.

uranium and other strategic minerals. There will be construction of airfields and communications and probably particular attention will be paid to air development. As a matter of fact, Pakistan has not got the trained personnel to deal with these developments. I have little doubt that American technical personnel will come there in large numbers. It must be remembered that the United States seldom function in a small way. In effect, therefore, Pakistan becomes a base for American political and military activity.

10. So far as Pakistan is concerned, I am quite sure that they have no fear of a Russian or Chinese invasion. A look at the map will convince anyone that it is almost physically impossible for such an invasion to take place across some of the highest mountains in the world. Obviously, Pakistan thinks of utilizing this aid against India. It is probably a fact that the US Government do not want this to happen and will discourage it. But they have not been able to hold Syngman Rhee in Korea.

11. All this poses difficult problems for us. For us to accept this American policy or fall in line with Pakistan and accept American military aid would be to write off our freedom and indeed to write off Asian freedom. It so happens that India is practically the only country which has shown some independence and self-respect in this matter. For India to surrender would be not only an Asian but a world tragedy. Of course, we have no intention of doing so and the country has clearly indicated what it thinks about this matter.

12. The giving of military aid by the US to Pakistan, in the peculiar circumstances of Indo-Pakistan conflicts, is a clear breach of neutrality by the US. The US, therefore, cannot be considered a neutral country in so far as any disputes between India and Pakistan are concerned. A natural consequence of this is that we should ask for the withdrawal of US observers in Kashmir. We have done so. The Secretary General of the UN has not given any firm answer yet but has advanced certain rather weak arguments against it.<sup>18</sup> There is nothing in those arguments and we shall politely but firmly insist on the withdrawal of these observers.

13. Other questions arise relating to American aid to India and the large numbers of US citizens who are functioning in various technical and other capacities in India. There is no reason for us to act in this matter in a hurry or without full thought. But we must recognize that things cannot remain where they are. They must move in one direction or the other. We cannot permit facilities to any foreign element for propaganda or to psychologically undermine the position we have taken up. This is too serious a matter to be dealt with casually.

14. The reactions in the Middle Eastern countries and in Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia to the American aid to Pakistan have been to a large extent similar

18. See *ante*, pp. 317-318.



to those in India.<sup>19</sup> This, of course, does not mean that all these countries will naturally adopt the same attitude as India's. Their position is not always strong and there are rival forces at play. But there can be no doubt that there are large elements in these countries, and some even in Pakistan, who are opposed to this new form of economic and military intervention with a view to domination.

15. We have to remember always that it is not for us any anti-Pakistani problem as such and certainly it must not be allowed to take the shape of a communal anti-Muslim problem. We must point out that almost all the Muslim countries in the Middle East or South East Asia have expressed, in greater or lesser degree, dislike of this US military aid to Pakistan. We must base our case on the larger political and Asian considerations, as well as those, of course, of our own freedom. Above all, we have to stress national solidarity and self-reliance. It may be that out of this trial we emerge stronger in the sense that we rely upon ourselves and forget for a while our petty internal differences. Our defence organization has to be kept up to the mark. We cannot compete in arms with great powers and it would be folly even to endeavour to do so. But it would be desirable for us to build up our second and third lines of defence from the point of view of discipline and morale. That means strengthening our Territorial Army and our NCC, etc. All this requires careful thought and I shall not write to you much more about it at this stage.

16. The Governors' Conference that was held two weeks ago was a very interesting one and many important subjects were fully discussed. Probably you will get a note about it. One subject that led to a good deal of discussion was education. We have had plenty of trouble with students, the latest instance of this being in Calcutta. It does little good to blame people for it even though they might be blameworthy. We have to diagnose the malady and seek a cure. For my part, I am convinced that at the bottom level of education we must proceed much faster with the basic method. As for university education, which is perhaps giving more trouble now than any other, we had a note from Dr Radhakrishnan.<sup>20</sup> With this note the Governors' Conference was very largely in

19. For instance, some members of the Burmese Parliament belonging to the Peoples Unity Party said on 5 March that "US arms aid to Pakistan was an indirect threat to and pressure on the neutral policy of the Burmese Government" and denounced the "American interference in Asian affairs." Dr. Tambunan, Deputy Speaker of the Indonesian Parliament, described the military alliance as "an unwise act on the part of Pakistan." For Sri Lankan Premier's reactions, see *Selected Works*, (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 443-444.

20. The note underlined the need for "consolidation and not expansion" in higher education and for improvement of the quality of education. It recommended opening of colleges specializing in applied sciences and technology, and of vocational institutes. The note emphasized the need to make the youth aware of the country's rich heritage in order "to break down the communal, linguistic and provincial differences." It also laid stress on making basic education the essential part of the curriculum in the rural areas.

agreement. I am enclosing a copy of this note as it might interest you. Teaching, at any level, depends ultimately on the quality of the teachers.

17. We also discussed how to expedite progress in Hindi. All were agreed that this was desirable. But it was pointed out pertinently that any attempt to push Hindi, especially in the South, might actually lead to greater obstruction. Indeed, this was taking place. Therefore, we should proceed with some tact and certainly not in an aggressive manner. The regional languages must always be given an important place and even English will have to have some place for some time to come.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### III

New Delhi  
14th April 1954

My dear Chief Minister,

I am again writing to you after almost a full month. Events and work crowd in upon us and it is a little difficult to keep pace with them. The result is that many things about which I would like to write to you have to be left out because, to some extent, they become out of date.

2. I want to write to you today, more especially, about the very grave international situation that has arisen. This is in relation to Indo-China. Behind all this, of course, is the dark and terrible shadow of the hydrogen bomb.

3. You must have seen my statement<sup>1</sup> on the hydrogen bomb which I made before Parliament. In this I made some proposals which were simple and perfectly feasible. All that I suggested was that experimental explosions of this bomb should stop and there should be a standstill agreement in so far as these experiments were concerned between the powers concerned, which were the USA and the USSR. I did not even suggest that the preparation or stockpiling of atomic or hydrogen bombs should cease. Further, I recommended that this matter should be considered by the Disarmament Commission.

4. My statement on the hydrogen bomb attracted a good deal of attention in many countries, chiefly because I gave expression to what innumerable people

1. See *ante*, pp. 445-449.



were feeling. The latest explosion of the hydrogen bomb at Bikini<sup>2</sup> suddenly disclosed that an immense and unascertainable power had been unleashed. A number of poor Japanese fishermen who were fishing far away suffered, and no one quite knows yet what the extent of the damage done by eating radioactive fish might have been. But the real shock came when it was realized that this weapon was going beyond human control and even human comprehension. Suddenly people realized that a war in which these weapons were used would mean utter destruction for vast areas of the earth's surface. There could be no victor or defeated as in ordinary wars, only an almost universal ruin might be the result. The popular reaction to this was natural and, if I may say so, healthy. But those who control this terrible engine of destruction evidently thought otherwise.

5. Soon after I had made my statement in Parliament on the hydrogen bomb, I received a brief and moving message from Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. He expressed his very grave concern at these developments which threatened the world and said that we must do something to prevent the catastrophe which appeared to loom ahead. He said further that he would have liked to have consultation with the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth countries if this had been possible. I replied to him<sup>3</sup> in suitable terms, drawing attention to the proposals I had made in regard to the hydrogen bomb. I added that I thought the situation was serious enough for us to consult each other.

6. The next day, Sir Winston Churchill spoke in the British House of Commons and I must say that his speech was a great disappointment.<sup>4</sup> It did not fit in with the message he had sent me. Evidently, something had happened in those two days which made him change his mind or express himself differently. His speech was criticized even by the Conservative newspapers in England as a surrender to the American demand. It must be remembered that the United Kingdom is in special danger if war breaks out. A very few hydrogen bombs, it is calculated, would put almost an end to Great Britain. As England is now a base for atomic bombs, it is also an obvious target. Hence the reaction of the British people is easy to understand.

7. I do not know why Sir Winston Churchill expressed himself in Parliament as he did, because this was not only not in tune with his previous message to me, but was unlike him. One can only assume that great pressure was brought

2. On 26 March 1954.

3. See *ante*, pp. 449-450.

4. On 5 April 1954, Churchill expressed his belief that the experiment had increased the chances of peace rather than those of war and said that he would not ask the US Government to cease their experiments. Regarding the biological aspect of the experiments, he thought the reports were greatly exaggerated.

to bear upon him by the US Government. The US Government apparently does not even consult its principal allies in important matters of policy and presents them with accomplished facts to which they have to agree, for the price of disagreement is a breach in the united front of the Western Powers. This has created a good deal of discontent in England and France, but, nevertheless, the Governments of these two countries fall in line with the US after, no doubt, protesting in private.

8. This hydrogen bomb incident must be seen in the context of other developments. There is now what is called the "Dulles policy". Mr Dulles and others in the United States have declared that if there is any aggression on the part of the communist countries they will instantly and massively retaliate using atomic weapons and bombs. He has also stated, in connection with the Far East, that the US would, in such a case, attack the mainland of China.<sup>5</sup> It was rather odd for these threats to be held out just when preparations were being made to meet in Conference in Geneva to consider the Korean and the Indo-China problem. Nothing very special had happened and the reasoning behind these terrible threats was not clear. There had been, it is true, some intensive fighting in Indo-China, where the Viet Minh forces were investing a fortress occupied by the French.<sup>6</sup> But this kind of warfare had taken place in Indo-China for several years with its ups and downs. It would appear that it was not so much the developments in Indo-China that made Mr Dulles issue his threats, but rather the development of Mr Dulles' policy.

9. Later Mr Dulles stated that Chinese intervention in Indo-China had come very near the borderline. The instances he gave were that there was some Chinese senior military officer advising the Viet Minh troops and anti-aircraft guns had been supplied by the Chinese.<sup>7</sup> This may or may not be true. But even if it is true, it could hardly be termed as any major intervention. On the other hand, it is well known that the United States are giving massive help in the shape of bombing aircraft and military weapons and supplies to the French.<sup>8</sup>

10. To say, as Mr Dulles did, that the Chinese were very near the borderline of aggression in Indo-China meant that we might be very near the massive retaliation which Mr Dulles promised in case of aggression. That made the situation a very grave one.

11. The next step that Mr Dulles has taken is to induce other countries, notably the United Kingdom and France, to join the United States in declaring

5. See *ante*, p. 441, fn. 2.

6. Viet Minh forces launched a major attack on Dien Bien Phu on 13 March 1954. Heavy fighting continued throughout March and April 1954.

7. See *ante*, p. 439, fn. 3.

8. See *ante*, p. 442, fn. 6.



what is called a collective defence to ensure peace, security and freedom of South East Asia and the Western Pacific. This means, in the present context, that all the countries joining in would help the French in Indo-China against the Viet Minh. As I write, a statement has been issued which indicates that Mr Dulles has met with a good deal of success in his endeavour and these countries have stated that they are ready to take part in this system of collective defence.<sup>9</sup> They have added, however, that they will wait for the Geneva Conference in the hope that this might lead to a restoration of peace in Indo-China.

12. The Conference at Geneva will be held in less than two weeks' time. Only the incurable optimist can expect any good to come out of it because everything has been done to make it infructuous. There is no atmosphere of peace or negotiation. One is led to imagine that a special effort has been made in order that the Geneva Conference might fail and then this collective defence scheme for South East Asia might come into effect. In other words, far from looking forward to a step towards some kind of a settlement or even to an easing of tension, we have to face continuous and increased tension with the prospect of a much worse development at any time. I do not know what the attitude of the Soviet Union or of China might be. But it is a little difficult to imagine that they will go to this Geneva Conference merely to sign on the dotted line.

13. The situation in Indo-China and the new turn that American policy has taken is a matter of far-reaching importance. In fact, the US have taken what might well be described as a fateful decision which offers two alternatives. One is that the Soviet Union and China should climb down completely and practically surrender in so far as several important matters are concerned; the other is an inevitable and rapid drift to a major conflict. As it is unlikely that the Soviet Union and China will, in effect, surrender, the chances of the other increase. Thus, the decision of the US taken recently is in effect to force the issue both militarily and politically in Indo-China. Indo-China is chosen, not only because it is considered important but also in order to set an example which might apply to other problems.

14. All this might be seen in the larger context of American policy in Pakistan and in Western Asia, as well as in the rest of the world, excluding the communist countries. Probably the United States believe that this policy of all out force and threats will succeed without precipitating a large scale war. In any event, it is a big and dangerous gamble. This affects the entire world but, more particularly, Asia. Asia has been and will continue to be the scene of hydrogen bomb

9. See *ante*, p. 441, fn. 3.

experiments and of war in which Asians are made to fight Asians. It may be that it will be Asians again who will have the unfortunate privilege of experiencing the effects of atomic bombing. Meanwhile, extreme pressure will no doubt be exercised in various Asian countries just as it is being exercised in some European ones. Thailand, the Philippines, Formosa and South Korea are, of course, lined up already. Pakistan has joined this group. The countries of Western Asia are experiencing these pressure tactics. No doubt, some of the countries in South East Asia will have a like experience. All this affects India. India presumably is supposed some time or other to fall in line under heavy pressure or to be isolated.

15. There is another aspect of this question. The United States is now definitely trying to function as world leader. At any rate, it regards itself as such and any country that does not fall in line with her policy meets with her displeasure. The idea of the old Monroe Doctrine<sup>10</sup> is now extended to cover the entire world except the communist countries. Also, it is interesting to note that the justification for intervention in Indo-China is said to be the fact that the lawful and friendly Government of Vietnam is attacked by Viet Minh, the lawful Government in Vietnam being the French colonial Government, whatever other form it may take. Therefore, colonialism has to be protected because it is lawful and recognized. This reminds one of the Holy Alliance in 19th Century Europe which was meant to protect all the old Kings and feudal regimes. All this is done in the name of assuring peace, security and freedom.

16. I have written at some length about this subject, because I would like you to appreciate the crisis that has come upon the world and which may well have serious consequences for us in India. All this necessitates hard thinking and united action by us and putting aside all our petty conflicts and differences of opinion. It is manifest that we in India are not going to barter away our freedom or our independence of action under any pressure or threats. I might mention that we were asked recently by the US Government for permission to send a large number of transport aircraft carrying troops to Indo-China. We could not possibly permit this as we had not permitted the French during past years to send their troops across or over India. I understand that the Government of Burma has also refused permission. I presume they will now be sent around via Colombo.

17. Soon there will be the meeting at Geneva, which has even less chances of success now than before. Much will depend upon the Soviet attitude, but the

10. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, p. 427.



issue is a grave one, because Mr Dulles appears to be a determined man and he has got both the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb.

18. You must have been following the course of events in Pondicherry and the other French settlements in India. This is a completely spontaneous movement.<sup>11</sup> Naturally we sympathize with it, but we have tried to observe international decorum and have left the door open for peaceful negotiations with France. If all existing Governments are supposed to be lawful and therefore entitled to continue as such, as in the case of Vietnam, then it may well be said that this argument can apply to the French and Portuguese settlements in India. Probably the US Government will not go thus far, but the policy they are pursuing in other parts of the world would be on a line with this.

19. I shall be going to Colombo on the 27th of this month. Some of these matters will, no doubt, come up for discussion there. It is difficult to imagine that all the Prime Ministers there will come to any kind of an agreement, because Pakistan at least is fully tied up with US policy and much pressure has been exercised on the other countries.

20. Since I wrote to you last, much has happened in India. In Travancore-Cochin, a PSP Government, under Shri Pattom Thanu Pillai, has been formed<sup>12</sup> and is functioning. The Congress Party there, which is the biggest single party, is supporting this Government from outside. In Madras, Shri Rajagopalachari<sup>13</sup> resigned owing to ill health and Shri Kamaraj Nadar has just formed a Government<sup>14</sup> which consists largely of Ministers from Rajaji's Cabinet. Shri Rajagopalachari undertook the burden of the Chief Ministership of Madras State at a critical and difficult moment when he was well entitled to rest. He brought about a great change in the State of Madras and India must be grateful to him for his great services. His record of service in India is unique. Although he has retired and has rightly deserved his retirement and rest, we all hope that he will be available to guide and advise us in the difficult days ahead.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. A nonviolent mass movement for union with India was launched on 19 March 1954 by the French India Socialist Party with the support of other political parties. The movement continued to grow in strength and popularity.

12. Pillai was sworn in as Chief Minister on 16 March 1954.

13. On 8 April 1954.

14. On 10 April 1954.

## IV

New Delhi  
26th April 1954

My dear Chief Minister,

I am writing to you on the eve of my departure for Colombo. I expect to be away for about a week. This Colombo Conference<sup>1</sup> has received a good deal of publicity and, for a variety of reasons, probably unthought of by its sponsor, it has become important in the world's eyes. It is true that such a gathering of some Prime Ministers of Southern Asia can do a lot of good, more especially at the present moment when conflict rages in a part of Asia and further dangers lie ahead, which imperil freedom. But a constructive attitude would require a common approach to our present day problems. How far that approach will be evident in Colombo is not easy to say now. There are obvious differences of opinion, on basic international matters, between India and Pakistan. We may not discuss the United States military aid to Pakistan there, but we must inevitably discuss the broader aspects of the United States' policy in Asia and, in this context, the military aid to Pakistan has to come in somewhere, as an illustration, if nothing else. One should have thought that in these major problems affecting Asian countries, there should be a common approach, even though the emphasis may vary. I believe that, on the whole, there is that common approach in so far as India and Burma are concerned and, to a considerable extent, Indonesia also. Ceylon is rather new to these international problems and has really not faced them or given much thought to them. It has lived an isolated existence thus far, interested chiefly in its own changing economy and in world prices of rubber and tea, etc., and in the problem of people of Indian descent. For the rest, it has been largely tied up with the United Kingdom and has not changed materially since it became independent, though the outer symbols and trappings have changed. Because of its practical isolation in this way, local problems, like that of the people of Indian descent, loom large. Behind this is a certain fear of the great land of India somehow overwhelming Ceylon, not by military might but by very numbers. Hence the excessive importance they attach to limiting people of Indian descent or Indian sympathies. They have, of course, also the problem of growing unemployment, and there again there is this fear of non-Ceylonese taking a growing share of the employment.

2. We appreciate these natural reactions of the Ceylonese and allow for them in our dealings with Ceylon. We have no desire to overwhelm Ceylon by numbers or in any other way. It will make little difference to India as a whole whether a few hundred thousand persons more or less are absorbed in Ceylon.

1. See *ante*, p. 423, fn. 2.



It would, of course, make a difference to those persons who will suffer if they are not treated properly and it is a matter of our self respect too. But, we have always to remember this fear of the Ceylonese. Any so-called pressure tactics on our part tend to increase this fear, and, therefore, make the solution a little more difficult. They begin to look away from India in matters of trade, etc., and rely on some distant country like England or, it may be, even Australia rather than India. And yet, every interest of theirs, including their basic cultural outlook, draws them to India, if but this fear was absent. Hence it is necessary for us not to say or do anything which adds to this fear complex.

3. Unfortunately, certain politicians and some groups in Ceylon neither speak nor act wisely and repeatedly come in the way of a friendly settlement. Even the last Indo-Ceylonese Agreement<sup>2</sup> has had some rough treatment in Ceylon,<sup>3</sup> and I am not at all sure how far it will be carried out. It is not so much what is being done in Ceylon in regard to it, but the manner of doing it and the spirit behind it all that has troubled me and that has irritated greatly the large numbers of people of Indian descent there. If these people lose all hope of fair treatment in Ceylon, then they may well take to wrong courses. They will suffer no doubt if they do that, but they can give a great deal of trouble to the Government of Ceylon. Because of this, apart from larger reasons, the only wise course for the Government of Ceylon is to come to reasonable terms with them and with us.

4. In spite of these political difficulties, there is little doubt that the mass of the people of Ceylon look more and more towards India, much more so than any other country. Even in the larger political field, there is probably more appreciation of India's viewpoint than the policy of the Government of Ceylon might indicate.

5. The Colombo Conference is meeting at a critical stage. A few thousand miles away, the Geneva Conference is meeting with all the modern fanfare of publicity. Vast numbers of delegates with their camp-followers have gathered in Geneva. Every national delegation there consists of hundreds of persons and probably members of the press have gathered in equal numbers. The city of Geneva, important as it is, is not a big city, and this vast crowd must tax it to the utmost.

6. Two days ago, I made a statement in the House of the People on Indo-China.<sup>4</sup> You have no doubt seen this. It was after a great deal of thought that I

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, p. 615.

3. On 7 March 1954, the Sri Lankan Government asked 64 Indian workers employed at Ratmalana airport to register themselves as Indian nationals if they wished to retain their jobs. India took strong exception to this because the workers had been refused registration as Sri Lankan citizens to which they were entitled under the new Agreement, and also the demand had been made without prior consultation with the Government of India.

4. See *ante*, pp. 439-444.

made this statement and the proposals contained in it. There is nothing remarkable about those proposals, and yet to some people they might seem an odd and even a brave approach. The fact is that the international atmosphere has become so vitiated by loud shouting and threats and sabre-rattling that the simplest and most obvious courses surprise one. All that I have suggested is really very simple and I think very obvious, though it does not fit in with the atmosphere of passionate denunciation of each other that is so common now.

7. I ended my statement by quoting from some words of the Pope. I shall repeat them here for they bring out vividly our present day international predicament. "Peace", he says, "cannot consist in an exasperating and costly relationship of mutual terror." That is how we live today in mutual terror, which is both exasperating and costly, and which cannot possibly lead to peace. I have ventured to point out in my statement, in as restrained a manner as possible, that this approach of threat and denunciation and ultimatum must be given up. I am not vain or optimistic enough to imagine that what I have said will produce a marked effect. But I have no doubt that vast numbers of people in the world will respond to it in the proper spirit and, it may be that public opinion does sometimes make a difference even in international affairs. In any event, it is for us to try with humility and firmness; we cannot guarantee results. It is enough for us if we can get out of this mental climate of fear and terror. When we talk of a peace area, we refer to many things, but essentially what I mean is an area free from this reign of fear and its progeny.

8. You will have seen the violent outbursts in America caused by our refusal to permit American aircraft carrying French troops from flying across India. This has angered many of the Senators and others in the United States.<sup>5</sup> And yet, we have laid down no new policy. For the last five or six years, we have consistently followed the policy of not allowing any troops or war materials to cross India by air or otherwise. This is applied to the French going to Indo-China and to the British going to Malaya. Having repeatedly refused permission to the French in past years, we could not possibly allow American aircraft to do this. In war, that would be a definite breach of neutrality. In the present state of partial shooting war and partial cold war, that would be equally bad, if not worse from the point of view of our oft-repeated policy. And yet, this simple fact has not been even understood by these worthy American Senators who are enebled by fear and hatred of what they call the communist menace. To them everything must be subordinated to the one end of America leading a

5. For example, the *New York Times* on 23 April 1954 wrote that Nehru should be reminded that "the real road to freedom in Indo-China does not lie through communist conquest, and a friendlier attitude on his part to these weak and young states that are trying with French help to defend themselves would be most helpful." See also *ante*, p. 494, fn. 3.



crusade against every country which is actually or potentially likely to come under communist control. Even if that objective was considered justifiable, the methods employed appear to me to produce a contrary result. When this contrary result becomes apparent anywhere, there is great irritation in the United States as if the fault lay with other people and not with the policy they were pursuing. It is astonishing how unwise and short-sighted American policy has been and continues to be, and how more and more it relies on sheer force and the might of the hydrogen bomb. It is forgotten that in spite of the hydrogen bomb, human beings still count.

9. The communist world also relies on force and the hydrogen bomb, but it is a little wiser in its approach. It does not forget how human beings react and takes full advantage of the passionate dislike in Asia and Africa of colonialism and racialism. Also, I believe, that neither the Soviet Union nor China desire a war. They may have more insidious methods of approach, but those methods cannot be countered by war but by other means.

10. We have come to the stage when the forces and machines of war are more or less evenly balanced between these two rival blocs and neither can imagine that it can overwhelm the other. Therefore, from the strictly practical point of view, the choice is between a war which destroys utterly and something that leads to the attainment of the objective aimed at and in some way averts war, which means some kind of mutual adjustment of the present day world based on live and let live. There is no other way. Between these rival giants and their loud trumpeting, there is the small and perhaps feeble voice of India. Because perhaps that voice represents some reason, some hope of escape from the awful dilemma of our times, it finds an appreciative audience in many countries. It might have been easier for us to remain silent and even try to close our ears to the drums of war. But even that is not possible. We are dragged into the fray, whether we wish it or not. The US military aid to Pakistan affects us and we have to say something and say it clearly and definitely. American aircraft want to carry troops across India. If we permit this, immediately our policy of nonalignment goes to pieces. So at every step we have to take a decision and to announce it, and merely remaining quiet does not lead to our escaping the consequences of what is happening. It is a trial and test for us to maintain a calm and dispassionate outlook and not to be swept away by any pressure or by an angry reaction to something that has happened. At the same time, to work hard to build up our own country and our own strength, both physical, psychological and moral.

11. I have referred above to the angry reaction of some American Senators. This was on the occasion of a proposal to give technical aid to India.<sup>6</sup> I must

6. See *ante*, p. 495, fn. 7.

confess to you that I have been much worried over this matter of accepting or not accepting financial aid from America. All my self respect is hurt at the taunts thrown out at us that, while we object to military aid being given to Pakistan, we are prepared to take other kinds of aid from the United States. Of course, there is a great deal of difference between military aid and aid for developmental purposes, which every country accepts to a degree. And yet, there is a germ of truth in that taunt. My own reaction would be to decline with all politeness all such aid, even though that might put us in some difficulty. I believe that the real growth of a country can only take place through inner strength and self reliance. Anything that might lessen that feeling of self reliance, weakens the country. It is through a measure of hardship, austerity and struggle that a people go ahead. That is how we made good in our struggle for freedom, and that is how we are likely to make good in our struggle for freedom, and that is how we are likely to make good in the economic struggles before us.

12. Though my entire inclination therefore is not to encourage this economic aid from the United States, I have felt that for us to take any such positive step at this stage would itself be an irritating factor adding to the ill will between India and the United States. And so, we have preferred to remain quiet about it and to await developments. These developments progressively make it more difficult for the aid to come or for us to accept it. Anyhow, we shall await events. But in regard to one matter, I am clear in my mind. We should discourage large numbers of people coming here from the United States or going to the United States from India under various schemes like the leadership programme, etc. It is not desirable for us to send our students or others to the United States for training, except for some very specialized courses. The atmosphere of the United States is not suited for this purpose and then the environment there is completely different from ours. Because part of the cost is met by some fund or other in the United States, we think that we are getting something on the cheap. That is not so and I think we should avoid this in future.

13. As I write to you, news comes to me that the office of our Commissioner at Nairobi in East Africa was suddenly raided by British troops and some of the assistant members of our staff were beaten and our papers thrown about.<sup>7</sup> All our African staff were arrested and taken away. This is apparently a part of what is called a great drive against Mau Mau. You will appreciate the great seriousness of this. Indeed the acting Governor subsequently offered his "most humble apologies" and ordered an immediate enquiry. He promised that those found guilty would be suitably punished. The Commander-in-Chief called also at our Commissioner's office to offer his apologies. We are taking suitable action in this matter in London and in Delhi. This incident indicates how the colonial

7. See *ante*, p. 505.



Government in Kenya is functioning. If this can be done to our representative's office and to our staff, it can well be imagined what others who have no such privileges have to put up with and, as for Africans of high and low degree, presumably everyone of them is treated as the worst of criminals. One might say that the whole population is dealt with as in a hostile enemy country and indeed in a worse way. Everybody is screened by the military in their rough and ready way, very few understanding the language even. This is the phase of colonialism and racialism that we see. We are asked to forget these matters and to join in the great crusade against communism by giving our moral sympathy and physical support to the French colonial regime in Indo-China and, possibly, at the same time to Chiang Kai-shek and Dr Syngman Rhee. It is difficult for me to understand how people in Europe and America cannot appreciate our feelings in such matters and how they can imagine that they can dragoon us in following policies which we dislike utterly.

14. We are seeing also French colonialism functioning at Pondicherry. There have been brutal assaults on the people there. However, there has been a development in regard to these French establishments which holds out some promise. The Prime Minister of France has written to me a friendly letter suggesting negotiations. I have replied<sup>8</sup> in an equally friendly manner and welcomed direct negotiations between the Government of India and the Government of France in regard to these settlements. Neither of us had made any commitments in these letters. But our position is well known. It has seemed to me that the French Government has at last realized that they cannot carry on as they have done. The second realization may soon follow that the only way open is to transfer these settlements to India. But naturally the French Government and people do not wish to be humiliated and we have no desire to do that. Therefore, we shall deal with them in as friendly a way as possible, holding on to our views.

15. Because of the developments in Pondicherry and for other reasons also, the situation in Goa is undergoing a change. But that is a more difficult problem than that of Pondicherry and we shall have to deal with it a little later. Meanwhile, we have made it perfectly clear to all parties concerned that we will not permit the soil of Goa to be used by any foreign power as a base or for other military purposes.<sup>9</sup>

16. The situation in Pakistan continues to be exceedingly fluid and uncertain. The elections in East Bengal have created a situation which, in a sense, is revolutionary.<sup>10</sup> Mr Fazlul Haq and Mr Suhrawardy are two prominent leaders

8. See *ante*, pp. 524-526.

9. See *ante*, pp. 520-522.

10. See *ante*, p. 97.

of East Bengal and they have considerable influence. But what has happened in East Bengal is something much more than perhaps these leaders themselves imagined. A younger, more advanced and more leftist element has come to the front and will undoubtedly want to have its way. This new element is not communal at all. Politically it has taken up a strong line against the US aid to Pakistan. It is intensely Bengali. You may be interested to know of what some of them said the other day. Referring to the Bengalis of West Bengal, they said that, "You people are becoming Hindiwalas now. We are the real Bengalis and therefore give us Tagore whom we will appreciate more than you will." This was said in a spirit of banter. But it shows this intense Bengali feeling that pervades East Bengal.

17. The demand of East Bengal is for the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan to be dissolved and for the Central Government to be changed.<sup>11</sup> Both these have thus far been rejected by the Pakistan Government. But I do not see how the Pakistan Government can continue to function as it is in the face of these demands. The only basic strength that the Pakistan Government has is that of the defence forces which mainly represent West Pakistan. It is hardly likely however that the army will be utilized against East Bengal.

18. Meanwhile in West Pakistan, in the Muslim League as well as the Constituent Assembly, a battle royal is raging on the language issue, Urdu alone or Urdu and Bengali.<sup>12</sup> It would appear that East Bengal and West Pakistan are in headlong conflict over this issue. Even the old East Bengal representatives in the Constituent Assembly stand firmly for Bengali.

19. King Saud<sup>13</sup> of Arabia has been visiting Pakistan. He was to have gone to East Bengal also, but this visit did not come off, no doubt because the Pakistan Government did not like the shape of things in East Bengal. The King made it known to our representative in Karachi that his visit to Pakistan was concerned with getting Pakistan's aid against Israel. He is not interested in other matters.

20. The conflict between Israel and the Arab countries is becoming more intense and acute. The Arab countries are definitely afraid of Israel's better-

11. This was demanded by H.S. Suhrawardy on 31 March 1954. On 4 April 1954, Dhaka observed a protest day and demanded the "immediate dissolution of this unrepresentative and reactionary Constituent Assembly" and its replacement by a body elected on the basis of adult franchise.

12. The decision of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party on 20 April 1954 that Bengali and Urdu would be the official languages of Pakistan led to widespread anti-Bengali demonstrations in Karachi on 22 and 23 April 1954. Several pro-Urdu newspapers were published with black borders.

13. Abdul Aziz Saud (b. 1902); son of Ibn Saud; in 1953 became Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence, and ascended the throne following his father's death. He visited Pakistan for 10 days from 20 April 1954.



equipped army and other resources. For the moment there appears no way pointing to a settlement of this old dispute.

21. I have written to you previously about a matter which has troubled me greatly and continues to exercise my mind. This is the question of minorities in India. I asked you once to find out the figures of recruitment of these minorities to our services. The figures I received were unsatisfactory. Our Constitution is very good and our laws and rules and regulations are also fair. But the fact remains that in practice some of our minorities, and notably Muslims, suffer from a deep sense of frustration. They feel that the services are not really open to them in any marked degree, whether defence, police or civil. In business, the evacuee property laws, which unfortunately continue even though they are not applied frequently, bear down upon them and restrict their opportunities. In elections to our Assemblies and Parliament, it is not easy for Muslims to come in. Even in our public organizations, it is becoming increasingly difficult for proper Muslim representation. I know this is so in the Congress. It is easy for anyone to become a primary member of the Congress, but when it comes to any elective post, a Muslim is at a disadvantage and there are no reservations now anywhere. I imagine that this applies to other political and like organizations also. It is not that there is any anti-Muslim feeling as such, though sometimes even this is present. It is more the recrudescence of local and caste feelings.

22. This is very much so in so far as Muslims are concerned. To a slight extent this is so in regard to Christians also, apart from some southern regions like Travancore-Cochin State. Looking at these questions not from a party point of view but an all India viewpoint, this is a very bad development, and we shall have to give serious thought to it because it may well lead to most unfortunate consequences. It is no good our criticizing the minority communities and telling them that they do not behave. It is always the duty and obligation of the majority to win the goodwill of the minorities by fair and even generous treatment. I fear that very often the majority community in India not only forgets the minorities but acts in a narrow-minded way, not realizing the far reaching consequences of this. The whole structure of India and the process of emotional integration, which is so important, will be badly affected if we do not deal with this situation quickly and with vision and vigour. Even some of our old valiant Muslim stalwarts of our freedom struggle find themselves today pushed out and with no effective voice.

23. We must never forget that we take pride in having a secular State. That brings its duties and responsibilities and obligations which apply far more to the majority than to the minority groups. But apart from theory and the rightness of a particular policy, the practical consequences of any other policy are of grave importance, for any other policy would inevitably lead to the encouragement of disruptive tendencies. I do not wish to exaggerate this matter and I do not think it has gone deep yet. But the mere presence of these tendencies is

dangerous. What troubles me most is the way most of us do not attach much importance to this. The first thing to do is to realize the importance of this question and to set about thinking how to deal with it in all aspects of public and other activities. We play an increasingly greater role in world affairs and our voice is respected. But, after all, the strength of our position and the respect that it commands outside India will depend on what we do within our country.

24. You must have seen the four important resolutions that the Congress Working Committee passed some time ago.<sup>14</sup> Among these resolutions was one on the language issue which dealt fully with various aspects of it.<sup>15</sup> This again is important from the point of view of integrating India. Also from the point of view of the minorities, whoever they may be. One reason for a sense of frustration among the Muslims is the growing belief that Urdu has little place in India now. I do not wish to go into the merits of the question, though the merits are strong in favour of Urdu and Urdu is not a Muslim language but an Indian language. But, apart from merits, the psychological result is important.

25. Then there is the resolution on the redistribution of provinces. You will notice that we have given the largest freedom of expression of opinion but we must maintain some discipline about it and some objective thinking. This is a dangerous subject which will lead to disruption if we are not careful.

26. A week ago, Dr Satyapal, the Speaker of the Punjab Assembly, suddenly died of heart failure. The present generation has almost forgotten the stirring episodes of 35 years ago, which shook India and heralded the coming of Gandhiji into the political arena and the mighty movements that followed. Satyapal and Saifuddin Kitchlew were the outstanding names in April 1919 in Amritsar, the Punjab, and later in India. It was their arrest that led to the Jallianwala Bagh killings and martial law in the Punjab. Dr Satyapal's name is thus a part of India's history.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

14. The resolutions adopted on 4-5 April 1954 related to reorganization of States, examinations for All India Services, question of language and medium of instruction in schools and colleges and prohibition.

15. See *ante*, p. 261.



## V

New Delhi  
20th May 1954

My dear Chief Minister,

I am writing to you as our present session of Parliament is ending. This has been a long and heavy session and all Members of Parliament, including the Ministers, of course, deserve a respite. The next session of Parliament is likely to meet in the third week of August. We shall thus have a fairly long interval of about three months. I hope that this will enable us to deal with many important matters which require thought and discussion. The day to day work of Parliament gives little chance for any leisurely thinking or discussion. Events succeed each other from day to day and it is difficult to keep pace with them.

2. In particular, I hope that we will give thoughts to two matters—the reform of administrative procedures and the future of planning and the second Five Year Plan. Both these are subjects which cannot be dealt with in a hurry and which require careful consideration. Yesterday I made a statement in the Council of States giving some indication of what we were doing in regard to reform in administrative procedures.<sup>1</sup> This is, of course, an old story and not only the Central Government but all the state governments have been dealing with this for years past. Some progress has also been made. Mr Appleby's report rather shook us up and some further progress was made as a result of our considering it. During the last few months, we have been carrying on a number of enquiries, from different points of view, into this matter of administrative procedure. We have collected a good deal of material which, I am sure, will help us in dealing with this problem effectively. During the next month I propose to give some time to the study of this material and in July I hope that we shall come to grips with it as a Government. It might interest you to learn that even while these enquiries are progressing, we have profited by them and there has been a tightening up of our procedure in many respects. There is less delay and more a sense of urgency.

3. The second Five Year Plan is, of course, of paramount importance for us. The importance lies not only in the actual work to be undertaken, but in our entire approach to it. I think that it can be said with confidence that the reaction of the people all over the country is eminently satisfactory, wherever good work is done. In particular, the community projects and the National Extension Service appear to be doing well.

1. Nehru said that his note of 17 January about review of civil service rules envisaged delegation of more financial powers to ministers and other administrative heads to facilitate expeditious implementation of the Five Year Plan and various other projects. See also *ante*, pp. 288-292.

4. The community projects administration started in April 1952 and had to be built up from scratch. There was some suspicion to begin with about this programme and many complained that it was much too official. Gradually the underlying meaning of these community projects, and later the National Extension Service, was understood by the people and their suspicions were dispelled. Credit for this is due to large numbers of people, but, in the final analysis, it is due to the village workers. The success of this scheme depends ultimately on those village workers even more than on those at the top. It is thus important that these village workers, should be carefully selected and given adequate training. The Director of the community projects administration, Shri S.K. Dey, has been the moving spirit and a dynamo in action. This programme, including the National Extension Service, now covers, in some way or other, about 1/8th of India's population. By the end of this year, it is expected to cover nearly 1/6th, that is between 50 million and 60 million people. This itself gives some idea of the magnitude of this undertaking and the way it is moving forward. Indeed, it may be said to have developed a certain momentum of its own. The question is how to give it right direction and how to keep up quality.

5. Training schools are now in operation for the training of:

- (1) *gram sevaks* (village-level workers);
- (2) social education organisers;
- (3) health personnel in the extension service; and
- (4) block development officers in extension service and administration.

More centres are going to be established to train women workers, village blacksmiths and carpenters, school teachers for rural work and village leaders.

6. It is clear that the real problem before us is not so much that of money, but of trained personnel. We have a fair number of highly trained people—good engineers, good doctors and specialists in other fields, but we lack terribly men in the middle stages, that is, overseers, teachers, mechanics, agricultural graduates, trained personnel for animal husbandry, and, of course, administrative personnel on a big scale. We have thought too much of schemes, big and small, in terms of money and possibly equipment, but have not paid much attention to the most important factor of all, that is, trained personnel. Much of this training takes three years or more. If we do not set about it immediately, then all our schemes will be held up for lack of such people. Therefore, every state has to think hard about such training of these middle stages and set up centres for it. It is obviously not possible for the Central Government to provide overseers, mechanics and the like in large numbers. They have to be trained in the states. Every state should, therefore, think out and forecast future requirements of every kind of trained personnel and make immediate provision for such training.

7. The community projects programme has suffered considerably from the shortage of imported equipment which was expected to come here from the



USA. It is hoped that a good part of it will reach us soon. As regards expenditure, it was pointed out previously that much of the money sanctioned and allotted for these projects had not been spent. Much progress has been made now in this respect and it is expected that a large proportion of the total allotments uptil now will be spent.

8. Thus, this community and extension programme has passed its early teething stage and is in full movement. The tempo of work is increasing. We have to keep up this tempo as well as the quality of the work. We begin now the second phase on the foundations we have already built. Most states have done well. The exceptions appear to be Andhra, Madras, Travancore-Cochin, Mysore, Delhi, Tripura and Vindhya Pradesh. Both Andhra and Madras have suffered from the changes due to the partition and the setting up of new administrations. Among the good states in this respect are Bihar, Bombay, Orissa, Punjab, Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Pepsu, Rajasthan, Saurashtra, Bhopal and Himachal Pradesh.

9. I have often expressed a dislike of the stream of people who are being sent abroad for special training. Hundreds and thousands go to other countries, chiefly the United States of America, under various schemes. I have no doubt that some people should go for special training. But I am more and more convinced that we should try to learn from what is being done in India. Foreign training is good in specialized subjects, but it is given in an entirely different environment and the person who comes back is often frustrated at the conditions he finds in India. What we want, above all, today is a vast number of people trained for the middle stages of work and we must devise some methods of doing so. Even from the point of view of understanding India and being in tune with it and seeing what is being done in the country today, it is far more desirable for our people to travel about India than to visit foreign countries. It is unfortunate that the lure of visiting foreign countries still draws a very large number of our people, who do not seem to realize what their own country is and how much there is in it to see and learn from.

10. I have begun this letter with some of our domestic problems for two reasons. Firstly, because in the ultimate analysis it is our domestic progress that counts and that gives us some strength to deal with outside problems. Secondly, because the time has come for us to review what is being done in India, to understand it and to give it the right direction and push. The next two or three months are relatively easy months from the political point of view and therefore it is desirable that we should utilize them in thinking about these matters, so that we can go ahead a little later with greater energy and understanding.

11. Since I wrote to you my last fortnightly letter, much has happened in international affairs. I went to Colombo to the South East Asian Prime Ministers' Conference there and, since my return, we have had to give much thought to what is happening at Geneva as well as, of course, the situation in Indo-China.

During the last few days I have spoken at length in both the Lok Sabha and the Council of States on foreign affairs, more particularly on the Colombo Conference, the Geneva Conference and the developments in the French establishments in India.<sup>2</sup> The upheaval in Pondicherry and other French enclaves has been remarkable and spontaneous. We welcome it, of course, and yet it is embarrassing for us because we wish to act in a strictly constitutional manner and not unilaterally. At the present moment our representatives are carrying on negotiations with the French Government in Paris about this issue. Thus far, not much progress has been made. This is partly due to the weakness and instability of the French Government. They hang on to office by a thin thread which might snap at any moment and therefore they dare not come to any vital decisions. I hope that these negotiations will yield substantial results. But whatever that may be, the future of these French establishments has been practically decided by the people living there and there can be no going back on that position.

12. Goa is a much tougher problem. We shall deal with it in due course with a mixture of patience and firmness.

13. About Colombo and Geneva, I need not say much because I have said much elsewhere. The Colombo Conference was undoubtedly a unique event and I am sure the Prime Minister of Ceylon, who invited us, was himself surprised at the importance of that Conference. It was the first coming together on the official level of some Asian countries, recently freed. Pakistan stood rather apart from the others because of its entanglement with American policy. Nevertheless, we arrived at a very large measure of agreement<sup>3</sup> because of the pressure of circumstances and the common urges of the people of Asia.

14. In Geneva, progress is slow, but it is evident that at least two countries are trying their utmost to find a way to some settlement, even though that might be a provisional settlement. These two countries are the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. France is in a very difficult position because of her defeat in Indo-China and the instability of her Government. French opinion is anxious to have a ceasefire and settlement in Indo-China. But the Government seems to be of many minds and is pulled in different directions. The United States, for the first time in international conferences, is not playing a very important part. Normally they dominate such conferences. But the initial lead they gave was not accepted by the others and Mr Dulles retired from the scene.

15. Basically the question is whether there should be a settlement involving give and take or an imposition. The United States want an imposition of the terms they approve of, which practically amount to a surrender of the other party, and yet the other party is by no means in a weak position. In fact, both

2. See *ante*, pp. 397-423.

3. See *ante*, p. 434, fn. 3.



militarily and politically, they are well established and there is no reason, therefore, that they should surrender. President Eisenhower put this essential difficulty in a phrase. He said that they were faced with a dilemma which was represented by the two words—unattainable and unacceptable.

16. No country in the world really wants war except probably Formosa and South Korea. They imagine that they will be beneficiaries if a war takes place. In a similar way there are two countries which are in a sense beneficiaries of the cold war. These are Germany and Japan. If there is any settlement, the help that is flowing into Germany and Japan from the United States is likely to lessen considerably.

17. Our relations with Pakistan are about as bad as they have ever been. I do not think there is much ill will between the peoples of the two countries. But governmentally these relations are bad. Politically, Pakistan is unstable and there is no knowing when there might be a change there at the top. The conflict between East and West Pakistan becomes more bitter.<sup>4</sup> Economic conditions in Pakistan are very bad. Meanwhile, Americans of various kinds crowd into western Pakistan.

18. I have drawn your attention previously to some resolutions passed by the Congress Working Committee at its last meeting. They are important and they lay down the policy in regard to the question of language, reorganization of states and prohibition which, I think, is of great importance and has to be followed. It is most unfortunate that both in regard to the states problem and the language problem, bitter and wholly unnecessary controversies continue. This does little credit to us.

19. Taking a broad survey, we can say that we are doing fairly well. Difficult problems confront us, internationally and nationally, and there are some forces at work which tend to disrupt and weaken. Among these forces are those connected with the language controversy and the reorganization of states. We have, therefore, to be particularly careful not to encourage these forces and to approach these problems in a spirit of conciliation. Speaking the other day<sup>5</sup> to large number of Members of Parliament on the language question, I pointed out that I was not aware of any instance in history, at any time, where there was such a great deal of agreement on such an issue as there was in India. This agreement on the question of language is enshrined in our Constitution and is generally and widely accepted by the people in the north and the south. In other

4. For example, several prominent legislators from West Pakistan stayed away from the discussion on 7 May 1954 in the Constituent Assembly on the question of treating Bengali at par with Urdu on the plea that the measure was an "appeasement" of and "surrender to political pressure" from East Bengal.

5. Nehru addressed the Congress Parliamentary Party on 7 May 1954. See *ante*, pp. 100-106.

countries, where language issues have been raised, there have been bitter controversies and a lack of agreement. In Yugoslavia there are three official languages and two scripts and all official work is done in three languages and two scripts. There is no compulsion on anyone to learn a particular language. Yugoslavia wisely decided to give this freedom so as not to appear to impose anything on any part of the people and to allow natural growth. We have gone much further and generally accepted two basic propositions: firstly, that all the regional languages have to be fully developed in their regions, and secondly, that Hindi should be the all India official language. This does not mean that Hindi is a better language than the other regional languages. It means that Hindi is the most suitable language for all India purposes. We must not let it appear that Hindi is being imposed at the expense of other languages, for that will be injurious to the growth of Hindi. Hindi has been accepted for all India purposes and we should help it to grow and enrich it for this purpose. Indeed, we should not even impose it on the smaller languages, as in the tribal areas. We have laid down that the mother tongue, whatever it is, must be the medium of primary education. It is for this reason also that I deprecate the agitation against Urdu. Urdu is no rival of Hindi and cannot be such. But to suppress it or discourage it is bad, both from the political and cultural points of view. We should encourage it in its own sphere and make people feel that there is no animus against Urdu. Another fact to be borne in mind is that no people, in any part of the country, should feel that they will be put under a handicap or disability because Hindi will become the all India language. If these two factors are borne in mind and if we work for the growth of Hindi, then there will be no opposition and no conflict.

20. In regard to the reorganization of states, it is becoming absolutely necessary that we pull ourselves up and refuse to bring this subject down to the level of passionate controversy. By strong language and denunciation of each other, we shall achieve nothing except our own discredit.

21. The international situation is a dangerous one. Our situation vis-a-vis Pakistan is also full of perils. We have to bear all this in mind in our domestic affairs and not allow ourselves to weaken or to be disunited.

22. It may interest you to know that a few days ago I met Mr Appleby who paid us a second visit this year. He went to many places which he had visited the previous year. He told me that what he had considered not possible last year had, to his surprise, been done. In fact, he was greatly heartened by the progress that had been made in India even in this year. He spoke highly of the administrative apparatus of some states. What cheered him especially was the popular response to our community project and other programmes.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru



## MISCELLANEOUS





## 1. Tragedy at the Kumbh<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: By your leave. Sir, I should like to say a few words. I do not propose to make a statement as the honourable Member<sup>2</sup> just wanted, in regard to the Kumbh Mela tragedy,<sup>3</sup> but I think it is right and fitting that we should, at the beginning of this session of the House, express our deep sympathy and sorrow and send our condolences to the relatives of the bereaved and in fact to the vast numbers of those who have felt the shock of this tragedy. It will not be fitting, I think for us at this stage to consider this matter in any detail and therefore I am not going into it for two major reasons apart from any other. One is that it is under enquiry—a very competent enquiry—whose Chairman is a distinguished ex-chief Justice.<sup>4</sup>

The second is that it is essentially a matter for the Uttar Pradesh Government and it is not normally the practice for any provincial matter to be discussed here in detail. But undoubtedly it is, in another sense, a very important national matter—a national tragedy—a matter in which all of us are interested....

So far as I am concerned, I was present, not at the spot where the tragedy occurred, but not very far from it. I was there in the *mela* itself on the occasion and I can never forget that tremendous concourse of humanity, consisting of probably 40 lakhs of people, on either side of the river. I have never seen anything like it in my life before either at the Kumbh Mela or in any other function in this country of any where else. It was a matter of deep sorrow and a tragedy that in this vast multitude some people at a particular spot should have come to grief.

I do not wish to go into facts because either one discusses the whole thing in great detail or one does not discuss it. It will serve no useful purpose to

1. Speech in Parliament, 15 February 1954. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, *Official Report*, 1954, Vol. VI. cols. 18-26. Extracts.
2. H.D. Rajah.
3. On 3 February, the main bathing day of Kumbh Mela, at Prayag, Allahabad, about 400 pilgrims were killed and 2000 injured in a stampede near Sangam, the holy confluence of the rivers, Ganga, Yamuna and the mythical Saraswati, when a procession of pilgrims, returning from the Sangam, tried to force their way through great crowds surging towards the river banks.
4. On 6 February the UP Government appointed a three member committee with Kamala Kant Verma, former Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court as Chairman; Panna Lall, ICS, former Adviser to the UP Governor, and A.C. Mitra, Chief Engineer, Irrigation, UP Government, as members, to enquire into the incident at Kumbh Mela and suggest ways and means to avoid such tragedies in future.

refer to odd facts here and there which I could very well refer to either from my own knowledge or from such information as I have gathered. That would not help the House to consider it. I beg to submit, Sir, that anyhow when the matter is under a competent enquiry the right time for its consideration is hardly now. For the moment I would suggest that we should express the deep sympathy and sorrow of this House and convey it to the relatives of those who are bereaved....

The fact that an enquiry was going to take place was obvious. That matter was mentioned to me immediately after by the Chief Minister. But as to the members of that committee I knew nothing till the next day when I read it in the newspapers. The honourable Member says that there are no non-officials on that committee. The committee consists of an ex-Chief Justice, Mr. Kamala Kant Verma,<sup>5</sup> of the Allahabad High Court, Dr Panna Lall<sup>6</sup>, a senior retired service man, who retired some years ago and who has nothing to do with the Government now, and the Chief Engineer. If I may say so, it is an excellent committee. The Chief Engineer might be considered to be connected with Government, but the others have no connection with Government at all....

It is a matter of gratification to me, Sir, personally speaking, that the honourable Members opposite are taking so much interest in this matter, whatever their motive or purpose might be....

It is for you, Sir, to decide at the proper time what we should discuss or what we should not discuss. This should not come up because it is entirely a provincial matter. I want to make that perfectly clear, because it would be a bad precedent if we ignore the rules and regulations and the practices of this House. Nevertheless, I say that so far as this committee's report is concerned, when it comes, we shall certainly place it on the Table of the House. And speaking on behalf of Government, quite apart from creating a precedent, we shall have no objection in discussing this matter.... I wished to draw a clear distinction in my statement about the subjects—provincial and other subjects—that could be discussed in this House. It is for you to decide. But, having drawn that clear distinction, I wish to say that in this particular matter the Government does not wish to come in the way of any discussion on it at any time provided the facts have been ascertained, and again, subject to your decision, in the course of the debate on the President's address, I take it that it will be open to any honourable Member to refer to this matter.

5. Kamala Kant Verma (b. 1887). Additional Assistant Government Advocate, 1933; Acting Judge, Allahabad High Court, 1937; Puisne Judge, 1937; Chief Justice, 1946; subsequently Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court and then of Greater Rajasthan.
6. (b. 1883); joined ICS, 1907; Chief Secretary to the UP Government, 1938-39; Adviser to the UP Governor, 1939-44.



## 2. Talks with PSP<sup>1</sup>

This is rather a mixed question (of talks).<sup>2</sup> There were several talks between me and Jayaprakash.<sup>3</sup> One does not discuss private talks in public but there was much public interest in these talks. Various daily newspapers published reports of these talks as well their surmises thereof. The surmises were partly correct and partly guess work. These partly dealt with discussions in PSP circles. I can know nothing about these discussions.

Myself and Jayaprakash have often met, whenever he comes to Delhi. I put it to him that in view of the great problems before the country, it would be desirable to have the largest measure of cooperation possible in dealing with the problems. Jayaprakash said he would welcome such cooperation. He asked me in what field he could cooperate. I replied that we should endeavour to cooperate in all fields, that is, both public and governmental. At a much later date Jayaprakash informed me that his party would expect us to agree to certain points laid down by them. He mentioned a number of these points. I said while we agree to some of the points stated, it was not possible for me to give the assurances he required. That ended the particular series of talks and certain statements were then issued by me and Jayaprakash.

Jayaprakash and myself have frequently met because we are old friends and colleagues and discussed matters of public interest. We have often corresponded on these points.

I have already stated that cooperation would extend to governmental level. Jayaprakash was the principal person who talked to me with regard to this cooperation on behalf of the PSP. Mr T. Prakasam was one of the other PSP leaders. He has now formed ministry in Andhra in association with the Congress Party. *The Hindu* of Madras is a paper which has maintained certain standard in

1. Reply to the questions of K.K. Banerji, an advocate, New Delhi, 19 February 1954. *The National Herald*, 21 February 1954.
2. On 19 February 1954 Nehru answered a number of questions regarding his talks with the PSP leader Jayaprakash Narayan and press reports on them in 1953, put to him by K.K. Banerji, an advocate examining him on commission, on behalf of the *Assam Tribune*, in connection with a defamation case filed by Bipin Pal Das, Secretary of the Assam Pradesh Praja Socialist Party in a Guwahati Court against the *Assam Tribune*. It was alleged that reports appearing in the said newspaper on 4-6 March 1953 regarding cooperation and coalition talks between the Congress and the PSP in New Delhi were responsible for the defeat of the PSP candidate in the by-election to the Assam Legislative Assembly from Guwahati Constituency.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 432-41.

Indian journalism and is known for its accuracy of reporting and journalistic fairplay. So also I consider the *Hindusthan Standard* and other important newspapers of India. I have read the news regarding these talks in other important papers. Parliamentary lobbies were also full of talks on these subjects.

### 3. To Clark Foreman<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
4th March 1954

Dear Mr Foreman,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of February 17th. I am sorry for the delay in sending an answer.

I am happy to learn that you are celebrating the seventy-fifth birthday of Dr Albert Einstein and I am glad of this opportunity to offer my homage to him. He has been, as the world knows, the greatest scientist of the age. But he has been something more. Throughout his life he has stood for human freedom and his message has given strength to people all over the world. We live in an age when freedom is threatened in many ways and from many directions. Indeed, that threat often comes in the very name of freedom. Dr Einstein has been a light in the growing darkness. I hope that he will have many more years of service to humanity.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 9/148/54-PMS.
2. Director, Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, New York.

### 4. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Chairman, I do not know what most of the Members of this House have felt after hearing the moving speech of the honourable Member

1. Speech in Parliament, 5 March 1954, *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, Official Report, 1954, Vol. VI, cols. 1802-1809. Extracts.



who has put forward this motion.<sup>2</sup> I presume that most of them must have listened to her with a very great deal of sympathy and agreed with many of the principles she has laid down.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, how can any one of us disagree with the basic approach which she has put forward? Nevertheless, in reading through this Bill one sees so many things attempted to be done. I am trying to think. I am not for the moment going into the merits of this Bill, that if this Bill is passed as it is, or more or less as it is, it would be a totally ineffective measure. We have a Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, I think, passed in 1919.<sup>4</sup> It is our misfortune that even today that Act is hardly applied in this country. Much can be done no doubt in improving it and going much further. For my part, I would not mind, I would in fact welcome, the idea of this whole subject being thoroughly gone into to find out what we can do about it. Now I confess that while looking at this Bill as it is, and the subjects which come in its wide scope, about which the honourable mover spoke so movingly, whether it is sport or shikar, whether it is religion or custom, etc., that is affected or whether it is the investigation of science that is affected, it seems to me that the Bill is so comprehensive and so widespread in its scope that apart from agreement or disagreement, it can hardly be given effect to. When we speak of India, we find that it is a great country with enormous varieties and with all kinds of customs, good or bad, and if we imagine that we are going to reform the whole of this country from the northern and the north-eastern mountain regions, the people who are living there to the south-east and the west, and if we think that we are going to change them basically and fundamentally by some Act passed here, I think that we are imagining too much. In fact it is just a possibility that the customs that we seek to put an end to in this way might not only flourish but flourish aggressively, possibly in some parts of India, not all. Almost every argument that the honourable Member has advanced can be advanced against the killing of animals for food. It might well be described, I think, in a sense as an uncivilised thing. I suppose, many of the Members of this House indulge in this uncivilised practice, and quite a large number of the people of our country indulge in it. I am not saying whether it is good or bad, but by some law if we try to change that practice—a change in fact of our social fabric—I think we would not succeed, and the things that we seek to do might not be done. I am entirely one with the

2. Rukmini Devi Arundale put forward the motion on Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Bill 1953, which aimed at amendment and codification of laws relating to prevention of cruelty to animals.
3. The Bill, she said, was an attempt at making the existing Act more comprehensive, incorporating the ideas of "commonsense justice and right". She was aware that the Bill was ahead of its time, but felt that kindness to animals was in reality kindness to 'life' on earth.
4. This Act, (Act 11 of 1890), was passed on 21 March 1890.

honourable Member when she says that any kind of killing in the name of religion is bad. It is difficult for me to connect the idea of a noble thing, of any noble principle, which is enshrined in religion, with killing. Nevertheless, I certainly would hesitate in imposing my will on others in that respect. I would try certainly to put a stop, an absolute stop, to the many barbarous and horrible things that she has related. But, if I may say so, by laying down some broad principles, however, everything is likely to fail. While we may have different views. I do not profess to express an opinion except to say that it is well over 36 years now since I used a gun against any living thing, and the last living thing that I attempted to shoot was a bear 37 years ago. Since then I have not done so because I have no desire to do so, and the very idea is somewhat repugnant to me. But for me to say that by a law I put a stop to all this business of what is called shikar in India, seems to be a large order, and an order which we will not be able to enforce though we try. Of course there are basic considerations which may lead us into long avenues of thought. Nature is said to be red in tooth and claw. In spite of what the honourable Member said about the nature of animals, I agree that by and large animals are not cruel in the sense that human beings are cruel. Animals kill normally for food, not for pleasure. But the fact is that it is a little difficult for me, not having adequate information on this subject, to say what would happen if every living thing in this world was allowed to live on.

I read somewhere that if all the fish were allowed to exist, in two days' time there would be no human beings left and that if all the termites were allowed to exist, our world would cease to exist within a very short time. I know that there is some exception in the case of insects in this, but one of our major difficulties in food production is the destruction of food crops by all kinds of animals. We unfortunately suffer from two disabilities. We, as a people, are given to the worship of animals, and it is a sure sign that, if you worship something, you gradually destroy it. With all our worship, in this country the animals are in a worse state as compared with other countries. Secondly, in our desire to protect, we are actually sometimes much more cruel than we might be. We try to avoid killing but we do not seem to mind cruelty and callousness of other kinds. That, of course, you have to change not by law but by other ways. I do not like vivisection and yet I do not know where to draw the line. There is no doubt about it that science has progressed by what might be called experiments in animals, though they need not be brutal experiments. There are many instances. There is the famous instance of the great biologist, Pavlov.<sup>5</sup> I do not think he

5. Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849-1936); Russian physiologist; Director, department of physiology, Institute of Experimental Medicine, 1890-1936; professor in the Military Medical Academy, 1895-1914; awarded Nobel prize for physiology and medicine, 1904; conducted the famous experiment demonstrating conditioned-reflex in a dog.



killed any animals but he experimented upon them and a whole science has grown up around it. It is difficult for me to say positively where the right lies, where the good lies, in such matters. I submit, therefore, to this House and to the honourable Mover of this Bill, that there is such a great field for us to act and act firmly that we spoil our work if we make that field much vaster by including many aspects in it about which it is difficult for me, at any rate, it may not be for many Members of this House, to express any opinion without any doubt and about which, I have no doubt, as many people in the country also will be doubtful. Therefore, let us seize hold of that field which we can and which really would make a tremendous difference to this country if we can stop cruelty to animals in that particular field. I do not mind this Bill or anything like it being considered, but my difficulty is that, according to the rules governing legislation, one accepts the principle of it and the main features of it at this stage; you pass the consideration of the Bill and then you send it to a Select Committee. Now, so far as the main feature of this Bill is concerned, i.e., prevention of cruelty to animals, I have no doubt that everybody in this House will accept it, but there are many other things in it which, as I said, create difficulties. I would have personally preferred this matter certainly considered and considered soon by a fully competent committee—may be a committee of the very names that are suggested here as a Select Committee and then a Bill—a more practical measure which can be given effect to—brought before this House rather than something which with all the noble sentiments behind it, is not very practicable in application and otherwise. My colleague, the Minister for Agriculture,<sup>6</sup> was telling me that he himself was going to propose some such thing. I have no objection to the further consideration of this Bill if the House so desires it. Government will not stand in the way, but we feel that the better way of doing this would be not to get tied up with this comprehensive measure in any way, but rather for the House and for the Committee to be so appointed, apart from this Bill to consider this question—consider even what is contained in this Bill, without being bound down by constitutional procedures—and bring forward a measure as soon as possible which can be rapidly given effect to. Of course, it is as well for us, absolutely right for us, to consider this question of preventing any cruelty to animals not only because of the animals themselves but much more so, as the honourable Mover said, because of the human being involved in it; it is a debasing thing for the person who indulges in this cruelty. Perhaps the effect is worse in his case than in those who suffer that cruelty. I agree with it entirely. Nevertheless, it seems to me, if I can say so with all respect, that human beings also suffer cruelty, not only cruelty in some crude

6. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai.

and barbarous fashion like this, but sometimes even worse cruelty, because it is a long-drawn out thing, whether it is from hunger or starvation or whether it is something else which people dislike. For example, I dislike men pulling the rickshaw, even though I do not say it is the worst occupation. There may be many occupations which may be worse than that, but even that does not appeal to me. Sometimes I feel that we are apt to forget the human being, in thinking of the non-humans. Some of the extreme advocates of ahimsa, I am told, even offer themselves to the insects as food, but they are very few no doubt. They also hire people so that they may offer some food to some of these various types of insects. That is what I call a complete perversion of the idea of ahimsa. If we go back to the history of civilization, it has been one of struggle and it has been one of the growth of the idea of compassion. I entirely agree with the honourable Mover that one test of civilisation, a very major test, is the growth of this feeling and practice of compassion. All the great men have said so and said so rightly, if I may say that with all humility, but compassion has to be effective compassion and not merely some kind of, if I may say so, flabby feeling which really creates more misery instead of removing misery. Therefore, I would suggest to the House that the Government attitude is that we do not wish to come in the way of further consideration, but we do think that there are a number of clauses in this Bill with which we do not agree. I would suggest to the honourable Mover and this House that the better method would be not to proceed with this Bill but to have the subject of this Bill considered fully by a committee to be appointed very soon.

B.C. Ghosh wished to know the attitude of the Government and suggested that if it was to appoint a committee; and the Mover agreed with it, then the discussion could be cut short.

JN: We would prefer the honourable Mover, with the consent of the House, not to proceed with this matter on the understanding that Government will very soon appoint a committee to consider the various things contained in this Bill.

J.S. Bisht asked whether this committee would include any doctors, since there were many eminent ones present in the House.

JN: I am not responsible for the names put forward. I just heard the names for the first time. I think that a much better way is to deal with it in that way, instead of continuing the arguments about the merits of this Bill and then for the House either to accept or reject it as the case may be, but the Government, as I said, will not stand in the way if the House wishes to proceed with the Bill.

I do not wish, in such a matter as this, to compel any Member—I am sorry



I used the word 'compel'—to indicate to any Member to vote in any direction other than in accordance with his own wishes in the matter. But I wish to make it perfectly clear that if the matter is ultimately referred to a Select Committee, so far as the Government is concerned, we are not bound to accept it. We have not agreed with certain important provisions in this Bill, although of course on the larger question of preventing cruelties we entirely agree. We want to find out how. But again I think it would be a better method to leave this to a separate committee....

## 5. Mohammad Iqbal<sup>1</sup>

A great poet or an artist is one whose ideas and thoughts are not only confined to the four walls of his country but spreads far and wide. All these qualities were possessed by Dr Iqbal. The ideas and thoughts contained in his poetry cut across the geographical boundaries of India and ring at every nook and corner of the world. One significant thing about his poetry is that there is freshness in his ideas and sentiments.

It will be absolutely wrong to claim that this great poet, whose message of universal love and concord will continue to inspire people for generations, belonged only to Pakistan. India has as much claim on him as Pakistan.

I cannot forget the love and affection showered on me by the great poet whenever he happened to meet me. The words spoken to me by Iqbal are still fresh in my memory. I can always picture before my mind's eye the meetings I had with him.

1. Speech at a function held at the New Delhi Residence of the Pakistan High Commissioner, to observe the sixteenth death anniversary of Mohammad Iqbal, 21 April 1954. *The National Herald* and *The Hindustan Times*, 22 April 1954.

## 6. Homage to Buddha<sup>1</sup>

The Buddha Purnima day this year is perhaps of even greater significance than the other anniversaries of this day. It marks a major period of time—two thousand and five hundred years. But the real significance is the tremendous contrast between the teaching of the Buddha and the way of force and violence that prevails in the world today. That contrast becomes more and more marked as the world hovers over the brink of catastrophe.

Many people, frightened at this turn that world events have taken and overwhelmed by fear of the modern engines of destruction, seek a way out. There may be temporary checks and restraints on this growing violence, though even these become less and less likely. But the real choice is to give up that way and choose another path, the path of peace and understanding.

And so, the lesson of the Buddha comes home to us with all its force in this context of the world today and we have to make this great choice.

To the memory of this greatest of the sons of India, I offer my deep homage.

1. Message on the occasion of Buddha Purnima, 24 April 1954. File No. 9 (148)/54-PMS. Also available in External Affairs (PIB) 1954.



## GLOSSARY

bahnon aur bhaiyon	sisters and brothers
bhoodan	donation of land; refers to a movement initiated by Vinoba Bhave
devanagari/nagari	script for Hindi, Sanskrit and some other Indian languages
dharam yudh	crusade
Harijan	collective name for class of untouchables; literally, people of God
inquilab	revolution
Jai Hind	victory to India
ji	an affix denoting respect
Jijnasa	desire to know
maidan	ground; open space
mantra	invocation
maqbara	tomb
mela	a fair
modha	stool/foot stool
musafir	a traveller
namaskar	salutation/a term of greeting
panchayat	village council
tehsil	a sub-division of a district
vasant panchami	fifth day of the eleventh month of the Hindu calendar, when the moon is waxing





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The current volume of the *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* deals with the period from 1 February to 31 May 1954. A distinctive feature of this volume is the sense which the speeches, letters and memoranda incorporated herein convey of profound changes in the offing within Indian society. This sense flows from the realisation that with the initial tasks of national consolidation having been achieved, Nehru, with the people of India, commenced moving towards the goals of economic regeneration and social transformation which had been defined in the course of the struggle for liberation.

Nothing epitomises the task of creating a resurgent India better than the continuous dialogue between Jawaharlal Nehru and the citizens of India, subsumed in the title "General Perspectives", which we locate in the opening section of the individual volumes of this Series. This section contains some of the seminal public speeches made by Jawaharlal Nehru in the period under review. Addressing a vast gathering in Kanpur, a flourishing industrial city in Uttar Pradesh, he spoke of the role which the ordinary citizens could play in removing the obstacles which stood in the way of making India a prosperous society. Yet, certain important considerations had to be kept in focus, as the nation struggled towards social and economic reconstruction. No longer did the governance of India rest upon an alien ruling class; no longer could the political leaders of the country, or its citizens, blame outsiders for the shortcomings of the collective national endeavour. For freedom brought with it tremendous responsibilities.

What were the rights and responsibilities to which Nehru referred in his speech at Kanpur? Subsequent speeches provide valuable clues to his understanding of these rights and responsibilities. Speaking shortly afterwards at Bhavnagar, for instance, the Prime Minister referred to the character of economic inequality and social discrimination within Hindu society, both of which would have to be resolved before it became a just and prosperous polity. Small wonder, then, that Mahatma Gandhi had devoted the last decade and a half of his life to the uplift of the untouchables, whom he renamed the Harijans, or the 'People of God.'

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